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
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
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
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














*Fred. Broadbridge*

THE BRITISH

# CONTROVERSIALIST,

AND

## LITERARY MAGAZINE:

DEVOTED TO THE IMPARTIAL AND DELIBERATE DISCUSSION OF  
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IN

RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, POLITICS,  
SOCIAL ECONOMY, ETC.,

AND TO THE PROMOTION OF SELF-CULTURE  
AND GENERAL EDUCATION.


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"MAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PRÆVALESCIT"

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## P R E F A C E.

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THE ingathering of another year has come ; and has brought with it one of those pleasing interspaces in the labours of the conductors of this serial in which they are privileged to hold personal intercourse with their readers, and to talk of the progress and prospects of the magazine. They have the pleasure of being able to report a considerable accession of interest on the part of their subscribers in the extension of the circulation, and in a desire to aid in the literary work on which the utility of the periodical depends. As a fair and open medium for the honest expression and friendly discussion of different opinions, it claims a place in literature ; a place which it has held, unchallenged, for sixteen years, with varying fortunes, but with unvarying devotion to intellectual culture, freedom of thought, moral progress, and impartial debate. To make it a thorough vehicle for self-improvement, our readers are invited to occupy its columns with their opinions on the subjects under debate, and they are regarded as in duty bound to aid their fellow readers with such information as they can give, suitable to their wants—that so the corresponding advantages of teacher and taught may be alike enjoyed by each. In the search for or in the sifting of truth, all may bear a part and each be benefited. To be helpful, we must be helped. It delights us to believe that from a larger circle of subscribers, more awakened than heretofore to their own interest in the matter, we shall be able to draw our contributions in years to come, while from the improved arrangements experience is from time to time suggesting, we hope to keep up the interest of our readers while we raise the general quality of the magazine.

The issues for this year may be taken as an earnest of the truthful and trustful endeavours of the conductors to increase the living human interest of the serial ; to make it effective for the working out of those high aims which it has been their constant effort to prompt, encourage, incite, and guide ; and to justify its existence by the fulfilment, through it, of a distinct purpose, and by making it,—

“ A closer link

Betwixt us and the crowning race  
Of those that eye to eye shall look  
On knowledge

If these aspirations can be realized by thought, love, labour and earnestness of purpose, they shall not be wanting on our part, nor do we fear that appreciation of effort will be chargeable upon our readers.

The gradual growth and painstaking adaptation of our magazine to the spirit of the age, might easily be tested by a comparison of the index of the present volume with that of some of our earlier issues. It would be seen that all the *unique* features which marked it, and gave it value in its youth, have been preserved, several new departments have been added, while though some have been extended and remo-



delled, none have been found profitless, or have fallen out of favour. In power, variety, and interest, the Leading Papers, growing with the writer's mind, become, year by year, more varied and valuable; "topics suitable for discussion" do not fail us, nor does that promptitude and flexibility of mind which makes debate useful and fascinating desert our contributors. The *Topic* not only affords an opportunity of questioning and probing the current affairs of the day; but acts as a hindrance to inconsiderate precipitance of thought. Our *Essayist* has succeeded in bringing together articles differing in quality and matter, but all, we think, of more than passing importance. The *Reviewer*, and the *Inquirer*, are gradually enlarging their utility and improving their form. In the *Eloquence of the Month* our readers have, in preservable and referable form, several of the best specimens of modern oratory, well-fitted at once for models to be imitated, and for Society readings as elocutionary exercises; while, with their annotations, they form a sort of record of the rhetoric of the men of our own time. In the lessons in life, progress and improvement contained in *Toiling Upward* show more and more—teaching by example too—how the choicest powers, virtues, and results of humanity, may be developed in lowly effort as in stately striving; and seem likely to furnish "a gallery of the illustrious" for the advocates of self-reliance, and the practisers of self-help. If any one will compare the notes attached to Pope's celebrated, though juvenile poem, in *Our Collegiate Course*, with those contained in works specially prepared for the use of candidates at examinations, they will have little difficulty in deciding on whose side the merits of aptness, judiciousness, and instructiveness, are to be found, while the anxiety expressed by many subscribers regarding the continuation of the "Syntax" and "Logic" attests their worth and adaptation to the requirements of our readers. The other sections do not seem to call for special notice. We may be permitted to express a belief that in variety, choiceness of topics, range of excellence, and general utility of contents, few serials of our day in the same compass and at the same price, will be found able, in the eyes of self-educators, to compete with the successive volumes of *The British Controversialist*.

Over the long labours of twenty-three volumes we have looked, and our sense of responsibility has been heightened by the retrospect. The harvests of the years—have they been ripened by God's sunlight?—under our care have they been profitably used by those for whom they were intended? Questions these of personal moment to readers, writers, and conductors alike. May they be fairly answerable in the audit-court of conscience, and may they give spurs to exertion, intensity to custom, and an additional force of energy to effort—that so our task may be done as the Taskmaster wills. Time is laying his hand on the heads and the hearts that were young when *The British Controversialist* took its place among the agencies of the age, and the longing for success increases as life advances towards the unrecallable. May the years find us, each and all, eager and true *Self-Improvers*. So shall they be, as we heartily wish them—*happy new years*.

# THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

## European Philosophy.

### THE DECLINE OF SPECULATIVE THOUGHT IN GREECE.

PHILOSOPHY does not disdain facts, it interprets them. Experience is the revealer of facts, not their expounder. Science teaches us what are the facts. Philosophy seeks to discover what they mean. The magnificent confusion of phenomena occasions and excites reflection; and reflection is philosophy. All facts, whatever they are, become objects of thought only by becoming objects of consciousness. It is in the conscious mind that they meet the gaze of observation and are brought within the range of experiment. There it is that apprehensive thought seizes facts, subjects them to examination and analysis, and brings induction in to aid it in compelling them to reveal not only what they are, but what hidden intent and power they bear within them. Into the consciousness of man the transitory enters; but, out of this, Philosophy resolves to extract the true and permanent—the everlasting essence of being—Truth. Consciousness is the field of experience and observation; beyond that, there cannot pass. All the tissues, along which sensation quivers as it flows, deposit, in conscious perception, the whole message they receive from the outward world or the personal frame. Such is human nature. We may transcend experience, we cannot overpass the limits of consciousness. It is in ourselves that we examine all things, however outward they may seem, and to whatever distance they may apparently project the investigations from which we anticipate to bring home truth—it must come home to us, we are unable to go out to meet or welcome it. Science is a record of facts arranged according to the laws by which we perceive or imagine that they are controlled. Our mind is not the instrument of vision, but that into which facts come or are brought for vision. Sensibility is the inner condition of consciousness; phenomena are the external occasions of it. A present consciousness of phenomena is experience; experience supplies the elements of science; and science is the orderly arrangement of experience in and by the mind. Philosophy is the sum of the convictions and truths which man acquires

from an examination of all the phenomena of thought. Hence its famous early word, "Know thyself;" hence, too, its early error, "And in thyself know *all*," which resulted from the premiss, "Man is the measure of all things." The fulness of all wisdom does not dwell in man. His nature is not co-ordinate with the universe. Although he is encircled by the Infinite, he himself is finite, and feels this finiteness only by the pressure of the Infinite upon his soul. The circumference of the circle of man's being touches and is sensitized by what is external to itself, and he gains a consciousness of the Beyond in the selfsame experience by which his personal circumscription and impotence is made known to him. As the margin of an island is fretted by the ebb and flow of the infitting sea, the human consciousness is excited and changed by the influences which operate upon it from the inhemming Infinitude in which it finds itself, and philosophy is the Newton who, in childlike simplicity, gathers the secret-yielding shells and pebbles which the ocean of Truth heaves up upon the sands of Time.

We have been endeavouring in a series of papers, of which the *Prolegomena* appeared upwards of twelve years ago (February, 1853), and the matter of which has been at intervals laid before our readers, to present a view of the course of philosophic thought in Europe capable of being surveyed and estimated by the mere English scholar, yet able, we hope, to endure the criticism of the adept in Greek-hoarded learning. We have lingered with the enjoyment of love upon the theme, and have endeavoured to delineate the itinerary of speculation with some care. After a long, and, let us confess it, somewhat toilsome ascent, we have now gained the topmost reach of that upland curve, and have only to trace the downward pathway of decline. In doing so we can accelerate our speed—especially as the objects on the route are less attractive, and the scenes exhibited to us are, by contrast with what has gone before, unimportant and uninteresting. We hope in this paper, therefore, to complete our sketch of Pre-Christian Philosophy in Greece, and in a subsequent one to outline the progress of speculative thought in Rome; after having accomplished which, we shall close our record of the tentative efforts of thought to acquire a knowledge of the truth—a record suggestive of lessons having a forceful bearing on the life and thought of our own day—lessons which we hope to expound in such a fashion as may incline our readers to lay them up in the memory of their hearts. Meanwhile we proceed:—

THE ATOMISTS.—Leucippus, of Abdera, was, perhaps, the earliest virtual expounder of the Atomic philosophy. This system explains the varieties of matter by supposing it to consist of an assemblage of minute indivisible particles flying through time and space in constant motion in differing directions and under different laws—linking, unlinking, relinking—in an inextricable, interchangeable dance and whirl of elementary atoms, whose ceaseless tides circle on in everlasting decay and re-creation. Like attracted by like, adhered



into substance, as Anaxagoras has in some sort affirmed, and Leucippus endeavoured to explain. But in the "Cosmogony" of Democritus the Atomic philosophy is displayed with a grandeur and glory which might almost be looked upon as a strange instance of *prevision*.

Democritus was a wealthy Abderite, who, in the quest for knowledge, exhausted every available place of instruction, every effort of his spirit, and every *lepton* of his fortune. His repute, however, in the State was such that the Abderites gave him the uncontrolled mastery of it, and bestowed on him a new fortune of 500 talents (£125,000). He was a notable thinker. The atoms, which he supposed built up the universe and were its prime elements and factors, in their possible collidings, became united, configured, and took up position in space. From these changes all phenomena arose, out of these the universe is formed. Matter is coarse and ponderable, but thought, like fire, consists of the finest elements. In this splendid, ever-changing universe there is but a temporary appearance. Hence his *laughter* at the paltry tricks at self-deception men played upon themselves to heighten their importance in their own and in others' eyes.

In the epigram—

"One pitied, one condemned the woeful times;  
One laughed at follies, the other wept o'er crimes,"

the difference between Democritus the laughing, and Heraclitus the weeping philosopher, has been regarded as expressed. Heraclitus was a naturalist, an obscure expresser of noble thoughts. He had great wealth, and was of renowned descent. He was also entrusted with political distinctions; but the mystery of his own nature wrapped him in melancholy and gloom. His speculations on man grieved him, because he seemed to be so infinitely little. He cannot reach the unhidden, which is alone the true. His doctrine is a mixture of Ionianism and Italicism. The ethereal element of wisdom surrounds man, and the glow of the fire of thought burns within him as a life not of himself, and yet most truly him. In through the senses sweep the sounds, sights, and other impressions of the all-inhemming sea of wisdom; but man is himself so great a conflict of extremes that uniform results can never be depended on, and the senses, though man's only means of perusing the Sibylline books of nature, dare not be trusted as the vouchers, much less as the teachers of truth. We mention the name of Heraclitus here in deference to the age-long contrast between him and Democritus; but a lengthy paper might easily be written upon either—both were great in their living day; and do not the philosophies of Leibnitz, Newton, and Dalton, Hegel and Schelling bear witness to their long-during influence?

**CYNICISM.**—Of the sage of Cynosarges, Antisthenes, an Athenian born of a Thracian mother, and a pupil of Socrates; or of Diogenes of Sinope, we have little to say. Yet it is unfair to regard them simply as snarlers and growlers. They were eccentric and austere,

but there was method in their madness. Luxury had unmanned Greece and corrupted the very fountains of action. To show that life was possible under other conditions than those of mere sensational delight—pleasure valued for itself alone,—to inculcate and prove that a life of worth could be spent in independence of the costly graces of existence, were, in that age of Greek sensualism, no unimportant aims. No wonder that their opponents called them pugnacious dogmatists, caustic drolls, sneering and envious humorists, morose in manners and petulant in speech, making a vain show of a content not felt, and gratifying malice under pretence of plain dealing. They could not escape—perhaps would not have cared to deny—the charge of being unsympathetic, haughty, self-isolating, contemptuous, and denunciatory. Those who oppose their contemporaries can scarcely escape aspersion. Cynicism was rather a protest against a manner of life than a method of thought. It was a practical, not a speculative effort to bring human existence nearer to truth and righteousness. Its error was that the protest was the outgrowth of self-righteousness. Its protest against degeneracy was the result of a feeling tending to make man degenerate.

CYRENÆICS.—Cynicism was Socratic morals vitalized by pride, and when the vigour of endurance was breathed into it, it became Stoicism. An opposite offshoot from the Socratic school was the sect of the Cyrenæics, which, in its degeneracy, passed into Epicureanism. It is not clear that Aristippus, the founder of this school, left any systematic exposition of his doctrines to his hearers or posterity. Aristotle does not mention them in his "Nicomachian Ethics," where he examines the theories of Happiness, suggested by philosophers. By weaving together a few scattered but disconnected snatches of thoughts attributed to him (mayhap more truly due to his mother-taught grandson, Aristippus the younger), we may get something like a glimpse of the doctrines of the sage of Cyrene. The Cyrenæan Ethics were five-fold:—1. Things to be sought and shunned; 2. Feelings; 3. Practices; 4. Causes; 5. Proofs. Pleasure was the supreme purpose of life; but pleasure was only such when enjoyed in moderation—when we were its masters, not its slaves. Excess is madness. Happiness is a collective name for all the partial pleasures, each of which was good and desirable for itself. Prudence must regulate enjoyment. Virtue and vice were matters of conventional arrangement; for neither in nature nor man is the rule of right and wrong fixed. All that man knows is what impresses himself,—the states of his mind, not the conditions on which these depend. Hence the rule of life for man was to be himself, and to do or manage whatever he wished. Horace epigrammatically expresses this when he says,—

"Et mihi res, non me rebus subjungere conor."\*

Theodorus, the successor of Aristippus, impressed by the logical

\* 'And I endeavour to suit circumstances to myself, and not myself to circumstances.'

influences of his age, while he held to the legitimacy of making the search for happiness the principle of life, felt compelled to advocate the employment of reason to discriminate between the relative values of gratification, for so alone could it be seen that the best had been chosen. Hegesias proclaimed the inadequacy of sense to be a criterion of what is desirable, and approximated his theory to the indifference professed by the Stoics, while he retained as the mainstay of his system the law of life, that if man sought anything it should be happiness. Anniceris again brought into the Cyrenæic sect the old idea of man as the measure of all things, and maintained that in the gratification of his own nature the pursuit of the agreeable was best accomplished. This was to be found in positive and active effort, not in mere passive reception or inertness. Pleasure is to be welcomed wherever found, and to be enjoyed in the sorts best suited to human tastes. To some, self-restraint may yield a higher pleasure than dependence on outer sources for delight; to others, corporeal pleasures might outweigh those of the mind; while others still, might find mental pleasures more effective to satisfy their ideas of the desirable. This is bringing philosophy down to the lowest human level. It is making it "all things to all men." If the good is the pleasant, selfishness is the only law of existence; and the moral law of Socrates, the piety of Plato, the moderation of Aristotle, are all alike restraints and needless tyranny.

**EPICUREANISM.**—To the name of Epicurus there is now attached a connotation of sensualism which has been gathered to it in the progress of centuries, and which involves a stigma, not only on his philosophy, but on his personal character, which is far from being deserved. The popular odium may not now be able to be entirely removed; it is not the less, on that account, but the more incumbent on writers regarding philosophy and life to insist on the erroneousness of the calumny, and to endeavour to separate the fame of Epicurus from the false impression now conveyed by the term Epicureanism. Though ourselves strongly opposed to the doctrine that "happiness is the highest good of man," we do not feel it right to leave unnoticed the misrepresentation to which the Philosophy of the Garden has been exposed. Error and evil enough attach to most human systems without making proofless charges of sinfulness against them. Still less just is it to bring the ultimate results of a system as a ground of accusation against the life of the thinker who originated it. Epicurus is no hero of ours, but he was not the incarnate Mephistopheles that he has been represented.

Epicurus—the son of Neocles the grammarian, and Chærestrate his wife—was born in Gargettus, near Athens (some say in the island of Samos), in Olympiad 109 (B.C. 342). He began to philosophize in his fourteenth year, taking his point of origin from Hesiod's assertion, "All things from chaos rose;" and "whence," said he, "came chaos?" His father replied, "That is not a grammatical, but a philosophical question." "The philosophers, then shall be my



teachers," he said, and began his search after wisdom. The writings of Democritus, the atomist, and the instructions of Pamphilus, the Platonist, stored his intellect for a time; he came to Athens, the metropolis of philosophy, in his eighteenth year, but Aristotle was not there. He left dissatisfied, and wandered successively to Colophon, Mitylene, and Lampsacus, striving to find the truth regarding human life. Hence he represents himself as "self-taught," and his system as "original." Yet we know that it affiliates itself readily to the practical morals of Socrates and to the atomic philosophy of Democritus, although it offends against the pure idealism of Plato, and the rigid canon of speculative consistency enforced by Aristotle. At the age of thirty-six, with his system formed, and the style of his life fixed, he returned to Athens to teach a fresh philosophy. The Stoics occupied the Porch; the Cynics lectured at Hercules' Gymnasium; Aristotle's followers walked about the Lyceum, and the Academic Grove was the resort of the Platonists. He chose a garden—a garden which has been characterized as—

"That happy home  
Where all is found that all desire,  
And Time hath wings that never tire;—  
Where bliss, in all the countless shapes  
That Fancy's self to bliss has given,  
Comes clustering round (like road-side grapes  
That woo the traveller's lips at even).—  
Where Wisdom flings not Joy away,  
As Pallas in the stream (they say)  
Once flung her lute; but smiling owns  
That woman's lip can send forth tones  
Worth all the music of the spheres,  
So many dream of—but none hears.  
Where Virtue's self puts on so well  
Her sister Pleasure's smile, that, loth  
From either nymph apart to dwell,  
We finish by embracing both."

This garden, however, was no place for fastidious voluptuousness, perverse sensuality, and debasing debauchery. It is incorrect to affirm that—

"Old Epicurus' garden was a sty."

He inscribed upon its portals this inscription, "The guest-loving owner of this house, where you will learn that happiness is the highest good, will freely offer for your acceptance barley-cakes and fresh spring water. Will you not be well treated?" In it he passed a life of speculation and delighted companionship with his disciples, not in fellowship of mind only, but of goods. Here, during thirty-six years, he taught and exemplified his doctrine, writing voluminously on many topics, contenting himself with spare feasts and many friends, preserving equanimity amid all the turmoils of

Greece. After a fortnight's illness, while taking a bath in hope of finding relief from the agony of stone, he expired at the age of seventy-three, having bequeathed his garden to his disciples, and arranged for the succession of Hermarchus as chief of his school. He had lived, not nobly perhaps, but prudently, and, in the then state of Greece, praiseworthily. He bequeathed to mankind "the greatest happiness principle," not only as an end but a rule of life, and gave vital origin to a theory of being whose effects have been felt along the whole course of human history. A very brief summary of his doctrines may suffice to show his place as a thinker and as a guide in practical life.

Philosophy consists of arguments and discussions, tending to show man the means of attaining a happy life. We seek wisdom that we may gain delight. Happiness depends on our knowledge of ourselves, of nature, and of society. This knowledge is attainable only by the right use of reason, and reason has certain *canons*, on the observance of which it insists. His Canonic expounds the legislation of reason. In intelligence we can distinguish *sensations*, or impressions made on man by outward objects and conceptions, which are the result of the combination of sensation with intelligence. As the starting-points of reasoning he calls them presumptions. Sensations cannot err, or communicate error. In the combinations of human thought with the impressions of the senses the earliest possibility of error arises. Hence the need of a comparison and analysis of conceptions, and an induction of the sensations in which they originate. Self-knowledge is reached through an examination of the sensibility, in which the passions hold a place. Passion is sensibility to pleasure and pain, and man naturally seeks the former and avoids the latter. This indicates human duty, which is to secure the greatest possible happiness. That an imperative moral law exists is a fancy, and the indulgence of that fancy unsteadies men in their search for pleasure. Physical well-being and mental tranquillity are the results of observing life's supreme law—avoid every pleasure which would deprive you of a greater, or produce a pain more intense than the pleasure sought after—seek the highest good. The knowledge of nature, or of the original principles of things, is arrived at through sensation, which affirms that the universe is material, and is built up of atoms endowed with a tendency to movement and combination. His theory here is but a slight variation of that of Democritus, although Epicurus denies the fatalism of the old atomist, and affirms both chance and free will. "The myth about gods" he considers preferable to the belief in "Fate." The gods, however, do not intermeddle with the concerns of men, but leave them to find happiness as they may. Hence life is to be enjoyed, and death is not to be feared; for "while we live it does not exist, and when it comes we no longer exist." The sole ethics of human life is to act so as to secure, not moments, but an entire life of delight.

A knowledge of society is acquired through the impressions of

sensation upon our life. Social life is a source of happiness, and ought to be sought so long and so far as it fulfils its end. Its highest and best form is friendship. Right and justice are concessions, and are only the conventional forms in which the self-interest of men embodies its inductions.

Such is the doctrine, a doctrine easily abused—though, in himself, effective for good, and well restrained—of which Epicurus was the propounder. It is a great decline from the practical morality of Socrates, the ideal duty of Plato, and even the prudent and cautious virtue of Aristotle. Its efficacy depends on *consequences* which cannot be foreseen, instead of on *motives* which are, to a certain extent, calculable and controllable.

It is altogether a low-pitched theory of life. It never recognizes man's capacity to fix before himself a high spiritual standard, and to aim at reaching that, with no hope or expectancy of reward, except in the consciousness of having achieved the object sought. It eliminates conscience from humanity, and its tendency was towards the passivity, not the activity of man. Its chief fault is, not that it is selfish, but that it checks and warps all self-development, whose processes are all painful, whose results are all productive of intense rapture and joy unspeakable.\*

**STOICISM.**—Zeno, the founder of the sect of the Stoics, was born at Citium, in Cyprus, about B.C. 362. He was shipwrecked in the neighbourhood of the Piræus, and was induced to settle in Athens, because it was the home of wisdom. The study of philosophy became a passion. Weakness of bodily frame compelled him to be abstemious, and his desire to be independent of changeable fortune, at a time when change was incessant, led him to systematize his abstemiousness, and to endeavour to discover the simplest method of conserving a life according to nature. This design initiated his philosophy, and imparted its bias to his ethics. His moral system is like that of Socrates and Aristotle; like that, too, of Epicurus—a practical morality, a system of life, a search for the highest good. He taught in the *Stoa Pæcile*, which was adorned by the paintings of Polygnotus, and hence arose the name of his school. He did not himself elaborate the theory of stoicism. Cleanthus, his successor (whose notable industry was the marvel of Athens), and the vigorous dialectician, Chrysippus, developed his doctrine, and widened the scope of its tenets. Under its latter forms it exerted a vaster influence than any philosophy in the declining days of thought.

It seems needless to differentiate minutely the specific tenets of these great masters of schemes of life, which sanctified a haughty self-reliance, if not an arrogant self-will. A general idea of the system is all we aim at placing before our readers. It was a complete,

\* See further, Smith's "Moral Sentiments," Part VII., sec. ii., ch. 2; "Diogenes Laertius," Book X.; Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things;" Cicero, "On the Nature of the Gods;" Lewes' "Biog. Hist. of Phil.," Part I., Eighth Epoch, ch. ii.; Maurice's "Moral and Metaph. Phil.," pp. 212—216; Brown's "Lectures," 99.

comprehensive, and thoroughly organized philosophy. It was not a system of Morals alone; it contained besides a Logic, which comprised an organon of reasoning and language, and a Physics, or system of nature. Plato had given a philosophy calculated to elevate the soul; Aristotle, one intended to regulate it; Epicurus, one fair enough in its expressed form, but degrading in its tendencies and results. Stoicism attempted to influence human character by making the intellect, or rather the will, supreme over the emotions. This gave it its apparent moral majesty, which was a strict, outwardly correct, cold, self-reliant pride.

Sensation is the source of knowledge. The intelligence is enclosed in a circle of sensation; the universe is only an assemblage of corporeal principles, of two kinds—active and passive—but all alike subject to the law of Fate. They grant to the universe, a god, a soul—but a god impersonal and not self-conscious—the germ and essence of nature. The maxim of its morality was, Be strong and free! but it would not define freedom, nor determine the elements of strength. It called on men not to regulate but to extinguish passion, that we may become as gods, acting by the sole energy of our own will, and being a law unto ourselves. To extirpate desire and quench passion, to bring into the soul the Order of Peace, and to require a supreme indifference to events and their results, constitute duty, holiness, and power. So alone can man be great, noble, worthy, serene in mind, fearless of death, glorious in action, and independent of the future and the promised palingenesia or re-creation which the Demiurgus might decree.

Stoicism is, in fact, the heroism of despair, and it may yield either noble or ignoble results as circumstances arise. No deification of self can ever be to man the truth of life. Order is obedience and harmony, not stubbornness, resistance, and defiant selfishness. Morality is measured activity, adapted to effect wise ends. The true law of man's being is "to suffer and be strong;" "to perfect strength in weakness;" to become great by being humble; to recognize duty as higher than enjoyment. Duty cannot be reconciled with fatalism. Sensation can never supply the ideas of justice, holiness, and ethical purity. Austerity is not sincerity. The highest good of man cannot be hopelessness; and stoicism must be regarded as a mistake—the mistake of great misguided natures.

PYRRHONISM OR SCEPTICISM has been almost as much misunderstood and misrepresented as Epicureanism. The Pyrrhonic doubt was a suspension of the judgment, an acquiescence in the logical doctrine that two contradictories cannot be true. Affirmative philosophy asserts that the mind contains within itself the means of attaining to absolute knowledge; negative philosophy asserts that the mind is dependent for all its knowledge on the fleeting flows of transitory phenomena. These assertions are each made with equal confidence, and enforced with great power. There is no overbalance of proof. The respective antinomies of assertion

and negation neutralize each other. Ignorance is confronted with intelligence, and intelligence with ignorance, and thought is brought to a dead-lock. Scepticism is not negative dogmatism, or infidelity. It is a halt of thought. It is a self-sustaining hesitancy. It is an acknowledgment of the folly of—

“Struggling in vain with ruthless destiny.”

Socrates doubted; but his was an eager investigating doubt—a warfare against the necessity of doubt. Plato awoke a new music of hope in the soul, and seemed to open a pathway to a new heaven of truth. Aristotle had checked the fiery and rash upsoaring of thought, and curbed the imagination by the reason. Epicurus, on the one hand, called men to live a life of delight, as the only trustworthy result of philosophic research; while Zeno, on the other, exhorted men “to scorn delight,” and, with the haughty heroism of defiance, to endure the privations of life, and to spend their days in a self-restraining abstinence from desire and enjoyment. Speculation was amazed. What could it do but doubt?

Appearances we know, feel, and live amongst. But where is truth, and how are we to know it to be truth? Is objective sensation a revelation of the real? Is subjective reason a faithful informant? Reason is critical. It aspires to discover truth. On what certainty is it grounded? How does it prove that things which *are*, are what they appear? Sense varies in degree in different men, and hence its revelations are not all the truth, and nothing but the truth. Reason asserts its legislative power; but what evidence does it give of its legitimacy? Does it never err? If it does not, how do you prove its infallibility? If it does, how can it be trustworthy? Can the human ideal ever coincide with the real? Is ontology possible? Is there a science of being, or is a science of seeming all that man can reach? Beyond *us*, all is uncertain. But life *is* a matter of fact. We *are*. The mystery that is about us we may not unwind from around us. Let us then abandon vain dreams and aspirations that never can be gratified. Let us give speculation the slip, and adhere to and use our practical life. Let not man any longer be a hunter of shadows, being himself a shade, but let life become to him real and earnest. Science is impossible; but life is our own,—nothing can overstay *that* with doubt. The search for science is self-annoyance. Peace is attainable only by the soul when we consent to recognize the incomprehensibility of things, and the necessary limitation of our human faculties to those things alone of which our consciousness gives us a sense of their certainty. Indifference to all that is without him is the only safe state for a man to live in.

Pyrrho had been a painter; he was a realist. The shows of things were known to him as different from the things they represented. He had learned that appearances could counterfeit realities. He was a citizen of Elis. While he was yet young Plato

died, and Aristotle was his contemporary. Zeno and Epicurus carried on their schools while he lived a peaceable bachelor's life with Philista, his sister, tending an humble farm,—

“ His country life kept all his salient points  
Unblunted, red his cheek and fresh his heart.”

The writings of Democritus and the instructions of Anaxandrus of Abdera, combined with what he had learned in Asia, when he accompanied Aristotle's great pupil to the East; the results of disputes with Philo of Athens, and conversations with Nausiphanes of Teos, as well as Epicurus, were all made means of culture by him. He had one quality too in which he differed much from other philosophers—he always spoke plainly, and kept closely to the question under consideration. He was calm, sagacious; calm as a stoic, not, however, through pride, but humility; sagacious as a Platonist, but not misled, like him, into the vast inane of speculation. He borrowed from Socrates the love and practice of virtue; he resuscitated the controversialism of the Sophists as a negative to all attempts at transcendentalism in the solutions of science. Of such inquiries he persisted in saying, “I know nothing about them, and must abstain from disturbing guess-work. I have to live as best I am able. Every effort made to attain the unattainable is a waste alike of life, reason, and happiness. Let virtue be mine, since truth will not consent to be won, however wooed.”

Speculation is constantly on the outlook; scepticism is a balanced equipoise of mind—the subject of things, not their subduer. To them it is indifferent, because indifference alone secures impartiality. Subjective certainty Pyrrho never denied; the evidence of consciousness he never attempted to weaken; but, then, he never attempted to affirm.

What fallacy, then, insinuates itself into the mind in scepticism! It takes for granted that open eyes, although dazzled for a while with excess of light, or impaired in vision when first plunged into darkness, can never accommodate themselves to either. It closes the eyes in a voluntary darkness; there is night, and here is day. What is looked upon in daylight assumes a different hue and appearance from that it wears by night; and the “visions of the night” differ from the series the day discloses. Shall we trust neither, and institute no comparison between them in hope of gaining some approximation to the reality of things? Is the logic of centuries alike, whether the matter is contingent, necessary, or impossible? Is there no *via media* between *unbelief* and *disbelief*? Is not doubt double thought—thought held neutral till that emerges which will enter into combination with either and give a new compound, one no longer held in solution, but precipitated? Is curiosity altogether wrong? Are the active instincts of the soul mistaken? Is shut-eyed ignorance preferable to that which is open-eyed? even if each be ignorance. Ought negative caution

to be transformed into positive dogma ; doubt into a creed ? If not, scepticism is wrong, however innocent honest doubt may be.

Human nature repudiates scepticism as an uninquiring doubt. Scepticism in that sense is death. An intelligent creature without inquiry and belief is a contradiction. But no human logic can furnish a refutation of scepticism ; it demands the demonstration of what *is* ; it denies a thinker's right to accept the existent as the basis of a system. We see the flower, we trace the stalk, we may even thread along the fine fibres of the root, and say the flowers proceed thence, but scepticism claims that we shall detail to it the *wherefore* that hides in that root to produce the flower, and demands that the scalpel shall lay *that* bare to sense. Human thought cannot go into the regions of irrelations, and absolute primal truths ; —to it all gives both light and shadow. Faith looks on the light and accepts what is seen in it. Scepticism points to the shadow, and affirms that till that is taken away there is no certainty that illusion or delusion has not a hold on sense and thought. Scepticism ignores the fatal dualism in which humanity exists—in being finite encircled by the infinite ; in being a self which necessitates the idea of a not-self ; in being body and soul. To demand that we should transcend all the conditions of our existence before we shall recognize anything as belief-worthy, is to provide an easy victory ; for it is to postulate the demonstration of the indemonstrable as a preliminary to conviction. Hence scepticism baffles all human logic, and claims, although unjustly, an unchallengeable irrefutability.

THE ACADEMICS.—In following to the end the career of the Greek philosophy, characterized by so much variousness, grandeur, vigour, and originality, we come to a term when fresh intellectual activity ceases, and when propagation and expansion become its objects. In the old Academy the highest and noblest thought of Greece found expression : Plato's name tells its height and worth. He is the aristocrat of uninspired thinkers. But the highest word to which Platonism could attain was opinion, not truth. It had indeed *imagined*, not found, a loftier guidance in the voyage of life. We allude, of course, to that memorable passage in the "Phædo," which contains, perhaps, the sublimest glimpses—like a lightning flash in a rent thunder cloud—into the future, that mortal thought has ever attained unaidedly :—"If a man can neither find the truth by the exercise of his own faculties, nor learn it with another's help, then, having chosen what is, at all events, the best and most irrefragable of human opinions, he ought to embark thereon, like a mariner going to sea\* (for want of any better conveyance) on a raft, and sail through life's voyage ; that is to say, unless it were possible to proceed on one's way more safely and less dangerously on some firmer vessel, or [in reliance] on some divine word."

\* The allusion is here probably to the escape of Ulysses from Calypso's Isle, in "Odyssey," Book V.



This perception of the need of a revelation did not emphasize itself upon the sect of the Platonists, and the old difficulty of translating opinion into truth prevailed. Abstinence from dogmatic judgments was therefore the duty of a reasonable man, according to the teaching of Arcesilaus.

Arcesilaus was born at Pitane, in Etolia. He was set by his guardian to study rhetoric, in which he made considerable progress. But philosophy had superior charms for him, and he listened to the lectures of Theophrastus for some time. He grew, however, dissatisfied with the mere word-logic of the author of the "Characteristics," and he went over to Polemo, under whom he had for fellow-pupils Crantor and Zeno. Arcesilaus revived the Socratic method of undogmatic research. In this he exhibited notable dialectic skill and rare felicity of persuasive eloquence. He was an extemporizer, not a writer; but tradition tells us pretty plainly the drift of his doctrines. He coincided with the great master in thinking that probability was man's only earthly guide. He inquired into Aristotle's philosophy of the reason, but he could not see in it any criterion of truth. He examined the theory of Epicurus, and found sensation equally fallible. He criticized the conceptualism of the Stoics, and there also he found failure. Scientific principles of knowledge he declared to be unattainable; but he maintained that for all human purposes opinion was sufficient, and that he who in practical life followed the best light he had did well, and would attain what to him would seem, and hence be, the highest good.

Carneades thought that he could carve a pathway from sense to truth. The *old Academy* and the *middle* then gave place to the *new*. Carneades was a Cyrenian. He was a pupil of Diogenes, the stoic, and under him he acquired skill in disputation. His controversial power he used constructively, not like Arcesilaus, destructively. He developed the doctrine of probability into a sort of logical coherence. We have a cognitive intellect; beyond us lie the objects of cognition. If we can bring these into relation we may attain to truth. The imaging faculty is the seat of truth or falsehood. We have in it three means of acquiring that highest degree of probability which human nature must consent to accept as the truth. These are—1, the liveliness of the impression made on our minds; 2, the conformity of different appearances of the same object at different times; 3, the examination of each appearance under various aspects, that we may ascertain whether it remains always alike. When we have used all these we have attained the highest human credibility. The splendid diction in which he uttered, and the severe form to which he subdued his philosophical doctrines, made him highly popular; and his extraordinary dialectical acuteness enabled him readily to defeat his opponents, and to keep up the reputation of Platonism against all comers.

THE PERIPATETICS.—The successors of Aristotle added no new idea to the system of that grand searching intellect. Theophras-

tus, the divine speaker, as he was called, carried on zealously the physical researches of his master, and has been recognized in science as the father of systematic botany. He reduced all thought and phenomena to some form or other of motion, and endeavoured to unify the whole speculations of Aristotle into a physico-theology, of which the predicaments were the supreme laws. Dicaearchus of Messina denied that spiritual force animates the universe; held that the principle of life was an indwelling energy of matter; and carried still further the idea of the supremacy of motion over all material things. Strabo of Lampsacus maintained that all truth was verbal, not real; that logic brought words together, and framed them into forms of thought; that sensation and thought are essentially one; that being is an abstraction to which no reality corresponds; that no divine energy overrules cosmology; and that motion and gravity are the primal qualities of elements, and from them all phenomena result. Many other thinkers spread Aristotelic ideas throughout the nations; but few possessed the power to comprehend the entire cycle of the philosophy they taught, while fewer still could add to the splendid and spacious structure of science which the Stagyrte had raised. They therefore hold no importance in a record of philosophic thought.

The foregoing pages are rather to be regarded as a series of brief notes on the progress of speculative thought in Greece, apart from or subsequent to the great systems which have been already, in the course of this series of papers, pretty fully explained. This article contains the minimum of matter which we thought could be given to each sect, to make their place in speculation appreciable. We could readily have extended alike the descriptive and the discursive portions, but brevity is sometimes even a philosophical necessity. The course of Greek thought has now been traced from its early uprise in human consciousness in the day-dawn of civilization. Then out of faith and theology the spirit of man made an exodus, and attempted, free from the shadows of the sanctuary, to see the truth in the pure light of thought. The contests of the dual impulses of spiritualism and sensuousness have been observed and criticized. The rise of scepticism and the dialectic controversy of the Sophists have been brought into the field of vision. Thus we showed how thought had sped from Thales to Socrates, from Pythagoras to Plato, from Anaxagoras to Aristotle, giving a vidimus of the lives and tenets of these great Greek thinkers. In our present brief epitome we have endeavoured to trace a few tributary and contributory streams, and to indicate the routes the great river of reflection took when, nearing a new era, it debouched through a delta into the infinite sea of Christian thought. We have only now to describe ancient speculation in Rome, and to offer our readers an estimate of the philosophy of the Old World, and we shall then have completed our survey and history of pre-Christian thought, and given to our readers a chart of Greek philosophy and its Roman supplement.

S. N.

## Religion.

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### IS THE DESTINY OF NATIONS DISCOVERABLY INDICATED IN THE PROPHECIES OF SCRIPTURE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

REALLY the question on the card for debate on prophecy seems a very foolish one. How could our good editors, except for impartiality's sake, permit a subject like this to be brought aboveboard in a periodical which has been on the whole so carefully conducted? Who, unless he is an infidel, doubts that "the future destinies of nations are discoverably indicated in the prophecies of Scripture"? "*All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, and for instruction.*" Prophecies form a large element in Scripture. They must be profitable for instruction, then. But they can only be profitable for instruction when they give discoverable indications of their meaning.

Prophecy is predicted history, history written in spiritual prevision, such as brings up before the eye of the mind the very form and pressure of the future. The power of prophesying is a divine gift, a precious seeing imparted to the mortal by the Divine Father. It is not merely an intensifying of the foreseeing capacity of man, nor an outgoing of the influence of the Spirit of the Most High in directing, enriching, and exalting the human faculties to a supernatural degree; but it is the direct and immediate gift of God communicated to the prophet, whereby the future is unveiled, the purposes of Jehovah are made known, and the destiny of nations is revealed for the guidance of believers, the hope of Christians, and the glory of God.

If this is so, we cannot but believe that God has intended these prophecies to be understood, not, perhaps, fully, but at least in part, and hence that the future destiny of nations must be discoverably indicated in the Scripture prophecies. It would be inconsistent with the character of God to set in motion the intricate machinery of prophetic inspiration, and only produce a series of dark sayings, as incomprehensible as the oracles of Dodona or of Delphi. In times past we know that the prophecies of Moses and Isaiah were fulfilled in Jesus Christ our Saviour; that those of Jonah were fulfilled in Nineveh; that those of Daniel were consummated in Persian and Arabian history. In these cases, and in all the long line of prophecies regarding the history of the Jews, we know that the future

destiny of nations was discoverably indicated in the Scripture prophecies. Jesus Christ often tells us that certain things occurred, "that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the prophets;" and His disciples, following His example, drew men's attention to the fulfilment of prophecy involved in the life and character of our blessed Saviour. Our Lord himself prophesied, and we can read in history the fulfilment of His predictions; and St. John, the Apocalyptic seer, assures us that those things shall most surely come to pass which he tells us of. Any one who believes in Scripture must therefore admit that the history of nations has been foretold in the prophecies of the Old and New Testaments of our faith.

"Scripture prophecy is not isolated from God's principle of action and government. The events predicted are not arbitrary importations into human history. They are moral results arising out of moral causes. They are nothing more nor less than human history divinely anticipated.

"The primary cause of prophecy is sin. Where there is no sin there is no prophecy. An unfallen world has no future; for perfect purity there is but an everlasting present. But a sinful nature can only live in the future; give that nature no future, and you drive it to despair; because you take away from it that which makes existence bearable—*hope*. God having designed to redeem man, this design necessitated revelation, and revelation necessitated prophecy. The very essence of the Bible, then, is prophecy. Its predictions have made it the pole-star of man's spiritual nature from the earliest ages; for they pointed him, and led him forward to happier times and better experiences. What is the Bible, taken as a whole, but one great and glorious prophecy of human redemption? All its parts correspond to this character. Every chapter of it has a direct relation to this one supreme object; and the whole scope of God's dealings with man has this end in view."\*

If the foregoing argument is correct, how can we avoid the conclusion that God has revealed His will in such a way that we may discover it? for a revealed will, the meaning of which we could not comprehend, would be an absolute absurdity, which we dare not attribute to anything that God has done or may do. We hold, then, that the whole debate is settled in its very terms. Prophecy is a divine forth-telling of the future; speaking by heavenly inspiration about things which as yet "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive." Prophecy is an interpretation of coming events. If in common life, and to common minds, forebodings arise, so that "coming events cast their shadows before," how much more surely may we expect

\* "Two Years After and Onwards," p. 16. We cannot allow the opportunity of mentioning this work to pass without recommending it to the serious perusal of those interested in this question. Its author, as it seems to us, has obtained the key to prophecy.

the truth to be made known when God himself rolls forward the map of time to some highly favoured saint and sage, whom He is about to send with a message of warning and entreaty to a people or nation whom He desires to instruct in the consequences of their follies and sins?

No good reason can exist for raising this discussion; for all believers in the Scripture prophecies are agreed that the revelations of the Old and New Testaments are predictions of future events foretold by individuals who, on the occasion of uttering them, were directly inspired, guided, and governed by God to see, to express, and to foretell the hidden wisdom of the Most High, that so He might be feared and served by His servants, and known to be God by all men.

"For a world in rebellion against its Maker and its King, it must be all-important to know the consequences of apostasy, and the time and manner of divine retribution and deliverance. God—who alone can see the end from the beginning, who alone can unveil the future—has, in His word of revelation, disclosed the rise, the career, and the fall of Antichrist among the nations, and these prophecies have been given for the benefit of His own people—for lessons of warning and instruction, for the strengthening of their faith, the brightening of their hope, the quickening of their zeal, and the increase of their joy."\* This quotation puts the moral purpose of prophecy very plainly before the mind. But the whole force of the argument would be lost if the destiny of nations was not discoverably indicated in the prophecies which God has vouchsafed to place before men. What proof of prophecy could we have if the meaning were not able to be seen, and the applicability of it to men and events were not at once evident? Those who have read Bishop Newton's "Dissertations on the Prophecies," or Sherlock's "Use and Intent of Prophecy," and such works as Keith or Fairbairn on the Prophecies, Stanley's "History of the Jewish Church," cannot fail to see that the debating of this question indirectly attacks the inspiration of the Scriptures, and has a tendency to encourage infidelity. Hence we think the choice of the subject is unwise and imprudent.

As, however, the editors, whose purity of motive is above suspicion, have determined upon its being debated, no doubt with a good purpose, we have thought it right, while gently protesting against the entertainment of the topic, to mention a few reliable arguments in favour of prophecy, as borne witness to by reason and common sense.

It is not necessary for a writer, on the opening of a debate, to travel beyond his province as a defender of his own position. We shall not—indeed, we cannot—anticipate the objections that can be advanced on the opposite side. Prophecy cannot be prophecy

\* We quote again from the eloquent and able work already referred to, "Two Years After and Onwards." London: Houlston and Wright. 1865.

unless the coincidence between prediction and fulfilment is discoverably indicated. We shall wait for our opponents' statements of the grounds of their opposition, and then we shall endeavour to go through our responsions as well as we may. In the meantime we think it incumbent on us to advise our readers to fortify their faith in the Holy Scriptures, which are given to make us wise unto salvation, unto eternal life, by reading Butler's "Analogy of Religion," and Farmer "On Miracles:" for prophecy is a miracle; and nothing is more certain than that prophecies have been given by God to prove to mankind not only His divine providence, but also his overruling providence, and tender mercy to the sinful children of men,—of which may we all be partakers. Amen.

W. C. MARKHAM.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

ONE day, walking on the Douglas Sands, in the Isle of Man, I was accosted by a gentleman in the most polite terms. After a few commonplace remarks relative to the weather, &c., he entered into a series of calculations as to the cost and possibility of erecting "the finest docks in the world" on the beach, at an expenditure of a few thousand pounds. He knew, or professed to know, the exact depth of the water, the force of the tides, and the resistance needful to prevent the works from being washed away; and then, waxing eloquent with his theme, he demanded that the European powers should unite to carry his plans into execution. I meekly interrupted him with the remark that a few thousand pounds could be obtained from the inhabitants themselves; and that the English Government, who had paid £300,000 for the rights of the island, was not yet bankrupt. "Mine, sir," he tartly answered, "is a work for Europe, and cannot be comprehended even, not to say completed, by any single power." I had now no difficulty in understanding that my new friend was, as the Scotch say, "crackit." I remember, also, hearing from the notorious Carlile a series of lectures in which he proved, evidently to His own satisfaction, that there had never been such a person as Jesus Christ; that his existence was as mythical as the personages of Homer's creation. Crowds attended upon his utterances; those who heard his facile statements were not astonished that he secured followers and believers. It is said that Carlile lived long enough to repent this nonsense, to believe, not only in the existence of Christ, but in His mediatorial work. It was well if it was so, well if we do not ourselves defer that work until it is *too late*.

Archbishop Whately, also, with wondrous power of argument, wrote a book to prove that Napoleon Bonaparte never existed. His primary object being to demonstrate the possibility of denying and of affirming the most impossible things. No doubt the writers of such statements, from some peculiarity of intellectual formation or malformation, believe their own arguments. Although there is

a little want of consistency in Dr. Cumming, for instance, who demonstrates with such clearness and evident self-satisfaction that the world must come to an end within a year or two, and yet enters upon a lease of property extending beyond that term! Of course it was a very "canny" act: if the world *does* come to an end as the prophet of Crown Court predicts, then the excess of the lease will not matter; if it *does not*, why, he is all right. If he is *now* south of the Tweed, he *has* been north. Meanwhile he may go on with his calculations and predictions, amusing himself and doing nobody any harm—or good. It must be mighty instructive for the Crown Court worshippers to hear Sunday after Sunday the same grind upon the same organ; and what does it all amount to? Does any man on that account forego a purchase? withhold from a venture? He were a very noodle if he did. But if Dr. Cumming and those who think with him were consistent, then all serious business relative to this world must cease; and if that belief became general, a universal stagnation of trade and of secular interests must ensue. Why should a man spend his present means in the education of his child, seeing that his child will never require to use that education? Why should a man send his son to college, where he may by mischance become contaminated, and where at best he can only secure the commencement of an education which cannot be completed, because of the nearness of the end? Why should ships be sent upon voyages which will extend over the prescribed period?—buildings be built, and laws made, for generations yet unborn? Why should anything be done save—making an end? Just as the knowledge of the day of a man's death would paralyze his arm from all healthful exertion, so, if such knowledge were given in relation to the world's end, would all true life and effort be destroyed. It is man's business, not to be ready for the end of the world, which may or may not be distant or near, but to be ready for the end of his own life—the day of his death; that at least, not distantly, is certain; the other is uncertain, and the "finding out" of such matter unprofitable and useless. How should the command, "Be ye also ready," be applicable if the end was known? for why should readiness be made for that which is not yet? The very fact that readiness is enjoined—"for such an hour as ye know not"—is proof that the end has not been revealed. God has evidently not made known His purposes to man, whatever His purposes and designs may be. It is drivelling triviality to indulge in calculations and speculations upon His intentions and designs, which are expressly declared to be "a great deep." And yet that poor puny man, with his finite and therefore limited capacity, should dare to map out His plans, to state that His intentions are to go so far and no further! If the time of the end were known, man would not be that which God has intended man to be—a free agent. For how would a man be free to act—to select the good and eschew the evil—in the face of the end? Do we not know when calamity comes, some sudden and awful circumstance, that then the life current is changed?

A storm at sea, for instance, that threatens destruction to all on board some struggling water-logged vessel, sends the mariners to their knees; the most impious become loud in their prayers and promises. And a good and excellent thing too, says some one. But not the way which God has elected to bring men to Himself. If by fear He purposed to convert the world, then all that would be needed would be to send an angel through the air declaring that God commanded men everywhere to repent. "He knows the end," says some one. So He may, or may not know, for anything you or I know. What He knows it is clear we know not, and, as at present revealed, cannot know. Astrology and kindred trash are foolishness; but to dare to penetrate into the intentions or secrets of God is wickedness. There are unquestionably a series of statements or prophecies declared in the Scriptures—given for our profit and advantage—some of which have been fulfilled, some of which have yet to be fulfilled. But the period *when* is not revealed. "The lion shall lie down with the lamb," or the hard and harsh nature of man's sensuousness shall be merged in the meek and gentle spirit which is so admirably typified by the gentlest of animals. But when? This prophecy has relation to the whole of mankind. When and by what means will the human family be brought to believe the truth of Christ's doctrines?—for how else shall the rough places of the moral world be made smooth?

And what must be said of "The Coming Struggle," "Two Years After and Onwards," "The Impending Wars of Europe," &c., &c., and all such trash? Why, that they remind us of the frontispieces sent out with the almanacks from Seven Dials, in which all imaginable disasters, by sea and land, in the air and under the earth, by wind and storm, by fire and the shafts of Death, which always, like the draped figure at a Greek festival, figures prominently, aiming his dart at some crowned head. Who does not know that this effective picture, always effective by reason of its contrasts and glare, is the result of a morbid imagination, if it is not, as is very likely, left entirely to the designer to do his best in producing a spirited picture for a specified sum? And then, when the thing is got out, how the crowd gapes, and wonders, and shakes its empty head, in prospect of the horrors in store for the coming year! What, indeed, is "The Coming Struggle," and the rest, but so much Seven Dials' word-cunning? Of course it is not difficult to "go in" for generalities—to prognosticate a number of things which will certainly happen, judging from the experience of the past. It may be said with some degree of certainty that in the future many children will be born and many children will die; that nations will mourn the death of their kings, because many of them are old and cannot live for ever; that wars will take place, because the nations are occasionally given to that sort of thing, and have, like individuals, much need of common sense—which, properly rendered, means good sense, and therefore is very *uncommon*.

The man who takes upon himself to torture and twist the Bible



to say what he designs it to say, is much like the man who opens the book at a venture, taking the first passage that meets his eye as the direction of Providence in any undertaking or matter of importance. And the obscurity which, of necessity, rests upon all figures and dates, proved at least, if nothing else has been proved, by Dr. Colenso, in his several volumes on the Pentateuch, makes speculation and prophecy, by the aid of such dates and figures, as to the future of this age, this century, about as satisfactory and as wise as Macaulay's famous prediction of the New Zealander sitting on London Bridge viewing the ruins of St. Paul's. But not only Dr. Colenso, but Dr. Davidson, the eminent professor and Independent minister, the editor of one of the volumes of "Horne's Introduction," has not hesitated to state the difficulties that necessarily surround all Biblical interpretation,—“the double sense, or rather, twofold reference—a germinant sense, continuing to widen till it embrace various references, or allusions and applications to various events.” How, then, can any but the charlatan put out statements that, on the authority of Scripture, this shall be and that shall not be? At the best it must be unprofitable surmise, tending to sustain and strengthen the morbid imagination; and, carried to extremes in belief, calculated further to disorder the disordered intellects of religious fanatics, and to lodge them in their proper home and resting-place—the lunatic asylum.

It is, we firmly believe, not our province or business to assert what God does or does not know; and therefore, when it is said that God's knowledge extends to knowing whether a man will finally be saved or lost, and therefore that the doctrines of election and reprobation are established,—we say, we know not. This we know, this we believe, or we would not believe in God's justice, that to all is it given to accept or reject the overtures of His mercy, and, therefore of the individual's election to live a life of probity or a life of sin. And so, precisely, do we believe in relation to states and nations. The ordering of their future is not divinely indicated in prophecy, so that we may regard it as settled; if it was, then of necessity there would be no responsibility in any public act, because every act would only be the act appointed to bring about the end; and if the end was evil because the action was evil, how could blame attach to the individual who worked out the Supreme's intention? The actions of nations, of peace or of war, must be the result of the aggregate action of individuals; the action of the individual will be in agreement with his sense, or otherwise, of the moral code. Now we all know how differently actions are viewed by the same individual under different dispositions; that which is loved to-day will be hated to-morrow; that which is despised and thrown off one day may be courted and embraced the next. How, then, not knowing the action of events upon individual characters who, among the nations, have offices of trust,—how can we speculate upon their course of action during any question of importance that may arise relative to the relation of states? All, we contend, therefore, is, so

far as regards our knowledge, unrevealed and uncertain ; the future is a closed book, depending upon thousands of influences and circumstances. Civilization is not a science nor yet a providence ; if it was, then we charge God with the wars and evils that stand in the way of civilization, which would be utter folly. For these reasons, therefore, we adopt the opinion that all speculation relative to the teachings of prophecy about the end of the world, save as amusement, must be classed with the pursuit of the philosopher's stone, the attempt to square the circle, the discovery of perpetual motion, the art of extracting sunbeams from cucumbers, or any other folly, from which we heartily say, " Good Lord, deliver us." J. J.

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## Social Economy.

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### OUGHT CORPORAL PUNISHMENT TO BE EMPLOYED IN EDUCATION ?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

A NAMBY-PAMBY spirit has got into our nation. Bribes are taking the place of a sense of duty, and instead of compelling obedience we have fallen to supplicating attention. This is altogether wrong, and proceeds on a visionary and vicious principle. To make things pleasant is a very good maxim, but it cannot always work ; and the boy who is good for sweetmeats and tracts is not at all like to be a whit better, but indeed much worse, than he on whom thwacks have been bestowed when justice demanded the infliction of them. It is quite a mistake to call corporal punishment cruelty. The cane, or the rod, or the birch twig, or the ferule, are only the emblems of power in the schoolboy's world, in class or at home, and represent the pain and sorrow which fall upon their elders when misconduct merits chastisement. If we could elaborate evil from the world, and woe from the catalogue of human ills, we would doubtless do so ; for we all feel like schoolboys, considerably self-indulgent, and would gladly have our own way, unmolested by pain or sorrow, disease or evil ; but we cannot manage it. Now boys are educated to act and suffer. They must feel the necessity of punishment, and be led to reflect on their conduct as affording reason for its infliction. If we banish punishment—corporal punishment—from school, we take away a source of wholesome caution and of beneficial fear. This we ought not to do.

That pain is a necessary schoolmaster the whole world testifies. To escape suffering in this world only one way exists—to attend to the laws of life, health, and duty. If we attempt to coax and fondle children into the belief that they are only to do their duty, fulfil their tasks, learn their lessons, and give obedience when *they*

are convinced of the utility, righteousness, and excellence of the commands enjoined, we shall do them grievous wrong; for they cannot availingly question the great laws of nature, or choose when or how much they will obey them. The pains and penalties of life are diligently and inexorably enforced.

We by no means advocate cruelty, injurious corporal punishment, or angry chastisement at all. Chastisement ought to be solemnly deliberate. Anger ought not to mete out punishment. Though anger is a legitimate expression of feeling, it is a bad gauge of amount of suffering due to faults. It is apt to exaggerate. Reason ought to allot the amount of punishment due to a fault; but anger at it ought not to be concealed. It ought to be shown that misconduct excites anger as naturally as good behaviour excites praise; and just as praise naturally and instinctively seeks to reward, so does anger call for condign severity. The rod is the legitimate exponent of offended authority. Life must have its bitters as it has its sweets; and we have no right to bring up children in a jam-tart and apple-pie world, where rewards are always ready for the good and impunity for the wicked.

Children are not reasonable creatures; their intellectual nature is only in process of development. For several years they are only animal, not intelligent. They have no perception of consequences that are not immediate. Their ideas of causation are not able to extend into future years, and to show them the effects of misspent time in youth embittering manhood and bowing the head of age. Corporal punishment is simply the means of keeping the mind open to the consequences of actions, and by dint of a few experiences to bring habits into action which will save greater and sadder evils. "No chastening for the present seemeth joyous, but grievous: nevertheless afterward it yieldeth the peaceable fruit of righteousness unto them which are exercised thereby," Heb. xii. 11.

It will be asked, Is the rod persuasive? We shall answer, No. It is not the work of the rod to persuade. The rod is a check; persuasion should precede and follow it. Punishment ought to be given only when the fault is one of temper, and is known to be wrong by the party doing it. Where there is no law there is no transgression, and there ought to be no punishment. But when a known law is broken, punishment is due, and corporal punishment; for that teaches the need for forethought, obedience, avoiding causes of exciting wrath, and the suffering which results from inattention to laws. It excites moral feeling, and teaches moral responsibility. Corporal punishment being applied to mental incapacity, moral peccadilloes, and thoughtless random children's follies—

"For evil is wrought by want of thought  
As well as by want of heart,"—

may appear to some to be injudicious, inasmuch as it inflicts on the body the chastisement of faults in which it was perhaps only the instrument. The body and mind, we reply, is a compound, in our

present state of being, an inseparable compound. The pain of the body is only known because of the mind residing in it. And our only means of exciting the mind is through the frame from which it gathers its impressions. Every boy knows that the dread of a flogging is a powerful dissuadent even from a very sweet folly; and that at a particular time of life he was much more moved by twitches of pain than twitches of conscience, by a sense of slaps than a sense of shame, and by a regular dusting than a religious scolding. Corporal punishment of itself, and unaccompanied by any other means of preventing the commission of evil, is of course objectionable. It is only an auxiliary in reformation. If used alone it becomes retaliatory, and appears as revenge. But administered judiciously and judiciously it is a powerful corrective of bad habits and a desire for doing wrong.

Education has two distinct functions; one encouraging, and one repressing. Praise and blame, rewards and punishment, are the means of working out these two ends. Sentimentalism always assumes the goodness and integrity of human nature, and only laments that so little encouragement is given to well-doing. In this it errs. Human nature requires weeding and pruning, delving and harrowing. It will not grow up well if it is simply encouraged. It must be discouraged. The petting system will not discourage. It does not even encourage only the good and leave the evil stationary. It encourages the evil fatally. We must have flogging—or some corporal substitute for flogging—if we are to have a discouraging element in education. We must not only persuade, but dissuade; and the most powerful dissuadent yet discovered is corporal punishment. Test corporal punishment as a deterrent by some other substitutes for it. Imposition—*i. e.*, the laying on of heavier tasks—is awfully far wrong. In every educational seminary schoolboys get daily as much as they on an average can do. Impositions overburden a back already bowed with a sufficient load. Temporary imprisonment and detention from the playground are objectionable, because they deprive a boy of an absolute requisite for health,—

“To give his blood its natural spring and play.”

When the confinement is accompanied or followed with deprivation of food it is inconceivably worse in a growing boy. The use of the fool's cap, of course, is now altogether abandoned. It does not shame, it makes shameless. Lecturing at, as a gallery lesson, is tenfold more horrible and galling than any number of stripes. Being set to commit hymns or prayers is inexpressibly more dreadful even than that. What punishments then are available that are not in some form or other corporal, though in a sense different from that implied in this debate, *viz.*, administered in stripes? There is really no way left but that.

Shall we then proclaim jubilee to the whole school-going race, exemption from punishment, a paradise of no penalties for wrongdoing? I fear this would lead to a worse state still. Children

would grow up without restraints upon their passions and their impulses, their habits and their inclinations, and too surely woes would thicken round their path in after life. It would then appear, in all the force of a lesson taught by experience, that "he that spareth the rod hateth the child." Firm, moderate, just corporal punishment, inflicted for reasonable causes, without anger, but with a severe sense of duty, ought to be employed in education.

SCHOLASTICOS.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"He that only rules by terror  
Doeth grievous wrong,  
Deep as hell I count his error—  
Let him hear my song."—*Tennyson*.

THE saying that we are children of circumstances is well illustrated in the taciturn consent we are apt to yield to the opinions and usages that prevail in our time. In few cases is this seen to better advantage than in the view people have of corporal punishment as a means of enforcing attention to education. They consider it a question out of their jurisdiction, and consequently form no decided opinion upon it. It is rare to find a staunch maintainer of either system, *i. e.*, of no punishment of a corporal nature, or of bodily chastisement, and we confess it is owing to accident that we have made up our minds on the subject. When we separate ourselves from the fact that such a means of imparting a stimulus to the attainment of knowledge exists, and is by many defended and even advised, it appears to us an impossibility that they can believe themselves in the right, or at most that they tolerate it merely as a relic of the barbarous customs of bygone ages. It is hard to imagine that even in the far-off days of ignorance and cruelty so inhuman a system should be adopted; that it should find supporters now seems monstrous, and a blot on the civilization of our times. It is well that so public a channel as this is afforded for discountenancing one of the greatest self-defeating systems that could be followed.

The origin of corporal punishment lies, no doubt, in the anger and impatience of masters. It is the means employed by a domineering spirit to inspire awe, and to avenge itself for any apparent neglect. It cannot be ascribed to a belief in its effectiveness, for it is contrary to all reason and theory, and its bad results are manifest to the most superficial observer. Hard-hearted and unobservant must be the man that follows such a system. Some maintain that it effects the ends desired, and point to the brute creation, and draw a comparison between boys and animals. But such a comparison is worthless. The difference between a reasonable and an unreasonable creature is immense; besides, it is our opinion that even here the lash is applied when treatment of a kinder character might be used with greater result, certainly with more humanity.

The object of corporal punishment is alleged to be to give an excitement to learning and duty. What! when it is removed is there a standstill in the education of the young? The ferule cannot always be exercising this wholesome effect. How much better is it to excite, if excitement is necessary, the young by means of emulation, and by showing them the usefulness and pleasure of knowledge!—means which will never lose their wholesome influence, much less will they exercise a contrary power. The young, in common with mankind, need only to be thoroughly convinced of the necessity or usefulness of any object to induce them to pursue it. Whenever practice does not follow advice it is from the want of conviction. We are persuaded that nobody pursues what he is positively convinced is detrimental to his own interests. This assertion may seem wrong to many of our readers, but we are sanguine enough to think that if they consider it they will arrive at a similar conclusion to the one we have indicated. It scarcely calls for proof here, or we might state the reasons for our belief in the opinion.

Granting the object to be a laudable one, and to be that of exciting boys to acquire their lessons, we then inquire whether this object is attained by the means adopted. Our opinion and observation lead us to think that it is not; in fact, lead us to think that the contrary end is effected. The cane and threats, we allow, may, like certain stimulants, produce the desired ends on the first few applications. But do they when used as a rule? Schools and boys collectively are often spoken of as small constitutions, and should be dealt with much in the same way. Here the effect of threats and punishment is readily seen, and it is such as certainly does not warrant a similar system in schools. We need only allude to the penalty attached to the crime of sheep-stealing fifty years ago, or even much less. Sheep-stealing was a capital crime, but did that fact in the least deter the class of men it was meant to deter? No. Sheep-stealing was much more general then than it is now, even when the dreadful penalty is revoked. It is true, no doubt, that the smaller number of convictions for this crime, in common with others, is owing to the better state of education and morals in the country. We do not deny this. We simply state that the penalty consequent on the discovery of the robbery had not the power of preventing it. We might come nearer the argument, and point out the effects between the system of education a century ago and that generally adopted in the present time. The cruelty and extreme measures of masters of the last generation were far less productive of good than the kind and temperate method pursued by the majority of masters of the present day. Schools were places of bondage. The very name was associated in the boy's mind with punishment and ill-treatment. And what was the consequence? Books were hated and masters were feared. And when a time of liberty came, the one was thrown aside with disgust and the conduct of the other resented in every way a revengeful spirit could contrive. Whereas the present

system acts in a manner diametrically opposite. At the worst, schools are considered by boys as necessary evils, while many look upon them with pleasure and thankfulness, and most carry away with them pleasant memories of the days passed there—the masters, and the old place itself. How many glad faces of old boys are seen at the end of the half, at the speech day, or at any annual rejoicing of members of their school! How many keep up the acquaintance with their master, and refer to him for advice on any important point! Books are held dear, and considered store-homes of knowledge. A love of reading is thus inculcated, and learning is valued for its own sake. The foundation that is laid at school by the masters is built upon by the after reading of the boys themselves. It is then the greatest advancement is made. If only the love for books and knowledge be inspired in a boy's breast, there is every probability that the career of that boy will be good and successful.

But, as we hinted above, corporal punishment defeats its own end. This end, to state it in plain words, is to make boys learn their lessons. Punishment may, as we said, at first effect this, but it soon loses its power. Even when success follows, it is produced by fear, and we have little faith in the use or even memory of a lesson thus acquired. Is it not said and forgotten? Is it ever thought usefully of afterwards? No; and surely one act of repetition, a heartless one, and the work of a threat, does not tend much to educate the mind or excite a liking for books. But let our readers recall to mind the time, even under this extreme pressure, any classmate of theirs was in acquiring a lesson. "Memory is the daughter of attention;" and how is it possible a boy can give the attention while under fear of punishment which he would otherwise do? A lesson thus learnt must necessarily take a much longer time than it would had it been the work of love rather than of dread. We all know with what alacrity boys pursue those objects in which they take pleasure, and the best means of producing this alacrity is by making their work pleasant. Our meaning is well expressed in the poet's line,—

"Love hath readier will than fear."

No more effectual way for rendering books hateful and for destroying a boy's ambition could be adopted than this of forcing him to his lessons. It creates, besides, a dislike for everything and everybody connected with the school, a spirit of animosity and revenge. It excites boys to passionate thoughts, and gives them the notion that one cares but little for the comfort and well-being of another. Then selfishness, and we might add cruelty, are taught where feelings the very opposite ought to be encouraged. Had corporal punishment all that some may claim for it, and if it be true that it exercises this baneful influence on the passions of the young, on this account it ought to be discountenanced. We would rather see the spirit of kindness and manliness inculcated in the minds of the young than that their memories should be laden with a mul-

titude of isolated and comparatively useless facts. School learning is but of secondary importance. A man of little or no book knowledge may be one of sterling use and sincerity. The qualities of a good citizen and a good friend lie not in a school education. A great scholar is not necessarily, apart from his knowledge, a better man than one wholly ignorant of books.

In our opinion, not only corporal punishment, but even punishment by impositions, should be discontinued in schools. As far as our observation and experience go, we think the majority of boys can be better governed and better taught without appealing to force. If a master does his duty, and to succeed he must in these days, the rod and tasks are unnecessary. His own example and influence supply all that is wanted to inspire boys with a love of learning and a strict regard to decorum. Some will no doubt partly allow what we say, yet maintain that in large schools it is absolutely impossible to educate boys or control them without some last resort, and that corporal punishment. We will allow there is some truth in the assertion; but this is the fault of arrangement, and does not in the least lessen the force of our argument. That with large numbers it is almost impossible for masters to make their influence felt we well know. But large schools should be arranged, which is readily done by increasing the number of classrooms, and thereby separating their numbers, so as to remove this defect in public school education. The influence of the masters would thus be brought to bear upon the boys with greater advantage, and the noise and trouble which cannot be avoided when a large number work in the same room would not then exist.

It is our opinion, and it is formed on no theoretical surmises, but from close observation and some experience, that no corporal or substantial punishment should be used in the education of youth. Whatever excitement is wholesome can be supplied by emulation, encouragement, and the influence of the master. We are glad to learn that this view is becoming general, and that at many of our grammar schools punishment is dying out. In future years it is probable that the system of at least corporal punishment will be looked upon as one of barbarous and ignorant times. ELPISTICOS.

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**RESULTS OF A LIFE OF PLEASURE.**—The end of the voluptuous is, that their soul degenerates into flesh. The sources of love, mercy, and faith, dry up. The heart, which has sent all its life to the senses, withers and hardens. A ferocious selfishness takes its place there, and seats itself on the empty throne of the generous affections. The very feelings of nature become blunted. There is within the soul darkness, coldness, horror; while around it (in the flesh, I mean) everything is lit up and inflamed by the fire of lust—a house lighted with a thousand lamps, as on the evening of a festival—a house of gladness, you might think; but enter it, and you find only a corpse within, and demons that are dancing round it.

VINET.



## Literature.

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### IS THE PERUSAL OF WORKS OF FICTION RIGHT OR WRONG?

#### RIGHT.—III.

THIS question, I apprehend, turns upon another, which is, Is the reading of works of fiction beneficial? If this question can be satisfactorily and conscientiously answered in the affirmative, then we may safely conclude it is right to read works of fiction. We think the question may be so answered from the following considerations. Fiction, as a vehicle for conveying the thoughts of men to others, has been, and is now, universally employed. Were we to examine the literature of every country, we should find it present in them all, and receiving a large amount of public favour. There seems to be an inherent taste for it implanted within the human mind, which develops itself under all circumstances. From the tropical to the frigid regions, it is appreciated by all sorts and conditions of men; alike by the cultivated and the ignorant, flourishing, however, more luxuriantly wherever fancy or imagination form an important stratum in the character of the people. This universal tendency of the human mind has not escaped the notice of men who have aspired to the dignity of authorship; hence when they have wished to unfold their thoughts or teach us the knowledge which they have gained by observation or experience, they have oftentimes resorted to fiction. Indeed, in many instances, it has been the sole medium of communication between mightiest intellects and the world at large. They have used it for a multitude of purposes, and generally with great success. They have, as it were, peopled the world with the offspring of their own brain, who are invisible to us, but who yet exercise great influence over our thoughts and actions, often for good, but sometimes, alas! for evil ends. They have carried fiction into and enriched every field of thought, by teaching now religion and morality, and now science and politics. By its aid they have endeavoured to supply the omissions of the historian, and it has in many cases reflected the past less obscurely than history itself, having invested the events of the days that are past with a vividness and an interest scarcely possessed by the occurrences of our own time. Fiction has moved men and women to laughter and to tears, and even to do noble deeds. It has directed its darts against antiquated abuses, and they have vanished like the morning cloud or the early dew. Extreme religionists, though deprecating the reading of it, have somewhat inconsistently industriously availed themselves of its aid to "point a moral and adorn a tale." It ranks on its roll of authors some of

the greatest of human minds ; for not to mention Shakspeare, Milton, and Bunyan, who undoubtedly wrote fiction to a very great extent, we have Goldsmith, Scott, Bulwer, and others in our own country ; and there have been men equally eminent in France, Spain, and Germany, nearly all of whom derive their chief title to fame from writings of a fictitious character.

Now all this we regard as presumptive evidence that the reading of works of fiction cannot be otherwise than beneficial, for we cannot conceive it to be possible that anything would receive a large amount of approbation throughout the whole world, unless there could be some good obtained from it, nor can we think that our minds can come into contact with the men already referred to without being benefited thereby ; for we are very reluctant to believe that they would have poured out their thoughts and spent their time and mental strength with no other object in view than to amuse us. But in our day presumptive evidence availeth little. A spirit of inquiry is abroad, demanding the why and wherefore of our opinions. Though this spirit is oftentimes too exacting, we do not wish to see it unexercised ; we would rather aid it by considering and endeavouring to answer the questions which it puts. Perhaps there is no question oftener asked and discussed than the one which heads this paper. The conclusions which are arrived at are as opposite as the poles ; some men—like S. S.—stating that works of fiction produce mental dissipation, and bring with them a train of evils which incapacitate the readers of them for study and for the due performance of the duties of life ; while others,—like Nam Der—affirm that they tend to rouse all the faculties of man, to exalt the taste, purify the moral nature, and to produce a state of mind which craves for higher and higher excellence. We believe those who make the latter assertions to be nearest the truth, and shall produce our reasonings for thinking so presently.

In discussing questions of any kind, it is always advisable to understand at the outset what is meant by the terms in which the question for discussion is proposed ; as instances are not wanting in which, after much time has been lost and tempers ruffled, the parties interested have discovered that they agree upon the subject in question, and that the difference between them lies *not* in their opinions, but in the different definition they each give to the same word. To avoid, then, spending our time so Quixotically and so uselessly, we will define what we understand by the term fiction. The word fiction is derived from the Latin, and means to form or to feign ; and in this latter sense we use the word to designate that which is false or untrue ; while we make use of it in the former sense when speaking of works of the imagination. Most works of fiction have some foundation in fact, which the authors have seized upon to form or weave into lessons of instruction : of course, in doing this, extraneous matter is generally, perhaps always, introduced ; but nothing that is untrue or contrary to human experience is written, although the circumstances related may never have cohered toge-

ther as they do in the author's book. No greater mistake can be made than to suppose that fiction is falsehood. Fiction is merely a mirror which reflects ourselves, showing us either what we are or may become. The writers of fiction never attempt to portray characters possessing virtues or vices foreign to human nature. In fact, we think that the nearer within the range of truth they keep in this and all other respects, the more popular and instructive will they be. And they who, by patient study and keen observation, become thoroughly acquainted with human nature in all its phases, will be able to rouse into activity either our best or worst passions, without having recourse to false representation or mere inventions. In brief, we think that fiction may be very aptly said to be "the holding, as 'twere, the mirror up to nature, the showing Virtue her own features, Scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time its form and pressure." It is now time we adduced our reasons for defending fiction, but before doing so we would remark that neither the immoderate nor the indiscriminate use of this class of literature finds favour with us. As with everything else, so with fiction, we may use it to our benefit or injury. Of course, no rule can be laid down as to the number of volumes which may with profit and safety be read per annum. Each person must determine that for himself; and in doing so he will be influenced by a number of considerations, such as the amount of leisure at his disposal, and the bent of his mind. We may, however, be more specific with regard to the character of the works which may beneficially be read. To afford this information we need not quote from a huge catalogue; a few lines from the poet will give it:—

"Some books there are that scarce deserve  
The name, however gay their liveries;  
Some are shams, on false pretences  
Gaining audiences; others are idle rhapsodies,  
Or crude and ignorant incapacities.  
Beware! nor waste thy time, nor wear  
Thine eyes, unless the book be recommended  
Well, by those whose judgment is of worth and weight."

We come now to consider the arguments in favour of the moderate and discriminate use of fiction. These are numerous, but we shall content ourselves with naming and dwelling for a short space on four of them. First, then, the perusal of works of fiction is a relaxation from labour, mental or bodily. 2nd. The reading of such works often leads to an acquaintance with other and more profitable books. 3rd. The perusal of such works gives us extensive views of human nature in different ages and societies. And lastly, in reading these works, our sympathies are generally excited in favour of virtue. In regard to our first proposition, we may state that, in the case of the working man, a novel read in the interval of labour is most refreshing. To him a work of fiction is an oasis in the desert of his daily toil, and the partaking from it at the close of his

day's work will the better fit him for his labour on the morrow. The excessive bodily labour many of them are subject to renders them unfit for hard reading; add to this that we English are naturally of a sad, dull temperament, and we then see the necessity of providing a remedy against a sort of melancholy into which working men would inevitably fall. To rouse their spirits and drive dull care away, many of them indulge in intoxicating liquors, but we believe that by reading fiction many of them are prevented from falling into habits of dissipation by the use of material stimulants. "They go to fiction as their sole luxury," says a writer in the *Scottish Review*, "and while others may be seen trooping to the tavern or the gin palace, they steal home to peruse the last volume of Bulwer, or a well-thumbed copy of Scott, and their wearied frames and jaded spirits are alike resuscitated by its perusal. If they read nothing else, their intellectual growth is sure to be affected; but even in this case some may not unreasonably suppose it better that it should be dwindled by an influence connected with letters than that it should be utterly destroyed by immoral habits and frivolous pleasures." Sir W. Scott, in dedicating the *Waverley Novels* to George the 4th, expressed a hope that their perusal would succeed in amusing hours of relaxation, or relieving those of languor, pain, or anxiety. And in many instances this hope has been realized. Channing, the American, tells us that Scott's sportive and thrilling productions have chained millions to his pages; that he has steeped many melancholy spirits in forgetfulness of their cares and sorrows, and that multitudes, wearied by their days, have owed some bright evening hours and balmier sleep to the productions of his magical pen.

With respect to students and others engaged in mental pursuits, we may remark that a novel read by them occasionally will invigorate and put new life into their depressed spirits, and they will afterwards return with a greater zest to their more profitable employment. As a day's pleasure in the green fields and pure atmosphere of some country place benefits an artisan and relieves the monotony of his existence, so a work of fiction read by a student in intervals of study gives an agreeable change to his studies, and helps to reanimate his wearied powers. It is as pernicious to forbid such a relaxation to the mind as to hinder the body from engaging in healthy sports. We are aware that students and others also are advised to rest the mind by varying their studies, rather than by an entire cessation from them, and to a certain extent this advice may be acted upon, not to an indefinite one. A labourer will find ease by changing his position when at work, and by varying his occupation, so as to bring different muscles into play, but he cannot do this to an unlimited degree. Nature would revolt at such a call upon her powers of endurance, and were the labourer unable to find a refuge in sleep, he would probably be summarily punished for the infraction of her laws. Doubtless our minds are less susceptible of fatigue than our bodies, but they cannot endure to be confined to severe

thought continuously, even though the subject of it were often changed. Weariness of and disgust with the whole of our studies would most likely ensue from an attempt to accomplish such a task. We are disposed to question too, whether the powers of man can be educated in their entirety without the aid of fiction. There are, for instance, the powers of the imagination to be brought out, and our sympathies for our erring and suffering brethren to be awakened, neither of which the mere cultivation of the intellect would accomplish. In Sir James Macintosh's opinion, the greatest merit of fiction is that it creates and nourishes sympathy. "It makes us," says Arthur Helps, in quoting Macintosh's opinion, "sympathize with obscure suffering and retiring greatness, with the world-despised, and especially with those mixed characters, in whom we might otherwise see but one colour." And we would ask, Who shall say that this sympathy, excited for men and women, whom we cannot aid, will not manifest itself in our lives to the benefit of those by whom we are surrounded, less fortunate than ourselves?

2nd. The reading of novels often leads to an acquaintance with more profitable books. It is well known that there is an inveterate tendency to indolence in the human mind, which requires strong incentives to cast aside its slothfulness. These incentives do not present themselves to all, or if they do, are not seized upon. Many require to be led into the realms of literature, and fiction lends its gentle aid to do this. It introduces and inclines us to appreciate the boundless stores of wisdom treasured up in books. As we emerge from boyhood into manhood, the desire to know something of books begins to manifest itself, and generally endeavours to gratify itself in the pages of a work of fiction; but these, as a rule, are very suggestive—create longings which they themselves cannot satisfy, and lead the mind into tracts of thought which render the perusal of other books necessary. And it has this salutary effect, not only in the early morn, but down to the dewy eve of our lives. Who can read an historical novel without desiring to know whether the author of it has portrayed the various characters in it as the historian has done? After reading Sir Walter Scott's "Kenilworth," we are irresistibly led to consult history to learn if he has given a faithful representation of Elizabeth and Leicester, and we are influenced in precisely the same way by Bulwer, Dickens, and others. Scott prided himself upon having made many read the history of Scotland; and it is stated that every one of his historical novels was followed by a host of publications from other pens, illustrating the respective periods. Dr. Beard, in his useful work on "Self Culture," avows his belief that novels pave the way to severer studies, furnishing a number of statistics in support of the opinion; and a writer in one of the reviews says, that "He who admires such oriental fictions as the 'Tancred' and the 'Talisman,' will be led to warmer love and a renewed perusal of the Scriptures themselves." Doubtless there are many foolish people who are so captivated by this species of literature as to be incapable of reading and appre-

ciating aught else, but this is no fault of the novels themselves; and it is unreasonable to desire the banishment of them from our literature, just because a few silly people have an insatiable and uncontrollable appetite for them.

3rd. The reading of them gives us extensive views of human nature in different ages and societies. Hemmed in as many are by unfavourable circumstances, they can know but little of the world, save what is comprehended in the narrow sphere in which they live and move. They can know scarce anything of the feelings by which those above them in intellect and social position are animated, till the veil which shrouds this knowledge from their view is lifted by the skilful pen of the fiction writer. Through him they learn that their superiors are susceptible of the same emotions as they—and that they, too, have their joys and sorrows, regrets and anticipations. We are aware that it may be urged that this species of knowledge may be more profitably obtained by the perusal of biography. But to this we demur. In writing biography authors are strictly confined to and by facts. They cannot, without exceeding their duty, conduct us into society into which the subject of their book never entered, neither can they describe scenery or places to which he bore no relation. But the writer of fiction labours under no such restriction. To him the splendid halls of the rich and the squalid homes of the poor are alike accessible, and he shifts the scene of his tale whenever and wherever he desires. Sometimes, in the same book, it will be laid in the busy city, on the restless sea, and in the quiet country village, just as the author's purpose dictates; and by these means he is able to present to his readers, in a single volume, far more phases of life than we could obtain in reading a dozen biographical works. And then the novelist is not content with exhibiting the life and society of his own time—he aspires to fill up the blanks of history, and accordingly he wanders through the past and gathers up valuable material which the historian had discarded, deeming it unworthy to be admitted into his chronicles of the kings' sayings and doings, the battles won and lost. Had it not been for Scott, and others who have followed in his wake, doubtless many interesting facts relating to our forefathers' condition would have remained buried in oblivion. The historian till recently considered it superfluous for him to say anything of the people's condition in the time of which he wrote. Historians have for the most part written to attain objects rather than truthfully to exhibit the past. Happily, they have now learnt differently, and conceive it to be as much their duty to present us with a faithful picture of the people's condition, their manners and morals in times past, as to record the intrigues of ministers, or the beheading of supposed traitors. Formerly that duty was left entirely to the writer of fiction; and possessing, as he does, the power to depict the past by means of dramatic representation, he enjoys an advantage over the mere historian, and consequently we have perhaps not lost much by the latter's negligence. It is some-

times alleged against fiction that it usurps the province and perverts the facts and records of history. We have seen that its writers have often performed the duties of the historian, but in doing so we do not consider that they usurped his power. They only supplied his deficiencies. He has left huge gaps hither and thither in his records of the past, and the writers of fiction have collected together material wherewith to fill them up, and have thus completed the work which the historian, from carelessness or other causes, had left unfinished. But allowing that fiction perverts history, an antidote is near at hand. We have already seen that it creates a desire for other kind of reading; and if after reading one of Scott's historical novels we form too high an estimate of the respective characters who appear in it, this can be reduced to a proper level by a perusal of history. But we do not believe that fiction does pervert history in any way; on the contrary, we believe that instead of doing this it gives us a juster view of it, and venture to say that Scott's account of a number of events in Scottish history are as superior in accuracy as they are in brilliant force to the records of the same event in ordinary histories.

Lastly, in reading works of fiction our sympathies are generally excited in favour of virtue. Here we come to consider the argument which, independent of all others, is able of itself to decide the question at issue; for if it can be shown that works of fiction conduce to moral culture, few will be so rash as to decry the use of them; and if, on the other hand, it can be shown that they cultivate our vicious propensities and exercise a baneful influence on our moral welfare, few will be so daring as to advocate their use. Notwithstanding all that has been written to the contrary, we assert that works of fiction do exercise a beneficial influence in the wide and important field of practical morals. They inculcate the practice of a variety of sterling virtues, not by wearisome precepts but by lively examples. In novels, our sympathies are always with the hero and heroine and against those who are plotting against them, and endeavouring by all means in their power to injure them. Now while the former are possessed of many virtues, which are not merely described and defined but are exhibited in action, the latter are possessed of an equal number of vices, which are dealt with in the same way as the virtues, and consequently the teaching power of fiction is enormous, for the respective characters become living entities whom we love or hate. And in loving and sympathising with those who are virtuous and good, and detesting those who are malicious and wicked, we are led to a more earnest love of that which is high and noble, and a more thorough hatred of that which is mean, ignoble, and detestable. Moreover, all the characters meet eventually with their due reward. Goodness is rewarded and vice punished, and this fact, we think, cannot but have a salutary influence upon the reader, for though he may think that rewards and punishments are not always meted out here as merited, he cannot escape the thought that

this will not always be the case, and that there is a day appointed in which, whatever he has sown that shall he also reap. The English fiction of the present century we believe is pre-eminently moral in its tendencies, and well calculated to—

“Keep down the base in man,  
Teach high thoughts and pure desires.”

In conclusion, we would say that it is equally futile to endeavour to prevent men reading works of fiction as to make the colossal attempt to expunge them from our literature. There is within us a deep-rooted desire for it which can never be wholly eradicated from our nature, but it may be turned to better account than it now is. Mighty rivers, which roll vast volumes of water to the sea, cannot be *stayed* in their course, but they may be changed; and, doubtless, fiction, under the influence of deeper religious feeling, and in the hands of men zealous in the propagation of the same, may become a powerful instrument to assist in the regeneration of the world.

W. B. S.

#### WRONG.—III.

TRUTH is the highest attainment of man. “What is truth?” is the question of greatest moment to us. To show us this truth our Redeemer came to earth; to teach us the way of truth His Spirit is promised and His word is given. Truthfulness of thought, character, life, and effort is the great aim of Christian men. Truth is godlike. To attain the image, the likeness of God in Christ, is the purpose of our being here. “The father of lies” is man’s enemy. “They love lying abominations” is the harshest accusation Jehovah brings against the Jews. All “that maketh and loveth a lie” is abhorrent to the Lord our righteousness. Hence, as the perusal of works of fiction is unchristian, it must be *wrong*.

But this line of argument may not satisfy the philosophic spirit of debaters like “Elpisticos” and “Nam Der.” The latter regards this debate as equivalent to asking, Is the imagination a legitimate source of pleasure and instruction? This question suggests that he had better tell us what he means by *imagination*. There is probably no word in the English language so vaguely—not to say ambiguously—used. Imagination is the power, with one, of imaging the impressions of the senses—a merely representative faculty. With another it is a power of calling up, associating, and depicting absent objects, and giving them a voluntary form. Another affirms that imagination has no reference to images faithfully copied from absent external objects made present to the mind, but a word of higher import, denoting operations of the mind upon these objects and processes of composition. Some call it creation governed by fixed laws. Some, again, like the late Washington Irving, get into ecstasies, and cry out, “It is the divine attribute of the imagination that it is irrepressible, unconfined; that when the real world is shut out it can create a world for itself, and, with a necromantic



power, can conjure up glorious shapes and forms, and brilliant visions, to make solitude populous, and irradiate the gloom of the dungeon."

Here is a fine set of differing opinions about what imagination is! What are we to say about "Nam Der's" definite terms? Is fiction a word more vague than imagination that he should seek to get rid of it? Is it not rather that imagination is a word which extends to the power of the clear-sighted sculptor, to whom form is visible as the essence of things; of the observative artist, to whom colours are known as the representatives of things; of the musician to whom sounds interpret emotions; and of the visionary bard, whose language is music, whose thoughts are sculptured, and whose scenes are painted, and whose ideas acquire the palpability of life? And it seems a judicious form of arguing to be able to suggest all these fine things as involved in the discussion, that those who oppose fiction may be railed at as dull, unpoetic dogs.

We protest against this cunning high jink of argument. Fiction is something feigned, something professing to be real and true, "*a lying imagination*." If "Nam Der" accepts our definition he must allow that fiction "is not a legitimate source of pleasure and instruction;" if he does not accept that definition he must give one which will show the precise coincidence and agreement of fiction and imagination, which, if he does, it will fall to him to prove that sculpture, painting, music, and poetry are fictions, and that fictions are sculpture, painting, and poesy. These feats of legerdemain, we apprehend, cannot be done, and hence we conclude that "Nam Der's" clever sophistry is taken from the list of tenable arguments; for it would stand thus:—

Fiction is (*lying*) imagination;

Imagination is a legitimate source of pleasure and instruction;

Ergo, a legitimate source of pleasure, &c., is fiction;

where the subandition, or whispering below one's breath, of the italic word is requisite to make out the syllogism; or it would stand thus:—

Poetry, painting, sculpture, &c., are all imagination;

All fiction is imagination;

Ergo, all fiction is poetry, &c.;

in which the false induction is precipitated. Either way there is a fallacy in the implied argument.

Relaxation is a good thing; but it is not, any more than other good things, to be bought at any price. "I am unwilling," Demosthenes is reported to have said, "to buy remorse at such a rate;" and he was right. Sinful relaxation is too dearly bought. Ovid long ago spoke of the folly of "feeding the mind with lies"—one of the best definitions of novel-reading which could be given. It is not well for men to train themselves to delights which are sinful, or to measure sin against sin, and proclaim that because novel-

reading is likely to keep men from the other temptations of Circe, therefore it is innocent. It is not innocent to break down the barrier between truth and falsehood. It is not innocent to mislead the mind by giving it an inclination to look upon life through a false medium. He is not blameless who, knowing how difficult the attainment of truth is, confuses and confounds the intellect with the necessity of continually restraining the associations of the mind from linking with history scenes and effects drawn from fiction, and of withdrawing from certain names of historic import the fictitious emotions which novel-reading has produced. The intellectual evil of the perusal of fiction is that all our associations become warped and distorted; all our views of causation in common life are unhinged, while the heightened shows of fancy make the every-day existence of man stale, weary, flat, and unprofitable,—sensationalizing the intellect. This proves that works of fiction are not good sources of instruction (p. 335).

The mind that lends its attention only at the summons of the intense interest of a novel soon loses its relish for the steady application of thought to business which daily life demands, and which is indispensable in prosecuting high studies. The mind that is accustomed to be rapidly borne along by the current of an engrossing narrative cannot reflect; whatever arrests it and causes reflection is painful; and when any one is accustomed for awhile to such reading, and to the indulgence of this mental intoxication, the exercise of reflection becomes first disagreeable, then difficult, and at last impracticable.

The emotional part of man's nature—of woman's more particularly—is easily stirred, and is subject to mysterious changes,—a lurking suggestion lying hidden for long in the recesses of the mind inactive, and then in a sudden bursting forth of power, making itself—

“Felt in the blood, and felt along the heart.”

It is, therefore, over our emotions that we ought to be most watchful. We should place a guard upon our hearts that they sin not. It is always difficult to trace the first diverging impulse of emotion; it is seldom possible to mark exactly the first sudden flaw in righteous thought; it is not often easy to note with an accurate eye the slight hitch which throws men off the right path. But we know that nothing in man is more readily touched to wrong issues than emotions; and that emotional errors are less readily corrected than any others. Hence the danger of voluntarily exposing our emotions to uncalled-for excitement. Now the chief delight derivable from the perusal of novels is this said emotional excitement. Is this a good either in itself or in its effects? We distinctly think not.

“True *emotion*, like the unchanging sun,  
Clears and improves whate'er it shines upon;  
It gilds all objects, but it alters none.”

False emotion not only changes but vitiates, disproportions as well as misinforms, and often induces suggestions which allow criminal intentions to filtrate into the mind, until the evils in the heart come out of the heart as issues of uncleanness, even as the Divine One hath said (Matt. xv. 19).

We had proceeded thus far in the writing of this paper, and had been interrupted in its composition, when the following passage in a critical notice of the paper "Provincialism," in *Cornhill Magazine*, fell under our observation in the *Daily Review*, an Edinburgh daily newspaper, whose editor, J. B. Manson, is, as a critic on art and literature, second to no writer on the provincial press. It fully bears out, as the reader will see, our views of the evil effects of the perusal of works of fiction:—

"Some years ago a most brutal murder was committed in the heart of London. An old nobleman, the uncle of our present Foreign Secretary, was found in bed one morning with his throat cut, and the assassin was his own man-servant, who afterwards affirmed that he owed his first conception of the bloody deed to Mr. Ainsworth's novel of 'Jack Sheppard.' And not many years ago, Mademoiselle Lemoine, a girl of sixteen, found herself hurried by a brief career of uncommon profligacy, ending with the burning alive of her own child, to the tribunal of her native place; and the sad short life thus revealed was in part traceable, according to the prosecution, to her familiarity with a particular novel, the 'Confessions of Marion Delorme.' These incidents, which might be greatly multiplied, show, not that works of fiction make their readers cut old men's throats and burn new-born babies, but that, whether for good or for evil, there is something in fictitious literature which does act upon those emotions in which our conduct takes its rise. There is that in it which undoubtedly goes down into the well-spring of human action, and, if it does not poison the waters or render them foul and turbid, it certainly puts them in motion."

This is the evidence of induction on the matter. It proves how subtly the emotions are brought into the condition of criminality by the skilful elaboration and exposition of fictitious events and the mental analysis of guilt. Fiction is falsehood; and though "truth is stranger than fiction," that is no reason why we should indulge in the imagination of evil in the hope that good will result. It cannot be so. Stains on the emotional nature of man are ineffaceable. Weeds whose seeds once get their roots into the emotions are ineradicable. They must grow there until the harvest; and what harvest can we expect from the love of falsehood? It is dreadful indeed to think of the daily absorption into the memory—aye, into the very heart of those scenes of vice, debauchery, and crime described in novels; but it is much more awful to reflect on the readiness with which we look upon and anatomize what God has so sedulously kept hidden from us—

"That hideous thing—a naked human heart."

"Fiction writers are frequently," it seems (p. 337), "moralists and social reformers;" that is, they teach truth by lies, they inculcate

honesty by misrepresentation, they advocate the obedience of men to the commandments of God by violating one, and so—

“Compound for sins they are inclined to,  
By damning those they have no mind to.”

“Nam Der” can surely not read this passage and compare it with the closing paragraph of his paper, and not be struck with the fact that he has overturned all his own elaborate house of cards by that last turn of the builder’s hand. If the appetite grows with what it feeds on, how can fiction be otherwise than highly dangerous—as highly dangerous as mental and moral suicide can be?

“Elpisticos” is even more amenable to moral criticism than “Nam Der.” “Ignorance,” it seems, “is not the mother of devotion,” but of sin (p. 417). Therefore we must get wise in all wickedness that we may become free from sin. To preach a crusade against novels is to ask people to shut their eyes to the fruits of “a tree to be desired to make one wise,” and to turn off the waters of the rivers of Paradise! It will expurgate our libraries of that extensive category—“readable books.” Of course, readable books are all very well, but are readable books quite the desirable category for the chief part of a library. Readable is not transferable with the useful, good, and true; and these are the characteristics which books ought chiefly to have wherever they can be had.

To defend one abuse by instancing another is a very usual though by no means a good style of argument. It is one to which we have noticed “Elpisticos” is prone. The assertion “that the immorality of a book does not render it an improper work for one’s study” (418) is really fearful. Is it not sufficiently answered by quoting the proverb, “Who can touch pitch without being defiled?” Because the streets of our towns are impure is quite a curious reason for steeping human souls in the impurities of fiction. The charge of impurity brought (in p. 419) against the Bible is gross and offensive. It ought not to have escaped editorial vigilance and expurgation. “The *proper* study of mankind is man” is just the very argument we have been using against novel-reading. Study man in biography, history, philosophy, political economy, travels, geographical details, social science; study man by any means that is true, but do not study fictitious man. Man as he is represented in fiction is altogether a false object of study. Let man be studied in a true mirror, not in a distorting one. Let us seek truth and abjure fiction. Ponder Samuel’s words on the purpose of life (421). Read the careful arguments of S. S., especially those paragraphs numbered (2) and (4). They cannot fail to convince candid inquirers that the perusal of works of fiction is wrong. Our own remarks, we hope, have shown that novel-reading is wrong, whether considered intellectually or emotionally; and we would press our opinions earnestly home on the minds of all who are as yet halting between the two opinions.

PHILALETHES.

## The Essayist.

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### LONDON UNIVERSITY.

[HISTORICAL NOTICE.—London University had its origin in a proposal made in March, 1825, to found a collegiate educational establishment by subscription in the metropolis. The promoters of this scheme had three chief purposes:—1. To bring the means of a thorough education within the reach of the inhabitants of London. 2. To enable those who were more or less excluded from the benefits of an Oxford or Cambridge education, in consequence of their non-adherence to the faith and practice of the Established Church, to acquire or bestow a complete education. 3. To establish in London an extensive and systematic course of education, specially adapted to professional pursuits, *e. g.*, Law, Medicine, Civil Engineering, &c. Money enough was subscribed in a few months to justify the most sanguine wishes of the projectors, by the purchase of £100 shares, and a number of donations of £50. A deed of settlement was executed in February, 1826, a council of twenty-four members was appointed, and the site on which University College now stands, in Upper Gower-street, was purchased. The late Mr. Wilkins produced a suitable design, of which the council and subscribers approved, and the foundation of the building was laid 30th April, 1827, by H.R.H. the Duke of Sussex. The building was completed, professors appointed, courses of instruction arranged, books, apparatus, &c., collected, and the institution, fully equipped, was opened for instruction in Arts; Law, and Medicine, in October, 1828.

In the year of its projection an attempt had been made to incorporate the proprietary by an Act of the Legislature, but as it was considered that it could only pass as a private bill, it became a dropped question. In 1830 a Charter of Incorporation was asked, and had gone through nearly all the usual forms prior to its being granted, when the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, the College of Surgeons, &c., opposed the grant. The matter was argued for three days before the Privy Council in April and May, 1834, and was under consideration, when a change of ministry complicated the affair. In March, 1835, William Tooke carried a motion in the Commons for an address to the King to confer a Charter of Incorporation on the London University by 246 for, in opposition to 136 against. The King replied graciously, and the council pressed the government for a decision. Meanwhile a new scheme of a precisely similar nature had been got up under the auspices of the higher clergy of the Church of England, under the designation of King's College, London. The promoters advanced a similar claim to incorporation. The government, in consideration of this condition

of affairs, proposed the incorporation of a body of gentlemen of eminence in learning and science, empowered to examine persons and confer degrees on students attending certain colleges in London, and such other places as might in future be designated by the crown, without the imposition of any test or religious qualification whatsoever.

The University of London was instituted by charter during the royal will and pleasure, 28th November, 1836. A second charter was granted by Queen Victoria, December 5th and 20th, 1837, which reconstituted the university on a better basis as an institution for "the advancement of religion and morality and the promotion of useful knowledge by holding forth to all classes of her Majesty's subjects, without any distinction whatsoever, an encouragement for pursuing a regular and liberal course of education, by offering to persons who prosecute or complete their studies in the metropolis, or in other parts of the United Kingdom, such facilities, and conferring upon them such rewards, as may incline them to persevere in their laudable pursuits; and for the purpose of ascertaining, by means of examination, the persons who have acquired proficiency in literature, science and art, by the pursuit of such course of education, and of rewarding them by academical degrees in evidence of their respective attainments, and marks of honour proportioned thereunto." The first examination for degrees under this charter was held in 1839. Additional powers were conferred in a charter dated July 7th, 1850; but an entirely new constitution was furnished to it, April 9th, 1858, at which time there were 47 colleges and collegiate schools affiliated together under the oversight of the University of London.

The London University really consists of a single body, consisting of a chancellor, vice-chancellor, thirty-six fellows, and the graduates. The chancellor is appointed by the crown for life, or during the royal pleasure; the vice-chancellor is elected annually by and from among the fellows; the fellows are eligible by the crown and the university, either alternately or conjointly. The graduates are, of course, those who have attained degrees in this university. The chancellor, vice-chancellor, and fellows constitute the senate. The graduates meet in convocation and arrange certain minor matters, but all real power is virtually vested in the senate. The university enjoys an annual grant from Parliament of £5,000.]

The London University was founded, in the legal and testamentary sense of its charter, on the twenty-eighth day of November, 1836. The visitor is her Majesty the Queen; the chancellor, the Rt. Hon. the Earl Granville; the vice-chancellor, Sir John George Shaw Lefevre; the senate is composed of thirty-three members; the registrar is W. B. Carpenter, Esq. This university grants the following degrees:—Bachelor of Arts, Master of Arts, Bachelor of Science, Doctor of Science, Bachelor of Laws, Doctor of Laws, Bachelor of Medicine, Doctor of Medicine. Students, also, under certain condi-

tions, may be examined on trial for certificates of competency (without taking degrees). These are found useful by candidates for appointments under competitive examinations in the public service.

Before entering the university it is necessary—except in certain cases which we shall mention in their place—to pass the matriculation examination, which takes place twice a year, on the second Monday in January, and on the first Monday in July, and is continued for five days. No candidate can be admitted to this examination unless he can produce a certificate of having completed his sixteenth year, which “shall be transmitted to the registrar at least fourteen days before the examination,” at the following address,—“To the Registrar of the University of London, Burlington House, London, W.” A fee of two pounds is demanded, which a candidate must pay to the registrar before he can be admitted to the examination: if he fail to pass the examination his fee is not returned to him; but he can be admitted to the same examination any number of times until he is successful, without any further payment, if he signifies his intention to the registrar at least fourteen days previous to the examination. The examination is conducted by means of printed papers; but the examiners are not forbidden to question any candidate *vivâ voce* for the purpose of ascertaining his proficiency. The examination is held at Burlington House, and sometimes provincial examinations are held in the large towns. When a sufficient number of candidates present themselves in such towns, sub-examiners are named by the senate, to conduct the examination at the same time and at the same hours as the examination in London is carried on, and who are answerable for the transmission of the answers to the London examiners, who look over the provincial and other papers at the same time, and the total results, both local and central, are made known on the Monday morning, at nine o'clock, in the week next but one ensuing. The names are arranged in alphabetical order in three divisions, according to merit, and a pass certificate may be obtained from the registrar by such as shall apply for it.

The subjects of the examination are:—

1. *Classics*.—One Greek and one Latin subject, selected by the senate one year and a half previously, and such subjects may be seen specified in the calendar. The classical paper will contain passages to be translated into English from each author, with questions on grammar, history, and geography. A separate paper also is given in Greek grammar, with easy sentences to be translated into Greek, and a similar paper on Latin grammar. Candidates may choose between the two.

2. *The English Language*.—Questions will be put on orthography, the grammatical construction of the language, composition. There will be also writing from dictation.

3. *English History and Modern Geography*.—History of England to the end of the seventeenth century, with questions on modern geography, with maps.

4. *French or German*.—At the option of the candidates. These papers will contain passages from the works previously specified, together with easy sentences, previously unseen, for translation into English.

5. *Mathematics*.—Arithmetic:—Ordinary rules, vulgar and decimal fractions, extraction of the square root, proportion. Algebra:—First four rules, simple equations, arithmetical and geometrical progression. Euclid:—First four books.

6. *Natural Philosophy*.—To particularize this branch would occupy too much of our space. We merely give the text-book, which is "Newth's Natural Philosophy."

7. *Chemistry*.—Text-book: "Wilson's Chemistry" (Chambers's series). Honours in classics, mathematics, and natural philosophy, chemistry, botany, and zoology, may be also gained at matriculation.

*Exhibitions at Matriculation*.—The candidate, provided he is under twenty years of age, and provided he shall declare his intention of presenting himself as above at the ensuing examinations, who distinguishes himself the most in classics, receives an exhibition of £30 per annum for the next two years; a similar exhibition is given to the candidate who distinguishes himself the most in mathematics and natural philosophy, and a prize of £10 for proficiency in botany or zoology.

We have made our remarks upon this first examination very full, more especially as the London University is intended for those who desire to get a degree in arts upon little more expense than their own private study; and in the pages of this magazine, which circulates very largely among the self-educated class, we would exhort those who have their evenings, or a little time to spare, to put their shoulder to the wheel, and endeavour, by passing the matriculation examination at London, to lay the foundation-stone of a future degree.

*B.A. Examination*.—This examination is divided into two parts, first and second B.A. examination.

*First B.A. Examination*.—This examination takes place once a year, and commences on the third Monday in July. No candidate, except such as have obtained either classical or mathematical honours at the matriculation examination in the preceding January, can be admitted "within one academical year of the time of his passing the matriculation examination, nor unless he have produced a satisfactory certificate of good conduct." The fee for this examination is £5. The subjects are, briefly:—Arithmetic, algebra, geometry and plain trigonometry, Latin, Roman history, and geography; the English language, literature, and history; the French or German language.

Any candidate who has succeeded in the pass examination may be examined for honours in mathematics and natural philosophy, in Latin, in English, and for prizes in French and German; and—provided he is not more than twenty-two years of age, and shall declare his intention of presenting himself at the second B.A.



examination within two years from his having passed the first B.A.,—if he distinguish himself the most in Latin, an exhibition of £40 per annum for two years is given him. A similar exhibition is given for mathematics and natural philosophy, those who have passed the first B.Sc. examination may also compete for this latter prize. The candidate that distinguishes himself the most in English receives an exhibition of £30 per annum for two years, and a prize of £10 if he does the best papers in French and German.

*Second B.A. Examination.*—This examination takes place once a year, on the fourth Monday in October. Candidates must produce a certificate of good conduct, and be of one year's standing from the time of passing the first B.A. examination; but if a candidate has been admitted to this latter examination within six months of matriculating, he must certify that he has completed his 19th year. The fee for this examination is £5. Candidates are examined in the following subjects:—Mechanical and natural philosophy, which comprises statics, dynamics, hydrostatics, hydraulics, pneumatics, optics (physical and geometrical), acoustics, and astronomy; animal physiology, classics, one Greek and one Latin author; with history and geography, Grecian history, logic, and moral philosophy.

Any candidate may present himself for honours in mathematics and natural philosophy, classics, logic, and moral philosophy; chemistry, animal physiology, and vegetable physiology, with structural botany. If a candidate of not more than twenty-three years of age have sufficient merit and distinguishes himself the most in mathematics and natural philosophy, he shall receive £50 per year for the next three years, with the title of University Scholar. There is also a similar scholarship awarded for logic and moral philosophy. Both these scholarships are also open to candidates for the second B.Sc. examinations. Any candidate of sufficient merit, who shall do best in classics, shall, under the above regulations, receive a scholarship of like value with the same title; and under the same stipulations he shall receive a prize, value £10, for the following subjects severally:—Chemistry, animal physiology, vegetable physiology, and structural botany.

*M.A. Examination.*—The examination for this degree is holden once a year on the first Monday in June. No candidate can be admitted until he is of one year's standing from the time of his taking his B.A. degree in this university, or in one of the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Dublin, or Durham, nor unless he is above twenty years of age. The fee for this examination is £10. Candidates are examined in one (or more at option) of the three following branches of knowledge:—1. Classics; 2. Mathematical and Natural Philosophy; 3. Logic and Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Political Economy.

If in the opinion of the examiners the candidate who distinguishes himself most in branch 1 have sufficient merit, he shall receive a gold medal of the value of £20, as also shall he, or any

other candidate, receive a similar reward for like proficiency in branch 2 and branch 3.

*Scriptural Examinations.*—These examinations are divided into two parts, and take place once a year, being conducted entirely by printed papers. No candidate can be objected to on account of his doctrinal views, nor can he be admitted unless he has previously obtained the degree of B.A. in this university.

*First Examination.*—Candidates must show a competent knowledge in any two out of the four following subjects:—1. The Hebrew Text of the Book of Genesis; 2. The Greek Text of St. Luke's Gospel; 3. Paley's Evidences, Butler's Analogy; 4. Scripture History.

*Further Examination.*—No candidate can be admitted to this examination unless he shall have passed the first examination at least two years previously. Candidates must show a competent knowledge in any three of the following subjects:—1. The Hebrew Text of one of the larger or two of the smaller books of the Old Testament; 2. The Greek Text of one of the Historical Books, and of one of the larger or two of the smaller epistles of the New Testament; 3. The Evidences of the Christian Religion; 4. Biblical History. The names of those who have passed are alphabetically divided into three classes according to proficiency, and a prize of books, value £5, is awarded to each of the first class.

*B.Sc. Examination.*—Candidates for the degree of Bachelor of Science must have passed the matriculation examination, or have taken a degree in arts in one of the universities of the United Kingdom. Bachelors of Arts of this university may be admitted to the degree of B.Sc. by passing in the first and second B.Sc. Examination in the subjects in which they have not been previously examined, and those who have passed the first M.B. examination in this university shall be admitted to the B.Sc. degree on passing the second examination.

*First B.Sc. Examination.*—This examination takes place yearly on the third Monday in July. No candidate—except such as have gained honours in classics, or mathematics, and natural philosophy, at the matriculation examination in the preceding January—can be admitted within one academical year from his matriculation; he must also transmit a certificate of good conduct to the registrar at least one calendar month before the examination, for which the fee is £5. Candidates must satisfy the examiners in the following subjects:—mathematics (same as at first B.A. examination), mechanical and natural philosophy, inorganic chemistry, botany and vegetable physiology, and zoology.

Any candidate may present himself for honours in mathematics and mechanical philosophy, in chemistry and natural philosophy, and in biology.

If a candidate of not more than twenty years of age distinguishes himself the most in mathematics and mechanical philosophy, and have sufficient merit, he receives an exhibition of £40 per annum.

He shall declare his intention of presenting himself at the subsequent examination. Candidates who have passed the First B.A. Examination may compete for this exhibition. An exhibition on the same terms and of the same value is given to him who distinguishes himself the most in chemistry and natural philosophy; and a similar exhibition is awarded for biology. These two latter exhibitions are open to candidates who have passed the preliminary scientific M.B. examination.

*Second B.Sc. Examination* takes place once in each year, and commences on the fourth Monday in October. Each candidate must be of one year's standing from the time of his passing the first B.Sc. examination, or must have obtained the degree of B.A., or have passed the first M.B. examination in this university; his certificate of good conduct must be transmitted to the registrar at least one calendar month before the examination, for which the fee is £5. If any candidate fail to pass this or the former examination, his fee, in either case, is not returned; but he can be admitted to the same examination any number of times afterwards without any additional fee, on giving notice to the registrar at least fourteen days before the examination. This rule holds good in every examination. The subjects are mechanical and natural philosophy, chemistry, animal physiology, geology and palæontology, logic and moral philosophy.

Any candidate of not more than twenty-three years of age, and of sufficient merit, may gain a scholarship of £50 per annum for mathematics and natural philosophy for three years, with the style of University Scholar: a like scholarship is awarded for logic and moral philosophy. Both these scholarships are open to those who have passed the second B.A. examination. Under the same regulations two scholarships of similar value are given for proficiency in chemistry and biology, and in geology and palæontology.

*D.Sc. Examination.*—This examination takes place yearly within the first fourteen days of June. No candidate can be admitted to this examination until after the expiration of two academical years, from the time of his obtaining the degree of B.Sc.; he must also give notice of his intention of presenting himself for this degree, and pay a fee of £10 to the registrar on or before the 1st day of April. No candidate can be approved of by the examiners unless he satisfy them in one of the sixteen branches of knowledge which are given in the London University Calendar, to which the reader is referred, the various branches, &c., being far too lengthy for the present paper. He must also pass in a *principal* subject and a *subsidiary* subject belonging to the branch which he has selected.

*LL.B. Examination.*—This examination takes place yearly within the last fourteen days of June. A candidate must give notice of his intention to present himself before the fifteenth day of April. He cannot be admitted to the examination until after the expiration of one academical year from the time of his taking his B.A. degree in this or some other university in the United Kingdom, or unless he has taken the degree of M.B. in this university. The fee for this

examination is £10, and the questions are asked entirely by printed papers. Candidates are examined in Stephens' Blackstone; the three portions of Dumont's edition of Bentham's *Morals and Legislation*, which contain the principles of legislature, the principle of a civil code, and the principles of a criminal code.

Candidates for honours may be examined in one or more of the following:—Principles of Legislation, Conveyancing, Law of the Courts of Equity, Law of the Courts of Common Law, Roman Law, Law of the Admiralty and Ecclesiastical Courts. The candidate of sufficient merit who distinguishes himself the most in the principles of legislation, shall receive a scholarship of £50 per annum for the next three years, with the style of University Law Scholar.

*LL.D. Examination.*—This examination takes place yearly within the first fourteen days of July. No candidate under the age of thirty can be admitted to this examination until he is of two years' standing from the time of his taking the degree of LL.B. in this university, or in any other university from which this university is authorized to receive certificates. Those above the age of thirty need let no time elapse between the examination of LL.B. and that of LL.D. Candidates must possess "a practical professional knowledge of the law of the common law courts of England, and of one of the three following other branches of positive law :"—1. Conveyancing, according to the Laws of England and Ireland; 2. Law of the Courts of Equity of England and Ireland; 3. Law of the Admiralty and Ecclesiastical Courts of England and Ireland, as well as of one of the following subjects:—(1) Roman Law; Principles of Legislation applied to (2) International Law, (3) Civil Law, (4) Criminal Law, (5) Law of Evidence, (6) Judicial Organization, (7) Procedure.

The candidate of sufficient merit who distinguishes himself the most in the examination receives a gold medal, value £20.

*M.B. Examination.*—Candidates must have passed the matriculation examination of this university, or have taken a degree in arts in one of the universities of the United Kingdom, must have spent four years, subsequently to matriculation or graduating in arts, in the study of medicine; one of these years at least must be spent at one of the medical schools recognized by this university; and must, to obtain this degree, pass the preliminary scientific examination, and the first and second M.B. examinations.

*Preliminary Scientific Examination* takes place in each year on the third Monday in July. Candidates must be seventeen years of age, must have passed the matriculation examination or graduated in arts in one of the universities of the United Kingdom. Fourteen days' notice, previous to a candidate's presenting himself at the examination, is required. The fee for this examination is £5. Candidates are examined in mechanical and natural philosophy, inorganic chemistry, botany and vegetable physiology, zoology and comparative anatomy.

After passing the examination a candidate may present himself

for honours in (1) chemistry and natural philosophy, (2) biology. An exhibition of £40 per annum is awarded for proficiency in each of these subjects, provided the candidate is not more than twenty-two years of age. Candidates for the first B.Sc. examination may compete for both these exhibitions.

*First M.B. Examination.*—This examination commences yearly on the last Monday in July. Candidates must produce the necessary certificates (see Calendar), and pay a fee of £5. Candidates are examined in anatomy, physiology, materia medica, and pharmaceutical chemistry, organic chemistry. An alphabetical list of the names of the passmen is published, arranged in two divisions according to merit.

Any candidate, provided he has passed in the first division, may be examined for honours in the following subjects:—Anatomy; physiology, histology, and comparative anatomy; materia medica and pharmaceutical chemistry, and organic chemistry.

In the course of the following week the examiners publish a list of the names of those who acquit themselves satisfactorily. In determining the relative position of candidates the examiners regard their proficiency in the same subjects in the pass examination. An exhibition, value £40 per annum for three years, is given to the candidate of sufficient merit who distinguishes himself the most in anatomy; a like exhibition is given for physiology, histology, and comparative anatomy, and two similar exhibitions are awarded for (1) materia medica and pharmaceutical chemistry, and for (2) organic chemistry.

Under the same circumstances the first and second candidates in each of the preceding subjects shall receive a gold medal, value £5.

*Second M.B. Examination.*—This examination takes place yearly on the first Monday in November. Candidates must be of two years' standing from the time of their passing the first M.B. examination, and must produce the necessary certificate (see Calendar), which must be transmitted to the registrar at least fourteen days before the examination, for which the fee is £5. Candidates are examined in general pathology, general therapeutics, and hygiene, surgery, medicine, midwifery, forensic medicine.

During the following week after the examination a list of the names of candidates who have passed is issued in two alphabetical divisions, and a certificate of having passed is given to each candidate.

Any candidate who has passed in the first division may be examined for honours in the following subjects:—Surgery, medicine, midwifery. In the week following the examination a list of the names of those who have acquitted themselves satisfactorily shall be issued by the examiners. Any candidate of sufficient merit, who distinguishes himself the most in surgery, receives a scholarship value £50 per annum for the next two years, with the style of University Scholar in Surgery. Three similar scholarships

are awarded for (1) medicine, (2) midwifery, (3) forensic medicine : the first and second candidates in each of the four preceding subjects shall each receive a gold medal, value £5.

*M.D. Examination.*—This examination takes place yearly on the fourth Monday in November. Candidates must produce the necessary medical certificate (see Calendar), which must be transmitted to the registrar at least fourteen days previous to the examination, for which the fee is £5. Candidates are examined in logic and moral philosophy, and medicine.

The candidate who distinguishes himself the most in this examination receives a gold medal, value £20.

Any practitioner who has commenced his professional studies on or before 1839, who intends to present himself for the degree of Bachelor of Medicine in this university, must pass the preliminary scientific examination; but need be examined only in chemistry and botany, and he can be admitted to the two subsequent examinations on producing certain certificates (see Calendar).

Any practitioner may be allowed to pass the examinations for the degree of M.B. and M.D. at once, if he has obtained his licence to practise prior to the year 1840, or if he has obtained a commission in the army, navy, ordnance, or East India Company prior to the above year.

[The utility and advantage of an institution of such a nature as the London University can scarcely be over-estimated by self-educators. It not only enables them to test their individual proficiency by the application of a trustworthy criticism, but it supplies as well a comparative registry of their attainments. Then the distinct recognition, testimony, rewards, and encouragements offered by it to persons of desert, without distinction of social position or creed, are truly valuable, not only as undoubted evidence of definite acquirements, but also as moral persuaders to diligence, toil, and endeavour. It would be well if the readers of this series, many of whom are doubtless striving earnestly to elevate themselves in the scale of personal and social life, would seriously bethink themselves of the benefit to be derived from preparing for and undergoing one or other or more of the examinations held at the London University.]

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## ON MODERN POETRY.—BYRON'S "MANFRED."

BY S. F. WILLIAMS,

*Author of "Essays ; Critical, Biographical, and Miscellaneous."*

"The most strenuous effort of Byron's imagination was the dramatic poem "Manfred," where he shapes into a visible form the beauty of inanimate foam—the apparition of the beautiful witch of the Alps rising from the sunlit spray of the cataract."—*Henry Reed.*

"As Byron has in this poem, more nearly than in any other, approached his ideal, so do we here find his genius bursting forth with more power and more originality than in any other of his works. In the character of "Manfred" the poet has displayed himself robed in that demoniacal pride, that intense and devouring ambition, which he would fain exalt into a virtue."—*The Earl of Belfast.*

MODERN poetry is essentially intellectual and philosophic. Metaphysical thought is one of its chief characteristics. The struggles of the soul, the hopes, despairs, and doubts of man, the relation of the outer and inner world, form its grand theme. Its subjects are, eminently, the riddles of life; the immutable laws which underlie and govern every action and our whole existence; the pure influences of external nature upon the mind; the beautiful in form and colour, the suggestive symbolism of material objects. It is, intellectually considered, peculiarly the poetry of an age of questioning, of earnest aspiration, of spiritual conflict between conventionalism and sincerity, between reason and unintelligent faith, between materialism and idealism: morally considered, its most obvious qualities are,—(1), the recognition of the associations and sympathies between the world of sense and the world of thought and emotion; (2), the spiritual interpretation of nature as the illustration of our ideas and feelings; (3), the value of nature's ministrations to the higher life, and of its noble contributions to the education of the mind and the growth of the imagination. In no era of English poetry so much as in this were the questions of life, death, sin, and the future, inwoven into song. At no period of our literary history so much as at this did poetry lead us into the depths of man's heart, into its passions, discords, storms, and unrest, into its longings after beauty and truth, into its warfare with the doubts which assail every speculative and thinking soul. The principle which has been most active in the inspiration and production of the poetry of this age is that which searches into the truths of our inner life. There are higher truths than those of observation and description. There is a clearer, deeper-seeing eye than that of the body. A scientifically exact record of a matter of fact does not reveal the most vital constituents of that fact—the spiritual causes which have been at work to produce it, the subtle influence it will have throughout all time, the relation it bears to man, and the principles which lie hidden in it. Every fact is intimately connected

with an abstract truth, and he who is satisfied with the merely literal fact possesses a body, but is unconscious that that body is the abode of a beautiful spirit. The body is temporary, the soul is immortal. The fact, the outward existence, the covering of things, the incidents and deeds which constitute the subject of history, are but the manifestations of ideas,—they are inconstant and pass away,—the truths which they embody and illustrate are eternal. It is the office of the imagination to reveal the unseen verities which are associated with facts, to show the union of things with principles. Mere utilitarianism is not the ultimate value of material realities; that is the lowest benefit, the marketable kind of good. To every circumstance there is a spiritual function, and its results are to be measured, not by any commercial and immediate effect, but by eternity. The real value of a fact is its spiritual meaning. A history of the French Revolution, limited only to narration, would no doubt be serviceable as a text-book, and it would satisfy the coldest investigator into the past; but would it lay open the resistless forces which burst forth and exploded in that political Vesuvius? Would it paint in their lurid hues those heaving and devouring billows of fire? Would it not write man down as a machine, and disown him as a soul, and as a moral and intellectual power? Would it be a story of the might of ideas and passions, or of a monster destroying engine? Upon the invisible causes of that convulsion, upon the profoundest truths, upon the unrobing of the nation's heart, upon the certainty of moral law, upon punishment, upon the revelation of the human spirit possessed by a fiery fiend, and of God's government of the world, it would be silent. The very root and core of the matter would be unprobed. But, on the other hand, when the story of the Revolution is written by a man in earnest, who sees the moral import of it, and to whom man with his sorrows, woes, and being, as distinct from man with his icy art and mechanism, is a subject of intense interest, then we have that English Iliad, the "prose-poem of the nineteenth century," as Kingsley calls Carlyle's "History."

It is, then, historically true that modern poetry, more fully than that of any preceding age, discusses the old eternal riddles, and looks beyond appearances to the foundations of things. Nature as a picture of beautiful colour, man in his visible entity and social relationships; those are not enough, are mere husks and shells. Think you that the stars teach nothing but wondrous mechanism—that the best part of us is that which is seen and temporal? Think you that the senses are all of human life? Do you not see in the created world something higher than forces, laws, and physical power? Is not that, too, a Divine Word—the wisdom and love of God, the thoughts and emotions of man syllabled there in heaven and earth. Deep truth lies in the landscape—truth from God spoken to the human soul—some experience of the human soul reflected there. The story of our life is written around us. Every object of the age is a picture of tears and grief, of laughter and joy.



The flowers, do they not affect us with a human tenderness? And of man know we nothing but his measurable existence and his mortal habitation? To see into the deep of his heart, to watch its sublime movements, to record its questionings, to solve its mysterious problems—that is the struggle of this age. Man's life, his destiny, his belief, the laws of his being, constitute the modern Sphinx. *Man the spirit* is the grand subject of our poetry. He is seen intensely searching for the truth. He looks out upon the world, and calls it but a vesture, the clothing of truth. He is dissatisfied with the faith based upon tradition and custom, and, bewildered with his own self-begotten doubts, driven to and fro in wild unrest, he is often dissatisfied with himself. Strongly has he grasped hold of the fact that he has a soul, that the soul is his real being. Not less firmly does he believe that he must conquer doubt for himself, though it be with strong wrestlings and through weary years; that he must seek the truth for himself; that he must attempt for himself the solution of those perplexing questions which agitate men's bosoms. He values the inner more highly than the outer inspiration. Downward to the depths of reason is his eye turned. Light is there, and it will come to him, the earnest seeker for the truth. He looks within himself longingly, patiently, to read the eternal truths written by the Creator on his soul. He is given to the consideration of the moral laws which govern him and the world. He extends his thought beyond phenomenal existence, reduces *that* to a secondary and symbolic position; he must approach the unseen, he must pierce to the invisible. To become right and perfect, to understand the mysteries of sin and death, to know himself—that is his earnest desire and effort. Such is the moral attitude of man in the poetry of Tennyson, Browning, and Bailey. We shall see this if we look more particularly to the metaphysical aspect of the works of the three poets who have exercised the greatest influence on the poetical literature of the present century. In the order of time they stand thus,—Byron, Wordsworth, Tennyson.

Byron's philosophic poetry is one long protestation—bitter, contemptuous, and defiant—against the primal curse and its consequences. Scepticism and misanthropy have for him a basilisk spell and fascination. Scorn and mockery are his elements; scorn of the inevitable power which surrounds him, mockery of the Supreme Will. His capacity for tenderness and hate is infinite. He is wildly tossed about in the storms and tempests of his own heart. He struggles to reach some mountain height, where the sky is blue and the prospect fair, where he may serenely dwell in security and calm; but, absolutely unable to control his volcanic passion, his excitable nature, his burning heart, he cannot patiently climb through the fogs and mists. The rest is far above him. He longs for the repose of evening; but he cannot wait for the light which precedes it to shine forth: it must burst upon him at once. He would know the unknowable; and the impossibility of learning it in the environment of humanity brings disappointment and

despair. Intensely he feels the restrictions of time and space. He would overstep those limitations ; and because the very conditions of his mortal existence are barriers which he cannot leap, his whole being is a moral chaos. He is in continual whirlpool. He will question and do battle with the Eternal because the universe is not made and governed otherwise than it is, because there is any government at all, and because, by certain forces, his actions are limited, his thoughts circumscribed, his knowledge confined. Heavily it lies upon him—the misery of limited knowledge without love, the moral wretchedness engendered by the separation of the intellect from goodness. This is his agony—he cannot free himself from the necessities of moral law. He will dare conflict with the principalities and powers of the spirit-world, if by that means some comprehension of the mysteries that bewilder him can be gained. He will transcend the sphere of tangible existence. Why should I be entangled by the pressure of material conditions and relations? Why may I not know more? Why not know all? Why cannot I scale the highest heights of truth? Why not fathom the unsounded depths? Why am I prohibited from understanding the sublime realities of the future? Why am I perplexed and tyrannized by an insatiable longing to see clearly the invisible? The actual incloses us everywhere. The senses impose upon us certain limitations, and when these are overstepped we are imprisoned by thought-forms. The spirit is conditioned. We are hemmed in by time, space, and personality. There is no complete escape from these boundaries. In our present organization there is built around the mind a wall, beyond which even the imagination cannot project itself; wall beyond wall, fair and crystal-like as the work of fairy hands; circle beyond circle in endless progression, yet still restriction; the infinite above us unapprehended, the problem of being behind the continually receding horizon. In impenetrable secrecy are some things hidden from our view. We cannot touch their extremities; we cannot reach their centre; we cannot see their beginning and end; their outmost circumference cannot be embraced. Are they in themselves absolutely and for ever incomprehensible? Or are they inscrutable only in relation to our surroundings? No idea can approach them; no eye can pierce to them; in invincible darkness are they concealed from us. Watch long and painfully, look up and gaze for a faint gleam of light to break through the impassable night. Will the smallest speck glint out upon the horizon while we are encompassed by certain conditions and limits? Through the thick obscurity will a star shine forth to the eager eye? Will no glimmering appear over that darkness to disperse it? Unfold thought to its widest development possible in this imperfect existence, and still some mysteries will not be included in that expansion. There is ever something beyond the most perfect human vision—something more full, more perfect—the infinite, which cannot be exhausted. Let the eye sweep round the horizon, let the imagination take its

most extensive flight, let consciousness be persistently interrogated, and still some enigmas baffle all these attempts to discover a solution: they remain—to some tauntingly, to some reverently, inconceivable.

Byron would break down the barriers which prevent him stepping into the unknown land. He does not strongly aspire to be in harmony with the moral laws which overrule him; he would rather destroy them. Because he cannot comprehend the absolute and final truth, he is at open hostility with things. Because he is defeated in his efforts to explain the riddle which puzzles us on every hand, his heart and mind are in discord with the melodies of truth. Because he cannot travel the whole immensity, he wanders homelessly about, and makes of the space allotted to him a desolation. Because he is imperfect and encircled by time, he is disquieted, agonized. The limitation of his faculties is the source of a sublime sadness. The proud man will not yield to the unalterable, and proclaims battle against it. It heeds him not—the puny, scornful mortal—that silent irrevocable law. The warfare brings its punishment—pain, woe, unappeaseable despair. The wrestling and collision produce bitter results. For ever irreversible is the moral government to which our being is subject. Hence Byron is sceptical,—hopelessly miserable,—his mind distracted and exposed to endless anguish. Moral necessity is his ceaseless, deep-rooted torment.

The justness of these remarks will be evident if we consider the philosophic questions suggested by and discussed in those two dramas which are universally judged to be the most metaphysical of Byron's productions—"Manfred" and "Cain."

What is Manfred's intellectual character? He is oppressed by mysteries both in nature and the soul. His sympathy is not with common men, or with men in their ordinary moods and avocations. No love for man throws rays of beauty like a queenly moon over his clouded heart. He is a stranger to the pursuits and thoughts of human kind in general. His condition here is far different from that of most living beings. He cannot exist amid the trivialities of every day. Without contempt he looks down upon our narrow conventionalism; without emotion he contemplates our joys; without envy he surveys our noblest achievements. Only slight communion does he hold with mortals; the experiences of humanity are regarded with philosophic indifference. His sphere is the abstruse. He is devoted to the study of the abstract and occult. He "heaps knowledge from forbidden mines of love." The supernatural, the impalpable—those are the regions over which his thought ranges. He endeavours to unfold that which is secret, to obtain a glimpse into the invisible. Is there not a higher kingdom than this physical kingdom of nature? Beyond the sweep of imagination are there not awful verities, at present unsearchable? Come there no voices to the child of clay, bidding him remember the unseen world? Is the hereafter a phantasy? Is our faith in

an imperishable soul, in a being that escapes from the clogs of the body and the confinement of the tomb, a mockery? The soul struggles to reach the fountain of knowledge, and longs for the sympathy of divine love. Are we misled by a beautiful illusion? We are disconcerted by mental and moral problems, which arise apparently out of a spiritual essence, and are connected with a spiritual world: are these only the confusions of a brain affected by an imperfect or a diseased organization, or by physical maladies? There is a faith which worships only in the temple of material things, which believes in nothing beyond the continent of the senses: is not that cold and unsatisfactory? There is a faith which transcends nature, which looks from the seen to the unseen, from time to eternity, which, by acknowledging the Infinite, blesses its possessor with the feeling of freedom from the trammels of the finite: is not that a sublime faith, the noblest? The one shuts out the future, immortality, God, and crushes the grandest instincts of our nature: are those instincts superfluities and wastes, for which no object is provided? The other, the faith which cherishes what positivism ignores, and cultures faculties whose actions and products science cannot test, weigh, and analyze, presents us with the sufficing and eternal things for which we naturally struggle, with One absolutely perfect object of love and reverence; it generates the holiest impulses; it incontestably assures us that the future life is no dream or fable, but a reality.

Manfred's faith does not grasp these verities of the religion of Jesus; but it does reject materialism, and communes with something beyond visible things. He does assert the existence of a spiritual world, and his passionate daring is to penetrate to the heart of that world's tormenting mysteries without fulfilling the condition which make the solution possible—death. His philosophy does not contain the highest things in heaven and earth, but it does affirm that there is a life after the death of the body. The subjects of his study lie beyond the provinces both of the senses and the reason. To gain in time the knowledge which only eternity can bestow constitutes the object of his wild, unbridled longing. The full possession of all truth, while fettered in a perishable frame, is the aim of his ambition. He would ascend to the source of truth, and boldly spy into the essence of things. Nothing less than an existence without any possible limit will satisfy him—an eye to which the secrets of the universe shall be open. What means does he use to nullify the restriction; to open that door which keeps his soul from the presence of first causes and principles; to liberate the mind from the effects of physical surroundings? How shall he escape from his environments and overstep the actual? With what keys shall he unlock the gates of his prison-house? Already he has destroyed the barriers of his senses. Cannot he freely move, think, and act within his kingdom, though circled? Cannot the kingdom be ever more extending, the circumference endlessly widening? Cannot the spirit create new limits for itself—limits beyond limits

without number, ever enlarging its boundaries? It can. As Descartes could not conceive a finite world, but, on the contrary, maintained that the extension of the globe was indefinite, expansion beyond expansion illimitably, so we cannot conceive the mind as shut in by restrictions which are finally and absolutely impassable, but are conscious of a retiring movement everlastingly going on, the imagination making its own restrictions, and thus incessantly amplifying the sphere of thought. This is what Manfred allows his imagination to do. Vaster and vaster becomes its range. It feeds upon the wonderful and marvellous. It treads upon unfrequented ground. It travels in domains wherein ordinary men have prohibited themselves from wandering. It beholds worlds beyond this terrestrial earth. Like Faust, he brings magic to his aid. He "passes the nights of years in sciences untaught." He is "a magician of great power and fearful skill." He assumes the prerogative of summoning unearthly apparitions to his will, of communing with—

"The many evil and unheavenly spirits  
Which walk the valley of the shade of death."

He intensely studies the teachers of the occult sciences. He "makes his eyes familiar with eternity."

"His knowledge, and his power, and will,  
As far as is compatible with clay,  
Which clogs the ethereal essence, have been such  
As clay hath seldom borne; his aspirations  
Have been beyond the dwellers of the earth."

He is not content with the attainable. He will endeavour to grasp the Infinite. But the intellect cannot grasp it. He knows nothing of humility and self-denial; he will not learn the doctrine which Goethe calls "renunciation;" therefore the invisible will not reveal itself to him. His knowledge is impotent because his moral nature is diseased, because his heart is wrong. His sciences are vanity,—

"And they have only taught him what we know,  
That knowledge is not happiness, and science  
But an exchange of ignorance for that  
Which is another kind of ignorance."

Manfred himself bitterly confesses,—

"They who know the most  
Must mourn the deepest o'er the fatal truth,  
The tree of knowledge is not that of life."

The darkness of ignorance is overcome, but deep-rooted misery lacerates his soul. Happiness is hidden from him. Isolated from mankind, he is haunted by a memory which peoples his solitude with the Furies, and which maddens him into fiery remorse. A memory of what? Of a woman slain by his heart. He had a sister, named Astarte, who, intellectually, was like himself;—

"She had the same lone thoughts and wanderings,  
The guest of hidden knowledge, and a mind  
To comprehend the universe."

In the hope, perhaps (as old books of magic may have suggested to him), of gaining the most glorious happiness, or of becoming preternatural in knowledge and power, this sister was sacrificed. To suppose that he destroyed her by an unnameable passion is inconsistent with Manfred's studies, mental pursuits, and objects. The assumption that he caused her death while under the dominion of an imagined cabalistic influence, and in the hope of purchasing something otherwise believed to be unobtainable, is most natural to the story, and to Manfred's dark cryptic arts. The manner of her death is not disclosed. The end of it—whatever that may have been—is not procured. What is the effect on Manfred?

The drama opens with Manfred's confession of his utter unrest, and the hopelessness of his search after quiet and oblivion of the crime. The spectre of remembrance has haunted him from of old. He is inexorably shut up between the walls of an awful memory. What a fearful altercation with his thought! Where shall he run to escape from it? How shall he crush and annihilate it? Where shall he find the Lethe to quench his thirst? Will volleys of cannon hush the stern, unmerciful voice? Wonder, in her measureless realms, cannot find a cave where its condemnation is not heard in ceaseless reverberations. Music cannot sing it into softer tones. In philosophy there is no healing. In the domains of science he fruitlessly wanders. Speed him over the wide earth, the spectre is everywhere tormenting him, quick travelling as his own wish, swift as his own fancy, inseparable as his own shadow. The universe is a huge dungeon of wretchedness, arched by a grim sky, without one star or speck of light. He has no hope or fear of anything. Unfrettingly, sublimely, he will endure all his sufferings. All around him, occasioned by the consciousness of his guilt, are discord and confusion, and the forces of nature are turned into devouring elements, which he will defiantly set at nought; within him, a soul demon-peopled by his own fancy. The intellect "avails him not." He invokes the spirits of the elements, and demands from them the boon of forgetfulness. He only discovers their incapacity to alleviate his misery. Baffled in this endeavour, he meditates suicide; but—

"There is a power upon him which withholds,  
And make it his fatality to live."

He enters the hall of the Sovereign of the Destinies, and commands that the dead be called forth, that he may question them. The phantom of Astarte appears:—

"*Man.* Hear me, hear me,  
Astarte! my beloved! speak to me.  
I have so much endured—so much endure—  
Look on me! the grave hath not changed thee more

Than I am changed for thee. Thou lovedst me  
 Too much, as I loved thee: we were not made  
 To torture thus each other, though it were  
 The deadliest sin to love as we have loved.  
 Say that thou loath'st me not—that I do bear  
 This punishment for both—that thou wilt be  
 One of the bless'd—and that I shall die;  
 For hitherto all hateful things conspire  
 To bind me in existence—in a life  
 Which makes me shrink from immortality—  
 A future like the past. I cannot rest.  
 I know not what I ask, nor what I seek;  
 I feel but what thou art—and what I am;  
 And I would hear yet once before I perish  
 The voice which was my music—speak to me!  
 For I have call'd on thee in the still night,  
 Startled the slumbering birds from the hush'd boughs,  
 And woke the mountain wolves, and made the caves  
 Acquainted with thy vainly echo'd name,  
 Which answer'd me—many things answer'd me—  
 Spirits and men—but thou wert silent all.  
 Yet speak to me; I have outwatch'd the stars,  
 And gaz'd o'er heaven in vain in search of thee.  
 Speak to me! I have wander'd o'er the earth,  
 And never found thy likeness—speak to me!  
 Look on the fiends around—they feel for me.  
 I fear them not, and feel for thee alone—  
 Speak to me! though it be in wrath; but say—  
 I reck not what—but let me hear thee once—  
 This once—once more!

"Phantom of Astarte. Manfred!

"Man. Say on, say on!

I live but in the sound—it is thy voice!

"Phan. Manfred! To-morrow ends thine earthly ills.

Farewell!

"Man. Yet one word more; am I forgiven?

"Phan. Farewell!

"Man. Say, shall we meet again?

"Phan. Farewell!

"Man. One word for mercy! Say thou lovest me.

"Phan. Manfred! [*The spirit of ASTARTE disappears.*]

"Nem. She's gone, and will not be recall'd;

Her words will be fulfill'd. Return to the earth.

"A Spirit. He is convulsed. This is to be a mortal,  
 And seek the things beyond mortality."

All his efforts to procure oblivion of the past are defeated. He does not look above. He acknowledges no God. To no king will he bow. Scorn is his everlasting companion. To love, to the heart, to all that is morally noble, that could bury the past and make the future joyous, he is a stranger. He will not submit to those divine laws by obeying which his requirements can be gained. He must die to learn the secrets he would here uncover. In the

hour of death demons claim him for their forfeit; but he denies their power over him, bids them disappear from his presence, and they vanish. Then his eyes open in eternity, whose mysteries he vainly searched into in his life.

Manfred represents the war between the flesh and the conscience, between what theologians call the "natural" man and the moral laws which God has imposed upon human life. Only on one condition can peace be proclaimed, finite harmonized with infinite, man's existence made accordant with the will and government of God. Manfred will not comply, he disdains to obey. He fights vainly the necessity of law. He scorns the Ordainer who has laid it upon him. He rebels against the command which requires from us one of the highest acts of which we are capable—submission to the eternal decrees. He is suffering the penalty of guilt, and while he would emancipate himself from that he refuses to acknowledge his culpability. He calls for peace, but externally and internally there is unslackening war. He strives to blot out the past; but it is everlastingly present. He would crush the recollection of bygone times, but hourly it grows more vivid. He looks for light; but the darkness increases in density. He intensely longs to behold a ray of hope, be it but a faint shimmering; but despair sinks deeper into his soul, like poison-tipped arrow after arrow shot quicker and stronger to the core from the unseen bow of an angel of retribution. Such is the discord, and chaos, and strife within him. This disorder is the result of his revolt against that vital and fundamental truth, —*man is under law*.

To sum up; intellectually, Manfred struggles to conquer the limitations by which every mental faculty is beset;—morally, frustrated in the object for which he destroyed Astarte in a manner undivulged, and for an end unrevealed—probably the realization of his intellectual sin—he is severed from hope, avows no responsibility to the inner tribunal of his conscience, and no accountableness to God, owns to no compunction for his crime, defies all punishment, although his memory is an eternally tormenting condemnation, and his mind a hell.

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## The Reviewer.

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*A Popular Appeal in Favour of a New Version of Scripture. Part II. The Priesthood of Christ.* By JAMES JOHNSTONE. London: James Nisbet and Co.

INTELLIGENT students of "Holy Writ," whose prayer is, "Open Thou mine eyes, that I may behold wondrous things out of Thy law," will rejoice at every effort made to elucidate the signification of the word of salvation, and that an earnest, God-fearing man has set himself to the agitation of the question of a revision of the Authorized Version of the Scriptures as his life-work. A second instalment of this "Appeal" is now before us, and in our opinion excels the former one as greatly in value as it exceeds it in bulk. It aims at a discussion of the chief elements of error occasioned by the phraseology of the ordinary English translation of the Bible, regarding "the Priesthood of Christ." Several passages of the Word are opened and expounded,—1 Pet. iii. 18—21; Isa. liii. 9—12; texts relating to Christ's resurrection (of which a list is given),—Lev. xvii. 11; xxiii. 10, 11; Matt. xxvii. 50—54; xxviii. 9, 10; 1 Tim. iii. 16; &c., &c. The consideration of these passages form the themes of several sections of the eight chapters into which the present part is divided,—the tendency of the whole being to prove "that there is light thrown" on the great doctrine of Christ's priesthood in the word of God, "which has hitherto been obscured through mistranslations in the received version of the Scriptures."

A Divine word has been given to us—"Search the Scriptures." "How readest thou?" is a question He once and again asked who came as the True Light; and He reproaches the lawyers of old for taking away "the key of knowledge" from the people. It seems clear, therefore, that such inquiries are sanctioned by our Saviour; and this is really all the sanction sincere Christians require. Questions of expediency or of usefulness may arise and require consideration, but the searcher for Divine Truth cannot be wrong in his object.

While we were reading Mr. James Johnstone's work, a pamphlet entitled "Baptism is dipping," six lectures by Francis Johnstone, one of the able Baptist pastors of Edinburgh, came into our hands, and, we are induced, reviewing this book as we do in the *British Controversialist*, to exhibit a paragraph which the "Appeal" contains in parallel columns, with some quotations from the latter-named work, which we may note incidentally as a very excellent tract on its own merits,—for so controverted points are always best seen.

FRANCIS JOHNSTONE'S BAPTISM IS  
DIPPING.

That "dipping is not baptism" is "an assertion utterly opposed to the witness of the Greek, to which the word *baptism* belongs; to the history of the church, from which we find dipping has been practised as baptism for 1800 years; to the word of God that teaches us that baptism is a burial; to the testimony of thousands of scholars, linguists, theologians, church historians, and commentators" (p. 3).

"The Greek word *baptizo*, both in Greek lexicons and Greek writers, denotes to dip, immerse, plunge, overwhelm. And no passage can be given in which it denotes either to drown on the one hand, or to pour or sprinkle on the other" (p. 34). "The first and great argument is the meaning of the word *baptizo*, which, as we have already seen, both in the Greek classics and Jewish writers, always implies and demands immersion, in the action or condition, literal or figurative. With this word the Baptists make their way through all opposition and over all difficulties. With this word they hold an immersion proved, and the impossibility of any man whatever disproving it by any difficulty which can be started. With this word we are as sure of an immersion as if the Greek word had been the Latin *mergo*, or our own Saxon *dip*, plunge, overwhelm" (p. 39). "The truth is, that both before and at the time of Christ, and after, the word *baptizo* in Greek writers is as fixed in its meaning as the word *dip* in English writers" (p. 85).

The following quotation will show what the author of "The Popular Appeal" thinks he has accomplished, and what the reader may expect to find proven in the tract:—

"Here falls to the ground, like a withered leaf, the oft-repeated assertion that a new version of the Scriptures would not throw a new light on any of the fundamental doctrines of salvation. There is light thrown on the doctrine of Christ's priesthood in these pages by the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures, which cannot be found in the received translation of them, or in any new version of them hitherto published."

We would willingly quote farther specimens, but the whole criticism and interpretation is so knit together that we find it difficult to disjoin a fragment.

JAMES JOHNSTONE'S BAPTISM IS NOT  
DIPPING.

"Note on 1 Pet. iii. 20, 21.—'When once waited the longsuffering of God in the days Noah prepared the ark, in which few, that is, eight souls, were preserved by water. So us, the antitype, now saves, baptism, not of flesh, putting away of filth, but of conscience, of good desire towards God; by the resurrection of Jesus Christ.' When this text is translated word for word, as given to us by God in the original Greek, it is found to contain the Almighty's fiat against translating the Greek word *baptisma* invariably by the word *immerse*. In this text the word *baptisma* has given to it by God two meanings, and an explanation of one of them. The first is '*baptisma* of flesh, putting away of filth.' The second is '*baptisma* of conscience,' which the Almighty explains by adding the words 'of good desire towards God.' Men as born into this world do not possess good desire towards God; 'the carnal mind is enmity against God' (Rom. viii. 7); '*baptisma* of conscience, of good desire towards God,' can signify nothing else than a change or purifying of conscience towards God. It is manifest that the passage cannot be correctly translated if it is made *immersion* of conscience, or *immersion* of good desire towards God; yet in the New Testament, published by the American Bible Union, the word *baptisma* is here translated *immersion*, in manifest contradiction to the explanation of the word as given to us by God in this text" (p. 95).

## The Topic.

### OUGHT MINORITIES TO BE REPRESENTED?

#### AFFIRMATIVE.

MINORITIES ought to be represented, else any one who holds an unpopular opinion is virtually disfranchised; for his vote has no effect in the nation. This is in reality, therefore, persecution for opinion's sake. It is right that all honestly formed opinions should be equal before the law; but the non-representation is nothing else than a bonus on mediocrity, and a punishment for originality. Neither of these ought to be; but they must be, unless minorities are represented.—T. M. D.

The interests of men have never been well attended to by majorities. Great men originate new thoughts, and convince a few choice friendly spirits. These again labour for the revision of prevailing political or social schemes. Some ready means of giving audibility to the ideas of men of higher thought than others should be got. We have an example of this system in the members for Oxford and for Cambridge, who are representatives of the minority of learned men. We find in this instance that the representation of a minority is beneficial, and we see that it is practical. It would be well for the country if some mark of regard was given to men of distinction, and the representation of minorities would provide this.—B. C. M.

Our present legislation altogether ignores, and that most wrongfully, all minorities. By a singular perversity of thought, wisdom has been declared to be the property of the many, though all experience shows us that it is the possession of a few only. In consequence of this, one part of the nation dominates over the other, which is of no account in the records of government. A suffrage

is not just, which makes one man, though possessed of a vote, a mere cipher in the nation, because his views differ from those along with whom he is accidentally compelled to exercise the franchise. At present, in reality, the members of our Parliament are elected by the few votes which form the difference between the minority which loses and the majority which carries the day, the voice of one party being wholly lost, because it happens to differ from the prevailing, though certainly not always the right opinion. Majorities exercise a tyranny not more respectable and not less despotic than that of other irresponsible rulers. Government by majorities is not democracy, for democracy is the equal representation of each and all—that is only the representation of the most servile minds, those who can be herded to the hustings by the agent of a party.—TEMPERANTIA.

Representative assemblies ought to provide for the due exercise of the franchise in such a way as to be effective to all who have claims to virtue, intelligence, love of law, property and life to protect, professional rights to uphold, or trade usages to support; in short, all those in whom the public good and their own interests can be regarded as identical. But the representation granted at present is that of a merely numerical majority, and not of all those whose interests are bound up with that of the community at large. Political equality is hereby infringed in its nicest point, and our boasted civilization comes to be only the refined selfishness of the greatest number. To grant a representation of minorities would obviate this charge.—PETER DICK.

That a man should be outlawed be-

cause he is in the minority is not right; yet this is practically what the present law does. It declares all who are not members of the majority incompetent to take a share in the regulation of society. This is a great wrong requiring an early remedy.—W. B. D. K.

If we ask who ought to compose the constituencies of this empire, the answer would probably be, all honest, thinking men; but the most honest and thoughtful men are those who form the minority always, for they are the originators of reforms; yet these we really disfranchise by our present law.—QUINTUS.

To call a general election, as it is carried on at present, an appeal to the sense of the nation is absurd. It ought rather to be called an appeal to the nonsense of the nation; for majorities can never be well informed, and therefore can never be judicious in their choice. It is not the choice of the majority that secures us now our passable house of representatives. It is the choice of the minority. The heads of parties select the men, and the followers implement the nomination. Minorities are thus virtually the nominators of our Parliament. This ought to be done away with, and an express law should be made for the legitimate representation of minorities in a right, just, and equitable manner.—JACOB JACOBUS.

Men who have zealously and steadily studied politics cannot but form opinions on subjects of national concern much in advance of, and far more correct than, those who only think of them now and again. J. S. Mill, for instance, knows more about political economy than perhaps three-fourths of even the educated men of our age; yet his vote only goes as far as a prosperous costermonger's; and there is no avenue open to him to help to send a man into the House, who would be known as the chosen of intelligent thinkers, who knew their man, and gave him his mission. Minorities ought to be represented.—DAVID NOURRIE.

#### NEGATIVE.

Minorities are nuisances in representative bodies. They are obstructives. They will not consent to be convinced, and they will not submit when outvoted. Government can only be carried on by a disposition to come and go. Only prevailing opinions can be listened to. Even the wisdom of Solon would be misplaced in our national assemblies where discussion is allowed. "Fancy franchises" to purchase the acquiescence of minorities are mere make-peace offerings, and are not founded on any right principle. If when men have votes they throw them away in vain attempts at attaining the unattainable—a representation of their own special views, without care for the consequences to the majority,—the majority ought not to help the minority into a more effective position.—J. WALKINSHAW.

Why should any man who is in a minority have a special privilege accorded to him? Why should he have the right to give expression to "second thoughts"? He has had one vote, why should he have another? If he has misused his vote once, may he not do so again? How would a voter in the minority at a side election act? would he get keeping it till a general election came on, or would he get using it at the next side one, and, if useless then, get it back once more? The representation of minorities is impracticable, and ought not therefore to be legalized. Minorities are already too well represented. They have the pulpit and the press, as well as a large proportion of the platform. In fact, our entire representation is a representation of minorities. A minority only have the franchise. We want universal suffrage, that we may get rid of the representation of minorities.—OPERATIVE.

Laws can only be cheerfully obeyed when they reflect the general mind of the country, and hence the legislature can only be practically useful by being made up of the representatives of the majority.—DAVID B.

"Most votes carries" is the maxim

of the day. Despots are minorities; crotchety men are minorities; all the quirky spirits are in minorities; the bubble currency doctors and the one-idea men are in minorities;—why should we be asked to agree to allow such men to be represented in our Houses of Parliament, which are the courts of appeal for what is best for the majority?—L. P.

Everything that is best, highest, and noblest is inevitably at first in a minority. Christianity itself was in a minority—a glorious minority of one, then twelve, then a few score, then many churches, and now it evangelizes the world. We cannot afford to have minorities represented; it would destroy their aggressive agency, take the marrow out of them. To represent minorities would be to stereotype mankind to the mere average of the majority, and that we know would not be wise.—N. D. W.

If minorities were represented, there would be an end of a large proportion of the activity in politics and morals which distinguishes the age in which we live. Minorities are the sources and centres of agitations, of associations, and of leagues. Their members become letter-writers to the papers, authors of pamphlets, and contributors to reviews. Into these channels they pour their energies, and they labour assiduously to

make converts. They speechify at public meetings, and exert every energy to become a majority, by exercising an influence on the convictions of their fellows. They know they must go heartily, earnestly, and effectively into concerted movements if they would gain their points. Minorities thus really become the public educators of the commonwealth—a function which they admirably fulfil, as may be seen from reflecting upon the Anti-slavery Society, the Reform Bill Agitation, the Ten Hours' Movement, the Anti-Corn Law League, the United Kingdom Alliance, the Newspaper Stamp Repeal Association, &c., &c., whose effectiveness was (or is) really due to there being no extant provision for the representation of majorities, and so they exert themselves to transform their few numbers into great ones, to cease to be minorities by attaining majorities, and so becoming entitled to representation.—A COB-DENITE.

The theory of majorities has been long and well tried, and like everything human, it has been proved to have its faults; but we do not think that these faults will be removed by the representation of minorities; on the contrary, we think they will be increased, because majorities generally choose what is best, while the minorities generally select what is inferior.—T. W.

## The Inquirer.

### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

537.—Can you tell me of a good "History of Sweden," containing an account of their early manners and customs, or other books equally useful.—J. W. B.

538. Who is Dr. Beard of Manchester? and what has he done or written?—CURIOSA.

539. Is there any "History of Accidents" published?—JAMES ALLAN.

540. From what books could one  
1865.

most readily glean a fair knowledge of the "Elements of Literary Criticism"?—H. C. H.

### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

516. *Self-culture in Theology* is always a difficult subject to give advice upon; because a suspicion of sectarianism almost inevitably lurks in the heart against the adviser. We would recommend the attainment of the power of reading the New Testament text in

the original by a study of Greek grammar, and the use of Giles's word for word Greek Testament; or, failing the practicability of this, the careful study of Dean Alford's New Testament for English readers, compared with Mr. Sharp's new translation. Collins's "Exegetical Commentary" will be almost sufficient for the study of the Old Testament Scriptures, unless a very critical acquaintance is wanted, in which case Horne's "Introduction to the Study of Scripture" might be used as a leading book. Ayre's "Biblical Treasury," Angus's "Bible Handbook," Eadie's "Biblical Encyclopædia," Kitto's "Cyclopedia of the Bible" (new edition, edited by Dr. W. L. Alexander), or the "Dictionary of the Bible," edited by Dr. W. Smith, would all (or each) be found to give valuable aid. A diligent and thorough perusal of the text of Scripture, with careful and thoughtful consultation of these works (or such of them as could be got) in cases of difficulty or doubt, and accompanied by earnest prayer, would perhaps suffice for all the ordinary purposes of a life not to be devoted to theological study. But if a more systematic course of divinity was wished, it would be necessary for an adviser to know more of the purpose than the query of G. D. S. R. supplies. As theology may either be studied *doctrinally*, i. e., in answer to the question, What do the Scriptures teach? *systematically*, i. e., What relation do the several doctrines of Christianity hold to each other? *historically*, i. e., In what times, under what circumstances, and with what results, did the several steps in progress of doctrine occur? *dogmatically*, i. e., What do Christian creeds teach, how came they so to teach, and on what grounds do these teachings rest? *expository*, i. e., What do the creeds mean, and how do the meanings thus assigned to them arise out of or flow from the sacred text? *exegetically*, i. e., Taking the sacred text as a topic of thought, to what results in the ultimate issues do the cognate passages lead as to doctrine and practice?

*practically*, i. e., What are the duties incumbent on Christians, and on what basis given in the Scriptures do they rest? *apologetically*, i. e., What objections have obtained in the world among thinkers or among the unconverted, and how may they be confuted and reduced? or *philosophically*, i. e., What place in thought does Christianity hold, how does it collide against or conform to all other speculations regarding righteousness,—it is evident that no slight single answer could meet the views of G. D. S. R. at haphazard. I shall be glad to resume the subject hereafter if wished.—A—R.

527. Oratory is a gift. But the power of public speaking is a culturable habit of expressing one's thoughts aloud. Everything that moulds the style and influences the mind aids effective public speaking. Imitative eloquence is, however, not likely to rise to the topmost height of a great argument. The expositions of eloquence which have been lately given in this serial correspond pretty much with our own experience and observation, and we wonder that after perusing them "A Student" should put the question he does,—unless it be in the hope that it may suggest to the writer of these papers the necessity of showing how the eloquence he defines and dilates on may be practically got hold of. Without attempting any *ex cathedra* exposition, I would recommend "A Student" to watch all the orators he has an opportunity of hearing, and to read with care all the orations he can get. Let him mark what in these affect him, and remembering that like is affected by like, let him imitate these orators or orations in these points. Frequent copying may fix a style, as may careful *memoriter* acquirement of former eloquent writings, but an earnest man always forms his own style, and his oratory grows and develops rather than is built. "A Student" must be earnest, then he will scarcely fail in being eloquent.—JODRELL.

529. The best works known to me on

Spanish literature are "History of Spanish Literature," by George Ticknor, born at Boston, 1st August, 1791, author of a "Life of Lafayette," &c. It was first published in three volumes in 1849, but has since been reissued: see also a review of this work in Prescott's "Critical and Historical Essays," pp. 442—501; Frederick Bonterwek's "History of Poetry and Eloquence," the part of which relating to Spanish Literature has been translated by Miss Thomasina Ross, and was issued, we think, in Bogue's series. His opinions have been substantially adopted and his facts reproduced by Sismondi, in his "Historical View of the Literature of the South of Europe," which has been translated into English by Thomas Roscoe, and forms two volumes of Bohn's Library. The chapters relating to Spain are XXIII.—XXXV. In the "Literary History of the Middle Ages," by Joseph Berrington (1743—1827), also issued in Bogue's Library, some chapters on "Letters in Spain" may be found, which may be followed up by a perusal of the chapters on the same subject in Hallam's "Literary History." Dr. Bowring's "Ancient Poetry," and "Romances of Spain" are interesting and useful. A less valuable work than those noted above has been published by Messrs. Chambers, edited by A. F. Foster (1851), while a briefer summary is to be found in "A Handbook of Modern European Literature," by Mrs. M. E. Foster (1849), pp. 55—103. We ought not to omit G. H. Lewes's pleasant little work on the "Spanish Drama," in Knight's volume; Dennis's "Cid," in the same useful series; and the volumes in Lardner's "Cabinet Cyclopædia," containing the Lives of the most eminent literary men of Italy, Spain, and Portugal. The introductory lecture delivered in 1825, by Don Ant. Ale Galiano, as Professor of the Spanish

language and literature in the University of London, contains some judicious and able remarks on the language and literature of the land from which he was exiled. Lectures XI. and XII., in F. Schlegel's "History of Literature, Ancient and Modern," have a few observations of Spanish writers. From these sources—all that I remember at present—your inquirer may gather a pretty fair notion of the attractions of Spanish letters. The study of Spanish is not difficult. Its root words remain almost entirely Latin; and the syntax, though differing somewhat from English, is less stringent and intricate than the classical or the Teutonic tongues. The advantages of its study are obvious.—S. N.

533. The most comprehensive encyclopædia, or series of encyclopædias, as regards subjects noticed or treated, are Maunders's "Treasures." There are six published—viz., "Science and Literature," "Biography," "General Knowledge," "Natural History," "History," and "Geography." Most have gone through many editions, and each new edition is thoroughly revised and corrected. Two others are in preparation—viz., "Biblical Knowledge," and "Botany." These works are considered trustworthy, and, for general reference, I know of no others in the language to equal them. The price is 10s. per vol., but booksellers in most large towns sell them at about 15 per cent. under the published price. Copies are to be met with at low prices at most book-stalls.—G. H.

537. The "History of Denmark, Sweden and Norway," by Dr. Dunham, in Lardner's "Cabinet Cyclopædia," 3s. 6d., Messrs. Longman and Co. "Life of Gustavus Adolphus," in the "Family Library;" and the article "Sweden," in the "English Cyclopædia," are the best sources I know.—R. M. A.

## The Societies' Section.

*Young Men's Associations for Religious Improvement.*—On a former occasion (vol. xxi., p. 388) we had the privilege, in the pages of this Magazine, of presenting a few remarks on the place and influence of "Young Men's Mutual Improvement Associations." These undoubtedly hold a unique and essential position among the agencies which are intended to develop thought and assist in the improvement of the mind; and he does himself an injustice who keeps aloof from their membership and work. With reference to associations in which the course of study is of a religious or scriptural character, we should be inclined to take even higher ground than this. It is highly *advantageous* to a young man to unite himself with others for the purpose of *literary* improvement; it appears to us almost *imperative*, especially at the present time, that every one who has his own spiritual welfare and that of others at heart, should form a connection with some association where *religious* truth forms the subject of serious consideration. Our age, with all its glory, is yet one which no thoughtful Christian can contemplate with feelings of unmixed pleasure. It is a cold and secular one, and many influences are springing from the very elements of its greatness, pre-eminently hostile to "pure and undiluted religion." It is an age of lax theology and prevailing scepticism; and hence it is one in which intelligent and settled views on religious questions are supremely necessary. To aid the young in arriving at these is, or should be, the objects of religious associations; and in furthering this important end they meet exactly what is one of the wants of our times. Too little attention is being given to this subject even by such as professedly adhere to evan-

gelical Christianity; the result being, that while every book hostile to religion which controversy has pushed prominently forward is eagerly laid hold of by young men, the great proportion are in no fit condition to pass a very superficial examination in the vital doctrines of the Christian faith. Where well conducted, nothing can be more helpful than a Young Man's Religious Association in connection with private Bible study, in enabling one, perplexed and confused by the clamours of rival parties in the church, to separate truth from error in the region of theology; while this is accomplished without the danger of encountering those asperities of temper and outbreaks of party-spirit which too often characterize sectarian discussions. Apart altogether, however, from the special necessities of our age, religious associations possess strong claims upon young men. There is no true Christian, no man whose heart is thoroughly imbued with love to Christ, who does not feel it to be his duty, privilege, and delight to study the will, character, and work of God as revealed in His holy word. A properly tempered heart cannot sink into a condition of self-complacency. It is ever seeking to vivify and increase the glow of spiritual life within itself. It realizes more and more the grandeur and richness of the truth of God, and seeks to open up to that, as deposited in the Scriptures, new and successful avenues. Religious associations, conducted in a judicious manner, are extremely helpful to earnest students of the Bible. They must be so. They bring the light of many minds to bear upon the one topic; and, each contributing its own special and peculiar portion of thought, the various sides and relations of that one topic are *all*



developed harmoniously. This could hardly be done by one mind, whose individual view of the subject must therefore be necessarily imperfect. Many of the stern difficulties which perplex a Bible student are only so because the subject is being contemplated from an essentially erroneous point of view; and many more are such as others in the course of their reading and study have found to admit of a satisfactory solution. Hence a clearer insight into divine truth can oftener be obtained in a short time by connection with such an association than could be had by a very great amount of solitary study.

All the remarks, moreover, which we previously made concerning the impulse to study imparted by connection with Literary Associations, and the beneficial character of the friendships formed among its members, are also applicable here; only in the case of religious associations the solemnity and grandeur, and practical importance of the truths which come before the mind from time to time, as well as the character of the friendships which are formed in the mutual study of such sacred themes, exert a purifying and ennobling influence upon the character of their members, which the former can neither command nor produce.

We were extremely glad to perceive the notices which have occasionally appeared in these pages concerning the character and operations of one of the branches of the "Glasgow Young Men's Society for Religious Improvement," viz., that of George Square. The writer might be allowed to refer to another important branch of the same society, with which for many years he had the

pleasure of being connected, viz., that of St. Andrew's Square. Its present studies are designed chiefly for those who are anxious to obtain clear impressions of doctrinal truth. Its extensive syllabus embodies a thorough and exhaustive course of systematic theology, while the careful and able manner in which every topic is investigated by the members can only be properly appreciated by those who regularly take part in its exercises. Besides the doctrinal *body* of the syllabus, arranged in three great divisions—1. God; 2. Christ—the Holy Spirit; 3. Man,—it embraces an important series of subjects on Messianic Prophecy, and another on the Practical Aspects of the Christian Life; the whole line of study being interspersed with parts of four other series on the miracles of Christ,—His parables; Scripture biography, and incidents connected with the labours of the apostles.

The members of this branch have likewise access to one of the first theological libraries in the city, besides its own small library and the library of the "General Society." There are also in connection with it Thursday evening winter classes for the study of Neander's "Church History," and of "Moral Philosophy;" and a Tuesday evening summer class, for the study of some of the advanced departments of English Grammar.

Further information, we have no doubt, would be given (if applied for) by the Secretary of the Branch, Mr. George Manuel, 127, Shamrock Street, Glasgow. Its meetings are held in St. Andrew's Square Schoolroom on sabbath mornings, at half-past seven o'clock.

*Scots Law Society, instituted 1815.*—The jubilee of the above society took place in the Edinburgh Hotel. Fifty gentlemen sat down to dinner. Mr. Adam Gifford, advocate (an honorary member of the society), occupied the chair. Mr. Robert Ellis, W.S., croupier. Many honorary members were present. The chairman

stated that he had received a number of letters of apology from a great many gentlemen whose avocations prevented their being present personally. The call addressed to the members had been responded to by all. He then gave the usual loyal and patriotic toasts. The chairman proposed the toast of the evening, "The Scots Law Society."

Fifty years ago that society had its birth, and they were glad to find they had present some of the founders of the society; many of the early members were present to witness its manhood. Many vicissitudes had befallen the society's progress. Many a time it had been on the verge of dissolution, but those who had founded it came to the rescue, and gave it a new lease of life. The society had survived its juvenile diseases, and had acquired a vitality of its own. He trusted that, like a corporation, it would never die. Many pleasures had been enjoyed in the halls in which it met. But the pleasure was the least of it; 500 gentlemen had attended; many of these still survive, and fill situations of honour, profit, and usefulness. He could not but feel that the society, whose fiftieth anniversary they were met to celebrate, might claim the honour of having effected great and permanent good. All the world is a school, and all the men and women therein are scholars; the first lesson is learned in their earliest days, and they are learning on till death. The Scots Law Society seemed to him to be one of the great educational institutes of the country. From its lessons were to be derived which were beneficial in all relations of life. The exchange of thought which took place in it ripened the minds of those who exchanged them. Partial truths were enlarged, supplemented, and made complete and entire. Distorted views were corrected; errors were brought to the light, and seen in their deformity. The mixture of thoughts and ideas, like the mixture of the rays of light, made that which was coloured, and partial, and incomplete, pure, and perfect, and complete, like the light of day. These advantages were accompanied with a delight and pleasure which they sought in vain in the stormier and rougher walks of life. They never had the pleasures enjoyed in the Scots Law Society in the debates they had to engage in elsewhere. It was a charac-

teristic of the society's meetings from its earliest days that, while there was keenness of argument and heat of encounter—while the arguments were sharp and the reasons piercing, there never was any bitterness, never any personal animosity. They met as friends and gentlemen, and as such they parted. The society derived lessons from experience. Essays were introduced in addition to debates, introductory addresses to vary the monotony of ordinary meetings, and valedictory addresses to send the gentlemen who had been conflicting all summer away in a friendly spirit. Not only so, but the society, strong in itself, held out its hands to sister societies; and the associated societies sprung up, of which there were at one time six, but which had now, he believed, been reduced to four. The intercourse between these societies cultivated a spirit of the best kind—not of hatred, but of emulation. Delegates were sent from one society to the other; open meetings were introduced, at which all the members of the societies might attend and take part; and thus what was at first but the meeting of a few gentlemen for mutual improvement had now become one of the institutions of the city, and one of the great educators of our legal youth. The chairman expressed his trust that the success of the present was but the beginning of an era in the history of the society which would be much more prosperous, and pointed out that the society might be greatly aided by the co-operation of its honorary members' occasional attendance at the meetings of the society, &c. He concluded by proposing success and prosperity to the Scots Law Society.

*Paisley Young Men's Bible Institute.*  
—A *soirée* of the Young Men's Bible Institute was held in the Abercorn Rooms. The hall was filled with the members of the Bible Institute and of the Bible Classes for young women, in connection with the Free Middle Church, taught by Mr. Matthew Muir, Mr. John Macalaster,

and a number of friends. On the platform were the Rev. Wm. Fraser, president of the institute, Mr. Wm. Keddie, Lecturer on Science, Glasgow, and the office-bearers of the Free Middle Church. After tea the president gave an address, in which he stated that he had been led to originate the Bible Institute for the purpose of affording young men an opportunity of systematically studying the evidences of the truths revealed in the Bible, and to enable them to meet the various scientific and critical objections which were brought against the word of God at the present day. The Institute had been attended with much success, and had now begun to take a hold on the community. Upwards of one hundred young men were now passing through the exercises of the Institute, and the public rarely saw placards posted on the walls of the town announcing meetings at which the truths of the Bible were attacked by men who displayed a lamentable ignorance of the subjects they discussed. He urged the young men before him to beware of mental listlessness regarding the great truths which concerned their spiritual well-being, and, above all, to cherish an earnest reverence for the Bible. Mr. John Miller, sec., read the report, which gave a statement of the course of study pursued during the past year, and a notice of the beneficial results which the Institute was calculated to produce. Mr. Hugh Harper, treasurer, read the financial statement. Both reports were adopted. Mr. Keddie then addressed the meeting on the unity of design manifested in the various types of the animal creation as afford-

ing proof of the unity of God, commending his hearers to study the various objects in the natural world, as revealing the power and wisdom of God, and concluded by assuring them that faith in the truths revealed in God's word was indispensable to fit mankind to live worthily here, and to prepare for a blessed existence hereafter. The chairman then intimated that Mr. R. N. Barbour (a member of the Established Church) was the successful competitor for the prize offered by Mr. M. Muir to the members of the Bible Institute for the best outline of the course of addresses delivered to the members during the session. Mr. Muir addressed Mr. Barbour, and presented him with the prize—four valuable books. The vice-president, Mr. Lawrie, in name of the members of the Bible Institute, presented Mr. Fraser with a handsome arm-chair as a token of their appreciation of his valuable labours among them. Mr. Fraser expressed his deep sense of the kindness which the gift implied, which he regarded as evidence that his services in the Bible Institute were appreciated. Mr. Thomson detailed what had been done during the past year by some of the young men of the Bible Institute in associations formed for intellectual and religious improvement. Mr. A. R. Pollock was commissioned by Mr. John Macalaster's female Bible Class to present him with a time-piece as a mark of their esteem for him as their teacher. Mr. Macalaster suitably acknowledged the gift. The proceedings were agreeably diversified by the singing of a band and some performances on the piano.

## Our Collegiate Course; OR, AIDS TO SELF-CULTURE.

### STUDIES IN ENGLISH LITERATURE.

#### POPE'S "ESSAY ON CRITICISM."—PART II.

[The causes of imperfect criticism:—1. Pride; 2. Defective Knowledge; 3. Judging of the whole, on a survey merely of parts.]

1

5

Of all the *causes* (1) which *conspire* to *blind*  
 Man's *erring* judgment, and *misguide* the *mind*,  
 What the *weak head* with *strongest bias* rules  
 Is pride (2)—the *never-failing vice* of fools.  
*Whatever* Nature has in *worth denied*,

#### MEANINGS OF WORDS IN ITALICS, AS SUGGESTIONS FOR PARAPHRASING.

Line 1. Occasioning impulses; unite; obscure.	4. Constantly active fault; ignorant men.
2. Fallible; lead astray; reason.	5. Anything that; excellence with-
3. Feeble intellect; most powerful prejudice overmasters.	held.

(1) "The doctrine of causation, in its simplest and most generalized form, may be briefly stated thus: that there is throughout Nature a constant series of events, seeming to depend on each other—the subsequent on the antecedent; the former of any two events being commonly denominated the cause, the latter the effect" (p. 51). "The simplest idea of a cause is, that which of itself makes anything begin to be" (p. 74).—"The Whole Doctrine of Final Causes," by Dr. William Josiah Irons.

"Cause, taken in its most general sense, denotes the particular occasion or chance on which the event connected with it, and which is called the effect or thing done, took place. . . . According to Aristotle, as is well known, a cause is of four kinds:—1. *Material*, which denotes the relation in which the marble stands to the statue that is formed of it. 2. *Formal*, which denotes the cause of everything being precisely what it is. . . . 3. *Efficient*, or that from which effects proceed. And 4. *Final*, which expresses the purpose or object intended to be accomplished by these effects. . . . If I were to attempt to annex a precise meaning to the term efficient cause, I should call it that which directly and immediately produces a change or event in nature."—R. E. Scott's "*Causation*," chap. i.

"The cause of a thing is that antecedent (or aggregate of antecedents) which is seen to have an intimate connection with the effect, viewed, if it be not itself a self-determining agent, in reference to a self-acting power whose agency it exhibits."—Karslake's "*Aids to the Study of Logic*," vol. ii., p. 43.

(2) "When I define pride to be that emotion which attends the contemplation of our own excellence, I must be understood as limiting the phrase to the single emotion that immediately follows the contemplation. The feeling of our excellence may give rise, directly or indirectly, to various other affections of the mind. . . . Vanity, then, and haughtiness, are not to be confounded with the simple pride

She gives in large recruits of needful pride!  
 For as in bodies, thus in souls, we find  
 What wants in blood and spirits, swelled with wind;  
 Pride, where wit fails, steps in to our defence,  
 And fills up all the mighty void of sense.  
 If once right reason (3) drives that cloud away.

10

6. Bestows; supplies; requisite  
 egotism.

7. Exactly; so; notice.

8. Is defective; filled; air.

9. Whenever; is wanting; comes forward; help.

10. Supplies; extraordinary defect;  
 intelligence.

11. Correct; repels; obstacle to clear  
 vision.

which leads to them in some minds, but which may exist, and exist as readily without as with them. The mere pleasure of excellence attained, thus separated from the vanity or haughtiness that would lead to any ridiculous or cruel display of it, involves nothing which is actually worthy of censure, if the superiority be not in circumstances that are frivolous, still less in circumstances that, although sanctioned by the fashion of the times, imply demerit rather than merit. In the circumstances in which it is truly praiseworthy to desire to excel, it must be truly noble to have excelled. It is impossible to be desirous of excelling without a pleasure in having excelled; and where it would be culpable to feel pleasure in the attainments that have made us nobler than we were before, it must, of course, have been culpable to desire such excellence. It is not in pride, therefore, or the pleasure of excellence as a mere direct emotion, that a moral error consists, but in those ill-ordered affections which may have led us to the pursuit of excellence that is unworthy of our desire, and that cannot therefore shed any glory on our attainment of it."—Brown's "*Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*," lxi, p. 412.

"Pride, of all others the most dangerous fault.

Proceeds from want of sense, or want of thought.

The men who labour and digest things most

Will be much apter to despond than boast;

For if your author be profoundly good,

'Twill cost you dear before he's understood.

How many ages since has Virgil writ!

How few are they who understand him yet!"

*The Earl of Roscommon's "Essay on Translated Verse."*

(3) "There is but one faculty which can claim to be the organ of philosophy, and that is the reason. The reason is the faculty of all perception, whether by immediate intuition, or by mediate representation or deduction; whether of the interior or the exterior consciousness; whether of the past, the present, or the future; whether of the actual or the possible, or of the probable or the impossible; whether of phenomena, or of being and truth; whether of cause or law. All perception and all knowledge belong to this one faculty. . . . The reason, when it perceives, thinks, or ratiocinates, does so under the consciousness of its own acts, and under convictions of the reality and truth of its operations."—*Tappan's "Elements of Logic,"* Part I., sect. xiii., p. 92.

"This word is liable to many ambiguities. . . . 1. Sometimes it is used to signify all the intellectual powers collectively. . . . 2. Those intellectual powers exclusively in which man differs from brutes. . . . 3. The faculty of carrying on the third operation of the mind, viz., reasoning or ratiocination. . . .

*Truth* (4) breaks upon us with *resistless day*.  
*Trust* not yourself; but, your *defects* to know,  
*Make use* of every friend—and every foe.  
*A little learning* is a *dangerous* thing (5)—

15

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 12. Accurate knowledge; full enlightenment. | 14. Employ.   |
| 13. Believe in; faults; understand.         | 15. A small amount of acquired knowledge; perilous. |

4. Reason is also employed to signify the premiss or premises of an argument, especially the minor premiss; and it is from *reason* in this sense that the word reasoning is derived. 5. It is also frequently used to signify a cause."—*Whately's "Logic,"* Appendix I., sect. xxiii., p. 223.

(4) "*Truth* is an antithetical idea; its opposite is falsehood. The great aim of the reason is truth; and logic comprises the laws which govern the reason in its searches after, in the processes by which it arrives at, truth. Truth in itself is identical with the highest form of reality—with absolute and necessary reality; and it is the parent of all other reality—the reality of actual objective being. The ideas, and the necessary and universal conceptions which immediately spring out of them, are the essential body of truth; actual being is the exterior embodiment of truth. Hence truth is that in which the reason ultimately, necessarily, and securely reposes. . . . In whatever region of knowledge the reason takes its stand, truth is its great and legitimate object. The idea of truth is the spring of all its activity."—"*Elements of Logic,"* by Henry P. Tappan, Part III., book I., par. 18, p. 197.

"*Truth* implies a report of something that *is* [or was]. *Reality* denotes the existence of a thing, whether affirmed and reported of or not. The thing reported either *is* or *is not*; the report is either true or false. The things themselves are sometimes called truths instead of facts or realities, and assertions regarding facts are called facts."—Dr. Edward Coplestone's "*Remains*," p. 105.

(5) "It is sometimes urged by those who consider the multitude as not intended to think, that at the best they can learn but little, and that this is likely to harm rather than to do them good. 'A little learning,' we are told, 'is a dangerous thing.' 'Shallow draughts' of knowledge are worse than ignorance. The mass of the people, it is said, can go to the bottom of nothing; and the result of stimulating them to thought will be the formation of a dangerous set of half-thinkers. To this argument I reply, first, that it has the inconvenience of proving too much; for, if valid, it shows that none of any class ought to think. For who, I would ask, can go to the bottom of anything? Whose 'learning' is not 'little'? Whose 'draughts' of knowledge are not 'shallow'? Who of us has fathomed the depths of a single product of nature, or a single event in history? Who of us is not baffled by the mysteries in a grain of sand? How contracted the range of the widest intellect! But is our knowledge, because so little, of no worth? Are we to despise the lessons which are taught us in this book of creation, in this narrow round of human experience, because an infinite universe stretches around us which we have no means of exploring, and in which the earth and sun and planets dwindle to a point? We should remember that the known, however little it may be, is in harmony with the boundless unknown, and a step towards it. We should remember, too, that the gravest truths may be gathered from a very narrow compass of information. God is revealed in His smallest work as truly as in His greatest. The principles of human nature may be studied better in a family than in the history of the world. The finite is a manifestation of the infinite. The great ideas of which I have formerly spoken are within the reach of every man

*Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian (6) spring: 16*  
*There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,*  
*And drinking largely sobers us again.*  
*Fired at first sight with what the Muse (7) imparts,*  
*In fearless youth we tempt the heights of arts, 20*

16. Partake largely; make no use of.  
 17. Small quantities overcome the senses.  
 18. Restores us the use of our faculties.

19. Excited; poetry gives.  
 20. Rash; strive to attain; topmost reaches; invention.

who thirsts for truth, and seeks it in singleness of mind. I will only add, that the labouring classes are not now condemned to draughts of knowledge so shallow as to merit scorn. Many of them know more of the outward world than all the philosophers of antiquity; and Christianity has opened to them mysteries of the spiritual world which kings and prophets were not privileged to understand."—*W. E. Channing, D.D., "On the Elevation of the Working Classes," "Works,"* vol. i., p. 463.

(6) *Pieria*, a narrow slip of country in the south-east of Macedonia, bounded on the west by Mount Olympus and its offshoots, of which a portion was called *Pierus*. The inhabitants were Thracians, and famous for music and poetry, hence the Muses were named *Pierides*.

"O, testudinis aureæ

Dulcem quæ strepitum, Pieri, temperas!" &c.

"O maid Pierian, who dost temper

The sweet ring of the golden shell."

*Horace, Odes, IV., iii., 18.*

(7) "Poetry has a natural alliance with our best affections. It delights in the beauty and sublimity of the outward creation of the soul; it indeed portrays with terrible energy the excesses of the passions, but they are passions which show a mighty nature, which are full of power, which command awe and excite a deep though shuddering sympathy. Its great tendency and purpose is to carry the mind above and beyond the beaten, dusty, weary walks of ordinary life; to lift it into a purer element; and to breathe into it more profound and generous emotion. It reveals to us the loveliness of nature, brings back the freshness of early feeling, revives the relish of simple pleasures, keeps unquenched the enthusiasm which warmed the spring-time of our being, refines youthful love, strengthens our interest in human nature, by vivid delineations of its tenderest and loftiest feelings, spreads our sympathies over all classes of society, knits us by new ties with universal being, and, through the brightness of its prophetic visions, helps faith to lay hold on the future life.

"In many poems there is more truth than in many histories and philosophic theories. The fictions of genius are often the vehicles of the sublimest verities, and its flashes often open new regions of thought, and throw new light on the mysteries of our being. In poetry, when the letter is falsehood, the spirit is often profoundest wisdom. And if truth thus dwells in the boldest fictions of the poet, much more may it be expected in his delineations of life; for the present life, which is the first stage of the immortal mind, abounds in the materials of poetry, and it is the high office of the bard to detect this divine element among the grosser labours and pleasures of our earthly being. The present life is not wholly prosaic, precise, tame, and finite. To the gifted eye it abounds in the poetic. The affections which spread beyond ourselves, and stretch far into futurity; the workings of mighty passions which seem to arm the soul with an almost superhuman

While from the bounded level of our mind  
Short views we take, nor leave the lengths behind;  
But more advanced, behold with strange surprise  
New distant scenes of endless Science (8) rise!

21

21. At the same time that; limited position.

22. Cursory glances; distances.

23. Farther; singular astonishment.

24. Fresh far-off fields; interminable.

energy; the innocent and irrepressible joy of infancy; the bloom and buoyancy and dazzling hopes of youth; the throbbing of the heart when it first wakes to love, and dreams of happiness too vast for earth; woman, with her beauty, and grace, and gentleness, and fulness of feeling and depth of affection, and blushes of purity, and the tone and looks which only a mother's heart can inspire,—these are all poetical. It is not true that the poet paints a life which does not exist. He only extracts and concentrates, as it were, life's ethereal essence, arrests and condenses its volatile fragrance, brings together its scattered beauties, and prolongs its more refined but evanescent joys."—*W. E. Channing, D.D., "On the Character and Writings of Milton," "Works," vol. i., p. 4.*

"In entering upon the wide field that here stretches before us we are met in the very gateway by the fact that both the dreamer and the thinker, the singer and the sayer, have declared the immediate aim of poesy to be pleasure. They are at war on many another point, but here they are at one. 'It is the pleasure of a truth,' says Aristotle; 'it is that of a lie,' says Bacon; but both feel and admit that whatever other aims poesy may have in view, pleasure is the main thing. Whatsoever we do has happiness for its last end, but with poesy it is the first as well as the last. This is not all, however; the tie is much closer. Poesy is not only meant for pleasure, but is founded on pleasure, and is the embodiment of all our happiness, past, present, and to come. It is built on, and of, and in, and for happiness.' 'It is the record,' as Shelley has it, 'of the best and happiest moments of the best and happiest of minds.' True, it often deals with sorrow, but none of our sorrows are without a ray of comfort; and as black in the sunshine appears brighter than white in the shade, so that oftentimes we cannot tell black from white; there is often a luxury in grief, with which we would not part for anything short of the highest bliss. Some have gone so far as to say that the pleasure wrung from sorrow is the greatest of all; as Shelley, that it is 'sweeter far than the pleasure of pleasure itself.' Without going so far, Bishop Butler, in his sermon on Compassion, says that we sympathize oftener and more readily with sorrow than with joy; and Adam Smith maintains that our sympathy with grief is generally a more lively sensation than our sympathy with joy. If these statements be true, they of course afford the very strongest reasons why poesy should deal with sorrow."—"*Poetics*," by *E. S. Dallas*, p. 10.

(8) "The sum of all things that man can know is circumscribed in quality, although in each quality there may be combinations of indefinite extent. That is, there are only so many possible sciences, although each science, in its own department, may be pursued indefinitely. . . . Correlative with the sciences are the arts. The sciences are knowledge, the arts are action. With the discovery of the sciences there follows invariably a new and amended order of action; that is, the arts, or the products of human activity, continually improve with the progression of the sciences. . . . Let it be remembered that science is not a *reality*, but only a *form* of thought. Science exists in the mind, and in the mind alone; it is the mind's mode of viewing reality. The realities are matter and mind."—"*The Theory of Human Progress*," by *P. E. Dove*, chap. ii., p. 168.

"History occupies itself with facts, science with causes. The former, according



So, *pleased* at first, the *towering* Alps (9) we try, 25  
*Mount o'er* the vales, and seem to *tread* the sky!  
The *eternal* snows appear already *past*,  
And the first *clouds* and *mountains* seem the *last*;  
But, these attained, we *tremble* to *survey*  
The *growing* labours of the *lengthened* way; 30  
The *increasing* prospect *tires* our wandering eyes—  
*Hills* peep o'er *hills*, and *Alps* on *Alps* arise!  
A *perfect* judge will read each work of *wit*  
With the *same* spirit that the *author* writ;  
*Survey* the whole, nor seek *slight* faults to find 35  
Where *Nature* moves, and *rapture* warms the mind;

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| 25. Gratiſied; lofty.                  | 32. Heights; peaks; ſpring up.         |
| 26. Aſcend; march upon.                | 33. Accompliſhed critic; peruſe; in-   |
| 27. Everlaſting; gone beyond.          | telleet.                               |
| 28. Vapours; peaks; utmoſt.            | 34. Similar ideas; writer compoſed it. |
| 29. Reached; feel fear and grief; look | 35. Look upon; trivial defects.        |
| forward on.                            | 36. Correct representation; earneſt    |
| 30. Increasing toils; extending path.  | feeling.                               |
| 31. Expanding view fatigues.           |  |

to Bacon, crawls upon the ground; but of the fountains of ſcience ſome are ſituated above, ſome beneath. For the cauſes of things are either ſupernatural or natural; the former can only be revealed, the latter muſt be investigated. The ſcience of ſupernatural cauſes is revealed theology, that of natural cauſes is ſcience in a peculiar and more limited ſenſe—or philoſophy.”—*Francis Bacon, of Verulam, by Kuno Fiſcher*, chap. ix., p. 246.

(9) “Nothing can be finer or more exact than Mr. Pope’s deſcription of a traveller ſtraining up the Alps. Every mountain he comes to he thinks will be the laſt; he finds, however, an unexpected hill riſe before him; and that being ſcaled, he finds the higheſt ſummit almoſt at as great a diſtance as before. Upon quitting the plain he might have left a green and fertile ſoil, and a climate warm and pleaſing. As he aſcends, the ground aſſumes a more ruſſet colour; the graſs becomes more moſſy, and the weather more moderate. Still as he aſcends, the weather becomes more cold, and the earth more barren. In this dreary paſſage he is often entertained with a little valley of ſurpaſſing verdure, cauſed by the reflected heat of the ſun, collected into a narrow ſpot on the ſurrounding heights. But it much more frequently happens that he ſees only frightful precipices beneath, and lakes of amazing depths, from whence rivers are formed, and fountains derive their original. On thoſe places next the higheſt ſummits vegetation is ſcarcely carried on; here and there a few plants of the moſt hardy kind appear. The air is intolerably cold, either continually refrigerated with froſts or diſturbed with tempeſts. All the ground here wears an eternal covering of ice, and ſnows that ſeem conſtantly accumulating. Upon emerging from this war of the elements he aſcends into a purer and a ſerener region, where vegetation has entirely ceaſed; where the precipices, compoſed entirely of rocks, riſe perpendicularly above him; while he views beneath him all the combat of the elements; clouds at his feet, and thunders darting upward from their boſoms below. A thouſand meteors which are never ſeen on the plain preſent themſelves. Circular rainbows, mock ſuns, the ſhadow of the mountains projected upon the body of the air, and the traveller’s own image reflected, as in a looking-glaſs, upon the oppoſite cloud.”—*Dr. O. Goldſmith’s “Hiſtory of the Earth, and of Animated Nature,”* Part I., chap. xii.

Nor *lose*, for that *malignant, dull delight*,  
 The *generous pleasure* to be *charmed* with wit.  
 But in such *lays* as neither *ebb* nor *flow*,  
*Correctly cold* and *regularly low*, 40  
 That, *shunning* faults, one *quiet tenor* keep,  
 We cannot *blame* indeed—but we may sleep. (10)  
 In *wit*, as *nature*, what *affects* our hearts  
 Is not the *exactness* of *peculiar parts*;  
 'Tis not a lip or eye we *beauty call*, (11) 45  
 But the *joint force* and *fine result* of all.  
 Thus, when we *view* some well-proportioned *dome* (12)  
 (The world's *just wonder*, and e'en thine, O Rome!),  
 No *single parts* *unequally surprise*,  
 All comes *united* to the *admiring eyes*; 50  
 No *monstrous height*, or *breadth*, or *length* appear,  
 The *whole* at once is *bold* and *regular*.

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| 37. Fail to feel; ill-natured, stupid joy.              | 45. Regard as.                              |
| 38. Kindly enjoyment; enraptured.                       | 46. Combined power; entire effect.          |
| 39. Poems; rise; fall.                                  | 47. In the same way; look upon.             |
| 40. Unfailingly dull; levelly attuned.                  | 48. Deserved admiration.                    |
| 41. Avoiding; even pathway.                             | 49. Separate items peculiarly astonish.     |
| 42. Object to.  | 50. Symmetrically; delighted gaze.          |
| 43. Imaginative literature; living objects; influences. | 51. Exceptional elevation; width; distance. |
| 44. Express fitness; special portions.                  | 52. Entire fabric; striking; proportionate. |

(10)

"Mediocribus esse poetis

Non homines, non Di, non concessere columnæ.  
 Sic animis natum inventumque poema juvandis,  
 Si paulum a summo decessit, vergit ad imum."

"But that a poet should be middling now,  
 Nor men, nor gods, nor publishers allow.  
 So poems that would please, if they descend  
 From a high standard, to the lowest tend."

Horace, "Art of Poetry," 372—378.

(11) "With regard to surface, *smoothness*; and with regard to structure, *regularity*, *repetition*, *radiation*, *equilibrium*, *balance of parts*, *simplicity of ratios*, all of which I comprehend under the single term *symmetry*, constitute the principle of composition, by which the aspect of simple or mere beauty is developed."—"The Philosophy of the Beautiful," by John G. MacVicar, D.D., chap. iii., p. 40.

(12) Dome, a term applied to a covering of a whole or a part of a building. . . . The word *dome* is applied to the external part of the spherical or polygonal roof, and *cupola* to the internal part. The dome of St. Peter's at Rome stands upon four piers, 62 feet high and 31 thick. From the arches spring the corbellings, which are finished by an entablature. Upon this entablature is a plinth. The plinth is externally an octagon, and internally a circle. On the plinth is a circular stylobate. Above the circular stylobate is placed the drum of the dome, which is pierced with 16 windows. In the centre rises the lantern, to which arched openings give light. The whole height from the external plinth of the dome to the cross is 263 ft. The total height from the pavement is 437½ ft. The total height internally, to the top of the dome of the lantern, is 387 ft.

## Literary Notes.

F. G. Trafford, the author of "George Gaith of Fen Court," &c., is said to be a lady, young, amiable, and accomplished, the wife of a cadet of the family of a Scottish baronet. It is a *nom de plume*.

The Rev. Walter W. Shirley, of Wadham College, Oxon, is preparing a List of Wycliffe's works, with descriptions of all known MSS.

A new edition, revised by the MS. texts, of Chaucer's Works, is proposed by the Syndics of the Oxford University press, and a Hexapla edition is suggested by Professor Child, of Harvard.

A Commentary on the Holy Bible, by Synd Ahmed, a Mahommedan, is publishing in parts in India.

The works of the late W. J. Fox, in 12 vols., are to be issued by the Fox Memorial Committee. They will contain much MS. matter.

Guizot's Memoirs, Vol. VII., is out, bringing us to 1847.

Two unpublished (or rather duplicate copies with different titles) Comedies by Talma, the French tragedian, have been recently discovered.

Thomas Hughes, author of "Tom Brown's School Days," &c., is to contest Lambeth.

C. Hole has in the press a "Brief Biographical Dictionary," including the names of 20,000 persons of eminence.

Francis Galton is engaged on a work "On Hereditary Talent and Character."

The works of Edmund Burke are to be issued in twelve monthly vols., in Boston, U.S.

A complete verbal and glossarial Index to Chaucer's "Canterbury Tales," and containing special lexicons of words found in other old English authors; with a Grammar of English in the fourteenth century, and an Essay on Chaucer's versification, is nearly ready at the house of F. Leypoldt, New York.

The "Church in Ireland, and its Relations to the State," by the Rt. Hon. J. Whiteside, is anxiously looked for.

A reissue (continued to 1854) of H. Martineau's "History of the Peace," has been published at Boston, U.S.

Felix Neve, professor of Sanscrit at Louvain, has printed a paper on the Belles Lettres of India.

Bacon's "Essays," and Johnson's "Rasselas," have been published at Calcutta in Indian translations.

A complete edition of Cowley's works is announced as in the American press, on large paper.

Algernon Swinburne, author of "Sappho," a poem, "The Queen Mother," and "Rosalind," plays; "Atlantia in Calydon," a highly meritorious poem, has a new poem in the press. It seems critics think that Swinburne and Buchanan are to head the poll for the inheritance of Tennyson.

*L'Epoque* is the title of a new journal, started in Paris by Ern. Leydeau, author of "Fanny," &c.

W. C. Russell, son of Henry Russell, composer, is about to lay claims to the honours of a writer of tragedies.

"Julius Cæsar," Vol. II., will, it is said, appear with the fall of the leaf.

Charles Waterton, author of "Wanderings in South America," "Essays in Natural History," &c., died at Walton Hall, York, aged 83. A biographic sketch of "Charles Waterton, his Home, Habits, and Handiwork," by R. Hobson, M.D., Leeds, is nearly ready.

The late Prince Metternich has left "Memoirs of his Life and Times" ready for the press.

"Rousseau: his Friends and his Enemies," is a work of mark, due to the pen of G. S. Moreton.

The King of Sweden has a new vol. of poems in the press.

The Rev. M. Reville, of Rotterdam,

has written a "Memoir of Theodore Parker."

Mrs. Oliphant, the "Carlingford" chronicler, is, we believe, the literary mother of "A Son of the Soil."

Prince Napoleon has the first vol. of a "History of the Buonapartes" in type. Of this work his speech at Ajaccio may be regarded as the advertisement.

Professor Key's "Crude-form Latin Grammar" is to be made a school-book for Germany.

Prof. John Grote has issued "Rough Notes on Modern Intellectual Science." As a Cambridge moral philosopher, the author of the book will gain attention.

It is stated that Dr. Vaughan has resigned the editorship of the *British Quarterly Review*, and that the Rev. H. Allen has been offered the *baton*.

A work which Proudhon was writing when he died, "On the Political Capacity of the Labouring Classes," has been completed by his friend, M. Chaudey.

"A Digest of the whole Law of England" is to be commenced with the sanction of Parliament.

John Stanyan Bigg (born 1829), author of "Night and the Soul," a poem of high merit and promise, 1855, died at Ulverstone, where he was born 19th May. W. M. Hetherington, D.D., professor of Systematic Theology in Glasgow F. C. College, author of some early poems, a treatise on "The Fulness of Time," "A History of the Church of Scotland," &c., died 23rd May.

Victor Hugo's (the younger) translation of Shakspeare has reached a second edition.

The youth of Lord Byron has been made the subject of a French drama.

John Frost, the exiled and pardoned Chartist, who is 81 years of age, is writing his "Autobiography."

Sir Joseph Paxton, M.P., author of the "Cottage Calendar," editor of "Paxton's Botanical Magazine," &c., died 8th June.

Owen Meredith, son of Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, is about to issue a collected edition, in two vols., of his Poems.

A Memoir of W. R. Baker, author of "The Curse of Britain," &c., is in the press, by her sister.

Robert Reid, author of "Old Glasgow and its Environs," died 8th June, aged 93.

*On dit* that the papers of the noted diplomatist Talleyrand, which by his will were not to be published till 1868, are not to be issued now till 1888.

Dante literature is in the ascendant. A crown folio edition of the "Inferno," with 76 engravings by Gustave Doré, is announced by Cassell & Co. They have adopted Cary's version. The Rev. James Ford, of Exeter, has, however, produced a new translation of the same book of the "Divine Comedy" in the original *terza rima*. But we wish Dr. John Carlyle could be prevailed on to reissue his prose version, which is strongly imbued with the Florentine's spirit. Our readers may, in this connection, recall the memoir of Dante given in our pages, May and June, 1857, in which the poet's relation to modern Italian nationalism was first pointed out in this country. Asher and Co.'s "Monthly Bulletin of Foreign Literature" contains upwards of fifty announcements of Dante-book in Italian.

M. Cousin is reported, in his old age (second childhood), to have become a Romanist and an Imperialist!

Kuno Fischer has rewritten Vol. I. of his "History of Modern Philosophy—Descartes and his Writings."

An edition of the select writings of Jean Paul Richter has been commenced in Berlin.

Herr H. Baumgarten has begun a "History of Modern Spain, from the time of the French Revolution onwards."

Napoleon III. is said to have received for authorship rights in "Julius Cæsar" £1,600. The profits of his work were made over to the family of his secretary, M. Mocquard. He is reported to have remarked, "I see a person can live by the pen in France." He should have added—"if he is an Emperor or a genius."

## Modern Logicians.

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THE LATE GEORGE BOOLE, LL.D., D.C.L.,

PROFESSOR OF MATHEMATICS, QUEEN'S COLLEGE, CORK;

AUTHOR OF "THE LAWS OF THOUGHT," ETC.

"The unity of the forms of thought in all the applications of reason, however remotely separated, will one day be matter of notoriety and common wonder; and Boole's name will be remembered in connection with one of the most important steps towards the attainment of that knowledge."—*Professor Augustus De Morgan.*

"It has often been observed that the biography of eminent literary men presents but few objects of general interest. The progress of their lives seems only measured by the order of their attainments and productions. From these we estimate the gradual rise and advance of mind and character, through every successive change from the nursery to the grave." So, upwards of thirty years ago, George Boole expressed himself in a lecture on the genius and discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton. The remark is as correct regarding himself as of any other of those gifted spirits who have given new thoughts to their age, or flashed the fresh light of vigorous and original minds upon the mysteries of life and nature. Few lives have been passed so uneventful and incidentless, and fewer still have been so successful in shedding the subtle radiance of intelligence down into the deep places of the soul, or more prolific in casting off those seeds of thought which multiply as the years increase, and grow with the ages. Of the possibilities enclosed within his own spirit, the best uses, we may be sure, have been made. Comparatively early as was the age at which "Death touched him, and he fell asleep," we dare not call his demise premature, however inscrutable the purpose of it, since Heaven willed it, and it came to pass.

"The man who, for his race, might supersede  
The work of ages, dies worn out—not used;—  
And in his track disciples onward strive,  
Some hair's-breadths only from his starting-point.  
Yet lives he not in vain; for if his soul  
Hath entered others, though imperfectly,  
The circle widens as the world spins round,—  
His soul works on, though he sleeps 'neath the grass!"

Among modern lives that of George Boole's is noteworthy on many grounds. As an instance of persistent industry ultimately  
1865.

winning success ; of a modest and unobtrusive career broadening into European fame ; of dutifulness being crowned with honour ; of self-culture attaining the higher reaches of professional elevation ; of humble worth gaining lofty recognition ; of the possibility of energy, earnestness, courage, and thought leading to reputation, usefulness, and a foremost place among the men who occupy the vanguard of the world's progress, the narrative of the life and life-work of George Boole is second to none in interest and instructiveness. Of the noisy celebrity given by applauding crowds he was never covetous, for he knew it was of short continuance. He aspired to the nobler renown of acknowledged merit, borne witness to by his own works and the unsolicited testimony of those who best understood the value of his achievements ; but still more he desired to attain that highest glory which consists in "a conscience void of offence toward God and toward man." Of a man so wise and good, so thoughtful yet so simple, who gave forth the hardly-earned learning and the elaborately-wrought products of his genius so unpretendingly, so free from self-assertion ; of one who taught so lovingly, thought so intensely, laboured so assiduously, and lived so blamelessly, whose insight into truth was so clear, whose heart was so noble, true, and dutiful, one may well write ; but who shall write worthily ? "As a man," an old friend of his writes to us, "I have scarcely ever known George Boole's equal. Looking back through the forty years—and I am nearly threescore and ten—that I have known him, I cannot recall an act or word of his which I could wish to have been otherwise. A perfect and blameless man is, we know, not to be found on earth ; and, doubtless, my friend had his faults ; yet, in honestly and searchingly revising the past, I see only a life of unflinching duty and self-sacrifice, incapable of a mean or low thought, with not an iota of vanity—even when he had become one of the landmarks of science, and must have known it." Such is the voice of friendship regarding his personal character ; and in the sequel it will appear that praise as high and as unreserved has been given—and given deservedly—of his intellectual endowments, and of the grandly original results in the forth-bringing of which he employed them. We prefer, however, that an "unvarnished tale" of his life, labours, studies, and investigations should prove his worth, to the exhaustion—if that were possible—of the language of panegyric in commendation of the earnest student, the successful toiler, and the nobler thinker, who has so recently "entered into his rest."

George Boole was born in Lincoln, 2nd November, 1815. He was the son of respectable though not of wealthy parents, engaged in trade in that Witham-washed and cathedral-crowned city. Though not rich in this world's goods, his relatives were held in general esteem. His father took great interest in scientific pursuits, and was an eager worker for the diffusion of useful knowledge among the people. In the early days of Mechanics' Institutes he laboured earnestly with others in getting one established in Lincoln.

It was a very flourishing concern, well patronized and supported; and was not a little indebted to its intelligent and scientific librarian and museum-keeper, Mr. Boole. It is hardly to be doubted that the influence of this love of knowledge, indulged in at a home fire-side, where daily bread was sweetened and sanctified by daily toil, and the honest earnings of labour were spent, not on the dainties or luxuries of sense, in the gratification of whim or folly, but in the ennobling acquisitions of mental usefulness and delight, was especially powerful in its effects on the susceptible boyhood of George Boole. Here he learned at once the dignity of self-reliance, the sacredness of human duty, however lowly, and the worth of knowledge, even in the humble levels of common life.

His early home-training combined example and precept in promoting a healthy and innocent Christian life. Strict without being stern, and sedate without being sour, the management to which Mr. Boole subjected his family was well fitted to develop alike the heart, the mind, and the activities of the inmates of his household. George, after a childhood passed within sound of the tones of Great Tom, and during a boyhood spent in rambles by the Witham's banks, receiving as into a mirror the image of Nature, and in strolls beside august ruins, or in the shadow of Roman gateways, mediæval castles, and cathedrals reckoned among the noblest in the empire, and among many other objects of interest in some of the narrow, irregular streets which exist in the old historic *Lindum* of the Romans, received the common lessons given to boys in the day schools of such towns. Though George Boole did not disdain the sports of boyhood, he loved better to spend his holiday time in the healthy, rational, and heart-charming pursuits afforded in country excursions on the Lincoln heaths, through which the Witham flows, before and after it passes under the bridges of "Merry Lincoln." The limited means of his parents, eager though they were to forward the scholarship of their son, prevented them from being able to afford him more than an ordinary education. In the National School he was first a pupil and then a monitor. But the class routine of tasks neither satisfied him nor his father. The latter supplemented the school work by courses of reading, training in observation, and some scientific instruction. The boy profited from all, but his thirst for knowledge remained unslaked and unsatisfied. Oh, how he envied the grammar school boys their privilege of attaining the means of proficient advancement in the knowledge of the ancient classical languages! A kindly neighbour, Mr. William Brooke, printer and bookseller, supplied what the eager-hearted boy, when about ten years old, desired—initiation into the mysteries of Latin grammar. Thus furnished, his own unspurred diligence enabled him to acquire fluency and facility in translation, and subsequently to reach the inner spirit of the authors of the Roman classics. To this he subsequently added, by self-tuition, an acquaintance with the original literature of Greece. His soul entered into communion with the writers of the olden

times, and difficulties vanished before his invincible perseverance. The self-reliant energy of genius is best shown in incident. The elder Boole was an enthusiast in seeking converse with intelligent spirits, and in asking knowledge from every available source; and he loved above all to hold intercourse with the learned—often, indeed, to the detriment of his more material interests, we believe. He was naturally proud of the progress of his son under circumstances somewhat adverse to profitable progress. On one occasion a stranger from one of the universities, probably Cambridge, on a visit to Lincoln, was induced by George's father to examine the young student. He found his grammatical and lexicographical acquaintance with the ancient languages very considerable indeed; but he revealed to him at once the existence and the importance of prosody—the science of pronunciation and versification. This circumstance, we believe, suggested to the young scholar the propriety of systematically re-studying the entire course he had gone through, in following out which resolve, George Boole expended two full years of mind-tasking and conscientious industry. The late Rev. George Stephens Dickson, the learned and accomplished incumbent of St. Swithin's, was useful at this stage of his progress too, in providing him with the opportunity of perusing books, and of consulting him upon points of doubt or difficulty: kindnesses these, which the recipient was able to repay in after years, when, at a somewhat late period of life, that reverend gentleman betook himself to mathematical studies, and found in his youthful friend one of the ablest instructors the county could furnish. This belongs, however, to the after-time of a friendship which lasted until death, and to studies of which we have as yet made no record.

His father's fondness for mathematical and optical studies had begun to touch the inner springs of the mind of the aspiring youth. He could, he thought, as readily master the elements of such investigations as those of the languages of Greece and Rome. When about seventeen years of age, the study of mathematics, under the supervision of his father, was fervently pursued; and he found such invigoration and excitement in the new discipline, that he speedily perused, studied, and mastered all the books he could procure. Very eagerly did father and son alike pore over the problems which by their knottiness puzzled, or by their newness bewildered the earnest pair of ardent hearts that beat with the ambition of success. By dint of diligent experimenting and sedulous thought they managed to conquer or elude the difficulties their course presented, and found it possible to overmaster them. Besides this, George Boole read copiously on all possible subjects, exhausting the library of the mechanics' institute of which he was a member, and finding the weekly provision of reading contained in the publications of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, the *Penny Magazine*, *Chambers' Edinburgh Journal*, &c., too little for the gratification of his capacious appetite for information. He was one of the most enthusiastic members of the mechanics' institute, and devoted



much time and interest to the welfare of that city foundling. He soon became known, even in Lincoln, "his own country," as one worthy of honour for the self-containedness of his mind and the earnestness of his endeavours after self-improvement.

In the unaided toils to which he afterwards committed himself, George Boole resolutely worked his way. With a dauntless heart he re-essayed every stronghold of difficulty until he vanquished the obstacles to his progress. It is true that in this method of study he was often brought to a halt by very slight impediments, and frequently grudged the time lost and energy spent in overcoming trivial hindrances which a helping hand could speedily have removed. But then he was training his mind to self-reliant effort, his eye to look unappalled at the apparently pathless places which he came upon in his progress, his intellect to keen scrutiny and experimental dexterity, and his moral nature to steadiness and earnestness. He was educating himself to be a discoverer even while only traversing the open fields of knowledge; and he was strengthening the sinews of his soul by the struggles he was compelled to make to surmount the difficulties or vanquish the obstacles which opposed his forth-going. The self-trainer is at a disadvantage in comparison with the school-taught in speed and perhaps accuracy; but it is not all disadvantage—strength, resoluteness, and ingenuity are developed in him of which the other knows little, and for original investigations these are the true preparations.

In May, 1829, the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge issued a "Life of Sir Isaac Newton," which was substantially a translation of the sketch of that man of rare scientific insight which J. B. Biot had supplied to the *Biographie Universelle*. The extra importance thus given to this memoir, and the questions which it raised, led to the production, in 1831, of a "Life of Newton" by Sir David Brewster, and a general discussion among scientific men of the merits of the expounder of celestial mechanics. Stirred by the agitation of the times, which had a peculiarly local interest to all Lincolnshire men, the Right Hon. Lord (afterwards Earl) Yarborough, Patron of the Lincoln and Lincolnshire Mechanics' Institute, commissioned a marble bust of Isaac Newton, which he presented to the members of that association. It was felt by the committee of management that advantage should be taken of this circumstance, and the interest it excited, to have a word in season spoken to those who were present at the inauguration festival, regarding the lessons to be derived from the life and labours of this illustrious Lincolnshire worthy; and so high was their appreciation of the energy, ability, and competency of George Boole, that he was unanimously requested to deliver an address on the "Genius and Discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton." To this he gave a reluctant consent, having stated as his objections his own youth and the magnitude of the topic.

On Thursday, Feb. 5th, 1835, in the presence of Lord Yarborough, the donor, and an intelligent and eager audience of the citizens of

Lincoln, George Boole rose, in the chapel of the ancient Grey Friars, granted by the corporation for use as a lecture hall, to implement his engagement to the committee. The youthful appearance of the lecturer, who was then only a shade above nineteen years of age, excited surprise, and when he gradually unfolded the mighty theme of his discourse surprise was heightened into admiration, and hearty plaudits from all parties in the building welcomed the *début* of the young and self-taught expositor of the worth and wisdom of the distinguished natural philosopher and mathematician whose memory the assembly had met to honour. The address was published at the request of the meeting, given expression to by Lord Yarborough, and through the combined kindness of one of George Boole's oldest friends, and of one of his former—I dare not in this case say old—pupils, whose reverence for her master's memory is great, the writer of this paper has been enabled to peruse that thirty years old lecture, which has now become scarce and rare. It is—even in memory of the magnificent eulogy delivered on the same topic by the Nestor of the orators of our day, Lord Brougham, 21st Sept., 1858, at the inauguration of a statue to Newton on St. Peter's Hill, Grantham—an able and excellent address, a large-minded and thoughtful discourse.

He announces, in the outset, his intention to bestow his thoughts less on the events of the life than on an exposition of the labours of “the *mind* of Newton.” Glancing hastily at the incidents of his birth and upbringing, he passes on to epitomize and explain the “Treatise on Optics,”—“one of the most elaborate and original of his works, and one which carries on every page the traces of a powerful and comprehensive mind.” Of this Boole says,—

“It is true that his theory has been left imperfect; admit that in some of the applications it has failed, but at the same time we must acknowledge that in what he failed he did not fail as a common mortal, and that the marshalled intellect of Europe has vainly endeavoured to fill up the chasm. There is in the very idea of light something so vague and intangible, that our imagination can with difficulty attribute to it an independent and material existence. Yet, granting this, and assuming as our *data* that, under certain known circumstances, known impressions are received which we designate colour, the analysis of its primitive elements, and of the laws and effects of their combinations, would still remain a mighty problem. It is singular, that of all the subtle and mysterious agencies,—light, heat, and electricity, attraction, connected by one general link, and commissioned by their author to confer upon dead matter the life and beauty of the universe,—light is the only one that has yet thoroughly unfolded the harmony of its laws, and submitted itself to human scrutiny. That genius which stands foremost in the triumph was the calm, patient, all-surmounting genius of Newton.”

After another instalment of narrative the lecturer proceeds to give an account of the work on which “Newton's claim to the discovery of universal gravitation must rest,”—prior to the issue of which “he found it an unsupported hypothesis,” by the publication of which “he left it an established truth. This was the “*Principia*, or Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy.” After ana-

lyzing this book, recording the main incidents of his middle life, and indicating "the religious impressions" which changed the object of the great thinker's life, and led him to employ himself thenceforth chiefly on "theological inquiries," the lecturer proceeds to give this excellent estimate of his state of feeling:—

"We cannot but consider this latter portion of Newton's life as highly and singularly happy: all that can make old age honourable he possessed, with scarce a shadow of its dotage and infirmities. He was not a father, but the natural affections were in him expanded into the broad principle of universal philanthropy. Subdued passions, moderate wealth, and the much-loved blessing of peace, all tended to smoothen and to illumine the rugged path of declining life. If desire of fame had been the meteor of his youth, it could not now disturb his repose, for he had long been at the summit of all earthly ambition. If the recollection of 'the single talent well employed' be attended with pleasure, surely that pleasure must have been felt in its keenest relish by him, who had received from his Maker ten golden talents, and well employed them all. These are the materials of happiness, and all these were possessed by Newton. But more than these, the support and solace of his faith, the prospect of future happiness which grows brighter as all other prospects decay, these were inalienably his. And though genius has often been a wandering star, the minister of licentiousness or the associate of scepticism, in his life we have ample testimony that such is not a natural or necessary alliance. Nor, perhaps, is there less to admire in the high excellence and unblemished purity of his moral character, than in that halo of philosophical glory which has gathered around his name."

The story of Newton's death being told, the inscription on his monument in Westminster Abbey being translated, he passes on to a general estimate of his genius and influence, in which occurs the following outflash of rhetoric:—

"The very pertinacity with which error retains its hold is one of the strongest arguments for the final and eternal establishment of truth; it results from a natural fear that, in the wreck of received opinions, the very foundations of credibility should be destroyed, and mankind a second time involved in darkness and obscurity. For this reason, perhaps, there have been few ancient kingdoms which have not bequeathed to other times a faith or a philosophy more enduring than themselves. The Coliseum and the Acropolis are in ruins, but the philosophies which sprung up beneath their shadows are yet deep in the tide of human opinions, still influencing, with an unseen but mighty influence, the character of this age. The dark creed of the ancient Persian is yet descending from sire to son in the sacred annals of the Guebres; and the faith and fame of Zoroaster are yet triumphant against the desolation of his country, and the sword and the Koran of its Mahometan oppressors. But more especially is this truth to be observed in the records and remains of more ancient dynasties—in patriarchal Assyria, in sepulchral Egypt. The long succession of their kings and warriors is now doubtful or forgotten; the colossal relics of their primeval architecture are daily mouldering; but their sombre religion, their wild astrology, originating in the days of their greatness, are perpetuated when the very shadow of that greatness is no more. If, from the history of false and discarded systems, we pass by analogy to the more enduring influence of truth, we shall perceive how high above the chances of time and vicissitudes the pedestal of Newton's immortality is founded."

The lecture closes with a personal application to the hearers to fulfil life's "great duties,—to suffer with fortitude, or triumph with humility; to expand with science, or warm with philanthropy,"—and

a tribute of praise to Lord Yarborough for "co-operating, heart and soul, in that noblest work of British patriotism,—the education, the enlightenment, and the happiness of his fellow-countrymen."

On its publication the lecture was read with avidity, and it drew upon George Boole the respectful regard of many of the people of Lincoln. A short time afterwards he was employed as an assistant in a large boarding school in Doncaster. Here, where the competition of scholastic establishments is very keen, he gave full satisfaction at once to the head master, his pupils, and their guardians. Here he not only attended to the great law of mental profit, *docendo discere*, "learn by teaching," but, opportunity offering, he began the study of the languages of Luther and Goethe, of Dante and Manzoni, and of Montaigne and Guizot. Of these languages, at least—German, Italian, and French—he ultimately acquired a singular mastery; and of the varied and extensive literatures of which they are the treasuries he possessed an accurate and catholic knowledge. About this time, too, the poetic mood of his mind found expression in lyric forms, which are credibly asserted to manifest a rare command of elevated thought, suffused with inspiring emotion, and uttered in musical verse. He devoted a large portion of the period capable of being employed studiously, to the acquisition of a well-grounded knowledge of English composition. His success in his newly-adopted profession was unmistakable; and it soon led to his receiving an invitation from the late Mr. R. Hall, proprietor of a large, popular, and successful educational establishment at Waddington, to take charge of certain of the departments in his seminary. This was an offer which was exceedingly acceptable to George Boole. It was gratifying to the youth's intense domestic affections, by restoring him to the neighbourhood of his family, adding somewhat to his, no doubt, narrow income, and affording him a higher position and more hope.

At Waddington he laboured with assiduity and conscientiousness, giving diligent and earnest heed to all that could promote the advancement and welfare of those who had been placed in his charge, and he was repaid by their rapid progress and their trustful love. His employer soon saw and acknowledged that he had added a man of no common order to his establishment, and reposed in him the utmost confidence—a confidence never withdrawn or abated.

But strong family reasons—the age, ill health, and narrowing circumstances of his parents, and the dependence on him, in part, of some of the other members of the old household—induced George Boole to open, on his own account, a day-school for boys and girls, in Free School Lane, Lincoln. Here he had fair success; his own early years approximating more in feeling to his pupils than usual; and he made many valuable friendships while engaged in the earnest exercise of his vocation. On the death of Mr. Hall, his old employer at Waddington, an advantageous opening for succeeding him occurred, and he accordingly removed there with his parents and other members of his family, and conducted a seminary much used by the agriculturists of Lincolnshire—a wealthy and intelligent

class—for several years. An eligible opening having occurred for a boarding (combined with a day) school, he subsequently removed to Minster Close, where he met with great success, and was known and respected as one of the most ingenious and ardent members of the scholastic profession. An eventless life of love, duty, and frequent self-sacrifice, self-reliant yet modest and humble, original yet boastless and blameless, was that which he now passed, —endeavouring to work out the great duty of developing the seeds of thought sown by the Almighty in his soul.

Trying and arduous as were the duties of the day, the energy and enthusiasm of a noble spirit enabled George Boole to give much time and thought to the encouragement and promotion of the objects of all local associations of an ameliorative character. In the Mechanics' Institute he never lost his interest. He had formed its library and arranged its museum, and now he took an active share in the management of its business as a member of committee; and, for the benefit of those whose day of school training had elapsed, but who felt in them yearnings after higher culture, he instituted and taught gratuitously, evening classes for the study of the ancient languages and mathematics, and perseveringly toiled on in his efforts to induce men to enter upon and pursue the paths of improvement and endeavour. Greatly through his influence, advocacy, and resistless business-like attention, a Female Penitents' Home was established, and set a-working on a footing likely to be effective in some measure for the accomplishment of its benign purpose—the reclamation from the paths of woe of the misguided and unfortunate of that sex—

“Whose chiefest joy or suffering springs from love.”

Meantime, the most sedulous study on his own part was continued. With tireless persistency he undertook and pursued the most laborious and intent courses of study. He was not contented with acquisition, wide as were the fields from which he reaped; he was anxious to originate. He felt within himself the power of passing beyond the limitations of science as it then was, and of opening to the footway of the studious new and unexplored regions of investigation. He essayed some contributions in the scientific journals, and these met with acceptance and recognition from the men of mark who conducted them. To the “Transactions” of the Royal Societies, both of London and Edinburgh, he contributed many papers by which he was proved to be worthy of a high place among the first mathematicians of his age. Curiously enough, it is related as a fact that George Boole's first communication to the Royal Society was recommended for rejection by the person entrusted with its perusal, and that only by accident another thinker, whose perception was more acute to the consequences of the views it contained, saw it, commended it, and ultimately, in 1844, it was successful in gaining the gold medal granted for pre-eminent excellence. This paper was entitled, “On a General Principle in Analysis,” and treated of “the separation of the symbols of operation;” and we are

able to state, upon the authority of some of the leading mathematicians of the present time, that it has been the source of almost all the improvements which have of late been introduced into that department of analysis. An additional proof of his high attainments as a mathematician may be found in the fact that on the establishment, in 1846, of the *Cambridge and Dublin Mathematical Journal*, one of the most able and erudite collections of original contributions to the science of quantity and the calculus of operations which have been produced in this country, George Boole was invited to become a contributor. Indeed, so great was the interest excited in many minds by the extraordinary mathematical genius of the self-taught Lincoln schoolmaster, that he was earnestly urged to enter the University of Cambridge, that he might place himself in a position to receive those supreme honours and high rewards which it is in the power of the university alone to bestow. This tempting counsel he had the self-denial to resist, because it would interfere with the fulfilment of those filial obligations to the implementing of which he considered himself morally bound. Even without the advantages of a course of university instruction, without the *éclat* of its honours, or the stimulation of its rewards, by sheer pith of will, and power of pertinacious intellectual application, he succeeded eventually in winning a reputation Europe-wide—echoes of which were heard, too, in the Western hemisphere—as an acute, ingenious, and rarely original mathematical genius; as the first and foremost expounder and extender of the science of operations. It would be neither profitable nor wise to occupy space here with a mere list of the contributions he made to the simplification and extension of the processes arising out of the relations of magnitude and number—contributions which transcend our own power of explanation, and whose value in a scientific point of view we accept as settled upon the faith of those whose specific studies and mental tendencies give them a right to be regarded as able and trustworthy adjudicators.

One of the papers which he contributed to this *Journal of Mathematics* falls within the special scope of this series of articles. It contains the germ of the speculations which he afterwards elaborated, and its main teachings are comprised in the following six canons, which we quote as remarkable at once for clearness of statement and intellectual acuteness; viz.,—

“1. That the business of logic is with the relations of classes and with the modes in which the mind contemplates those relations. 2. That, antecedently to our recognition of the existence of propositions, there are laws to which the conception of a class is subject—laws which are dependent upon the constitution of the intellect, and which determine the character and form of the reasoning process. 3. That these laws are capable of *mathematical* expression, and that they constitute the basis of an interpretable calculus. 4. That these laws are furthermore such, that all equations that are formed in subjection to them, even though expressed under functional signs, admit of perfect solution, so that every problem in logic can be solved by reference to a *general theorem*. 5. That the forms under which propositions are actually exhibited, in accordance with the principles of this calculus, are analogous to those of a philosophical language. 6. That, although the symbols of the calculus do not depend for their interpretation upon the *idea of*

quantity, they nevertheless, in their particular application to syllogisms, conduct us to the quantitative condition of inference."

The ideas outlined in the foregoing six canons were further elaborated in a treatise entitled "The Mathematical Analysis of Logic," published in 1847, on the same day as Professor A. de Morgan's "Formal Logic; or, the Calculus of Inference," appeared. We may remark that these books, notwithstanding the apparent similarity of subject, are little if at all connected with each other. They are so distinct that neither can supply the place of the other. De Morgan's system is all constructed on the ideas of logic already received, but is widened in all directions by those suggestions regarding extension which operate habitually in a mathematician's mind, and is distinguished by the use of a symbolic language, which, though not mathematical, could never have been invented except by a mathematician. Boole's system is distinctly mathematical. It shows that the forms and transformations of algebra can be fitted to meanings of the symbols which will make them express the forms and transformations of thought. "He brings," as De Morgan somewhere expresses it, "the laws which work under cover in thought—the *genus*, to show themselves in daylight in algebra—the *species*." "He sees thought in its workings *below* language, and tracks its transformations *beneath* the cover of expression." "He finds the laws of thought symbolized in algebra." As, however, this tract has been superseded by a more exhaustive work, which is "devoted to the same object, though its methods are more general, and its range of applications far wider," it will, we believe, be advisable to adjourn our criticism of these bold generalizations till we can take a single and connected view of the entire scheme of the author whom Sir William Hamilton characterized as "a very acute philosophical mathematician," while he spoke of this work as "a very able" one. To Hamilton's opinion we might add that of the late Prof. John Pringle Nichol, who regarded George Boole as "one of the most accomplished mathematicians of our age;" and of J. D. Morell, who says, in reference to the book under notice, "These researches promise to be one of the most fruitful of modern contributions to the science of logic; and if fully carried out by the author (as we understand they are to be), to the science of metaphysics as well."

To the general reputation gained by these works there was added the special renown acquired by his contributions to the "Transactions" of various societies, the *Mathematical Journal*, and still more, that justly arising from the issue of "A Treatise on Differential Equations," of which the praise in all mathematical circles was high. It became a class-book even in Cambridge. The poet's axiom, that "the world knows little of its greatest men," was once again exemplified in Boole's case. While his fame was growing all over the Continent, he was contentedly pursuing his scholastic duties, a well-appreciated citizen, but almost unknown as one who was capable of revolutionizing one of the best-cultivated fields of human knowledge. His hour was not yet come.

The early closing movement secured the sympathy of George Boole; and when the efforts of an "association for obtaining an abridgment of the hours of business in all trades, with a view to the physical, mental, and moral improvement of those engaged therein," which had been established in Lincoln under the presidency of the Hon. Alexander Leslie Melville, of Branston Hall, succeeded in securing the early shutting of the shops in that town, he, as one of the vice-presidents of the society, endeavoured to turn the minds of its members to the improvement of the time thus placed at their disposal. On 2nd February, 1847, he delivered an address on the "Right Use of Leisure," which was "published at the request of the committee." From this tract, now scarce, but of which, through the kindness of Dr. John Ryall, Vice-Principal and Professor of Greek in Queen's College, Cork, we have been favoured with a perusal, we anticipate that the following excerpts will be found valuable to our readers. After some congratulatory remarks on their attainment of leisure, he proceeds to enforce the truth that opportunity involves responsibility.

"Such a thing as irresponsible right has no existence in this world. Even in the formation of opinion, which is of all things the freest from human control, and for which something like irresponsible right has been claimed, we are deeply answerable for the use we make of our reason, our means of information, and our opportunities of arriving at a correct judgment. It is true, that so long as we observe the established rules of society, we are not to be called upon, before any human court, to answer for the application of our leisure; but so much the more are we bound, by a higher than human law, to redeem to the full opportunities."

He points thus to the variety of objects from which the human mind may derive innocent gratification:—

"Reflect for a moment on the wealth of ideas which is bequeathed to us in the writings of our poets, on the stores of instruction which are opened in our histories, on the lessons of wisdom contained in the recorded lives of those who have adorned our race. If we desire to acquaint ourselves with the structure of the universe, how many subjects of inquiry and meditation present themselves! What wonders in the heavens! what a glory and beauty in the world around us! what order and intelligence throughout the whole! Dr. Chalmers has remarked that every investigator of nature is led to regard his own particular department of research as the richest in interest and wonder. How replete and gorgeous, he then observes, should we consider the whole to be! If we quit the study of material nature, and apply ourselves to the pursuit of truth in the province of moral and social inquiry, another universe, not less replenished with wonder and interest, presents itself. The rise and fall of extinct nations, the mission they accomplished in the world, and the work which they have left to be done by us; the causes on which national wealth, and virtue, and happiness depend,—these are questions which are second to none within the range of the human intellect in dignity and interest. In short, to whatever province of the kingdom of thought we turn our attention, we find abundant scope and reward for the activity of our inquiry."

This is his general estimate of "men's silent monitors," books:—

"There are none of the monuments of past ages in which so much of the accumulated results of human labour is presented to us as in books. Considered merely as a memorial of the industry of man, every well-filled library is more replete with



wonder than are the most costly of material structures. The most renowned of ancient cities, could we repair the ruins of time, and restore its lost magnificence, would scarcely represent a larger aggregate of toil than the single library of the British Museum. Such a collection excels every other result of labour, not less in character than in extent. It presents us with the issues of all past time, it unfolds to us the great discoveries of science, it brings us into acquaintanceship with men who were, intellectually and morally, of a larger than the common stature of our race. We should esteem it as a high privilege to be admitted to this intimate fellowship with the wise and eminent, not of this place or of the present time alone, but of all times and generations."

After this he gives advice, good and sound, on the study of history and biography combined with geography. He then proceeds to consider the claims of science,—physical, moral, and intellectual,—indicating, as he goes, the chief easily accessible works which should be read. Here is a passage the spirit of which we highly approve :—

"We ought to seek truth for its own sake; and we cannot set too high an absolute value upon either rectitude of opinion or consistency and accuracy of judgment. But it is our business to act as well as know; and these faculties of our nature, the speculative and the practical, may contribute mutual strength and support. If right judgments are necessary to rectitude of conduct the converse proposition is true also. Rectitude of intention, and an earnest desire to carry into practice the truth to which we have already attained, are in some measure necessary to correctness of judgment. For belief is not altogether involuntary; but while it acts is, in turn, acted upon by the habits, the feelings, and the will."

After advocating the compatibility of scientific study and scriptural sanctity, another passage we relish occurs :—

"Consider what truth is. We are not to regard it as the mere creature of the human intellect. The great results of science, and the primal truths of religion and morals, have an existence quite independent of our faculties and of our recognition. We are no more the authors of the one class than we are of the other. It is given to us to discover the truth; we are permitted to comprehend it: but its sole origin is in the will or the character of the Creator; and this is the real connecting link between science and religion. It has seemed to be necessary to state this principle clearly and fully, because the distinction of our knowledge into Divine and human has prejudiced many minds with the belief that there is a mutual hostility between the two—a belief as injurious as it is irrational."

After speaking of the study of languages, he adverts to the means of education, and gives utterance, on this subject, to an important idea :—

"Foremost among the agencies of education we may rank the conscientious discharge of the duties of our lawful business and calling. For the labours of our daily avocation are not merely the equivalent which we pay, in the market of the world, for food and clothing, and other advantages which we may enjoy, but also our sphere of duty—our field of exercise and trial. Now, every faculty we possess is strengthened by exercise; and thus, when the business of our lives is seen by us in the light of duty, it becomes an important means of confirming the power of that principle, and the habit of obedience to its precepts, within us. This appears to me a very just view of the design of life, and it is one which invests with a real dignity and importance the homeliest of our lawful employments."

He passes next to consider the influences of nature on the mind, the duty of cultivating a love for its beauties, and the blessings to be derived from the exercise of the social faculties in works of beneficence. The expense of printing this lecture was undertaken by Mr. J. T. B. Porter, in admiration of the talent it displayed, the sentiments it contained, and the object it was meant to promote, as well as in token of the personal esteem in which he held the lecturer.

In 1845 the Government of Sir Robert Peel projected the establishment of the Queen's colleges in Ireland, in the hope of overcoming the difficulties in the way of promoting mixed but undenominational education in that country. Parliament consented, and the Catholics at the time accepted the compromise. Buildings for this purpose were erected at Belfast, Galway, and Cork—the latter a fine Tudor-Gothic quadrangular pile. The appointment of professors was a delicate task, for the experiment was fraught not only with peculiar dangers, but with promises of great national advantage. Of the places thus put in the gift of Government, George Boole was selected from among several candidates to fill the position of professor of mathematics in Cork. This promotion he obtained in 1849; it gave him a position he was eminently fitted to adorn, and it supplied him with leisure to promote the favourite studies of his life. Some grumbling at the election of a man unmarked by academic fame or university honours was mooted at first, but the choice was amply justified in the results; for no professor was ever more popular with and beloved by his students than the self-raised thinker of Lincoln, while the success of his students in almost every walk of life proves that he possessed the rare faculty of being "apt to teach." The University of Dublin did not long hesitate to confirm with its approval this judicious act of Lord Clarendon's vice-royalty by conferring on him the honorary degree of LL.D.

Professor Boole, on leaving Lincoln, received ample evidence of the esteem in which he was held. Previous to his departure he was entertained by his fellow-citizens at a public supper, presided over by James Snow, Esq., M.D., the mayor. On this occasion he was presented with a handsome silver inkstand and a valuable collection of books. The members of the Mechanics' Institute, remembering his services, arranged for a testimonial presentation too; and the Professor vainly endeavoured to divert them from their purpose by proposing that they should add to their library a copy of Newton's works, or to their apparatus an astronomical telescope. They were determined to recognize his goodness by a gift; and this was finally bestowed on him in the shape of a splendid copy of Johnston's "Atlas of Physical Geography," a work of great cost and worth. At this point of his fortune, when position and influence are his, and a new future lies before him, we may break off our narrative for the present. We shall resume it in our next, and supply then not only an account of his career at Cork, but such an outline of his thoughts as shall justify us to our readers in giving his name a high place among "Modern Logicians."

S. N.

## Religion.

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### IS THE DESTINY OF NATIONS DISCOVERABLY INDICATED IN THE PROPHECIES OF SCRIPTURE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

“Now we see through a glass darkly.” Mystery and prophecy are the lenses through which we are led to look upon miracle, wonder, and history. The thin dawn and twilight of Revelation tells us of the serpent’s head bruised by the woman’s seed, and the noonday brightness of Christ’s glory shows us that the coming and the salvation of Jesus Christ were discoverably indicated even at the time when the morning stars were young. The “rainbow of promise” which God set in the clouds is a discoverable and a prophetic indication of divine mercy, not past only, but present and future. The promise God made to Abraham regarding his seed discoverably enough indicated what was to be, and has been, the history of the Jewish nation. In Moses there are given discoverable indications of our Redeemer from the bondage of sin and death, and he said, “A prophet shall the Lord your God raise up unto you, like unto me; Him shall ye hear in all things” (Acts vii. 37). Along the whole course of Scripture, prophecy becomes clearer and more distinct as the fulness of time approaches, and then the Sun of righteousness arose, making all that was previously dark plain as the sun at noonday. So has it been in the past with God’s word; so we should say it is likely to be in the future. God’s revelations must give discoverable indications of their approaching fulfilment; and though but a part and not the whole is visible to mortal view, that which regards the destiny of nations must be, though by slow degrees, and cautiously, seen to be indicated in God’s prophetic books. But we must recollect that clouds and darkness are around God’s throne, and that the clearness of the heavens is for the perfected saint, not for the sinner under probation. Earnest students of God’s word are expected, by our Saviour himself, to be able to discern the signs of the times; and hence we must believe that the destiny of nations is discoverably indicated in Holy Scripture. But J. J. is wiser than Jehovah, in his own conceit. We know the character of the person who is wiser in his own conceit than ten men who can render a reason, though there is no word in our tongue to name one who treats with disregard and contempt “the revelation of Jesus Christ which God gave unto Him, to *show* unto His ser-

vants *things which must shortly come to pass*; and He sent and signified it by His angel unto His servant John" (Rev. i. 1); and makes a jesting mockery of the students of this precious Book given to *show* things which must be hereafter. Of this same prophecy, too, the Spirit of the Lord, by whose inspiration it was given, has said, "Here is wisdom. *Let him that hath understanding count the number of the beast*" (Rev. xiii. 18). It is also expressly asserted that "these sayings are faithful and true: and the Lord God of the holy prophets sent His angel to *show* unto His servants the things which must shortly be done" (Rev. xxii. 6). Is J. J. willing to be reckoned among those who, "seeing, see not," because they will not understand?

Bishop Hurd (1720—1808) was a great and good man, and had J. J. read his "Introduction to the Study of the Prophecies concerning the Christian Church," he would scarcely have ventured to use the words "drivelling triviality" regarding such studies, or classed those who pursued them with "charlatans" and "religious fanatics." What "Seven Dials' cunning" is, we do not profess to know; but we do think that in the following passage from the work above-mentioned there is a wisdom which excels, and an honesty which rebukes, the smartness of such writers as J. J.:—

"If we look into the writings of the Old and New Testaments, we find, first, that prophecy is of prodigious extent, that it commenced from the lapse of man, and reaches to the consummation of all things; that for many ages it was delivered darkly to few persons, and with large intervals from the date of one prophecy to that of another; but at length became more clear, more frequent, and was uniformly carried on in the line of one people, separated from the rest of the world, among other reasons assigned, for this principally, to be the repository of the divine oracles; that, with some intermission, the spirit of prophecy subsisted among that people to the coming of Christ; that He himself and His apostles exercised this power in a most conspicuous manner, and left behind them many predictions, recorded in the books of the New Testament, which profess to respect very distant events, and even run out to the end of time, or, in St. John's expression, "to that period when the mystery of God shall be perfected."

If J. J. acknowledges these premises laid down by Bishop Hurd, he must either grant that "the destiny of nations is discoverably indicated in the prophecies of Scripture," or make some affirmation which shall be equivalent to an assertion that God has set in motion all this vast and intricate machinery of prophecy only to puzzle the world with a set of useless enigmas; and that our Lord Jesus, following in the same course, propounded useless predictions, because they were such that their meaning was incomprehensible; for that, I presume, must be held to be the case, if they do not contain discoverable indications of their signification. That men have made mistakes regarding the meaning of prophecies is no proof that they give no discoverable indications of their meaning. The stars, re-

maining as they have been from the creation, have supplied mankind with the Ptolemaic, the Copernican, and the Newtonian theories ; but that does not prove, it rather confirms the assertion that they did give intelligible signs of the secrets of the mechanism of the heavens. All the mistakes of commentators cannot destroy the fact of the truthfulness of God ; and it is impossible for us to believe of God that He would give to mankind a whole series of distinct prophecies, with moral consequences depending on them, and yet supply a clue to their interpretation and their meaning.

In Bishop Newton's (1704—1782) "Dissertations on the Prophecies" there is a passage on "the fulfilment of the Mosaical prophecies concerning the Jews," referring chiefly to the 28th chapter of Deuteronomy, "the greater part whereof," he says, "we see accomplished in the world at the present time." "And is not," he asks, "the truth of the prediction fully attested by the whole series of their history, from their first settlement in Canaan to this present day?" After tracing the course of the history of the Jews from that predictive passage through their wars with the Chaldeans and with the Romans ; the sieges they endured from Shalmaneser, Sennacherib, Nebuchadnezzar, and Titus ; the strange circumstances of the siege of Jerusalem ; their being rooted out of their own land ; their dispersion, and its circumstances, and the oppressions they were fated to endure, as well as the long continuance of their plagues, he remarks as follows :—"Here are instances of prophecies, of prophecies delivered above three thousand years ago, and yet as we see fulfilling in the world at this very time. And what stronger proofs can we desire of the divine legation of Moses? How these instances may affect others I know not ; but for myself I must acknowledge they not only convince, but amaze and astonish me beyond expression. They are truly, as Moses foretold they would be, "a sign and a wonder for ever." "Moreover, all these curses shall come upon thee, and shall pursue and overtake thee till thou be destroyed, because thou hearkenedst not unto the voice of the Lord thy God, to keep His commandments and His statutes which He commanded thee ; and they shall be upon thee for a sign, and for a wonder, and upon thy seed for ever." Here it is distinctly asserted and implied that discoverable indications of the destiny of nations are to be found in Scripture prophecies, of which the proofs are patent unto this day. How can these things be accounted for else? And the moral purpose, as we have said before, of all this should not be lost sight of. As Richard Hooker (1553—1600) has remarked, "God mingled prophecies of things both civil and ecclesiastical, which were to come in every age, from time to time, till the very last of the latter days, that by those things wherein we see daily these words fulfilled and done, we might have strong consolation in the hope of things which are not seen, because they have revealed as well the one as the other. For when many things are spoken of before in Scripture, whereof we see first one thing accomplished and then another, and

so a third, perceive we not plainly that God doth nothing else but lead us along by the hand, till He has settled us up upon the rock of an assured hope, that not one jot or tittle of His word shall pass away till all be fulfilled?"

Prophecy might in some measure be represented to the mind under the figure of the chorus to a Greek play. The chorus foretells, describes, and criticizes the action of the stage; brings the minds of the spectators into a fit state for comprehending and tracing out the awful complications of the plot; and introduces those reflections which seem appropriate to the events involved in the performance. But the chorus does not actively aid in bringing about the catastrophe, or in altering the tenor or tendency of events; it testifies, abjures, warns, exhorts, and grieves, but it does not affect the chains of causation which are exhibited as working on to some great and terrible end. The grandeur and sublimity of the Greek choruses are admitted by all; but some are found to doubt the continuous miracle of prophecy. Now those prophecies with which Scripture teems are couched in language more sublime, with a prevision infinitely more perfect, in a greater variety of forms, and in a spirit of moral earnestness far surpassing the grandest strains of the Greek tragedians. They give indications of the great drama of Time as really discoverable and as truly affecting as anything in literature—yea, much more so; we cannot therefore agree to the dictum of J. J., that all speculations about the teachings of prophecy are absurd and ridiculous.

We deem it our duty to express our regret at the levity with which J. J. treats this subject. On almost every page he endeavours to turn into jest matters of sacred importance whose associations ought to be kept free from merriment. Let him remember who has said, "Let your speech be alway with grace, seasoned with salt;" and let him endeavour to employ "sound speech that cannot be condemned, that he that is of the contrary part may be ashamed, having no evil thing to say" of him. On this topic, at least, let us have neither banter, "nor foolish talking, nor jesting, which are not convenient." The spirit in which "W. C. Markham" approaches this discussion—abating a little for his hasty preliminary rashness of judgment—is much better adapted to the theme. It is a deep and solemn consideration whether the destiny of nations is discoverably indicated in Scripture prophecies; for it involves not only the truth of God's word, but also the moral effects which the perceptible fulfilment of prophecy ought to have upon us. It is especially incumbent on thinking readers to see that the arguments used in this debate are sound, for the issues are momentous; as the acceptance of the negative would go to cut away one of the grandest "evidences of Christianity." The accuracy of this statement may easily be tested by the perusal of any work on accomplished prophecies; indeed, may be taken as proved by the references of Jesus to fulfilled prophecy.

D. J. MILLER.

## NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE absolute truth of the prophecies of Scripture does not need to be denied by those who adopt the negative of this question. The impotence of human faculties alone requires to be predicated. Because we affirm that the human intellect is limited, we do not require to affirm that Scripture is false. Prophecy is one of the deep things of God. Prophecy is a mystery; prophecy is God's divine foreknowledge of events, but it does not imply man's knowledge of these, still less does it involve his foreknowledge of them. Much may be true that is not discoverable by man, or even discoverably indicated to man. If it were not so, man would be all-wise; for there would be no wisdom beyond his power to conceive and believe, to know and to judge about. It would be so preposterous to make such an affirmation, that we shall not gratuitously assume that any one of the writers on this question will regard it as tenable. How many books have been written on prophecy, all of which are now the merest lumber! They were held by their authors, as by many of their readers, to be the true and perfect mirror of the future, drawn from the unerring word of God, and therefore infallible; but the error was in human self-sufficiency, not in the Scriptures' insufficiency.

"Too well they act the prophet's fatal part,  
Denouncing woe to man with zealous heart;  
And each, like Jonah, is displeased if God  
Repent His anger, or withhold His rod."

In Luther's time the world was to come to an end, and the fanatics of that day left lands unploughed and duties unperformed, because the day of the Lord was at hand, till want and pestilence made them wiser. How many tomes of old divinity prove that Napoleon I. was the great Apollyon of Revelation, and the French Revolution the outpouring of the vials of divine wrath! but now Napoleon III. figures as the future hero of Armageddon, and the Pope has got back his former title of Antichrist. Now all this is sad—sad for man's sake and the gospel's; for every one of these self-satisfied egotists who believe that unto them have the deep things of God been revealed, creates a band of followers only to be transformed into a band of dupes—dupes, too, who revenge their disappointment, which is the result of their own folly, by casting away their faith in the word of God, when they would act far more wisely in casting away their too consummate confidence in themselves and in their accepted prophets and seers.

Take as an example the most important series of prophecies that were contained in the Scriptures—those relating to the coming and work of the Saviour; these will prove that the destiny of nations (*He came for the healing of the nations*) is not discoverably indicated in Holy Writ. It was discoverably indicated that Jesus would be born in Bethlehem (Matt. ii. 5), but *when* was unknown,

*by whom* was unknown, and *how* was unknown. That Herod would seek the young child's life was unknown until revealed (ver. 13), though the departure into Egypt consequent thereupon led to the fulfilment of a prophecy (ver. 15). It was unknown how Rama's lamentations were to be brought about, and it was not only endured, but inflicted, in perfect ignorance that the hand of God was in it till it was done (ver. 17). How Jesus, the babe of Bethlehem, was to be a Nazarene was unknown prior to the return of the holy family from Egypt. In perfect ignorance of what they were doing, they settled in Galilee, and hence the prophecy "He shall be called a Nazarene" was unwittingly accomplished. So, again, all the parties connected with the trial, condemnation, and crucifixion of Jesus acted from their own motives and designs, and found in them, till all was fulfilled, no discoverable indications of the destiny of nations in their acts.

It is, we affirm, of the essence of prophecy that man should have no foreknowledge of its meaning, else would God be robbed of the glory of working out the counsel of His own will upon the earth. If man foresaw God's aim, he could work for its fulfilment, and might credit himself with bringing it to pass; but God has "hid these things from the wise and prudent," and only shows when His purpose is fulfilled the fact and actuality of His prophecy. God can foresee to the utmost distances of time, and can indicate the working of the events that shall occur therein; but that man can discover these, or that he was intended to discover these, we very much doubt. The very first prophecy given to mankind was misunderstood. "The seed of the woman" which was promised did not become manifest till the fulness of time in Jesus; but Eve hastily assumed that all was well when Cain was born, and rejoiced because she had "gotten a man from the Lord;" but Cain was not Jesus; he was his brother's murderer, not the Saviour of men. It has been so almost from that early time. Prophecy has only been seen to be accomplished when it has been brought out into historic reality, when men could not say they foresaw it and brought it to pass.

"W. C. Markham" thinks this a foolish question. We think it is a most important and appropriate one. We have been deluged since 1848 with a shower of prophetic interpretations, after about half a century's quietness on that topic; and men's minds are being harassed with fears of "The Coming Struggle," "The End of All Things," "The World's Destiny," "The Impending Woes of Europe," and a whole heap of books professing to unveil the mysteries of "Two Years After and Onwards." The moral effect of these tracts, treatises, and disquisitions is terribly injurious. They lead people to forget, in dreadful anticipations of the future, the duty of the day. They keep many in a continual heartache and a quagmire of disturbed thought. If they could be persuaded that all such pretended revelations were as veracious as the announcements of a quack medicine vendor, they would find more peace to their souls



than anything else could give, except the one thing needful—faith in Christ. If by this discussion the popularity of such reading among the thinking subscribers to this Magazine could be arrested, great benefit would be conferred on them, and through them on society at large. We entirely dissent, therefore, from Mr. M. in his estimate of this question, which we regard as second to none in importance among those which agitate the religious world.

But we far more emphatically dissent from his opinion that prophecies would not be instructive unless they gave discoverable indications of their meaning. They would, I believe, on the other hand, wholly fail in being profitable for instruction if they could be understood beforehand. For, either on men's foreseeing the oncoming of the prophecy, and knowing the consequences of it, they would strive against the fulfilment of it—in which, if they succeeded, they would falsify the prophecy; in which, if they failed, they would grow to believe that prophecy meant fate, and that effort was useless;—or, perceiving the indications given, they would conform themselves to the subsequent teachings of the prophet, and would thus themselves, by their own acts, fulfil the prophecy, and give reason for asserting that the prophecy led to its own fulfilment. In either case God would be robbed of His glory, and man would heighten his own pride, and revel in the vain imaginations of his own heart, which are deceitful above all things.

Prophecy is pre-written history, I grant, but it is only written in the foreknowledge of God and expressed in the language of man, that there may be registration and proof of the "determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God." If it were not so, man's free will would be an idiot's thought. There could be no real freedom for man if God discoverably indicated to each person beforehand how he must act, and what he must do to bring about the predetermination of history. Fearful theological consequences would flow from the belief of such a theory. It cannot be valid. "Markham" must grant that, if man is a responsible creature, he must be permitted to follow his own path, and to do his own will. This being done without let or hindrance on God's part, we can unlock Heaven's book; we can see that the divine foresight beheld the end from the beginning, and things that were afar off as though they were nigh at hand, without risk of suggesting the thought that, by discoverable indications in prophecy, He had led and guided the nations to accomplish the prophecy which He gave them.

"God is His own interpreter,  
And He will make it plain."

We cannot believe in the modern interpretations of prophecies regarding the future without disbelieving the free will of man, or the moral attributes of the Most High.

HAWKSEYE.

## History.

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### IS A SCIENCE OF HISTORY POSSIBLE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE question now before us for debate is not a metaphysical one, involving a long rigmarole discussion on free will, necessity, foreknowledge, and those other recondite problems which occupied the minds of the controversialists of the Stygian council, "on a hill retired," which only resulted in their ideas being "in wandering mazes lost." The metaphysicians may continue their former Donnybrook Fair style of settling disputes regarding their doctrines, or rather dogmas. This discussion ought to be kept free from these whirlpools of thought. We think it is quite possible to get at a fair method of debating this topic without getting out into the wide and delusive sea of metaphysics, in which it is only possible to go astray by rule, logic, and pre-arrangement. Let us, if possible, avoid "the highfalutin" of *à priori* reasoning, and get upon the terra firma of reality.

History is a record of the acts of man, their motives, and their consequences. The dry knowledge of facts and usages is not the most useful portion of history. It is that which exhibits the motives of men, and the causes which bring about actions and events. Events are only the outward form which motives and causes assume. They are not history. They are only human activity made visible, human thought brought into actual manifestation, human passion realized.

There is a common mind to all men. The activities of the mind and will are known. They follow and obey certain distinct and traceable laws. The psychology of man is not nearly so far removed from human knowledge as metaphysicians pretend. We all know, from our own consciousness, how mind works, how motives influence, and how the wills of men are moved and changed. The orator calculates the effective order of topics for his speech; the thinker plans his demonstration; the statesman determines upon his schemes; the financier allocates the incidence of the taxes in framing his budget; even the advertiser schemes out his phrases with a definite dependence on the uniform operation of certain great laws in the mind of man. Nothing, therefore, can be more certain than that men precalculate, and precalculate on the faith of the uniformities of mental action in men. So far as human calculations are correctly laid they are favoured by success. This success

is the evidence of the scientific precision which has been observed in forming the opinions acted upon. Every instance of success so resulting from pre-arranged adaptation of means to ends is an instance of the absolute possibility of a science of history—for it is, in fact, history in the laboratory; it is making history, setting in motion the very springs and causes out of which history issues.

Shelley's Fairy Mab is the modern Clio. She says,—

"To me 'tis given  
The wonders of the human world to keep;  
The secrets of the immeasurable Past  
In the unfailing consciences of men—  
Those stern, unflinching chronicles—I find.  
The Future from the causes which arise  
In each event I gather. Not the sting  
Which retributive memory implants  
In the hard bosom of the selfish man;  
Nor that ecstatic and exulting throb  
Which virtue's votary feels when he sums up  
The thoughts and actions of a well spent day,  
Are unforeseen, unregistered by me."

This prescient power is often exercised by statesmen. They form historical inductions, and they calculate that in similar circumstances similar events shall arise. Unless there were a science of history, however rude or unsettled in its tenets, such precalculations would fail. Treaties, laws, tariffs, financial schemes, and institutes of various sorts depend upon the activity of the principles of causation in history as really as do inventions depend upon the continued operation of the laws of nature, of which science has traced the elements. It may be agreeable to some minds to laugh at the discoverer of the *new science* (of whom, we may notice, an interesting biography was given in the *British Controversialist*, April, 1858), but the future of the universe will prove that Vico had caught a true idea, though he had not gained an adequate hold of it.

To those who believe that "all that we know is—nothing can be known," history is, of course, a nonentity, and with them we can have no controversy. If history is a record of events known to have occurred, in contradistinction to fiction, or events known *not* to have occurred, something is known. Everything that is known is known as antecedent, concomitant, or sequent. When the sequence is regarded as the result of a known antecedent, then we call it the consequent. Causative antecedence and consequence is science. Whenever we perceive that one effect involves (at least) another, we have attained to a certain amount of scientific information. If, then, history is anything else than a mere old newspaper, full of disconnected and incoherent paragraphs; if it is a chain of events, one depending on and resulting from another; if there is a perception of source and issue given in it, then it is (so far) scientific. The more closely, of course, it brings the bond of causation

before the eye, the more surely it is scientific, and the more confidently may we rely that a science of history is possible.

How can we trust to human foresight, or calculate on results at all, if we cut out of our means of dependence the faith we have that the future will resemble the past, and that there is in the actions of to-day the sowing of the seed of future history? How, in fact, can we retain a belief in the responsibility of nations and of rulers, if we affirm that a science of history is impossible?

From analogies drawn from other sciences we may deduce the inference that a science of history is possible. Political economy treats of "the nature of *wealth*, and the laws of its production and distribution, including, directly or remotely, the operation of all the causes by which the condition of mankind, or of any society of human beings, in respect to this universal object of human desire, is made prosperous or the reverse."\* It is undeniable that there is a science of wealth, dealing with all human concerns in the manner indicated in the above definition; that it determines the principles of action which men should reverentially adopt; and that it substantiates the accuracy of its first principles by appeals to facts in the past, while it seeks to apply them in the present. That a science of such a nature is constructible by human thought, and applicable by human forethought, gives fair grounds for believing that a science of history is possible. The existence of a science of morals is indisputable. Few would suppose that there could be such a science, but there is, and in it we have had laid down for us the laws of the actions, of the feelings, emotions, and passions of men. It cannot be impossible that there is a science of history, since there is a science of that which makes history,—a science of human conduct, its consequences and requirements.

Statistics seem to deal with the most alterable commodities and affairs, and yet we find that there is a science of statistics, and that from the mere columns of figures which are supplied to that science as its raw material many important facts may be deduced. Since, then, even statistics yield us truths, how can we resist the impression that history also, as it leads to truth, is possessed also of a logic,—that is, is susceptible of scientific treatment?

Some books have been issued, bearing titles like the following:—"God in History;" "The Philosophy of History;" "The Lessons of History," &c., &c. Now, if God is in history as well as in nature, His workings may be traced in the former as in the latter;—if there is a "philosophy," there can hardly fail to be a "science," for philosophy is but a collection of the higher principles of science; if there be lessons, they can only be useful if they are scientific, for lessons the truth of which could not be calculated on would be worthless. We believe, then, that we may fairly claim to have established the thesis given out, that a science of history is possible. We hope that in the controversy begun the ideas put forth here

\* J. S. Mill's "Principles of Political Economy," p. 1.

will be grappled with, and that we may have a "full, free, and impartial discussion" of this most important topic. If we cannot manage to excite this, then we must regret our ineffectual efforts, and sigh out,—

"Our wasted oil unprofitably burns,  
Like hidden lamps in old sepulchral urns."

CHEPENOM.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

HISTORY is the outgrowth of life. Life is complex; life is unfathomable, a mystery of insoluble intricacy. In the centre of life is will, a faculty "nine times folded in mystery;" all around life there lie change, circumstance, interests of all sorts, laws, customs, influences—a perfect maze of incalculable elements. Life requires to be passed among these, developed in these, worked out through these, and often made what it is in spite of these. History is life past. The historian is a recorder. What *has been* it is his duty to tell. His view must be cast back from event to action, from action to actor, from actor to motive, from motive to influence. At every remove the intricacy and incomprehensibility of things increases, and difficulties multiply as men's thoughts pass on from known realities to unknown inducement. With what telescope can man bring into vision bygone influences? by what calculus can he estimate the force and power of temptation? by what instrument gauge the intensity of the will?—by which processes of figurate or symbolic summation work out the relations of circumstances inducing and repelling man to or from the commission of certain deeds? Is not the difficulty impossibility? Can there be a science of uncertainties?—of probables and improbables at once? Can man know the unknown? If these things are possible, a science of history may be on the very furthest verge of possibility too; but can such things be? Is man able to decipher and explain the entire complexity of life, thought, endeavour, accomplishment, and will?

The inexhaustibility of life, as an issue of possibilities, and the deep secrets of the tides of thought and passion both combine to make a science of history impossible. Who can be the fortune-teller of the results of one life? who dare venture to predict the issues of all life? "The juggles of a shallow cheat" may occasionally appear to have foreshadowed the foreordained; but we do not attach conviction to Zadkiel's "Almanack," nor do we ever wish to see history reduced to an art of wizardry. What horoscope can be invented which will so unveil the future as to inform us at what great times those shall have birth—

"Whom fame  
Is lavish to attest the lords of mind?"

Had we such foreknowledge, could we not employ it to defeat the approaching dominion of such men by a massacre like that of Herod's at Bethlehem, better managed? If we cannot have such foreknow-

ledge, then we cannot have a science of history; for science is prevision—the power of determining that which must be from a knowledge of what has been and is. Law is the last word of science; law excludes uncertainties, and all history is a heap of unexpected events rising up into being in opposition to human intentions and foresight. There can be no science where the elements are incalculable, and we all know that the determinations of men are invisible, and their motives often unknown even to themselves: “the heart is deceitful above all things.” Hence,—

“History has her doubts, and every age  
With sceptic queries marks the passing page;  
Records of old nor later date are clear,—  
Too distant those, and these are placed too near;  
There time conceals the objects from our view,  
Here our own passions, and a writer’s too.”

If a science of history were possible, our own consciousness would be guilty of absolute deception; for it asserts the entire freedom of the human will, its self-moving power and capability of determining its own course. But science is the arrangement of all things as the subjects of given laws whose operations are known, and whose results may be depended on. Science is, therefore, the direct contradiction of the free will of man. It is the negation of human freedom. It is the impugner of human responsibility. It is the denier of one of the chief facts in the human spirit. Individual action, arising from freedom of will, alone distinguishes man from “creatures of the baser sort.” When the ideas of men become concentered into a public opinion, and are set into operation upon the great questions of the times as they arise, they assume different aspects, and these different views cause men to be grouped into sects, communities, parties, or other combinations; but free will is exerted by each, and unless we could foreknow what combinations would enter into facts we could not have anything like a science of history.

Another argument has been thus stated by a great thinker, and a professor of history:—“Many modern men of science wish to draw the normal laws of human life from the average of humanity; I question whether they can do so; because I do not believe the average man to be the normal man, exhibiting the normal laws, but a very abnormal man, diseased and crippled; but even if their method were correct, it could work in practice only if the destinies of men were always decided by majorities; and granting that the majority of men have common sense, are the majority of fools to count for nothing? Are they powerless? Have they no influence on history? Have they even been always a minority, and not at times a terrible majority, doing each that which was right in the sight of his own eyes? You can surely answer that question for yourselves. As far as my small knowledge of history goes, I think it may be proved from facts, that any given people, down to the lowest savages, has, at any period of its life, known far more than it has done—known

quite enough to have enabled it to get on comfortably, thrive, and develop, if it had only done what no man does—all that it knew it ought to do and could do. St. Paul's experience of himself is true of all mankind,—‘The good which I would I do not; and the evil which I would not, that I do.’ The discrepancy between the amount of knowledge and the amount of work is one of the most patent and most painful facts which strikes us in the history of man, and one not certainly to be explained on any theory of man's progress being the effect of inevitable laws, or one which gives us much hope of ascertaining fixed laws for that progress.”\*

A still more important argument against the possibility of a science of history we cull next from a still greater thinker—one of those men whose studies in that special field gives him a special right to be heard as an authority. The exceeding solemnity of the passage, its beauty and elegance, its pertinency and its convincingness will, we believe, commend itself to every reader. Noble as are many passages of our greatest living historian, few quotations can equal the fine steadfast insight of this distinctly unanswerable argument from the writings of Thomas Carlyle:—

“Our clock strikes when there is a change from hour to hour, but no hammer in the horologe of Time peals through the universe when there is a change from era to era. Men understand not what is among their hands; as calmness is the characteristic of strength, so the weightiest causes may be most silent. It is in no case the real historical transaction, but only some more or less plausible scheme and theory of the transaction, or the harmonized result of many such schemes, each varying from the other, and all varying from truth, that we can ever hope to behold.

“Nay, were our faculty of insight into passing things never so complete, there is still a fatal discrepancy between our manner of observing these and their manner of occurring. The most gifted man can observe, still more can record, only the series of his own impressions; his observation, therefore, to say nothing of its other imperfections, must be *successive*, while the things done were often *simultaneous*,—the things done were not a series, but a group. It is not in enacted as it is in written history; actual events are nowise so simply related to each other as parent and offspring are; every single event is the offspring not of one, but of all other events, prior or contemporaneous, and will in its turn combine with all others to give birth to new; it is an ever-living, ever-working chaos of being, wherein shape after shape bodies itself forth from innumerable elements. And this chaos, boundless as the habitation and duration of man, unfathomable as the soul and destiny of man, is what the historian will depict and scientifically gauge, we may say, by threading it with single lines of a few ells in length. For as all action is by its nature to be figured as extended in breadth and in depth, as well as in

\* Charles Kingsley's Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge on “The Limits of Exact Science as applied to History,” p. 32.

length,—that is to say, is based on passion and mystery, if we investigate its origin, and spreads abroad on all hands, modifying and modified, as well as advances towards completion,—so all narrative is, by its nature, of only one dimension—only travels forward towards one or towards successive points. Narrative is *linear*, action is *solid*. Alas for our chains or our chainlets of causes and effects, which we so assiduously track through certain handbreadths of years and square miles, when the whole is a broad, deep immensity, and each atom is ‘chained’ and completed with all. Truly, if history is philosophy teaching by experience, the writer fitted to compose history is hitherto an unknown man. The experience itself would require all knowledge to record it, were the all-wisdom needful for such philosophy as would interpret it to be had for asking. Better were it that mere earthly historians should lower such pretensions, more suitable for Omniscience than for human science; and aiming only at some picture of the things acted, which picture itself will at best be a poor approximation, leave the inscrutable purport of them an acknowledged secret; or at most in reverent faith, far different from that teaching of philosophy, pause over the mysterious vestiges of Him whose path is in the deep of time, whom history indeed reveals, but only all history, and in eternity, will clearly reveal.”\*

We shall not venture to destroy the effect of this quotation by any commonplaces of ours. Surely no one will dream, after this, that a science of history is possible.

PHILETHES.

## Social Economy.

### OUGHT CORPORAL PUNISHMENT TO BE EMPLOYED IN EDUCATION?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

COMMON sense is grander than theory. Practical experience settles disputes best. Nothing can withstand the arguments of facts. We do not hesitate to say that “Scholasticos” is nearer the truth of facts than “Elpisticos.” The former is a very moderate advocate of the use of the *flagellum*, and the latter gives us the argument of hope rather than of experience. It is a pity to see him begin with a fallacy in the very quotation which he takes for his motto,—

“He that *only* rules by terror  
Doeth grievous wrong.”

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No one ever attempts to rule *only* by terror, but it is the duty of every ruler to be "a terror to evil-doers, and a praise and protection to such as do well." Schoolmasters rule by authority, influence, personal character, habit of command, position in society, and by right of superior training, as well as by the power of inflicting corporal chastisement. It is a gross fallacy, then, to quote Tennyson's lines as at all applicable to the subject; for of no schoolmaster can it be said, as it was of "the Captain,"—

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This is an important admission on behalf of the schoolmaster from an accepted source, and is itself a condemnation of the application made of the lines on a sea captain to the traducing of the schoolmaster, who never "only rules by terror."

It may be reckoned a fact that when a man like Goldsmith, who was reputed a dunce, speaks thus of his schoolmaster he acknowledges the beneficiality of the weapon of punishment. We can secure another witness almost equally unimpeachable, in Burns, who says, "Though it cost the schoolmaster some thrashings, I made an excellent English scholar, and by the time I was ten or eleven years of age I was a critic in substantives, verbs, and adjectives."

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till submission is attained, but does not approve of it in grown boys. J. A. St. John, in his notes on this point, says, "Locke's idea that it breaks the spirit of children is confuted by the experience of all ages; nor is it a jot more correct to say that it naturally creates an aversion to learning in any who are not born to be dunces. Both at Athens and Sparta, not only the boys, but the youth even in the gymnasia had their irregularities punished with stripes, undoubtedly without their spirits being broken, or any aversion created for those studies by which they were to distinguish themselves in the republic. Correction is inflicted in our own country with like results; but the question is respecting its efficiency in promoting the ends of discipline, and whether other punishments might not be employed with equal or greater advantage. My own experience, as the father of a numerous family, is that they cannot. With a few timid unenergetic natures, or when a child is brought up in the midst of grown persons alone, confinement, sour looks, banishment from the society of those they love, may, perhaps, be found sufficient, particularly with girls; but no man who has ever had to deal with a house full of robust, high-spirited, energetic, adventurous boys, could ever hope to maintain order, or enforce application, or repress the tyranny of the stronger over the weaker without sometimes having recourse to the rod. I hear, indeed, of such marvels; but I never see them, and fear that those manageable children exist only on paper."

"All the pious virtues which we owe  
Our parents, friends, our country, and our God,  
The seeds of every virtue here below  
From *discipline* and early culture flow."

Hugo Reid, in his treatise on "The Principles of Education," in the chapter on *Discipline*, remarks that, "notwithstanding the many laudable endeavours to find a substitute for it, it may be doubted whether anything has yet been contrived half so efficient as corporal punishment for those cases where punishment is really required. The fear of pain, and of the anger of him who has it in his power to inflict it, operate powerfully on the very young; while, in those of more advanced years, the fear of disgrace is added. And these are far stronger motives with the greater majority than any others within the reach of the educator. . . . It is a powerful instrument in the hand of the educator; and when not employed too often, but sharply and decisively when used at all, following with certainty when deserved, it is of the greatest assistance in maintaining discipline and enforcing diligence, and every parent or teacher should be very sure that their other means of influencing those under their care are adequate for the purpose before they deprive themselves of this very efficient one."

These observations we think judicious and obviously correct, and completely do away with the objection of "Elpisticos," that the ad-

vantage of the use of corporal punishment is contrary to all reason and theory. It is at once consonant to theory and experience that those who know that punishment may be and will be inflicted if transgression be indulged in will grow to be wary and be taught to be thoughtful. It is, of course, a disagreeable thing to think that punishment should be required at all; but the present condition of our race makes punishment a necessary part of human life, and we believe its educational influence is greatly beneficial.

MALVERN.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

FLOGGING and fagging are two great crimes against boyhood. The latter is a method of manufacturing tyrants and serfs; the former is the finest system in the world for encouraging and extending brutality. Corporal punishment as an educative agent is infamous. The birch rod ought to be expelled from British schools. One slip of olive is worth a whole grove of birch. As Douglas Jerrold once said, "Children only feel the twigs of the birch, but the produce is often ashes in the mouth of mankind." The education driven into one by force generally turns out to be a farce. Duncedom is not much to be wondered at as education is carried on now-a-days. One cannot eat so many crab apples as our masters compel us without getting the stomach-ache. Who will invent a patent digester for all the useless cram and lumber with which schoolboys are plagued and worried, and the getting up of which is the prime cause of flogging? We hold that if education were arranged on a sensible system there would be no more shirking of lessons by a healthy boy than there would be of roast beef and plum pudding. It is our unnatural system of everlasting cram that makes learning detestable in school days, and gives so many cares and regrets to life's after hours. So long as flogging is allowed, a small per-centage of scholars may be made upon the present system; but if flogging were abolished, schoolmasters would require to change their system and give wholesome grain instead of dry husks for mental food.

Education is mental training; but corporal punishment distracts thought, and makes learning to be looked on as an annoyance. Beating is not teaching, and flogging is not training. The mind is little influenced by the birch, and what little it is in the wrong direction: it is in the direction of deceit, of fear, and of detestation; whereas it ought to be inclined to dependence, love, literature, and the acquisition of knowledge. Corporal punishment is reprehensible especially for this, that it too often augments the stupidity it is employed to chase away; very frequently sours the mind against the pain and trouble of thinking out its tasks, and not seldom excites stubborn resistance against all endeavours to bring the boy exposed to it to love his book or attend to the education felt to be necessary for him.

We are convinced that greater injury to morals and progress has been the result of the general adoption of flogging as an agent in education than would have resulted from the general licence of laziness in the pupils exposed to the training of the rod. How many fatal declensions from the paths of virtue, how many runaways from the influences of home, have shown the injudiciousness of attempting to coerce nature by merely physical force,—of trying to bend instead of to guide the human will!

Cruelty is of all things the least excusable of the faults of man. We indicate this by calling it inhuman and inhumane. If cruelty be thus alien to humanity, how wrong must that system of education be which works with it as a necessity, and pleads for the use of the rod as an essential to sound progress in the labours of the school! Now even when the most moderate chastisement is given in school, its tendency is to cultivate in the youthful mind the power of cruelty. It is an advocacy by example of the reformatory influence of the infliction of pain. This of itself is clearly objectionable. We ought chiefly to avoid in education the encouragement of the lower passions; and, by the administration of corporal punishment, this is chiefly enforced and commanded. What wonder, therefore, if bickerings and brawls abound, if quarrels and dissensions arise? What wonder, moreover, if on such occasions the keen though unintentional and unperceived sarcasm of the young delinquents takes such a form as this:—"I'll *teach* you to do that again; I'll *learn* you to behave otherwise; I'll make you know your *master*!" with a blow given as emphasis to each exclamation? This is the legitimate fruit of the system of corporal punishment, and its results cannot be otherwise than most pernicious to those who are sent to school to be "edified thereby."

The preceding paragraph will, we should think, completely counteract the assertion of "Scholasticos" that corporal punishment "excites moral feeling and teaches moral responsibilities" (p. 23). What moral feeling is excited by the infliction of corporal punishment but contempt of the inflicter, pity for the sufferer, and hatred of the proximate cause of the pain being got—the lesson-work of the school? What moral responsibility can there be elicited from the birch twig? It is not moral responsibility that is felt on the application of the *ferula*, but a very tangible inclination to throw up for ever the bookwork of the schoolboy and run off to sea, where the glare of the master's eye may never again be met, and life be, as boys imagine it, one continual holiday. Instead of being "a dissuadent from a very sweet folly," it is more frequently the cause of bitterly repented-of transgressions. It is also a very great persuasion to deceit. Boys, seeing "no use" in punishment of that sort to themselves, or, so far as it seems to them, of others, believe themselves justified in cheating the "old croakers," whom "Scholasticos" represents, out of the pleasure of "dressing their jackets" or deranging their nerves.

Corporal punishment was in full swing when witch-finding,

martyr-burning, imprisonment for not attending the parish church, hanging for sheep-stealing and rabbit-shooting were part and parcel of the customs of civil life. All these have changed. We should change this too. The world will be sufficiently wise some day to break the rod of the schoolmaster, and hang an olive branch over each desk at which a teacher sits.

Goldsmith, Chatterton, and Sir Walter Scott were reckoned dunces in their classes; so also was Ebenezer Elliot. Hear the confession of this latter:—"Oh the misery of reading without having learned to spell! The name of the master was Brunskill, a broken-hearted Cumberland man, one of the best of living creatures, —a sort of sad-looking, half-starved angel without wings; and I have stood for hours beside his desk, with the tears running down my face, utterly unable to set down one correct figure. I doubt whether he ever suspected that I had not been taught the preliminary rules. I actually did not know that they were necessary. and looked on a boy who could do a sum in vulgar fractions as a sort of magician. Dreading school, I absented myself from it during the summer months of the second year, 'playing truant' about Dalton Deign and Silverwood, or Thryburgh Park."—*Autobiography*, p. 15.

This is the moral responsibility the rod teaches. It distorts all the inclinations of a boy; it applies the argument of pain, not to persuade him to attend, but to drive him away from school; to forget all other duties and responsibilities, that he may escape the degradation and the pain which comes to reputed "duncery."

"Ah! better far than all the Muses' lyres,  
All coward arts, is valour's generous heat;  
The firm, fixed breast which fit and right requires."

But valour, thoughtfulness, and often, too, truthfulness, depart from the spirit at the brandishing of the rod, and the cowed and craven urchin resigns his noble nature in fear of the "mickle love" wrought by the twigs of the "birchen tree."

It is all very well for masters to asseverate,—

"I must be cruel only to be kind."

Children do not understand paradoxes, and cruel kindness does not commend itself to their feelings. A greater amount of intelligence in the teacher, of moral principle in the management of classes, of considerateness for infirmities of mind and morals, would greatly facilitate good education. While we rejoice that the schoolmaster is abroad, we must confess that we sincerely wish he was less seldom found flourishing the rod and handling the cane.

HOPESTOCK.

before the eye, the more surely it is scientific, and the more confidently may we rely that a science of history is possible.

How can we trust to human foresight, or calculate on results at all, if we cut out of our means of dependence the faith we have that the future will resemble the past, and that there is in the actions of to-day the sowing of the seed of future history? How, in fact, can we retain a belief in the responsibility of nations and of rulers, if we affirm that a science of history is impossible?

From analogies drawn from other sciences we may deduce the inference that a science of history is possible. Political economy treats of "the nature of *wealth*, and the laws of its production and distribution, including, directly or remotely, the operation of all the causes by which the condition of mankind, or of any society of human beings, in respect to this universal object of human desire, is made prosperous or the reverse."\* It is undeniable that there is a science of wealth, dealing with all human concerns in the manner indicated in the above definition; that it determines the principles of action which men should reverentially adopt; and that it substantiates the accuracy of its first principles by appeals to facts in the past, while it seeks to apply them in the present. That a science of such a nature is constructible by human thought, and applicable by human forethought, gives fair grounds for believing that a science of history is possible. The existence of a science of morals is indisputable. Few would suppose that there could be such a science, but there is, and in it we have had laid down for us the laws of the actions, of the feelings, emotions, and passions of men. It cannot be impossible that there is a science of history, since there is a science of that which makes history,—a science of human conduct, its consequences and requirements.

Statistics seem to deal with the most alterable commodities and affairs, and yet we find that there is a science of statistics, and that from the mere columns of figures which are supplied to that science as its raw material many important facts may be deduced. Since, then, even statistics yield us truths, how can we resist the impression that history also, as it leads to truth, is possessed also of a logic,—that is, is susceptible of scientific treatment?

Some books have been issued, bearing titles like the following:—"God in History;" "The Philosophy of History;" "The Lessons of History," &c., &c. Now, if God is in history as well as in nature, His workings may be traced in the former as in the latter;—if there is a "philosophy," there can hardly fail to be a "science," for philosophy is but a collection of the higher principles of science; if there be lessons, they can only be useful if they are scientific, for lessons the truth of which could not be calculated on would be worthless. We believe, then, that we may fairly claim to have established the thesis given out, that a science of history is possible. We hope that in the controversy begun the ideas put forth here

\* J. S. Mill's "Principles of Political Economy," p. 1.

will be grappled with, and that we may have a "full, free, and impartial discussion" of this most important topic. If we cannot manage to excite this, then we must regret our ineffectual efforts, and sigh out,—

"Our wasted oil unprofitably burns,  
Like hidden lamps in old sepulchral urns."

CHEPENOM.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

HISTORY is the outgrowth of life. Life is complex; life is unfathomable, a mystery of insoluble intricacy. In the centre of life is will, a faculty "nine times folded in mystery;" all around life there lie change, circumstance, interests of all sorts, laws, customs, influences—a perfect maze of incalculable elements. Life requires to be passed among these, developed in these, worked out through these, and often made what it is in spite of these. History is life past. The historian is a recorder. What *has been* it is his duty to tell. His view must be cast back from event to action, from action to actor, from actor to motive, from motive to influence. At every remove the intricacy and incomprehensibility of things increases, and difficulties multiply as men's thoughts pass on from known realities to unknown inducement. With what telescope can man bring into vision bygone influences? by what calculus can he estimate the force and power of temptation? by what instrument gauge the intensity of the will?—by which processes of figurate or symbolic summation work out the relations of circumstances inducing and repelling man to or from the commission of certain deeds? Is not the difficulty impossibility? Can there be a science of uncertainties?—of probables and improbables at once? Can man know the unknown? If these things are possible, a science of history may be on the very furthest verge of possibility too; but can such things be? Is man able to decipher and explain the entire complexity of life, thought, endeavour, accomplishment, and will?

The inexhaustibility of life, as an issue of possibilities, and the deep secrets of the tides of thought and passion both combine to make a science of history impossible. Who can be the fortune-teller of the results of one life? who dare venture to predict the issues of all life? "The juggles of a shallow cheat" may occasionally appear to have foreshadowed the foreordained; but we do not attach conviction to Zadkiel's "Almanack," nor do we ever wish to see history reduced to an art of wizardry. What horoscope can be invented which will so unveil the future as to inform us at what great times those shall have birth—

"Whom fame

Is lavish to attest the lords of mind?"

Had we such foreknowledge, could we not employ it to defeat the approaching dominion of such men by a massacre like that of Herod's at Bethlehem, better managed? If we cannot have such foreknow-

ledge, then we cannot have a science of history; for science is prevision—the power of determining that which must be from a knowledge of what has been and is. Law is the last word of science; law excludes uncertainties, and all history is a heap of unexpected events rising up into being in opposition to human intentions and foresight. There can be no science where the elements are incalculable, and we all know that the determinations of men are invisible, and their motives often unknown even to themselves: “the heart is deceitful above all things.” Hence,—

“History has her doubts, and every age  
With sceptic queries marks the passing page;  
Records of old nor later date are clear,—  
Too distant those, and these are placed too near;  
There time conceals the objects from our view,  
Here our own passions, and a writer's too.”

If a science of history were possible, our own consciousness would be guilty of absolute deception; for it asserts the entire freedom of the human will, its self-moving power and capability of determining its own course. But science is the arrangement of all things as the subjects of given laws whose operations are known, and whose results may be depended on. Science is, therefore, the direct contradiction of the free will of man. It is the negation of human freedom. It is the impugner of human responsibility. It is the denier of one of the chief facts in the human spirit. Individual action, arising from freedom of will, alone distinguishes man from “creatures of the baser sort.” When the ideas of men become concentered into a public opinion, and are set into operation upon the great questions of the times as they arise, they assume different aspects, and these different views cause men to be grouped into sects, communities, parties, or other combinations; but free will is exerted by each, and unless we could foreknow what combinations would enter into facts we could not have anything like a science of history.

Another argument has been thus stated by a great thinker, and a professor of history:—“Many modern men of science wish to draw the normal laws of human life from the average of humanity; I question whether they can do so; because I do not believe the average man to be the normal man, exhibiting the normal laws, but a very abnormal man, diseased and crippled; but even if their method were correct, it could work in practice only if the destinies of men were always decided by majorities; and granting that the majority of men have common sense, are the majority of fools to count for nothing? Are they powerless? Have they no influence on history? Have they even been always a minority, and not at times a terrible majority, doing each that which was right in the sight of his own eyes? You can surely answer that question for yourselves. As far as my small knowledge of history goes, I think it may be proved from facts, that any given people, down to the lowest savages, has, at any period of its life, known far more than it has done—known



quite enough to have enabled it to get on comfortably, thrive, and develop, if it had only done what no man does—all that it knew it ought to do and could do. St. Paul's experience of himself is true of all mankind,—‘The good which I would I do not; and the evil which I would not, that I do.’ The discrepancy between the amount of knowledge and the amount of work is one of the most patent and most painful facts which strikes us in the history of man, and one not certainly to be explained on any theory of man's progress being the effect of inevitable laws, or one which gives us much hope of ascertaining fixed laws for that progress.”\*

A still more important argument against the possibility of a science of history we cull next from a still greater thinker—one of those men whose studies in that special field gives him a special right to be heard as an authority. The exceeding solemnity of the passage, its beauty and elegance, its pertinency and its convincingness will, we believe, commend itself to every reader. Noble as are many passages of our greatest living historian, few quotations can equal the fine steadfast insight of this distinctly unanswerable argument from the writings of Thomas Carlyle:—

“Our clock strikes when there is a change from hour to hour, but no hammer in the horologe of Time peals through the universe when there is a change from era to era. Men understand not what is among their hands; as calmness is the characteristic of strength, so the weightiest causes may be most silent. It is in no case the real historical transaction, but only some more or less plausible scheme and theory of the transaction, or the harmonized result of many such schemes, each varying from the other, and all varying from truth, that we can ever hope to behold.

“Nay, were our faculty of insight into passing things never so complete, there is still a fatal discrepancy between our manner of observing these and their manner of occurring. The most gifted man can observe, still more can record, only the series of his own impressions; his observation, therefore, to say nothing of its other imperfections, must be *successive*, while the things done were often *simultaneous*,—the things done were not a series, but a group. It is not in enacted as it is in written history; actual events are nowise so simply related to each other as parent and offspring are; every single event is the offspring not of one, but of all other events, prior or contemporaneous, and will in its turn combine with all others to give birth to new; it is an ever-living, ever-working chaos of being, wherein shape after shape bodies itself forth from innumerable elements. And this chaos, boundless as the habitation and duration of man, unfathomable as the soul and destiny of man, is what the historian will depict and scientifically gauge, we may say, by threading it with single lines of a few ells in length. For as all action is by its nature to be figured as extended in breadth and in depth, as well as in

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length,—that is to say, is based on passion and mystery, if we investigate its origin, and spreads abroad on all hands, modifying and modified, as well as advances towards completion,—so all narrative is, by its nature, of only one dimension—only travels forward towards one or towards successive points. Narrative is *linear*, action is *solid*. Alas for our chains or our chainlets of causes and effects, which we so assiduously track through certain handbreadths of years and square miles, when the whole is a broad, deep immensity, and each atom is ‘chained’ and completed with all. Truly, if history is philosophy teaching by experience, the writer fitted to compose history is hitherto an unknown man. The experience itself would require all knowledge to record it, were the all-wisdom needful for such philosophy as would interpret it to be had for asking. Better were it that mere earthly historians should lower such pretensions, more suitable for Omniscience than for human science; and aiming only at some picture of the things acted, which picture itself will at best be a poor approximation, leave the inscrutable purport of them an acknowledged secret; or at most in reverent faith, far different from that teaching of philosophy, pause over the mysterious vestiges of Him whose path is in the deep of time, whom history indeed reveals, but only all history, and in eternity, will clearly reveal.”\*

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The acts of the imaginative faculty may be divided into two classes, and this diversity is caused by the degree in which the imagination is aided by the reasoning powers of the mind. In the first class are the ideal thoughts of the fancy : here the imagination is but slightly curbed by reason. In the second class are the speculative conceptions of the intellect : here we have the reasoning powers of the mind stimulated and excited by the imagination. It would be exceedingly difficult to lay down an arbitrary line of demarcation which should clearly separate these two classes ; but it is evident that the productions of novelists belong to the former class. "Nam Der" and "Elpisticos," however, apply to works of fiction—part of the former class—encomiums which rightly belong to the latter only.

"Nam Der" says that "the more closely we bind the reason to labour during the day, the more excited is the play of the imagination during the night."

Our experience is just the reverse of this : it is true that if we devote ourselves so closely to intellectual labour as to neglect bodily exercise during the day, the imagination will then be more vigorous during the night ; but this is caused by physical derangement, and does not proceed from our neglect of the imaginative faculty during the day. With the most intense and unimagi-native mental labour, mingle a due amount of bodily exercise, and you will have fewer dreams of fancy at night than if you indulge the imagination by reading works of fiction, and mix therewith a smaller proportion of intellectual and physical exercise.

According to "Nam Der" "works of fiction are necessary." This is, indeed, a startling assertion, and one which our opponent has made either without giving any evidence in support of it, or as a conclusion from the argumentation in the preceding paragraph. If deduced from the reasoning which precedes, it would stand thus :—

Relaxation is necessary ;

The perusal of works of fiction affords relaxation ;

Ergo, works of fiction are necessary.

The sophistical nature of this argument is self-evident ; for although the perusal of works of fiction affords relaxation, yet novel-reading is not the only pursuit capable of yielding relaxation. Therefore it does not follow that, because relaxation is necessary, works of fiction are in consequence necessary also.

"Elpisticos" maintains that no valuable book should be withheld from the student because of its impurity. Indeed ! Then, to be consistent in supporting this theory, he must also maintain that talent is greater than purity, that intellectual ability is more to be attended to than morality, and that the mind is of greater importance than the soul. "Elpisticos" does not wish for a valetudinarian, but for a healthy virtue. We rejoice to hear it. But is he likely to gain such a virtue from a perusal of the Athenian comedies ? He does not approve of a virtue "which keeps out of

the common air for fear of infection," but wishes for a virtue "which is proof against the risks of ordinary life." We hope he is in possession of such a virtue; at the same time we beg leave to remind him, we have a divine authority for saying that "he who trusts in his own heart is a fool." What a dreadful mockery it is to pray as thousands do, "Lead us not into temptation," and then a few minutes after unnecessarily enter the path of temptation with their eyes wide open! A work of fiction is not, as B. W. S. represents it, an oasis to the working man in the desert of his daily toil, but rather a bye-path meadow which captivates the affections, and draws the feet out of that path which leads to the acquisition of truth—an enchanted ground which detains from more profitable pursuits,—indulging also that "inveterate tendency to indolence in the human mind." "Elpisticos" says that "reading novels tends to enlarge the organ of imagination." We heartily endorse this statement, and bring it forward as one reason for maintaining that the perusal of works of fiction is wrong. We want facts, not fancies—actualities, not possibilities—realities, not ideal images—truths, not fictions. This fancy of ours needs a bridle, not a spur. However little this faculty may be indulged, yet wherever there is an unoccupied mind there is an active fancy. Soon as our minds leave the search after truth—neither reading works of profit nor bestowing their thoughts on practical or scientific subjects,—immediately our fancy supplies the mind with vain imaginations. This shows that our fancy needs not to be stimulated.

"With fiction, then, does real joy reside?  
 And is our reason the delusive guide?  
 Is it, then, right to dream the syren's sing?  
 Or mount enraptured on the dragon's wing?  
 No! 'tis the childlike mind, to care unknown,  
 That makes the imagined paradise its own:  
 Soon as reflections in the bosom rise,  
 Light slumbers vanish from our clouded eyes;  
 The tear and smile, that once together rose,  
 Are then divorced; the head and heart are foes;  
 Enchantment bows to wisdom's serious plan,  
 And pain and prudence make or mar the man."

At the close of a dissertation on novels and novelists, W. B. S. says, "All this we regard as presumptive evidence that the reading of works of fiction cannot be otherwise than beneficial, for we cannot conceive it to be possible that anything would receive a large amount of approbation throughout the whole world unless there could be some good obtained from it." But this is arguing beside the mark; for it is not sufficient to prove that novel-reading is in some respects beneficial; and that it is possible to obtain some good from the perusal of works of fiction, our opponents must prove that the benefit derived from novel-reading exceeds its ill effects. This they have failed to do, and therefore we still maintain that the perusal of works of fiction is wrong.

SAMUEL.

## The Essayist.

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### A FEW THOUGHTS ON MAN'S COMPOSITE NATURE.

"Man is his own star, and the soul that can  
Render an honest and a perfect man,  
Commands all light, all influence, all fate;  
Nothing to him falls early, or too late."

JOHN FLETCHER.

MAN is my subject. Man, the most noble and most wonderful work of God's hands. I propose shortly to consider him in his threefold nature—of body, mind, and soul. Space will not permit, and I think it is not needful that I attempt to prove the proposition which is my start-point, that man is made up, or that he is possessed of body, soul, and spirit, as the Bible terms them, but as they may be more correctly termed, body, mind, and spirit.

These three distinct existences during life make up one whole, as three distinct persons are contained in one Deity. Each has its special office; "each has its work appointed by the Eternal Will;" yet all three are mysteriously and wonderfully knit and woven into one being. That man may do his duty and fulfil his mission, all must harmoniously work together to the same end, yet neither can move out of its own sphere. Like the planets, each has its centre of motion, and each has its particular orbit, and as mysterious as is the power which holds them in their places is the vital principle which intricately unites the three component parts of man's being.

The body receives impressions of the objects about us through the senses, which are five in number, viz., smell, taste, touch, hearing, and sight.

The three first I pass over as of little importance; the fourth, hearing, is a faculty possessed only by the ear: the sensation-recipient is the tympanum, a sort of drum upon which certain effects are produced by sounds carried on the air. Through its medium we obtain the gratification arising from music and from the utterance of human voices; by its aid the mind may be lulled to sweet oblivion of the harrassing cares of daily life, and the soul be tuned to sweetest harmony and concord, brought into most intimate relation with, and participation in, the "music of the spheres." To it we owe the delight with which we listen to the masters of language; to the preacher, who entreats us to regard less the grovelling concerns

of earth and to attend more to those matters which are of weightiest import to the soul, both here and in the more mysterious hereafter; to the orator, whose intelligent mind is spurred to activity by zeal and energy, as he denounces the wrong in our systems of politics or public morality; to the man of letters, as he tells of the achievements, 'midst difficulties and sorrows, of such of his fraternity as sleep the last and the only true sleep, the sleep of the tomb; to the elocutionist, as he, with silvery tongue, recites the masterpieces of the victims of that semi-divine madness—poetry. What, indeed, do we *not* owe to this faculty, since, before printing was invented, by its means were handed down in a large measure the songs, traditions, and wisdom of the ancients?

Sight is the fifth, most important, and most noble of the senses. The eye is the organ of sight, the retina of which is an expansion of the optic nerve. Rays of light reflected from various objects are brought into contact with the retina; the impression thus produced is conveyed to the brain, and thence to the mind. The ideas which this faculty furnishes us with are of the visible appearances of things. To it we owe the pleasure we have in studying the lineaments of beauty in the "human face divine." The beauty of the world in which we live; the smiling valley dotted with rustic homesteads, and its fields of corn ripe unto harvest; the fast-flowing river, emblem of life, and the grand old rocks; the "sheep and cattle upon a thousand hills;" the "forest primeval," and the trackless desert; the rolling waves of the boundless sea, and the blue sky blazing with its countless jewels;—what are all these things to us if we cannot behold them? Thanks to the sense of sight, the soul may *revel* in them. With feelings too deep for utterance, with soul spell-bound, wrapt up in the wondrous beauty and sublimity of the scene, we may stand on the summit of Snowdon or Helvellyn and view the magnificent and glorious panorama that is outspread before us; or we may, in the solemn silence of a summer night, gaze upon the stars which deck the firmament, and become acquainted with the planetary system. Who that from these sources has felt his nerves thrill with delight, who that has feasted his eyes upon the wonders and magnificence of nature, until his sympathetic soul has become intoxicated with emotions and ecstasies language can but feebly describe, cannot enter into Milton's submissive sorrow for his blindness, as he reads the fair lines alluding to it in our great poet's immortal epic:—

"Thou

Revisit'st not these eyes, that roll in vain  
To find thy piercing ray, and find no dawn;  
So thick a drop serene has quenched their orbs.

With the year

Seasons return; but not to me returns  
Day, or the sweet approach of even or morn,  
Or sight of vernal bloom, or summer's rose,  
Or flocks, or herds, or human face divine;

But cloud instead, and ever-during dark  
 Surrounds me, from the cheerful ways of men  
 Cut off; and for the book of knowledge fair  
 Presented with an universal blank  
 Of Nature's works, to me expunged and razed,  
 And wisdom at its entrance quite shut out."

What shall I say of the mind, in few yet adequate words, that I may pass on to the consideration of the soul, and to a general estimate of my subject, so as to bring my paper within the necessary limits?

The mind is the seat of reason or of intelligence. Logic is the name of the science which treats of the mind, its faculties, qualities, and attributes. And as whatever I might say of logic would be formal, and therefore unsuitable for the present occasion, I pass over this branch of my subject shortly, first noting that whoever feels inclined to study it properly will find himself amply rewarded for any mental toil he may undergo, for we—

"Know that the human being's thoughts and deeds  
 Are not like ocean billows, blindly moved;  
 The inner world, his microcosmos, is  
 The deep shaft out of which they spring eternally:  
 They grow by certain laws, like the tree's fruit;  
 No juggling chance can metamorphose them."

And we are also compelled to believe that—

"He who made us with such large discourse,  
 Looking before and after, gave us not  
 That capability and God-like reason  
 To rust in us unus'd."

And now of the soul we cannot see, of that mysterious existence which sits throned within the mind, that principle of life which directs man's energies and thoughts, whose monitions every human being feels, whose judgment he cannot escape. The soul is the living breath of the Unseen yet Omnipresent; the voice of the Omnipotent speaks to man through its medium; the soul is the conscience, and the voice of the conscience is the voice of God. Woe to that man who hears it as though he heard it not!

"If," says Plato, "there is anything in man partaking of the nature of the divine it is the soul:" and again, "The soul is the most excellent of generated existences." That master-mind of all time has typified the soul as a chariot sweeping through the region of Existence, with Thought and Desire as the steeds and Personality as their driver. "And inasmuch as to explain what the soul is in itself would require a science divine and lengthened disquisition," he gives utterance instead to that grand allegory of the winged steeds bearing the chariot of Being, under the control of Personal Life, through the magnificent panoramas of existence, and finding, in



the continually augmenting experiences brought before it, knowledge, culture, and truth.\*

Man is possessed of spirit, mind, and body. "The first," says Plato, "pre-existed in and formed a part of the gods; the second is a product of life, and unites itself to the bodily organization at birth. The body is the seat of sensation, the mind is the seat of opinion, the soul is the seat of science. At death the subtle intermixture by which man is consubstantiated is dissolved, and the spirit—unless by sin it has forfeited its divine privilege—returns to the great panorama of existence, where reality is everlasting." So thought and wrote Plato, the master-spirit of Greece and of the world, 400 years before the coming of Christ. Alas! that in this nineteenth century of the Christian era, with the full benefit of the revelation of God to man given in the Bible, with the bright light of Christianity to illumine the mind, and to give form and bent to the soul's aspirations, there should be men who profess to disbelieve in Him who was and is from everlasting to everlasting; to doubt the existence of a soul as distinct from the mind; or, if to yield that point, still to maintain that at death it is annihilated: whilst this hero of ancient Greece—without the key-note to existence furnished in the Bible, with nought but his own sense-knowledge,—fought his way through doubt and error to a full belief in the existence of soul, and also of its immortality. How much may we yet learn from this deep-thoughted sage, who, in Athens,—

"The vivid chart of human life display'd,  
And taught the laws that regulate the blast;  
Wedding wild impulse to calm forms of beauty,  
And making peace 'twixt liberty and duty."

Every pulse of man's being, every throb of his heart, every thought of his brain, speaks the immortality of his soul; his mind shrinks from the thought of a mere material existence to close in his grave. Well may he therefore claim for his soul—not immortality only, but personality also—a distinct and separate existence.

An eminent novelist† of our day, with the calm spirit of philosophy seeking into the speculations of science, and using fiction as a means of communicating to the world great truths which, conveyed in any other form, might be wholly disregarded, has beautifully illustrated the threefold nature of man. He supposes a human being in the state of trance, and says,—

"The brain now opened on my sight, with all its labyrinth of cells. I seemed to have the clue to every winding in the maze. I observed three separate emanations of light,—the first, of a pale red hue; the second, of a pale azure; the third, a silvery spark.

"The red light, which grew paler and paler as I looked, undulated from the brain along the arteries, the veins, the nerves. And I murmured to myself, 'Is this the principle of animal life?'

\* S. Neil, on "Plato," in *British Controversialist*.

† Bulwer Lytton, in "Strange Story."

"The azure light equally permeated the frame, crossing and uniting with the red, but in a separate and distinct ray, exactly as, in the outer world, a ray of light crosses and unites with a ray of heat, though in itself a separate individual agency. And again I murmured to myself, 'Is this the principle of intellectual being, directing or influencing that of animal life,—with it, yet not of it?'"

"But the silvery spark! what was that? Its centre seemed the brain, but I could fix it to no single organ. Nay, whenever I looked through the system, it reflected itself as a star reflects itself upon water. And I observed that, while the red light was growing feebler and feebler, and the azure light was confused, irregular—now obstructed, now hurrying, now almost lost—the silvery spark was unaltered, undisturbed, so independent of all which agitated and vexed the frame that I became strangely aware that, if the heart stopped in its action and the red light went out, if the brain was paralyzed, that energetic mind smitten into idiocy and the azure light wandering objectless, as a meteor wanders over the morass,—still that silver spark would shine the same, indestructible by aught that shattered its tabernacle. And I murmured to myself, 'Can that starry spark speak the presence of soul? Does the silver light shine in creatures to which no life immortal has been promised by divine revelation?'"

Much more might be said in illustration of my proposition of the threefold nature of man, but let what is written suffice for this occasion.

In conclusion, I may observe that if men would clearly comprehend their own nature, and specially the particular provinces allotted to the mind and the soul, they would be saved from much trouble. For instance, the man of a scientific mind frequently repudiates the doctrines of God's existence and his own soul's immortality. He is first a sceptic, and then an infidel, because he cannot, by his science alone, account for the aspirations and desires of his soul. He forgets that the soul has a sphere and a special work of its own, and that there are many questions particular to it which cannot be solved or explained by any reference to the reason.

In regard of the great end of life, what does it matter for such a person, though—

"He be in logic a great critic,  
 Profoundly skilled in analytic;  
 He can distinguish and divide  
 A hair 'twixt south and south-west side,—  
 On either which he can dispute,  
 Confute, change hands, and still confute.  
 For he a rope of sand can twist,  
 As tough as learned Sorbonist;  
 And weave fine cobwebs, fit for skull  
 That's empty when the moon is full?"

It is perhaps the most difficult, as it is the most necessary, thing on earth for a man to attend to, to know himself. "Know thyself," said the Pythian of old: that precept descended from heaven. Some men go into the opposite extreme to the one I have instanced. They believe in spirit-rapping, table-turning, and the like nonsense, for want of that pabulum of sound sense which a properly trained and well-balanced mind supplies. Thus do some men make reason

their god, and others their morbid imagination ; all alike securing thereby their own exceeding sorrow and utter discomfiture. They go groping through the world, because "having eyes, they see not," nor do they yet understand. Nor thus can they drink in their—

"Intellectual life,  
All sweet sensations, all ennobling thoughts,  
All adoration of the God in Nature,  
All lovely and all honourable things;  
Whatever makes man's mortal spirit free,  
The joy and greatness of his future being!"

Let us, instead, understand ourselves and our nature, our relation to each other, to the world, and to God, that we may learn so to think and—

"So live, that when the summons comes to join  
The innumerable caravan that moves  
To the pale realms of shade, where each shall take  
His chamber in the silent halls of Death,  
We go not like the quarry-slave, at night  
Scourged to his dungeon; but sustain'd and sooth'd  
By an unfaltering trust, approach the grave  
Like one who wraps the drapery of his couch  
About him, and lies down to pleasant dreams."

T. M.

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**LITERARY MEN IN THE NEW PARLIAMENT.**—A large number of university and literary men have been returned for the first time to the new Parliament. Mr. M. A. Bass, returned for Stafford, is a member of Trin. Coll., Cambridge, and graduated in 1860. Mr. G. O. Trevelyan, the "Competition Wallah," elected for Tynemouth, is also a member of Trin. Coll., Cambridge, where he graduated in 1861, being second on the first list of classical tripos. Mr. W. H. Gladstone, elected for Chester, is a member of Christ Church, Oxford, where he graduated in 1862, taking a third class in mathematics. Mr. A. Peel, youngest son of the late Sir Robert Peel, returned for Warwick, was educated at Oriel Coll., Oxford, where he graduated in 1848. Mr. W. H. Stone, returned for Portsmouth, was educated at Trin. Coll., Cambridge, where he graduated in 1857. Mr. Schreiber, elected for Cheltenham, was educated at Trinity Hall, Cambridge, of which he became a fellow, and was second class in classics. Mr. J. D. Coleridge, member for Exeter, was educated at Exeter College, Oxford, and afterwards became fellow of Baliol. He graduated in 1842. Lord Duncan, who has been returned for South Warwickshire, is an Oxford classical "first" of last year. Prof. Henry Fawcett, who has been returned for Brighton, was educated at Trinity Hall, Cambridge, where he graduated in 1856, when he was seventh wrangler. Amongst the literary men who have been for the first time returned are Mr. Forsyth, Q.C., the author of "The Life of Cicero;" Mr. J. S. Mill, Mr. Thomas Hughes, Mr. Torrens, and Mr. Oliphant. Amongst literary and university men who took high honours who have been rejected may be mentioned Mr. Lamont, Mr. Passmore Edwards, Mr. Alfred Austin, Mr. Mason Jones, Mr. Freemantle (scholar and first class man of Baliol College, Oxford), the Hon. W. Brodick, of Oxford; the Hon. Reginald Abbott (a double first at Oxford), Mr. H. G. Thomson, a classical "first" at Cambridge; and the Hon. T. C. Bruce, a wrangler and first class man of Cambridge.

## The Eloquence of the Month.

### DR. CAIRD ON PULPIT ELOQUENCE.

The Rev. John Caird, D.D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Glasgow, is the son of an engineer. He was born in 1823, in Greenock, at the Burgh Academy of which Renfrewshire seaport he was educated. He entered the Glasgow University as a student in 1836, and pursued therein the entire eight years' curriculum required by the laws of the Scottish Church as a preparation for ministry in its sanctuaries. In 1845 he was ordained as pastor of Newton-upon-Ayr, a burghal suburb on the right bank of the river Ayr. After a few months he was transferred thence to Lady Yester's Church, in Edinburgh, the appointment to which is in the hands of the Council of that city. In 1850 he removed on account of his health to the rural parish of Errol, in the song-celebrated Carse of Gowrie, a few miles from "The Fair City of Perth." On 14th October, 1853, he first preached before the Queen at Balmoral, and in 1855 a sermon on "Religion in Common Life," which he preached before her Majesty there, was printed by royal command. In 1858 he accepted the pastorate of a magnificent church built beside the West End Park, Glasgow, and hence called Park Church, and issued a volume of "Sermons," which are highly esteemed for their practicality, earnestness, simplicity, and perspicuity. On the retirement (in 1862) of Professor Alexander Hill, D.D., he was unanimously chosen by the University Court, as patrons, to the professorship of divinity. The following oration was delivered by Professor Caird on the occasion of the induction of a clergyman to the pastorate of the Cathedral Church, Glasgow.]

Is the influence of the clerical order on the wane? Has the pulpit lost its ancient power? Is the respect still accorded to the ministers of religion more prescriptive than real—not the fragrance of a present sacrifice, but the odour of former incense, that still lingers around deserted altars? If it be so, is the diminished influence due to inevitable causes, or is it remediable? is it to be ascribed to the nature and necessary conditions of the office, or to the inefficiency of its present representatives? to the rise of the surrounding tide of social enlightenment, or to the crumbling away of that rock which formerly rose so proudly above the waters? Must the ministers of the gospel make up their minds to a lower place and a weakened power over society, or seriously inquire into the causes of the alleged failure, and manfully, in God's strength, set themselves to retrieve it? It might not be difficult to show that the allegation of diminished clerical influence is, at any rate, greatly exaggerated. It is true that dull preachers and scanty congregations are, in our day, functions of each other; but I do not think that this correlation is a dispensation of providence peculiar to the present time. It might be shown that wherever there is power in the pulpit there are overflowing congregations and eager listeners.

There is, I think, good ground to maintain that there pervades society, more than in almost any past age, a profound interest in religious questions, a spirit of inquiry, a readiness to treat in a serious spirit any honest endeavour to throw light on the deeper problems of human life, a disposition in the laity to enter even into theological and critical discussions, and to welcome the aids which scholarship, philosophy, historical and critical investigation are affording to the study of the Scriptures, and the determination of their authority and import. Moreover, the clergyman's is a vocation the social power of which all have felt, or must perforce admit. To multitudes his very person is associated with their most sacred thoughts and holiest affections, with their deepest earthly joys and sorrows, with their eternal hopes. Is it possible that one so implicated with the very roots of life, and entwined with its daily, hourly growth, should cease to exert a marked influence in society? My first assertion, then, is, that it is false to say that the pulpit, or the clerical calling in general, has lost, or is losing, its social influence; but my second assertion is, that its influence is not what it ought to be. Looking at the theory of the office, and the splendid opportunities which it presents, it would seem to be possessed of almost incalculable power. Looking at the office as experience compels us to regard it, our estimate of its practical results must be sadly abated. And whilst many other causes may contribute to this contrast between the influence of the Christian ministry as it is, and that influence as it ought to be, one great cause is to be found in the fact that the office is grander than its functionaries, that the ministers of Christ fall short of their great opportunities.

I crave attention for a moment to the causes of the inadequate or imperfect influence of the Christian ministry at the present day. One most obvious hindrance to ministerial success is the false motives by which many are attracted to the ministry. The love of money can scarcely, in Scottish churches at least, be enumerated as one of these. Viewed relatively to other professions, the clerical is not in our country the pathway to wealth. In making choice of a profession, even a man of commonplace ability might easily find a more lucrative field of labour in trade or commerce than in the service of the church; and if he be conscious of power, if he be endowed with abilities above average, the prizes that are open to him at the bar, in the chambers of the legal practitioner, in the civil service, in the calling of the physician, the man of letters, the artist, the engineer, are much more splendid than the very highest success would bring him in the church. Many a vigorous-minded clergyman, in mature life, looking round on the career of his school and college rivals, may easily point to one and another now enjoying well-earned wealth and honours, while anxious toil and rigid economy can scarce keep his own head above water. Surely he who knows this, and they who, full well aware of it, calmly surrender brilliant prospects for an ill-rewarded calling, may claim exemption from the suspicion of wordly motives in the choice they have made.

I have never been able to see why enforced poverty should guarantee clerical purity of motive. A lawyer or physician is as much bound to be self-denied as a clergyman; but does either of them for that reason refuse a fee? Or would he quietly listen to a rich tradesman or merchant who offered him beggarly payment for his skill and toil, on the plea that self-sacrifice is a fine thing, and that a Christian should be above the love of money? Why should the clerical be the only profession of which wealthy tradesmen and others are able to buy the results of a costly and long-protracted education, of scholarship, learning, philosophy, rhetorical and other accomplishments, to speak of nothing higher—to have the highest kind of mental food week after week provided for them at a rate of emolument they would scorn to compound for in their own case—nay, sometimes would blush to offer to a clerk? There are minds not noble enough to be won by the love of Christ, yet not base enough to be the slaves of money. A magnet more potent than comfort, ease, luxury, to many such is to be found in popular applause—in the social publicity, influence, power, which, in less or greater measure, the successful minister is sure to win. Few positions lead so directly to publicity, or satisfy so readily the craving to be seen, known, and talked of, as that of a popular divine. In all communities, rural or civic, the parson is a man of mark and importance. Even if he be a man of little ability—one who in any other walk of life would never be known or heard of—here there is an adventitious deference and respect which, due to the office, is in most minds transferred, apart from his own merits, to the man who occupies it. The squire receives him at his table; the bow of the smutched artificer, the wondering homage of children, await him as he goes forth on his parochial rounds; a general atmosphere of deference surrounds him, very pleasant to a weak mind, not unpleasant to a strong one. And then, translate the youthful and ambitious minister from the modified publicity of the country parish to the unmeasured publicity and manifold excitements of a town charge, and is there not much to feed the vanity and satisfy the love of display, or power, or praise, and so to present irresistible fascination to many a mind which higher motives would fail to move? Who, if he be accessible to such influences, is so much sought after, fêted, flattered, as the young and popular preacher? For whom do competing congregations contend? Whose presence is so eagerly solicited by charitable societies, Sunday school managers, and churches that have a debt to clear off? Whose name is so eagerly coveted by getters-up of *soirées* and public meetings, and plastered on walls and boarding in big letters as a sure attraction to the hunters after religious amusement? To whom do tasteful gifts and presentations so often hint a homage which the tongue may not speak? Then think of the weekly excitement which the pulpit brings to him whose passion is for popular applause. The crowded pews, the thronged aisles, the preparatory commotion, and the stillness when the object of interest

appears; the half-impatience of psalms and prayers as mere preliminaries to the great point of interest; the hushed waiting stillness, the kindling eyes and flushed countenances while the skilfully constructed climax is being wrought up, and sentence after sentence rising in interest, falls from the orator's lip; and then, as the goal is reached, and the exhausted speaker pauses, the long-drawn sigh of relieved suspense, the interchanged glances of sympathetic admiration, the momentary rustle over the auditory, and then the settling anew for another dose of rhetoric! What an ordeal is this for a weak head and a vain heart to go through! What incense rises on such a scene—a sweet odour in the nostrils of the too conscious idol of the hour! There is inherent weakness in such a ministry amidst the superficial flutter of success. The secret of the popularity-hunter is sooner or later found out. Discerning minds, perhaps, see through his shallowness; pious minds fall back from one who lives for self; and the educated, supercilious, sceptical class, instead of being influenced by him, pride themselves on penetrating the clap-trap of religious excitement, and find in the whole affair a fresh theme for disdainful criticism and epigrammatic articles on popular preaching.

Another cause of the inadequate influence of the clerical office is the lack of solid ability and learning in many of its representatives. Ability and learning will not make a minister; but no man should aspire to the office without, at least, a more than average share of ability and learning. At all times, and in a peculiar manner in our own, the clergyman's should be an intellectual profession. Almost as much from worldliness and indifference the legitimate influence of the clerical order is apt to suffer from superficial culture and narrowness of thought. The work of the ministry needs, even for the obscurest rural spheres, a wise, well-cultured, and sagacious mind, as well as a warm and devout heart, in him who would perform it well. It is quite true that rustics, farm servants, labourers, and the like classes, are not to be fed by learned disquisitions and philosophic arguments. A man who is too fine to preach plain words to common men, who talks in a would-be refined and philosophic style to a village congregation, intersperses his meaningless big talk with references to philosophers of whom his auditory know nothing, and, probably, himself as little, with scientific and philosophic terms, "objective," "subjective," and the like, which it would utterly puzzle himself to define, and with quotations from Tennyson, which he has not sense to understand nor taste to appreciate,—what practical results to man or mortal can be expected to flow from teaching such as this? It is quite true, also, that a pious man of humble talent and little erudition may do much good where an abler and more accomplished man would do little or none. Nevertheless it must still be maintained that to give due weight to the ministry, even in the most unobtrusive sphere of pastoral duty, a thoroughly well-educated and clear-headed man is needed. But especially in large centres of population, the age we live in de-

mands an able and highly educated ministry. It is true that there is perhaps no profession in which it is possible for a man of slender parts and superficial culture to succeed so well. There are men who never could get on in any profession where real ability could be tested, who gain, after a sort, popularity and preferment in this. For here almost everything depends on popular preaching. It must needs be that in a large congregation the majority are not the most discerning, and as success depends not on the results of a long course of labour, where shallowness might by-and-bye begin to crop up, but in most cases on the capacity to get up one or two showy sermons, it will often happen that a man with a few superficial graces, whose whole stock-in-trade is composed of fluency, self-sufficiency, good looks, sound lungs, and a sort of vulgar histrionic power, will carry the day against solid learning and modest piety. Nay, it may even be maintained that such a man succeeds by reason of his want of depth, and that if he were only a little wiser he would succeed worse. Such teachers drive away thoughtful, inquiring, reading men from the sanctuary. The educated laity, no longer content to adopt their creed ready made, to let the old technicalities bury thought, the old assertions pass unexamined, the old conventional verbiage play pleasantly on the ear, now read and think for themselves. They come to church with their minds sharp, educated, well-informed, perhaps anxious and unresting, disturbed by the deeper problems of thought and life, longing for intelligent and earnest teaching, eager to welcome the words of thoughtful wisdom and piety from one whose special education and calling has given him a presumptive right to speak. Let such an one speak to them, not controversially, not in the tone of formal disquisition, but in a manly, earnest, thoughtful spirit—a mind which has itself grappled with those questions which all who think must face, which has not quelled its own difficulties by the sop of conventional formulas, which has earned the right to guide others in those conflicts through which it has fought its own way to rest. Let educated men as they listen to him perceive, not by pretentious philosophic terms or the jargon of criticism, but by a thousand insensible indications, that the speaker is abreast of the culture of the age, knowing something of what its deepest speculators have said, and its sweetest poets have sung; let them feel that he is a good and pious man, sincerely attached to the church, but also that his piety has not soured or narrowed him, nor his ecclesiasticism made him intolerant;—in one word, let men as they listen to him feel that he is one who excites their respect,—and it is incalculable the power over them for good which he will possess. He will wake within them, amidst all that is rough and commonplace and unideal in their daily life, the slumbering consciousness of higher and better things. He will stir the fount of awe and reverence and aspiration within them. Their intellectual difficulties, if not removed, will no longer interfere with the deeper life of the spirit. Their whole sympathies will cling round the man who has thus touched them. They



will go forth animated by his counsels to play a braver and a better part in the world, to meet life's trials and sorrows with a calmer wisdom, and to face the mystery of death at least without dismay. But, alas! instead of such a teacher, let the growing intelligence and thoughtfulness of the age repair to the sanctuary to find the place of instruction occupied by shallow dogmatism or blatant self-conceit. Let them be regaled with discourses, every sentence of which contains something to make an educated man wince. Let them hear the grandest verities strained through the sieve of a contracted mind, the conceptions of prophet, seer, or apostle dilated by tinsel rhetoric, and degraded by tawdry illustration. Let them be compelled to give ear while one whose youth should at least teach him modesty scatters profound difficulties to the winds by hollow denunciations and arguments ludicrously unconvulsive, and asserts as self-evident, propositions, each of which contains at least *one* portentous solecism, and all this with the traditional air of infallibility and the smirk of self-satisfaction on his lips.

Can we wonder if after such an exhibition there are those who refuse to subject themselves to such risks again? It is grievously unjust in popular writers to represent such teaching as typical specimens of the modern pulpit. But it will be well if those whose vocation it is to be the teachers of the church endeavour to preclude the possibility of such an imputation. I know, my brother, that in addressing you I speak to one to whom such reflections are well-nigh impertinent. I rejoice in the conviction that in your heart there is breathing the inspiration of high resolve, the unselfish determination to consecrate time, thought, study, all your powers and attainments to the service of Christ and His church. Would that the same could be said of all! What the future of our church is to be—nay, what is infinitely more important, what the future of Christ's church in the land is to be, who, in this strange time of seething thought and unsettled inquiry, can foretell? But be it what it may, one thing is obvious, if we are to make head against manifold opposition without, and much indifference and faint-heartedness within, it will not be merely by ritual improvements. That is well. Solemn beauty and tasteful services have their use. Still less will it be by ignoring the difficulties of the age, and determining to ring for ever on the old stock of phraseology the changes on the old forms of thought, as if no one had ever asked their meaning or questioned their authority. Obstinacy will only drive away the inquiring; ritual beauty will be trying to arrest them by gossamer threads. But where these fail, two things—if God and truth be realities—will, nay, must succeed:—First, the life of God in our own souls, for life only can give or diffuse life, faith makes men believe; and next to that the power of living thought, of rich and genial culture, of intellectual nobleness in the teachers of the church.

## Toiling Upward.

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### ROBERT NAPIER, MECHANICAL ENGINEER AND SHIPBUILDER.

INDUSTRIAL achievements are the glories of our age. The heroes of progress now-a-days are those who add to the world's means of attaining comfort. The nobility of labour is recognized as worthy of homage, and he who multiplies for men the means of earning an honest livelihood is regarded as a national benefactor. In a land like ours, surrounded by the sea, in a country to which shipping is a necessity, in a nation whose commerce leads its fleets over every ocean and up every navigable river, those who provide improvements in the construction, material, machinery, or motive power of our ocean-ploughing missionaries of wealth, comfort, and merchandise, ships, cannot fail to be thought of as worthy of double honour. Such a one is he of whom we are now to present a brief sketch. He is one of the modern heroes of our nation,—one of those whose toil has been upwards and whose efforts have been successful, not for his own elevation only, but for the elevation of a large section of the labouring classes, and for the improvement of an important species of industry in a great city requiring employment for many hands, support for many families, outlet for many talents, and means of transit over sea for much commerce. He is a true social benefactor who conducts a branch of trade affording a livelihood from the labour carried on in the premises to four thousand workmen and those who are connected with them. He is a moral benefactor who shows in his own person and progress the possibility of rising from the lowliest station to a position of usefulness, influence, and honour, by the exercise of thrift, diligence, intelligence, and probity. He is a national benefactor who brings an original and pliant genius to the perfecting of the means of commercial transit, and of political communication. It is a matter of no small moment to prove that the avenues to affluence and influence are not thirled to and inseparable from lordly birth or family distinction, but that worth can win its way in the great passages of the world independently of anything but strength of will and power of brain, nobility of purpose and unrelaxing perseverance; and hence the utility of the records of the lives of those who have succeeded in "toiling upwards."

We are very far indeed from being anxious to preach "the gospel of success," as if winning in the world sanctified all aims and efforts. No; there is a higher gospel—the gospel of suffering,—

of which One is the great Preacher, which we hold to be the good news of God to man. It teaches us that worldly success and earthly prosperity are not the grandest objects of the soul. We believe, too, that there are grand moral lessons to be found in tracing the causes of the "downs" as of the "ups" in life. The chief difficulty in managing to give efficacy to the teachings of unsuccess is to keep clear of censoriousness, and of using words of warning without going the length of harshness; in fact, to preserve one's soul from the guilt of misjudgments. Professor Creasy has indeed ventured to lecture on "Unsuccessful Great Men," and executed his task with much ability, but not with much acceptance. It is a necessity of the every-day philosophy on which we act now-a-days, that palpability should be given to observations by instances capable of affecting those whom we address, and man is much more prone to sensationalism than to rationalism in the ordering of his life.

Were we the inhabitants of a sinless world, success would be the invariable attendant of righteousness, and non-success would be unknown. But the laws of life act under a certain amount of disturbance, and we have to guard carefully against accepting the certificate of success as evidence of the righteousness of the means employed, though we need scarcely ever fear that righteousness will lead to the highest success,—the working out of a noble life, a dutiful and beautiful moral existence. Though, therefore, we herald and vaunt those who have been "toiling upward" by pointing to their success, we do not at all affirm or imply that there have not been or are not holy and good lives, on which the sun of prosperity has not shone. We know to the contrary. This, however, is no sufficing reason wherefore we should cease to trace the causes and results of success in human life, and strive to learn so to shape our course as to bring our efforts within the circle of the working of the efficient causation of Providence for the furthering of good in the universe.

Robert Napier, son of James Napier, Deacon of the Dumbarton Incorporation of Hammermen, and his wife Jean Ewing, of the Bwings of Roseneath, was born 18th June, 1791, in the ancient royal burgh of Dumbarton, the capital of the district of Lennox. James Napier, though only a blacksmith by trade, employed three or four journeymen and a like number of apprentices, was a notable person in the burgh, of which he was one of the councillors in the days when Dumbarton, with a population of about 2,000, united with Glasgow, Renfrew, and Rutherglen, in sending a representative to Parliament, and sometimes succeeded in carrying its man in opposition to the adjoining burghs, as the foregoing towns were named in the old writs requiring the return of a member. He was a dooce elder in the ancient parish church, under the pastorate of the Rev. James Oliphant, famous in his day as the author of some "Catechisms" for the instruction of the young in religious doctrines. His ancestors had dwelt in Dumbarton for generations, and he was connected by kinship with many of the well-to-do in-

habitants of the peninsular town at the estuary of the Leven, the castle of which was once the guardian of the Firth of Clyde.

His mother belonged to a family held in high honour in her native parish for probity and worth. She was affable, kindly, and much esteemed by her neighbours, especially by those of the humbler walks in life. She was the mother of a race of useful sons, of whom, though Robert is the hero of our paper, much might be said as examples of energy, perseverance, and sturdy laboriousness. But from this we must abstain.

As one of the burgh councillors, James Napier was a patron of the Grammar School, which was then taught in two divisions,—English and classical; Writing and mathematical. Robert was sent early to school, and was kept regularly and carefully at the classes,—studying not only English, but Latin and Greek; not only ciphering, but mathematics and mechanical drawing. The masters of the school were men of taste, diligence, and ability, and Mr. Napier acknowledges the singular painstaking with which they pushed on himself and his brothers,—of whom one, Dr. Peter Napier, minister of College Church, Blackfriars, Glasgow, was noted for the accuracy and width of his classical attainments and general scholarship. To Mr. Trail, Robert expressed himself as indebted for the excitement in his mind of a love for mechanics.

Though his father greatly desired he would devote himself to one of the learned professions, Robert so earnestly besought permission to become an artisan that his father reluctantly consented, and he was bound, at the age of fourteen, apprentice to the trade of a blacksmith under his father, with all due solemnity, as became an apprenticeship begun under a deacon of his craft. In a place wheretan-works, glass-works, shipbuilding, and gunnery were carried on as staples, there was a good opportunity for acquiring variety of culture in tool-making and general repairs. Robert not only wrought his daily time in the shop at his trade, but made the more delicate parts of his business the amusement of his leisure hours, and spent these in tool-making, constructing steel implements, experimenting on gunlocks and other artistic developments of a blacksmith's skill. After the finishing of his apprenticeship he continued to work with his father, and during this period he was engaged on the smithwork connected with the extensive calico-printing works then getting into active working order in the neighbouring villages of Renton, Alexandria, and Bonhill, in the course of which he was brought into contact with some of the most experienced millwrights—then the only practical engineers—in the country, and was brought into the midst of some of the finest and most ingeniously adapted working machinery making at that time.

On coming of age he expressed a desire to see the kind of work executed elsewhere, and on getting his father's leave he set off for Edinburgh with £5 in his purse, and a testimonial of character from the minister of Dumbarton in his pocket. He was a fortnight in the Scottish capital before he got a job, and even then,

though he was a handy workman, he had only half a guinea a week for wages. In this place he continued nine months, although living was so expensive that he was scarcely able to make both ends meet. After this he succeeded in gaining employment under the firm of Smith and Stevenson, engineers to the Northern Lighthouse Board of Commissioners for Scotland. The elder partner was the constructor of the lighthouse of the Little Cumbraes in the Frith of Clyde, and the younger was not only the projector but the executer of the Bell Rock Lighthouse on the Forfarshire coast,—a work of great difficulty and danger, managed with consummate skill, by patience and thoughtfulness. In the works of this firm he learnt many useful processes and adaptations in the use of the metals.

After a while he returned to work with his father, who was then much in need of his handy and thoughtful son. He also passed a winter in Glasgow, working by day at the forge and studying by night in the classes of the Andersonian Institution. An opportunity having occurred of purchasing a small business in the Gallowgate of Glasgow, Robert—under the advice of his uncle, John Napier, then working a foundry in the city—was induced to think of securing it. For this purpose his father advanced him £50, of which he paid £45 for the tools and goodwill of the lowly blacksmithery. Here, in 1815, he set to work with two apprentices as a general artificer in iron, and by diligent toil managed to draw around him a paying if not a lucrative business.

Watt had before this stirred the attention of the world to the powers of steam, and made it a prince among the forces of machinery. The adaptation of steam to the propulsion of vessels in water had long occupied the minds of inventive men. Without debating the claims of Blasco de Garay, who is said to have exhibited in 1543, at the port of Barcelona, a ship propelled by steam, or noticing the Marquis of Worcester's entry in 1655, in his "Century of Inventions," and Papin's projection for the same purposes, we may regard this idea as requiring a full century to work it into practicality. In 1736 we have Jonathan Hull's atmospheric steam-engine tug patented. Then in 1759 we have the plan of the Swiss clergyman Genevois to adapt Newcomen's engine to the moving of spring propellers, opening and shutting as required, in imitation of the foot of aquatic birds. The Seine became the scene of other experiments, in 1744, by the Comte d'Auxiron, and in 1745 by M. Perier; the Marquis de Jouffroy, in 1781 renewed experiments on the Saone. At the same time Fitch and Rumsey were trying the same design in America. The former had succeeded in 1783 in moving a boat on the Delaware, and in 1785 presented a model to Congress; and the latter had shown George Washington, in 1784, a model of a boat in motion, and in 1787 succeeded in making a few short journeys on the Potomac. After both Fitch and Rumsey had, with the aid of a company in favour of each projector, addressed Boulton and Watt on the subject without convincing them of the feasibility of their plans, a trial was made, in 1793, on the Thames, of a boat on

Rumsey's model. The plan was improved and patented by Wm. Linaker in 1808. Contemporaneously with these attempts the experiments of Miller, Taylor, and Symington, proved, though they did not immediately produce, the practicality of navigation by steam. Dr. Cartwright contrived a steam-barge, and showed his model to Fulton. Symington in 1801, under the patronage of Lord Dundas, began a series of experiments well persevered in; and in 1803, Fulton, under the auspices of Chancellor Livingston, made another attempt, slightly successful; and after visiting England and inspecting Symington's boats, on the Forth and Clyde Canal, returned to America, and, with an engine supplied by Boulton and Watt, set a steamboat on the Hudson, 1807. Fulton died in 1815. John Stevens, of Hoboken, had also, in 1807, constructed a steam-vessel, but as Fulton had a monopoly in the state of New York, he was obliged to take his ship round by sea to Delaware, and was consequently the first (known) navigator of the ocean by steam.

The practical application of steam to navigation is, however, now universally admitted to be due to Henry Bell, of Helensburgh (born at Torphichen, Linlithgowshire, 1767), who in 1812 established on the Clyde the *Comet* (so called because it was built in 1811, a comet year). After this, the profitable navigation of British rivers by steam was no longer doubtful, and great endeavours were made to perfect marine engines. Companies arose everywhere, and thinking men began to employ themselves in developing the resources of steam as a motive power applicable to sailing vessels.

About 1818, David Napier, cousin of Robert Napier, and a man who is regarded by competent authorities as having done, in the first twenty years after its introduction, more for the improvement of steam navigation than any other man, was largely engaged in promoting the introduction of steam navigation upon the open sea, and had just established the *Rob Roy* to ply between Greenock and Belfast. This seems to have induced Robert Napier to turn his active mind to steamboat engines. In 1823 he completed his first marine steam-engine, which continues to work effectively still. But in 1837, when a steamboat company offered prizes for the swiftest river boats driven by steam—for the decision of which a steamboat race was got up—both prizes were awarded to vessels having engines on board built by Robert Napier. In 1830 the Glasgow Steam-packet Company entrusted him with the construction of a line of steamers to ply between Glasgow and Liverpool,—a labour in which he was completely successful. In 1836 the East India Company commissioned him to prepare for them a sea-going vessel of peculiar powers to ply between Bombay and Suez for the facility of correspondence, &c., between their great empire and their premises in Leadenhall Street. The Dundee and London Shipping Company placed upon the Thames a fleet of first-class vessels from Robert Napier's works, the success of which was highly satisfactory. This was called the *Berenice*, and was esteemed a swift and sure sailer. The *British Queen* was, in 1839, supplied with its machinery at his Govan shipbuilding works; and he made

for Mr. Assheton Smith, upon the hollow wave-line principle, the fast-sailing steamship *Fire King*. The company formed by the recently deceased Mr. (afterwards Sir) Samuel Cunard, Messrs. Burns, of Glasgow, and Messrs. Marson, of Liverpool, in 1839, to carry the American mails safely, quickly, and regularly by steamships instead of the dilatory old ten-gun brig packets, was provided, in 1840, with its first four steamers by Robert Napier, and scores of Atlantic steam-vessels cross the sea with machinery expressly planned for deep sea work by Napier, of Shandon. The speed, safety, and recurring regularity of these vessels are well known in both hemispheres, and have been acknowledged, in 1859, by the raising of the late Sir Samuel Cunard to a baronetcy. The *Duke of Wellington* screw steam, bearing 131 guns, war-ship, the largest which at that time had ever been put to sea, was, among other vessels which Government set afloat in which steam was substituted for sailing ships, fitted up with its machinery by Napier. That the work had been accomplished satisfactorily may be assumed; for in 1859 the *Black Prince* was given to Napier to build. This iron-sided or armour-plated ship, intended to be impervious to common shot, was, with the *Warrior*, the commencement of that fleet of iron-cased war-ships which Government is intent on placing on every sea. It is of 6,109 tons burthen. Next year the iron-cased frigate *Hector* was constructed in the same yards. It was of 800-horse power, and bore to be of 4,062 tons. In 1861 Napier built the fast-sailing steamship *Scotia*, of 1,200-horse power and of 4,050 tons, for the Cunard Company, as a relay for the *Persia*, of 3,600 tons and 1,100-horse power, built by him in 1856 for the same firm. To him, in 1860, the Government entrusted the construction of an immense steam-ram, a work in which he succeeded to admiration. On 26th June, 1865, there was launched from the building-yard of Messrs. Napier and Son the last of a series of three iron-clad steam-ram ships, which were manufactured for the Turkish Government. A large concourse of spectators were assembled, and among those present were the following Turkish gentlemen:—Captain Arif Bey, Hassan Effendi, Colonel Essad Bey, Colonel Edilaton Bey, Hesenein Effendi, the Ottoman Consul, &c. The vessel, which, like its two other companion ships, has been constructed with great skill and care, is 300 feet over all, 56 feet broad, depth moulded, 37 feet; tonnage, o.m., about 4,200-load, draught about 25 feet. She is to be propelled by horizontal direct acting engines of 900-horse power nominal, which will be supplied with steam from six boilers, arranged three on each side of the ship, and occupying a space 58 feet long by about 32 broad. The armament of the vessel will consist of sixteen 150-pounders on the main deck, one 150-pounder and one 300-pounder on the upper deck. Of his recent contracts the particulars are to be found in the newspapers from time to time as the several launches occur, and we do not care to enter into the disputed matters arising from the reputed production of vessels intended for the use of the Confederate states, which brought up questions of international law and the

relation which these laws bear to the trade and commerce of our day. We have done enough in the foregoing sketch to show in Robert Napier—the employer of nearly 4,000 hands, in the mastery of the most extensive shipbuilding concerns on the Clyde, the birthplace of practical steam navigation, and in the power of distributing in wages upwards of £12,000 a year—a very clear instance of toiling upward.

He who began life as a mere apprentice to handiwork, and passed on through low-paid journeyman labour, till an opportunity offered of his becoming a small master in a mean blacksmithery, has within the course of half a century won himself one of the highest places in shipbuilding on the banks of a river on which the construction of marine engines and of steam-vessels, as it was an early, is yet a pre-eminent branch of trade. He has placed the fastest sailing river vessels upon the Clyde, *e. g.*, the *Neptune*, and on the Thames, *e. g.*, the *Queen of the Orwell*; and on the sea he has floated the largest, safest, and fastest *effective* steam-vessels which run to and fro—that knowledge may be increased or war shortened, and to him some of the noblest ships in the British navy owe their colossal might; while the two apprentices employed by him in 1815 have increased in 1865 to nearly, as we have said, 4,000 men.

Robert Napier is a member of the Institution of Civil Engineers; of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, and several other scientific bodies. At the International Exhibition of Paris (1855) he had a gold medal awarded him, and Napoleon III. decorated him with the Legion of Honour for his Atlantic steamships; while in our own Exhibition (1862) he was chosen chairman of the jury on naval architecture. He is proprietor of the beautiful estate and Tudoresque mansion of Western Shandon, in his native county, on the Gareloch,—a branch of the Clyde, about three miles north-west of Row (of controversy fame), where are the grave and monument of Henry Bell, and five miles from Helensburgh, one of the Clyde watering-places. Here he has gathered together an extensive gallery of splendid works of art, of which he is an enthusiastic and a well-informed collector.

Mr. Napier attributes his success to no special merit of his own as an inventor or original thinker, as the Brunels, Scott Russell, the Stephensons, Maudslay, &c., might do, but to patient labour, anxious foresight, sterling honesty in the fulfilment of contracts, excellence of workmanship, secured by his known determination never to pass a badly done piece of work out of his yards. The freedom from failure in his plans, and the safety of his works when in the river or on the sea, are due to caution, vigorous oversight, and business probity. Though he has attained his 74th year, and friends and brothers are falling around him, he survives, full of years and honours, strong in mind, manly in heart, carefully sedulous in working out his contracts, an esteemed and honoured citizen of Glasgow, one of the princes of manufacture, whose “toiling upward” has been crowned with a deserved success.



## The Reviewer.

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*English Writers.—The Writers before Chaucer; with an Introductory Sketch of the Four Periods of English Literature.* By HENRY MORLEY. London: Chapman and Hall.

HENRY MORLEY is a man of extra mark. He was born in 1822, passed his boyhood in Rhenish Prussia, being educated at Neuwied, near Coblenz. He was one of the early students of King's College, London, where he graduated as M.D. Shortly after this he began the practice of medicine as a profession at Madeley, on the banks of the Severn, in Shropshire. While here he composed a volume of tales, poems, and translations, which were published under the title of "The Dream of the Lilybell," in 1845. They indicated German culture, and by their superiority, for juvenile productions, of style in prose and verse, attracted notice as efforts of promise. In 1847 he issued two "Tracts on Health" for cottage circulation,—1. On health-preservation; 2. On interrupted health, and sick-room duties,—in the belief that sanitary reformers might do a great deal of good if they were to imitate the Religious Tract Society by circulating extensively in such districts as the Coalbrookdale collieries, near which he was located, tracts on medical subjects, simple in style, low in price, and trustworthy in matter, explaining the principles of true hygiene. These were discreet, sound, and concise. In 1848 he issued a volume of poems entitled, "Sunrise in Italy: Reveries,"—asking the reader, in a preliminary sonnet, to judge—

"Whether they be wasteful weeds,  
Or spring of truth's imperishable seeds."

One of the poems included in this volume is beautiful and Shelley-like; the chief verses, however, are eloquent rather than poetical, and are full of the spirit of the year 1848, when reform seemed to have attained the mastery of the earth. Of his book the author says,—

"With spiritual Freedom, and the growth  
Of Human Intellect; with the sweet art  
Of Poetry, which arms within the heart  
An angel to wage war with worldly Sloth;  
With Human Love, its fine and grosser part;  
And constant Friendship, differing from each;  
With Charity, which, as the spreading beech

Yields shadow to the ploughmen, who depart  
 From narrow cots to toil beneath the sky,  
 When they for converse rest, so can subdue  
 The heat of those who labour for the True:  
 With these hath been my song. From flight so high  
 Now tremblingly the silent Muse descends,  
 And flutters through the people, seeking friends."

"How to make Home Unhealthy" is a satirical tract on sanitation, published anonymously in 1850. It first appeared in the *Examiner*. In 1851 he issued his educational satire, the ironical "Defence of Ignorance." He next appeared as a biographer in his able and interesting "Life of Palissy the Potter" in 1852; in 1854 his "Jerome Carden" supplied an admirable sketch of the doings and thinkings of the celebrated heterodox mathematician, naturalist, philosopher, and physician; and in 1856 his "Cornelius Agrippa" placed before the public another member of that illustrious though curious society which lived and moved in the sixteenth century. He had been an extensive contributor to *Household Words*, and he issued, in 1857, a collection of essays, sketches, and verses, under the title of "Gossip," gathered from its pages. His elaborate and beautiful volume, full of curious reading, strange history, and quaint associations, entitled "Memoirs of Bartholomew Fair," appeared in 1859. He is, we believe, at present editor of the *Examiner*—a paper which, for nearly half a century, has held a high position as a literary and political organ. The present volume is, so far as we know, his most recent production. It is mainly the result, we have been told, of a condensation of lectures delivered in the evening classes taught by him at King's College, London—a labour of love on which he has been engaged for nearly eight years. "The students in these classes," he says, "are young men from the age of one-and-twenty upwards, some of them in middle, or even later life, who bring unflagging energy to studies of their own choice, paid for out of their own earnings." Having such an origin, this book is quite the kind of history of the labours of the mind of England to which we feel inclined to call the attention of our readers. There is a fine breadth and solidity about the thinking; it is full of fresh emotion; its matter is collected from wide fields, but it has all been elaborated in the mind of the author, who has formed out of the materials ready for his service a new, excellent, and admirable book. If it is possible to complete within reasonable limits of bulk and time the survey of literature he has begun to furnish, he will have provided a most valuable addition to the student's book-shelf, and the libraries of institutions for self-culture. We think it would be a great boon were its author to reissue, in a cheap and easily accessible form, the 116 pages of Introduction, in which he attempts to convey some idea of the Life of English Literature.

The following is his division of the epochs in "Our English Speech:"—

"Upon historical accidents, affecting to a most remarkable extent fashions of speech, and not upon changes of the fixed natural character, we must found the division of a history of English literature into its four periods, viz.:—

"That of the formation of the language, ending with Chaucer.

"That of Italian influence, felt even in Chaucer's day; but more fairly inaugurated by the 'company of courtly makers,' who preceded the age of Elizabeth.

"That of French influence, of which the beginning is marked strongly by a change in the style of Dryden, subsequent to the 'Annus Mirabilis.'

"And that of English popular influence, which was established gradually, but which should be dated from Defoe.

"To the last named there was added a slight admixture of German influence. The best period of German literature came in aid of the tendency to revert to what is usually called Saxon English, which had begun to live again when writers addressed more habitually the great body of the English people than the polite circle of fashionable patrons."

Those who have read the biography of Chaucer in the *British Controversialist*, January and March, 1860, may wish to compare that with impressions gathered from another thinker, as in this quotation:—

"Chaucer, born seven years after the death of Dante, was twenty-four years younger than Petrarch:—

'Franneis Petrark, the laureat poete,  
Highte this clerk, whose rhetorike sweete  
Enlumined all itaille of poetrie,'—

from whom he says that he took the 'Clerke's Tale of Patient Grisel;' and he was fifteen years younger than Boccaccio, from whose 'Thesaida' he took the 'Knight's Tale of Palamon and Arcite,' and with whose 'Decameron' his 'Canterbury Tales' have in common the tales of the Reve, the Franklin, and the Shipman, all of which existed also among the store of French lays and *fabliaux* open alike to the Italian and the English poet. The complete inertness of the mere conceits of sonnet or canzone on the English mind of Chaucer is worthy of noting. As translator of the 'Romaunt of the Rose' he recognized and shared the taste for mystical allegory. But his mind, like that of his countrymen, fastened on a poetry instinct with life and dramatic action. His wholesome sense of the ridiculous caused him to round with a shrewd English humour all the sentimental corners even of the tale of 'Griselda,' thereby humanizing it into a more sterling poetry, and doubling the force of its pathos. The influence of the French rhymers and story-tellers, and of the new classical force given in Italy by the great founders of modern literature, Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio, to the vulgar tongue of the land in which, of all others, the Latin had a right to be retained as its own classical language, we may trace everywhere in Chaucer; but all is digested, and serves only to feed the vigour of a most genuinely English mind. The religious heart of this country also, and its resentment of corruption and injustice, both in Church and State, represented in great part by Wiclif, spoke through our great poets, and was as real in Chaucer's fiercely contemptuous jests upon the greed and the false pretension of the monks, as in the religious allegory by which the author of 'The Vision of Piers Plowman' looked through the griefs of a bewildered and misguided people to the divine simplicities of Christian truth."

This excerpt on romantic poets will be useful in keeping our dates and ideas clear:—

"In Elizabeth's time we find Spenser still, in a few translations and in his son-

nets, following the lead of Petrarch: but in his 'Faery Queene' he passed out of the school in which Ariosto was his best beloved master. Petrarch and Boccaccio had died within a year of one another; and exactly a hundred years after the death of Petrarch came, in 1474, the birth of Ariosto. Ariosto died at the age of fifty-eight. Twelve years after the death of Ariosto, Tasso was born. But Tasso and Spenser were contemporaries, the Italian by nine years the elder man. The dates of their death lie close together, Tasso dying in 1595, Spenser in 1599. When, therefore, Spenser introduced into the closing canto of his second book a paraphrase and translation from Tasso's episode of the Garden of Armida, he expressed the exquisite enjoyment of a great poem then new to the world; but his more frequent reproduction of matter from what he calls 'that famous Tuscan pen' of Ariosto shows rather the lifelong influence of an established classic that had been singularly in harmony with the whole spirit of its time. Thus the description of the discovery of Duesza as a 'loathly wrinkled hag' is in part taken literally from Ariosto's account of Alcina. The tale of the false Philemon, in the same book, corresponding to Ariosto's tale of Geneva; and in Spenser's third book the tale of the Squire of Dames, which is the Host's tale from the twenty-eighth canto of 'Orlando,' are also well-known examples of this direct testimony to Italian influence."

This may be taken as a good compendious summary of the chief Elizabethans:—

"While Euphues was thus in fashion, Shakspeare being yet young as a playwright, and, at the date of the critical preface to 'Menaphon,' Bacon was a young barrister, part deviser of the dumb shows at Gray's Inn, and within two years of his appointment as Queen's Counsel; Sir Philip Sidney had been dead two years, and Ascham twenty years; Sackville, Lord Buckhurst, whose pen contributed to the first English tragedy, still had some twenty years of life before him. Of Marlowe's brief career only five years were yet to come; of Greene's, but four, during which his overcharged confession and self-accusation of an ill-spent life would give some strain of a wild sobbing earnestness to his last novels. Ben Jonson was then but fourteen years old; Fletcher but nine; Beaumont, Massinger, and Webster three or four; Donne was a youth of sixteen; and twenty years were yet to pass before the birth of Milton, who was himself ten years older than Cowley, and twenty-four years older than Dryden, who was a man of forty years old at the birth of Addison. Throughout the whole period thus indicated the taste for conceited writing, introduced from Italy in or before the first years of the reign of Elizabeth, prevailed. It was modified by the character of the sovereign, and influenced in some respects by the tone of public feeling in each generation; but the desire for constant imagery, for cunning sentences, and ingenious allusions, that, by display of a writer's reading, should make out his title to be read, abided by the courtiers and scholars, who were not only the chief critics, but who formed a large proportion also of the readers of a book. The dust of Latin in the sermons of Bishop Andrewes; the quaint wit of Fuller, which obtained for him two audiences, one within doors and the other out of window, in his little chapel in Savoy; the sententious writing in the 'Enchiridion' of Quarles, manifest clearly enough their relationship to Euphuism. Old Izaak Walton—whose life ran through a part of Elizabeth's reign, and extended through the whole subsequent period even until Addison was a boy of eleven—becoming weary of the strain of wit, looked back from the days of Charles I. to "Come live with me and be my love," that smooth song made by Kit Marlowe now at least fifty years ago. The milkmaid's mother sung an answer to it, which was made by Sir Walter Raleigh in his younger days. They were old-fashioned poetry, but choicely good; I think, he says, 'much better than the strong lines that are in fashion in this critical age.'"

On Dr. Samuel Johnson and the French Academy the following extract makes some good remarks :—

"The Hôtel Rambouillet was in the height of its credit when, in 1635, Richelieu proposed to a weekly assembly of male authors, which met for mutual aid and discussion at the house of Conart, one of their number, corporate life under the protection of Louis XIV. The offer was accepted, and the French Academy was thus founded, with especial charge over the French language, which the academicians were to purify and fix, by the publication of a dictionary and grammar. It has been said of Dr. Johnson's English Dictionary that he alone compiled it, while the dictionary of the French Academy was the work of forty men, each subject to much feminine dictation. But between the two works the essential difference is not to be forgotten. The forty men in Paris had power of life and death over the words of the French language committed to their hands. The word they admitted into their dictionary was hereafter to be admissible in good French literature, and the whole host of words that were rejected were, by virtue of their rejection, to become unlawful in polite society. It was to be a settlement of language by a *coup d'état*. But there has been neither need nor taste in England for that method of procedure. Dr. Johnson might insert or omit what he pleased without crushing a syllable of spoken English. French refinements tended to a tight-lacing of the language in a dictionary carefully devised as stays, which to this day are supposed to give it a fine figure and material support. Broad-chested English has allowed its lungs free play, and will be strapped up in the leather covering of no man's dictionary."

Those who have lately been enjoying the account of Johnson's life in the *British Controversialist*, will thank us, we think, for clipping out this rare little morsel on that great man :—

"The lesser critics in polite society, who applied not their own minds, nor the minds of better thinkers, but the mere words of those better thinkers twisted and crushed into a critical jargon, to the estimate of works of intellect, still held in a degenerate way to the classicism of Paris. They decreed natural pictures of life and plain English 'low.' Fielding was in their eyes 'low,' and several times in 'Tom Jones' the great novelist takes in mockery this word out of their mouths. Goldsmith, too, born twenty-one years later than Fielding, we find harping on the word in playful, kindly scorn. But when we look back to Goldsmith, at his side we see the figure of that elder friend, but two years younger than Fielding—the strong, tender-hearted Samuel Johnson. How sound a mind he kept within a body by whose physical infirmities he should have been made insane! Johnson was ten years old in the year of Addison's death, and twenty years old in the year of the death of Steel. Of English writers none fought more sturdily and honestly than he in the war of intellectual independence. He began literary life in London, as what printer Bowyer called 'an author of the lower class—one of those who are paid by the sheet,'—subsisted on fourpence-halfpenny a day, ate only what he earned. Conquering the resistance of the adverse world and of his own adverse bodily state, he fought the hard uphill fight for himself, for others with him, and for all the writers who came after him, and made himself until his death, in 1784, the worthy central figure in the literature of his country. His intellect alone would not have given him, ungainly man as he was, this rank in a day when the profession of letters was so little honoured that some such apology as the 'accidental elopement of a composition' was thought necessary to excuse a gentleman for coming into print. In Johnson's days we find even the poet Gray, after his 'Elegy in a Country Churchyard,' much handled about over polite

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tea-tables, had fallen into 'the hands of an editor who vowed he would print it, writing of that piece of true literature to his friend Walpole, 'I have but one bad way left to escape the honour they would inflict upon me, and therefore am obliged to desire you would make Dodsley print it immediately (which may be done in less than a week's time) from your copy, but without my name.' Presently suggesting also, 'If he would add a line or two to say it came into his hands by accident, I should like it better.' Walpole wrote an advertisement to the effect that accident only brought the poem before the public, although an apology was unnecessary to any but the author. On which Gray wrote, 'I thank you for your advertisement, which saves my honour.' It was in the honour of Samuel Johnson to be absolutely free from this false pride. His wit was rooted in the highest sense of duty, and complete sincerity of thought and word. There was a true English soul in Johnson's intellect. Milton himself did not more formally dedicate his powers to the service of his great taskmaster than Johnson, who prayed for a blessing on his work when he sat down to it, habitually but never formally, as many will pray for a blessing on their roast meat who would think it wrong because unusual to ask a grace upon their words. It is not the form that is here dwelt upon. Men may pray without ceasing who never kneel, and never write or whisper formal words of prayer. Johnson prayed with his heart, and with the faithful pen through which he spoke his heart, and was in all as simply true as when he pitifully carried home on his back the unhappy prostitute whom he found lying exhausted in the streets. Johnson's strength with his countrymen lay in that inner worth to which Smollett's frank eyes at once penetrated. 'This,' he says, 'was a very grave personage, whom at some distance I took for one of the most reserved, and even disagreeable figures I had seen; but as he approached his appearance improved, and when I could distinguish him thoroughly I perceived that, in spite of the severity of his brow, he had one of the most good-natured countenances that could be imagined.'

We dare scarcely venture to quote further now. We may perhaps return soon to a consideration of the contents of this volume, of which there are as many pages yet to notice as (to use Macaulay's expression) the number of the beast, viz., 666, treating of pre-Chaucerian life and literature in a scholarly and yet an attractive way. We entirely coincide with the remarks and aim of Henry Morley in closing his preface:—"The well-being of our wit depends greatly upon our close familiarity with all that is best in English thought. And if we could so read over again the story of the English mind as to recall some at least of the living influences which made our foremost writers what they were; if we could so think over it all, that we might attach to any name or period at least enough of human interest to save an immortal utterance of living thought from being as a mere dead book to us—for we are not reading a book until we feel in it a man living and speaking,—something would be gained. There would be something gained even by small success in such an effort; and knowing that, I pass now with good courage to an effort to recall in these volumes some traces of the life of English literature."

Henry Morley has not attained slight, but great success in this work. We hope that he may be able to finish the grand critical and historical edifice he has commenced; he has youth and energy

on his side, a noble topic to treat worthily, and, multitudinous as are the works on this subject, ample scope yet for the entire series of three volumes, in which he purposes to store up the results of his readings and thinkings about literature, literary men, and their oaks and lives. *Au revoir.*

*Self-made Men.* By WILLIAM ANDERSON. Second Edition.  
London: John Snow.

THIS is a book we should like to see in the library of every working man's club, mechanics' institute, &c., and on the shelves, for frequent perusal, of many a tradesman, clerk, and artisan's cottage. It is a book of worth in these days; for it is a record of successful effort to work out great purposes with human life in humble circumstances. Perhaps, of many of those mentioned in this book, "Self-made Men" is not the best designation. We like the phrase the wonderful shepherd-lad, painter, astronomer, mechanician of Keith, James Ferguson, uses for those to whom heaven has given large endowments of intellectual power, "God Almighty's scholars." What a book might be made of men worthy of such a name! The contents of this book are, Chap. I. Introductory and explanatory, on the importance and nature of self-education. Chap. II. Characteristics of self-made men, viz., deep sense of the worth of manhood, high hopes, a knowledge of the value of time, money, and industry; perseverance, decision, strong moral principle, weight, and thoroughness. Chap. III. Examples of self-made men, viz., John Bunyan, Edward Baines, Hugh Miller, and John Kitto—good examples all. Chap. IV. How men are made: they are neither made by circumstances, constitution, nor their coalescence, but by voluntary determination. Chap. V. Appeals founded on the preceding chapters, and an attempt to prove that difficulties can be overcome.

It is difficult to know how to review a book of this sort. To sever the comments from the context is to give the extract the appearance of a secular sermon; to quote the context without the comments is to supply a text, but not to fill in the exposition founded on it; to give both requires great discretion, where choice is so wide, and is scarcely fairly done by quoting one portion alone. Beset by these difficulties, it has suggested itself to us that a few strong statements contained in the book, referring chiefly to men who have risen in our own day, and who are yet alive to do good service to their generation, might not be amiss. Of course, in doing this, we leave the responsibility for the facts stated with their author, Wm. Anderson, a graduate, we believe, of Aberdeen University, and the writer of many books:—

"Alexander Bain was a weaver boy in Aberdeen. By his own merit he raised himself to a commanding position in the scientific world. His two elaborate works, viz., 'The Senses and the Intellect,' published in 1855, and the 'Emotions and the Will,' published in 1859, have been pronounced on high authority to be 'among the most important contributions which have been furnished to mental science during the present generation.' He is now appointed to the new chair of

logic in the university of his native city" (p. 300). "The people's park, Halifax, is the munificent gift of Frank Crossley, Esq., M.P., and cost £30,000 . . . and who is Frank Crossley? His father was a clerk in a carpet manufactory; his mother a domestic servant: and he acquired his vast wealth, not by a single bound, but by patient toil" (p. 45). "Mr. Robert Grant, author of the 'History of Physical Astronomy,' recently appointed to the chair left vacant by the late lamented Professor [J. P.] Nichol, was born to no inheritance, but by his brains he made conquests for himself" (p. 151). "Some years ago, a young man employed in Blantyre print-works, in Scotland, despite all his privations, determined to get a good education. He employed his leisure hours in the cultivation of his mind; worked hard at Blantyre factory in summer, and harder at Glasgow University in winter; rose step by step, until he became a minister of the gospel. He is now Dr. Livingstone, the celebrated African traveller, whose recent visit to his native land was hailed with such enthusiasm" (p. 38). "John Philip, who, twenty-six years ago, took French leave of Aberdeen, and worked his passage on board a coasting vessel from Scotland to London, for the purpose of gloating upon art, and with strange dreams of art-inspiration, returned to his northern home, succeeded in painting a picture that attracted the notice of Lord Panmure, and was last year elevated to the honourable rank of R.A." (p. 152). "Michael Faraday, LL.D., England's most eminent chemist, worked at the craft of a bookbinder until he was twenty-two years of age" (p. 299). "Not long ago, at Thurso, in the far north of Scotland, Sir R. Murchison discovered a person named Robert Dick, not only a capital baker, but a profound geologist and a first-rate botanist" (p. 11).

These cullings from scattered pages will prove that "Self-made Men" possesses an interest of a high order—as a work embodying cumular proof that will, intelligence, morality, industry, and talent are elevating powers, and may be used for elevated and elevating purposes. Hence we commend the book.

*A History of France for Children.* By C. A. NORTON.  
London: Houlston and Wright.

THE success of "My Nephew's History of Rome," which we reviewed in October, 1864, has induced the authoress "to venture upon a similar history of France." She has done both wisely and well. We subjected this book to two ordeals of criticism. We compared it with Fleury's "Histoire de France," and Miss Corner's work on the same subject. It is superior to both in simplicity, compactness, and the avoidance of phraseology suggestive of ideas not suitable for the young. The style by this loses some of its picturesqueness, but not its force. Having satisfied ourselves by this comparison, we had the book placed in a circle of youngsters ranging from seven to twelve years of age. It was read with the avidity of delight, and we knew then that our own critical decision—of which the little readers knew nothing—had been subjected to experiment, and tried as by fire. We can hint at one objection only. If there had been three pages of an estimate of France in its relations to the other countries near it, perhaps—we only say *perhaps*—the opening pages might have had more attraction. But it is really a well got up and excellent historical tract for childhood's earlier stages.



## The Topic.

### OUGHT THE FRANCHISE TO BE A RIGHT OR A PRIVILEGE?

#### A RIGHT.

WITH some exceptions, every man has a right to the franchise, because he is, by his profession or trade, adding to the wealth and assisting to develop the resources of the country; because he pays his fair share of the taxation, and is therefore entitled to have a voice in its disposal; because every one is ruled by the laws of the realm, and ought to have a share in their formation. It is an axiom in Great Britain that there is one law alike for the rich and the poor; this could not be the case if the rich had the exclusive making of these laws, because they would make them to suit themselves, without consulting the interests of the people. Such men as paupers, imbeciles, lunatics, criminals, cannot be expected to have a right to vote, because they are unable to do it properly, or because they have forfeited all claim to the privilege. I am not exactly an advocate of universal suffrage; but I do think that the £10 qualification is too high, and that there are many working men living in £6 and even £4 houses who are quite entitled to vote, and quite capable of doing so with judgment and propriety. —R. D., Jun.

The franchise is the "safety valve" of British freedom and prosperity. The nation is formed of an unlimited number of individuals; each person is a member of the body politic, and therefore entitled to be heard in the administration of public affairs. Every one generally (as a body corporate) tends to increase the nation's prosperity in maintaining social order, contributing to the revenue, defending the state when required, and in compelling redress when reparation is necessary. When a

person thus serves his country the franchise is a "right" which any one ought to enjoy who is endowed with the ordinary faculties of intelligence and wisdom; and not a "privilege" which a certain status is alone capable of conferring upon any particular man or class of men.—G. M., Sd.

At a recent election meeting, when questions were being put to the candidate for Parliamentary honours, one person in the assembly—I know not whether he was a reader of this Magazine—asked at the would-be representative the very question which forms this month's Topic, viz., "Do you consider the franchise to be a right or a privilege?" The candidate answered the querist in these terms: "I consider the franchise to be both a right and a privilege." This was—although it appeared satisfactory to the meeting, and rather a clever saying—a mere evasion of the principle involved, as we presume, in your Topic, viz., "Ought the franchise to be a right or a privilege." A right is that to which one has claims arising from high moral considerations; a privilege is something granted as a favour. The question then is, Have the inhabitants of this country their representative government merely on sufferance, or have they it grounded on a just moral foundation? This goes down to the root of the matter. If Parliament is a matter of grace, the franchise is an affair of privilege; if Parliament is a matter of right, then the franchise is also a matter of right. Laws may regulate, but they cannot justly abrogate them. Representation is the right of every one who honestly performs the duties of his station in the commonwealth; and as duties and

rights are reciprocal, we hold that the franchise is a right, and not a privilege.—M. D.

### A PRIVILEGE.

What is it to be included in the franchise? simply, on the one hand, you have a voice in selecting the council of the nation; and on the other, you are deprived of that privilege. Then, in the government of the nation, why not let every man comprising that nation have a voice in its selection? Such argument seems certainly to point out the franchise as a right and no privilege; but would it be wise, would it be safe and judicious, to pass such a measure recognizing universal suffrage? for by the great preponderance of the lower and uneducated class in the country, they would swamp all other classes combined, and so the governing power of the country would be placed in the hands of one section, instead of each having a power. But some may say, if one class possess a powerful majority, have they not a right to that power they may gain from their numbers? But have they also a right to drown all others? No, they have none; for under the present extension of the franchise, every one can be included who has sufficient intellect and energy to qualify him to judge upon those principles and events which alone can guide him in the use of that privilege. The franchise is, I believe, a *privilege* to be obtained only by age, prudence, and wealth.—D. M.

Mere existence confers no right, politically considered. Political life is a compact for the preservation of what has been gained by its various members. It would be folly to assert that were life entitled, the party put in possession of it a claim to equality with those who had worked their way into, or attained their place and done their duties in that state or position. The management of the State cannot be

entrusted to those who do not fully and fairly perform their duties to the State. These duties the State, and not the parties claiming membership, has a right to fix. They may confer it on whom they choose, and then it becomes a right; but it is as a privilege that it is given, and the privilege continues only so long as the conditions on which it has been granted remains. In all points, therefore, it seems that the franchise ought to be regarded as a privilege, and not as a right.—G. M. W.

The difference between a right and a privilege is not very clear. Every man is privileged to go to law with his neighbour, but only succeeds when he has a right to maintain. The law only recognizes the right to vote as belonging to those who have been declared by the Reform Bill worthy of choosing representatives. As it has been granted by Act of Parliament, we must suppose that it is only a privilege guaranteed—and so made a right—to its present possessors. The question, then, comes to be, Ought this state of things to be? Should we be content to regard the franchise as a privilege, or ought it to be demanded as a right? This would lead us to universal suffrage. That is, it will lead to the disenfranchisement of those who at present possess the privilege, and take them out of the privileged class to put them back again among those who have a right to vote. I do not think that the franchise should be reckoned as a right. At no time have mankind, as the simple right of manhood, been possessed of the franchise. The franchise should be reserved for those who have shown by their life, conduct, or acquisitions, that they have the honour of the State and the good of their fellows at heart. This should be followed by the conferring of the suffrage upon those who reciprocate the benefits they derived from existence under a settled Government.—SAFE-GUARD.

## The Societies' Section.

*Arbroath Mutual Improvement Society.*—A *soirée* of the Mutual Improvement Society in connection with the East Free Church, Arbroath, was held 29th June, William Salmond, Jun., Esq., in the chair. After a few remarks from the chairman, recitations were given by Messrs. Duff, Davie, Fairweather, Christie, and Durie, interspersed with songs from Messrs. Neish and Davie. Essays were read on "Julius Caesar," by Mr. D. Macgregor; on the "Sabbath," by Mr. Stewart; and on the "Good Old Times," by Mr. Neish. The members and friends present were highly delighted. The treasurer earnestly called upon the young men present at the social meeting as friends to become members of this association, the only one of the kind in Arbroath. There are thirty-two members on the roll. Debates have been zealously discussed on Capital Punishment, Charles I.'s Execution, the Theatre, &c.; conversations were held on Feeling Markets, the Sabbath, and Innovations. Several able essayists have come forward: subjects—"The Improvement of Time," "The Social Evil," "Infidelity," &c. The ensuing session begins on Wednesday, the 13th September, opening with an essay from Mr. Neish. For the past session the office-bearers were the Rev. John Robertson, president, *ex officio*; Wm. Salmond, Jun., Esq., vice-president; Mr. Geo. Macgregor, secretary; and Mr. Stewart, treasurer.

*A Manuscript Magazine and Literary Society* is about to be established under the following rules:—THE NATIONAL CORRESPONDING LITERARY SOCIETY.—Honorary president, Samuel Neil, Esq. Secretary, Mr. Frederick S. Mills. Rule 1. That the society is formed for the mutual improvement of

its members in the art of literary composition by their criticism of the papers and composition of each other. 2. That each member shall, as frequently as conveniently may be, send to the secretary an original MS. for circulation in the society. 3. Upon the receipt of each MS the secretary shall mark thereupon the number of days allowed to each member for perusal, and shall forward it to the first member on the list by book post, and that upon the expiration of the time marked thereupon, such member shall forward it to the next upon the list; the last member to return it to the secretary, who will return it to its author. 4. That every member shall forward his criticisms and opinions on each contribution with each parcel. 5. That MS. may consist of essays, tales (complete or serial), sketches of life or character, and poems. 6. That the secretary shall issue half yearly a printed report of the proceedings of the society. 7. That "a budget" for literary odds and ends shall be issued every three months. 8. That the office of secretary shall be annually filled at the election of the members. 9. That no subscription shall be required from the members, but that upon entering the society each member shall pay to the secretary the sum of 2s 6d. to cover the preliminary expenses, and the printing of rules, reports, &c. 10. That any member wishing to frame an alteration in these rules shall send his proposal to the secretary, who will forward it to each member, and receive their votes; the majority in every case to accept or reject such proposal. Intending members should at once communicate with the secretary, Mr. Frederick S. Mills, 159, New John Street, West, Birmingham.

## The Inquirer.

### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

541. I see in the newspapers every now and again quotations made from a paper called the *Owl*: is this a real periodical?—A COUNTRY LAD.

542. Could you inform me what translations of Montaigne's "Essays" exist; and what is their character?—D. G. H.

543. What is the History of the Queen's Colleges in Ireland?—JAMES FREW.

544. A great many dictionaries are edited by Dr. William Smith: who is he?—THOS. L. MCKAY.

545. Is not the publication of so many *dictionaries* a great impediment to the supply of a general want—a complete Encyclopædia at a cheap price? Which works of either sort are best suited for a working man's club library?—THOS. L. MCKAY.

546. Which is the best way to accustom one's self to persevering thought? When I begin to think my mind wanders; when I read attentively I become drowsy: how can these faults be cured?—T. V.

547. Can you recommend any book of prayers suitable for the use of a private Christian, who wishes to be able to offer up adoring praise from his own heart at his own hearth, and in an assembly of a few friends for Scripture reading?—AN ANXIOUS INQUIRER.

548. In putting into practice the advice of R. H. M., I feel very much the want of a good English Dictionary. I have a large one of Walker, and a small one of Webster; but they do not contain all the words I come across. Will any of your readers, therefore, recommend me one, containing all the words found in English classic authors, with their derivation, pronunciation, and extracts exhibiting their various significations?

A review of Latham's "Johnson's Dictionary" (now publishing) in your Magazine would be valuable.—E. H. R.

549. I would be obliged to any of your readers for the meaning and derivation of the word "esoteric"—as, "esoteric theology." It occurs twice in Principal Tulloch's "Beginning Life," and I can find no such word in any dictionary I have searched.—RUDDY.

550. Will any reader kindly favour me with a short sketch of the Rev. Frederick Denison Maurice, stating the church party to which he belongs, his religious and theological views, and his position as a writer, with the characteristics and scope of his principal works, more especially of his "Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy"?—G. H.

551. Can you give any account of the life of David Gray (the Kirke White of Scotland he is called, I believe), and the merits of his poems?—J. W. B.

552. Do you know of a good but cheap work on Grecian manners in the time of Alexander the Great, and also Saxon manners in the time of Edwy and Elgiva (A.D. 955), and a good history of Essex, and a good article on tragedy?—J. W. B.

553. Who is the author of "Twinkle, twinkle, little star"?—J. W. B.

554. For a beginner in Greek, what author do you advise him to commence with?—J. W. B.

555. Can any of your readers inform me of the name and address of the publisher of the *best* work on mathematics for a beginner? also, if the method of working out problems has altered during the present century?—AN OLD SUBSCRIBER.

556. Will any one of the numerous readers of the *British Controversialist* kindly inform me whether Italian is more useful than Spanish, which is the easiest acquired, and the length of time

each would take to acquire at the rate of an hour's unaided study daily?—W. T. G.

#### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

538. John R. Beard, D.D., is a Unitarian minister, late of Manchester, now residing at Altrincham, Cheshire, to recruit his health, worn by a forty years' ministry in Manchester. He is widely respected by the denomination, of which he is one of the brightest ornaments. And he holds no mean position in the learned world for his classical acquirements and Biblical researches. As to the works he has written, there is scarcely a subject on which he has not commented—always in a free, broad, and inquiring spirit. As a friend of self-education, he has written a "Life of Toussaint l'Ouverture," "Self-Culture," 5s., and contributed to Cassell's "Popular Educator," Lessons in Greek, Latin, and English, to the "Historical Educator," "History of English Literature," also, "Latin Dictionary," "Latin Made Easy," &c., &c. As a controversialist in defence of his religious views he has given "Reasons why I am a Unitarian," "Grounds and Objects of Religious Knowledge," "The Divinity and Atonement of Jesus Christ Scripturally Expounded," "Trinitarian Texts and Arguments," &c., &c. As a Biblical student we may note the following: "A Revised English Bible the Want of the Church, and the Demand of the Age," a "People's Dictionary of the Bible" (2 vols., 12s.), contributions to Dr. Kitto's "Cyclopædia," &c., &c. He has translated, under the title of the "Handbook of Family Devotion," a companion volume to the "Meditations on Death and Eternity" of Miss Cobbe, being selections from the works of Zachokke, &c. Other works known to me are "Man's Origin and Destiny," "Illustrations of the Divine in Christianity," "Sabbath Leisure," "The Confessional: a View of Romanism in its Principles, Aims, and Actual Workings," "Unitarianism in its Actual Condition." His latest work, just fresh from the press, is "Christ the

Interpreter of Scripture." Nearly half a score of other works might be added, and a legion of pamphlets, &c., called forth at different periods of his busy life; and his hand has contributed to all the Unitarian magazines, and some other quarterlies, &c., &c.; but if "Curiosa" reads the ones mentioned he will begin to have a glimmering notion of who Dr. Beard is, and what he has written. I may add that he is one of the editors of the *Unitarian Herald*, a contributor to the *Theological Review*, and one of the professors of the Home Missionary College of Manchester. He has contributed also to the *Westminster British and Foreign Reviews*, the *Journal of Sacred Literature*. All this work crowded within the space of threescore years and ten, and a mind still active and vigorous!—R.

Dr. Beard is an eminent Unitarian minister, author and editor of several works in philosophic theology. Some years ago he published a "People's Dictionary of the Bible," a comprehensive, learned, and useful work, carefully written, and full of valuable information. It received high encomiums from the English and American press. Dr. Beard has also published "A Biblical Reading-Book," throwing much light on Scripture pronunciation, history, antiquities, and geography, and containing a well-written "Life of Christ;" "Scripture Illustrated," a small work on Palestine; "Scripture Vindicated," being an investigation into some of our Lord's miracles in answer to rationalism; and "Illustrations of the Divine in Christianity," a series of eloquent sermons on the divine element in the character and teachings of Jesus. In reply to Strauss's "Leben Jesu," Dr. Beard edited, and in part wrote, "Voices of the Church," a controversial work which I have not seen, but of which Dr. J. Pye Smith and Dr. Robert Vaughan speak highly. An edition of M. Saintes' "Critical History of Rationalism in Germany," carefully edited by Dr. Beard, was issued by Simpkin and Marshall in 1849, and, later still, "An Introduction to the Books of the Old and New Testa-

ment," from the German of A. Schumann. To these labours must be added the services rendered to Cassell's "Popular Educator." Of Mr. Cassell's coadjutors in the cause of providing for the working classes cheap and healthy literature, Dr. Beard has been one of the foremost and most valuable. He contributed to the "Educator" the "Lessons in Latin," the "Lessons in English Language and Literature," and the "Lessons in Greek," all of which have been republished by Messrs. Cassell and Co. He has also, in conjunction with his son, Charles Beard, B.A., compiled a "Latin Dictionary" for the use of students of his grammar. As a preacher he is said to be thoughtful, forcible, and sometimes eloquent.—S. F. W.

540. "The Elements of Literary Criticism" seem in a fair way of being most admirably set before the readers of this unique and excellent magazine, in the "Studies in English Literature," which are placing before us Pope's celebrated poem on that subject, with a series of annotations which very greatly enhance the value of the text, besides conveying a large amount of admirable expository instructions on almost every point of literary criticism. As the quotations are all carefully given, the works named may be regarded as forming the basis of a catalogue of books on literary criticism. H. C. H. appears to want something else and other; but it is difficult to tell what. Dare we venture to suggest to our instructor in so many matters, Mr. Neil, the value which we should all attach to a series of papers from his pen on "The Philosophy of Literary Criticism," or some similar subject? The scattered and fragmentary, desultory, and unsettled criticism of the present day is eminently unsatisfactory. We have departed from the old landmarks of style, &c., and require new guidance. The old books, of course, are Irving's

"Composition;" Blair's "Lectures;" MacGill's "Lectures on Rhetoric;" Kame's "Elements of Criticism;" Campbell's "Philosophy of Rhetoric;" Gordon's "Quinctillian;" Tyrwhitt's "Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetry;" and Cicero's tractates on "Eloquence and Oratory." Of modern works the best are unquestionably Whately's "Rhetoric," and Neil's "Rhetoric;" both of which H. C. H. should read.—J. T. THORNTON.

541. The *Owl*.—It is quite a real paper—a sort of political *Punch*, issued on Wednesdays during the sittings of Parliament. The following slip from the *Manchester Courier's* London letter in one of the weeks of June, which I put into my scrap-book, may tell "A Country Lad" a little more:—Mr. Lawrence Oliphant has written to the *Times* to contradict the rumour that he is editor of the *Owl*. It was hardly necessary for him to do so, for any one who has listened to its hearings for the last few weeks must have perceived that the brilliant wit which guided it through its first season no longer presides over it. The truth is precisely what was stated in these letters some time ago. The revelations became sometimes indiscreet, and Mr. Oliphant, who was then editor, received a quiet hint from the Foreign Office that he must either quit it, or give up the *Owl*. It is needless to say which course was adopted. The right to the title and certain other matters was sold to the present proprietors for, it is said, £500, and the present editor, Mr. Berthwick, then entered on his labours. By the way, with reference to the title, it is said that the name is owing to the ingenuity of the Hon. Mrs. Norton, who suggested that the editor should simply reverse the initials of his name, Lawrence William Oliphant, which made O. W. L. Pleased with the suggestion, the editor adopted it, and behold the result on Wednesdays. T. U.

## Our Collegiate Course; OR, AIDS TO SELF-CULTURE.

### STUDIES IN ENGLISH LITERATURE.

#### POPE'S "ESSAY ON CRITICISM."—PART II.

[False critics judge of the whole by parts, and hence err; absurdity of expecting perfection.]

<i>Whoever thinks a faultless piece to see,</i>	53
<i>Thinks what ne'er was, nor is, nor e'er shall be.</i>	
<i>In every work regard the writer's end,</i>	55
<i>Since none can compass more than they intend ;</i>	
<i>And if the means be just, the conduct true,</i>	
<i>Applause, in spite of trivial faults, (13) is due.</i>	
<i>As men of breeding, sometimes men of wit,</i>	
<i>To avoid great errors, must the less commit ;</i>	60
<i>Neglect the rule each verbal critic lays [supply down],</i>	
<i>For not to know some trifles is a praise.</i>	
<i>Met critics fond of some subservient art,</i>	
<i>Still make a whole depend upon a part ;</i>	
<i>They talk of principles, but notions prize,</i>	65
<i>And all to one loved folly sacrifice.</i>	

[Don Quixote and the poet.]

Once on a time La Mancha's knight, (14) they say,  
A certain bard encountering on the way,

#### MEANINGS OF WORDS IN ITALICS, AS SUGGESTIONS FOR PARAPHRASING.

Line 53. He who expects; perfect production.

55. Consider; design.

56. Seeing that; accomplish.

57. Causes set in operation; management.

58. Praise, notwithstanding; right.

59. Good birth; occasionally; genius.

60. Keep free from; be guilty of.

61. Defy; pedantic; imposes.

63. Delighting in; inferior department of.

65. Fundamental laws; peculiarities lay stress on.

66. Conceit resign.

(13) In his "Tales of Parnassus" Trajano Boccalini (1556—1613), the Venetian satirist, indicates his contempt for small critics by a fable to the following effect:—"A famous critic having collected all the faults of an eminent poet into one bouquet, brought them as a present to Apollo, the supreme judge in Parnassus. He accepted the gift, and determined on bestowing on the donor a suitable reward. The critic was in ecstasies. Apollo commanded a sack of newly threshed wheat to be put before the expectant, whom he ordered to pick out the chaff, and lay it on one side in a heap. The critic gave all diligence to his task; and when it was finished Apollo presented him with the chaff for his reward."

(14) "To 'Don Quixote,' Cervantes (1549—1616) owes his immortality. No work in any language ever exhibited a more exquisite or a more sprightly satire, or a happier vein of invention, worked with more striking success. Every one has

*Discours'd in terms as just, with looks as sage,*  
*As e'er could Dennis, (15) of the Grecian stage;* 70  
*Concluding all were desperate sots and fools*  
*Who durst depart from Aristotle's rules.*  
*Our author, happy in a judge so nice,*  
*Produced his play, and begged the knight's advice;*  
*Made him observe the subject (16) and the plot,* 75  
*The manners, passions, (17) nnities (18)—what not?*

69. Conversed; accurate; wise.

71. Asserting; complete muddle-brains.

73. Bard, fortunate; critic; skilful.

read 'Don Quixote,' . . . every one is acquainted with the knight of La Mancha, who, losing his reason over his books of chivalry, imagines that he lives in the times of paladins and enchanters; who, resolved to imitate Amadis and Orlando, whose histories he has read with such delight, mounts his lean and ancient steed, braces on his rusty armour, and traverses woods and fields in search of adventures. Every common object is transformed by his poetical imagination. Giants, paladins, and enchanters meet him at every step; and all his misfortunes are not sufficient to undeceive him. But the Don, with his faithful Rosinante, and his squire Sancho Panza, have already taken their places in our imagination."—*Sismondi's "Literature of the South of Europe" (Bohn's Library), vol. ii., p. 218.*

(15) John Dennis was the son of a saddler in London, where he was born 1657. He was educated at Harrow and Cambridge, and travelled in France and Italy. He was a Whig in politics, a small poet, a political and critical pamphleteer and writer for the theatres. He criticized Addison's "Cato," in revenge for some supposed slights in the *Spectator*, as well as Pope's "Essay on Man," translation of Homer, &c. Southey has praised his critical powers. He was the author of "Liberty Asserted," "Appius and Virginia," and other plays. Pope and Swift, in conjunction, wrote "The Narrative of Dr. Robert Norris, concerning the Strange and Deplorable Frenzy of Mr John Dennis, an officer in the Custom House." The former makes him one of the heroes of "The Dunciad," and speaks of him as—

"Too dull for laughter, for reply too mad."

On the poem in which he is here mentioned, Dennis says, "His (Pope's) precepts are false or trivial, or both; his thoughts are crude and abortive, his expressions absurd, his numbers harsh and unmusical, his rhymes trivial and common; instead of majesty we have something very mean; instead of gravity, something that is very boyish; and instead of perspicuity and lucid order we have too often obscurity and confusion." The critic found few to sympathize with him. Dennis died 1734.

(16) "The subjects of tragedy, it seems, should not be taken from events beyond the bounds of history, nor from events in history, either recent or generally known. In every fable there must be a mixture of history and fiction. History is necessary to convey authority and credibility. Fiction is necessary to supply circumstances sufficient to form an interesting action."—*Dr. William Barron's "Lectures on Belles-Lettres and Logic," LV., vol. ii., p. 310.*

(17) "Whoever does not affect and move the same present passions in you that he represents in others, and at other times raise images about you, as a conjuror is said to do spirits—transports you to the places and persons he describes—cannot be judged to be a poet, though his measures are never so just, his feet never so smooth, or his sounds never so sweet."—*Sir W. Temple's "Essays," IV., Of Poetry.*

(18) "The privilege of adding fiction to real and known events enables the poet to attack with efficacy the heart of the spectator. He forms from both an



All which *exact to rule* were brought about,  
 Were but a combat in the lists left out.  
 "What, *leave the combat out?*" *exclaims the knight.*  
 "Yes, or we must *renounce the Staggyrle.*" 80  
 "Not so, by heavens!" (he *answers in a rage.*)  
 "Knights, squires, and steeds must enter on the stage."  
 "So *vast a throng the stage can ne'er contain.*" (19)  
 "Then build a new, or act it on a plain."  
 Thus critics of less *judgment than caprice,* 85

77. According to dramatic usage.  
 79. Omit; cries out.  
 80. Withhold obedience to Aristotle.

81. Replies; passion.  
 83. Great; multitude; accommodate.

action, interesting and probable; that is, an action all the incidents of which shall point to one great object or catastrophe, and which shall be performed, as nearly as possible, in the place and during the time of the representation. In these requisites will be discovered the foundation of the *three unities* of—1, action; 2, time; and 3, place. By unity of action is meant that all the incidents of the poem shall point to one great catastrophe. By the unities of time and place is understood that the actual performance of the action may pass nearly during the *time* and within the *place* of the representation. Without unity of action it is impossible to excite and agitate the passions; and without the unities of time and place it is impossible to preserve probability, and to persuade the spectators that the action is not imaginary. But with all these unities properly observed, the illusion will be complete, and the passions will be as effectually roused by the feigned events as if they were real."—*Dr. William Barron's "Lectures,"* I.V., vol. ii., p. 311.

- (19) "O for a Muse of fire, that would ascend  
 The highest heaven of invention,  
 A kingdom for a stage, princes to act,  
 And monarchs to behold the swelling scene!  
 . . . . But pardon, gentles all,  
 The flat, unraised spirits that have dared  
 On this unworthy scaffold to bring forth  
 So great an object; can this cockpit hold  
 The vasty fields of France? or may we cram  
 Within this wooden O the very casques  
 That did affright the air at Agincourt?  
 O pardon! since a crooked figure may  
 Attest in little space a million,  
 And let no ciphers to this great accompt  
 On your imaginary forces work.  
 Suppose within the girdle of these walls  
 Are now confined two mighty monarchies,  
 Whose high upreared and abutting fronts  
 The perilous narrow ocean parts asunder;  
 Piece out our imperfections with your thoughts;  
 Into a thousand parts divide one man,  
 And make imaginary puissance;  
 Think when we talk of horses that you see them  
 Printing their proud hoofs i' the receiving earth;  
 For 'tis your thoughts that now must deck our kings," &c.  
*Shakspeare's "Henry V.," Prologue, Act I.*

*Curious, not knowing, not exact, but nice,  
Form short ideas, and offend in arts  
(As most in manners) by a love to parts. (20)*

[A love of conceits and trickeries of thought also misleads.]

Some to conceits alone their taste confine,  
And glittering thoughts (21) struck out at every line; 90  
Pleased with a work where nothing's just or fit,  
One glaring chaos and wild heap of wit.  
Poets, like painters, thus unskilled to trace  
The naked nature and the living grace,  
With gold and jewels cover every part, 95  
And hide with ornaments (22) their want of art.

85. Intellect; love of conceits.

90. Dazzling; effected in.

86. Peculiar; wise; precise; pedantic.

92. Offensively brilliant mixture; dis-

87. Defective notions; make mistakes.

orderly.

(20) "It would be amusing to make a digest of the irrational laws which bad critics have formed for the government of poets. First in celebrity and in absurdity stand the dramatic unities of place and time. No human being has ever been able to find anything that could, even by courtesy, be called an argument for these unities, except that they have been deduced from the general practice of the Greeks. It requires no very profound examination to discover that the Greek dramas, often admirable as compositions, are, as exhibitions of human character and human life, far inferior to the English plays of the age of Elizabeth. . . . All the greatest masterpieces of the dramatic art have been composed in direct violation of the unities, and could never have been composed if the unities had not been violated. It is clear, for example, that such a character as that of Hamlet could never have been developed within the limits to which Alfieri confined himself."—*Macaulay's "Essays," Moore's "Life of Byron."*

(21) "The metaphysical poets were men of learning, and to show their learning was their whole endeavour. If poetry be an imitative art, these writers will, without great wrong, lose their right to the name of poets, for they did not imitate anything; they neither copied nature from life, neither painted the forms of matter, nor represented the operations of intellect. Their thoughts are often new, but seldom natural; they are not obvious, but neither are they just; and the reader wonders by what perversity of industry they were ever found. The most heterogeneous ideas are yoked together; nature and art are ransacked for illustrations, comparisons, and allusions; their learning instructs and their subtlety surprises, but the reader commonly thinks his improvement dearly bought. They were not successful in representing or moving the affections. Wholly employed on something unexpected or surprising, they never inquired what on any occasion they should have said or done. Their attempts were always analytic; they broke every image into fragments, and could no more represent by their slender conceits and laboured peculiarities the prospects of nature, or the scenes of life, than he who dissects a sunbeam with a prism can exhibit the wide effulgence of a summer's noon."—*Dr. Samuel Johnson's "Lives of the Poets"*—"Cowley."

(22) "Figures of speech, which poets think so fine—  
Art's needless varnish to make nature shine—  
All are but paint upon a beauteous face,  
And in description only need a place.  
But to make rage declaim, and grief discourse,  
From lovers in despair fine things to force,

True wit is nature to advantage dressed, (23)  
 What oft was thought but ne'er so well expressed;  
 Something whose *truth* convinced at sight we find,  
 That gives us back the image of our mind.  
 As shades more sweetly recommend the light,  
 So *modest* plainness sets off *appritly* wit;  
 For works may have more wit than does them good,  
 As bodies *perish* through *excess* of blood. (24)

100

99. Accuracy unhesitatingly; admit.  
 102. Demure; decks; lively.

103. Possess; is advantageous.  
 104. Die; too much.

Must needs succeed, for who can choose but pity  
 A dying hero, miserably witty?  
 But oh! the dialogue where jest and mock  
 Is held up like a rest at shuttlecock;  
 Or else like hills eternally they shine,  
 They sigh in simile, and die in rhyme!"

*Sheffield's "Essay on Poetry."*

- (23) "'Tis not a flash of fancy, which, sometimes  
 Dazzling our minds, sets off the slightest rhymes;  
 Bright as a blaze, but in a moment done:  
 True wit is everlasting like the sun,  
 Which, though sometimes behind a cloud retired,  
 Breaks out again, and is by all admired.  
 Number, and rhyme, and that harmonious sound,  
 Which not the nicest ears with harshness wound,  
 Are necessary, yet but vulgar arts;  
 And all in vain these superficial parts  
 Contribute to the structure of the whole;—  
 Without a genius, too, for that's the soul:  
 A spirit which inspires the work throughout,  
 As that of nature moves the world about;  
 A flame that glows amidst conceptions fit,  
 Even something of divine, and more than wit;  
 Itself unseen, yet all things by it shown,  
 Describing all men, but described by none."

*John Sheffield, Duke of Buckinghamshire, "Essay on Poetry."*

- (24) "It is inattention to the universality of the *principles of criticism* that makes our judgment on literary matters uncertain and inconsistent. . . . It is true that various languages, different religions, and distant ages have produced, and will perpetuate, numerous peculiarities in ancient and modern works of literature; but however these causes may induce a diversity of colour and shape, we shall find that the substance of such works of the intellect is in all of them essentially the same. Excellence in all of them must depend, according to their several natures, on the presence of imagination, fancy, good sense, and purity of language; and all that is previously necessary for the critical examination of ancient and modern poetry, upon the same principle, is to set aside for the moment those qualities which are the accidents of particular places and times, and then a review of those qualities which remain, and are common to every place and to all time, will be as obvious in the case of a Greek and English, as in that of an English and a French author."—*H. Coleridge's "Introduction to the Greek Classic Poets,"* p. 1.

## Literary Notes.

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MRS. SIGOURNEY (*née* Lydia Huntley), the celebrated American poetess, died at Hartford, Connecticut, U.S., June 10th, aged nearly 74.

An Italian poet, Regaldi, has proposed the erection of a monument at Athens to Homer.

Robert Dale Owen is engaged on a biography of Lincoln; J. A. Arnold is preparing 'Lincoln's Administration,' and a large amount of literary activity is employed on *the War*, its history, episodes, objects, and upshot.

The two papers on "Auguste Comte, his Life and Writings," recently issued in the *Westminster Review*, from the pen of J. S. Mill, are to be republished separately soon.

Prof. J. S. Blackie's ballad-translation of Homer is in the press. It will, including valuable prolegomena and notes, occupy four volumes.

Gail Hamilton is Miss Abigail Dodge, of *Hamilton*, Massachusetts, U.S.

A "Bopp Fund" is to be established as a jubilee memorial of the foundation of "Comparative Philology," on May 16th, 1816, by that professor's work.

The "Pilgrim's Progress" has been issued from the China Mission press.

Mill's "Political Economy" has been translated into German by Herr Soetbeer.

A complete edition, in seven vols., of the works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, has been issued in America.

Isaac Taylor, author of "Fanaticism," "Physical Theory of Another Life," "Wesley and Methodism," &c. (b. 1787), died 3rd July.

The paper in *Cornhill* on "Erasmus" is said to be by James Hannay, author of "Characters and Criticisms," &c.

A translation of Strauss's new "Life of Jesus" is promised for October.

Richard Morris is about to edit, from MSS., Chaucer's poems, for Messrs. Bell and Daldy.

The Dowager Lady Combermere is engaged in preparing a memoir of Lord Combermere.

The Vice-Chancellor of Oxford has announced the following prize subject to 1866; English Essays—*Stanhope*, "The Reign of Richard II.;"—*Chancellor's*, "Autobiography;" Dr. Ellerton's "The Duty of the Church on Christian Missions;" Latin Essay, "Thucydides and Tacitus Compared;" Latin verse, "Neapolis;" English verse, "Virgil Reading the 'Æneid' to Augustus and Octavia."

Thiers is to publish his speeches on "The Roman Question," "Political Liberty," and "Finance."

Dr. John Forster's "Life, Journals, and Letters of Jonathan Swift" are now definitely promised.

Dr. F. Ueberweg, of Bonn, has issued a "System of Logic, and a History of Logical Teaching."

The "Sea Workers," a novel by Victor Hugo, is nearly ready.

B. E. Malmström, Swedish poet, died June 27, aged 49.

Dr. Irons is at work on "The Bible and its Interpreters."

S. P. Woodward (b. 1821), the geologist, died 11th July.

The Newdigate prize for the best poem on "Mexico" has been awarded at Oxford to Fred. Dobree; Richard B. Michel gained the Latin Verse prize for a poem *Dantis Exsilium*. On the Essay subjects "Instinct," "Secret Fraternities of the Middle Ages," and the "Rise of Russia," prizes were awarded to F. A. Channing; A. P. Marras; and W. M. Hatch respectively.

## Modern Logicians.

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### THE LATE GEORGE BOOLE, LL.D., D.C.L.

"A generation will arise in which the leaders of education will know the value of logic, the value of mathematics, the value of logic in mathematics, and the value of mathematics in logic."—A. DE MORGAN, F.R.A.S.

THE Queen's Colleges of Cork, Galway, and Belfast, though now incorporated into and forming one University, were opened as separate institutions in 1849. In that year the council of the Curvierian Society (an association founded in 1835) projected a *conversazione*, which was held in the rooms of the Royal Cork Institution and School of Design, under the presidency of A. F. Roche, Esq., then mayor of the city. This reunion was intended as a complimentary reception and welcome to the president and professors of the newly established college, and partook, in some measure, of the nature of a popular demonstration in favour of that institution. The *conversazione* was a great success; much interest was excited in the public mind by the event, and the new staff of officials which Government had added to the equipment of the city found themselves in the midst of friends. At the opening of the succeeding session (1850-51) another *conversazione* was held with equal success, and the college was thereafter considered as one of the home institutions of the Munster seaport.

Of course, the planning, preparation, and arrangement of lectures, class lessons, examination questions, &c., the reception and classification of pupils; and attention to their regular, gradual, and effective mastery of the science of which he had been chosen the teacher, occupied much of the time and thought of the new professor, who was doubly diligent, because he felt that the true test of his own worth would be held to be the success of his students. The ultimate form into which his department settled was two classes—senior and junior—meeting four days in the week; either or both of these classes being subdivided, as might be found convenient for the purposes of special and adapted instruction. All the students of the senior class, as well as the more advanced members of the junior class, received arranged exercises weekly, to which answers in writing were required. The course of study commenced with the arithmetic of fractions, and led through the elements of Euclid and the study of algebra, to the application of these in the sciences and the arts. The senior section was introduced to a knowledge of solid and analytic geometry, the differential and integral calculus,

the philosophy of operations, and the adaptation of their principles to the problems arising in mathematical physics and astronomy. In all the work that he did, he was thorough, and his system of teaching, though strictly scientific, was amply relieved from tedium by the ingenuity and facile tact of the proficient instructor. In a very short time he became the idol of his students. They saw in him much more the learned friend than the stern preceptor. He took a personal interest in them, not only in the class-room, but in their own homes or lodgings. He opened his house to them in the most social manner, and not unfrequently gave of his slender substance to help them in temporary straits, and especially in times of sickness he acted not as counsellor only, but consoler—for he carried in his heart the living warmth of practical godliness, and the fadeless light of Christian faith. They knew his sympathy with them, and they repaid him by diligence and with love. Though, in fact, one of the most profound and original mathematicians of this age, he stooped to the humblest capacity, and expounded the merest elements to the veriest tyro with an earnest simplicity and absence of pretension which seldom failed to secure its end—the progress of the student.

But he was not a one-sided soul, of mathematics all compact. He was genial, intelligent, and widely informed, as lovable in the social circle as he was keen-minded in the study. He was held as an acquisition in the city of his adoption, both on account of his frank, candid, and honourable demeanour, and of his enthusiastic readiness to work for the furtherance of any good end. Among his colleagues he rapidly acquired respect and love. They saw his wonderful adaptation to his office; they knew the love he inspired in his students, and they noticed the daily influence he exerted on all classes to harmonize differences and promote peace and good-will among men. But while he rose in general esteem, he did not fail to prosecute the great life-task laid out for him—his own self-development, and through that the development of the kindred sciences of mathematics and logic.

In 1851, at the opening of the third session of Queen's College, Professor Boole, as Dean of the Faculty of Arts, delivered a "lecture on the Claims of Science, especially as founded in its relations to human nature." This is a discourse of remarkable expansiveness of thought. In it he considers the origin of human knowledge, the relations of science to the constitution and design of our own minds, the benefits we owe to it, and the claims which it possesses on our regard. We cull from its pages the following extracts:—

"Science, then, we may regard as the joint result of the teachings of experience, and the desires and faculties of the human mind. Its inlets are the senses; its form and character are the result of comparison, of reflection, of reason, and of whatever powers we possess, whereby to perceive relations, and trace through its successive links the chain of cause and effect. The order of its progress is from particular facts to collective statements, and so on to universal laws. In Nature

it exhibits to us a system of law *enforcing* obedience; in the Mind a system of law *claiming* obedience. Over the one presides necessity; over the other the unforced obligations of reason and the moral law. Such I conceive to be the true conception of science."

The following is an admirable specimen of rhetorical enumeration:—

"The instinctive thirst for knowledge, its disinterested character, its beneficial tendencies, are among the most favoured topics of ancient writers. Cicero dwelt upon them with a peculiar delight, and he has invested them with more than the common charm of his eloquence. Plato made them a chief ground of his speculations concerning the just man and the well-ordered state. Aristotle gave to them the testimony of one of the most laborious of human lives. Virgil devoted the fairest passage of his best poem to the delights of a calm and meditative life, occupied in quest of truth. Lucretius drew from philosophical speculations the matter of what some have regarded as the noblest production of the Latin muse. Sophocles made knowledge, in its aspect of power, the theme of incomparably the finest of his choral odes. Æschylus made knowledge, in its other aspect of patience and martyrdom, the noble burden of his Prometheus. And there is a ground for the conjecture that such influences were not unfelt by those older poets and seers with whom our Milton felt the sympathy of a common fate, and desired to share the glory of a common renown. The early dawn, too, of philosophy, not to speak of its subsequent and higher development in the schools of Athens and Alexandria, is full of suggestive indications. Some records, scattered, indeed, and dim and fragmentary, still exist of the successive attempts which were made in Ionia, in the cities of Southern Italy, and in Greece, to penetrate the mystery of the universe, to declare what it is and whence it came. In those speculations, vague as they are, we discern the irresistible longings of the human mind for some constructive and general scheme of truth, its inability to rest satisfied with the details of a merely empirical knowledge, its desire to escape into some confined sphere of thought, and, if it might be, to hold 'converse with absolute perfection.' Nor are the efforts to which such feelings gave birth to be regarded as accidental or unmeaning. They had a prospective significance in relation to the science that was yet to appear. They were like the prelusive touches of some great master of harmony, which serve to awaken the feeling of expectancy and preparation. I affirm, and upon deliberate examination, that the peculiar order of the development of human thought which preceded the rise and growth of modern science was not an arbitrary thing, but it is, in its main features, susceptible of explanation. Though for any elucidation of the phenomena of nature it is utterly worthless, upon the human faculties it throws a light of illustration which can scarcely be valued too highly."—P. 25.

The idea of "a constructive and general scheme of truth," alluded to in this passage, is one of those which possess a singular fascination for all great minds, and Boole's mind seems in its composition to have flashed back to the thoughts of a former time, when he attempted to pursue Thought into her secret recesses. This appears to have induced him on revision to add note (a), p. 31, the most important portion of this tract. From it we gain a brief and plain statement of the germ idea of his entire system of logic:—

"All correct reasoning consists of mental processes conducted by laws which are partly dependent upon the nature of the subject of thought. Of that species

of reasoning which is exemplified in algebra, the *subject* is *quantity*, the *laws* are those of the elementary conceptions of quantity, and its implied operations. Of logic the *subject* is our conceptions of *classes* of things, represented by general names; the ultimate facts are those of the above conceptions, and of the operations connected therewith. Let these two systems of thought be placed side by side, expressed, as they admit of being, in the common symbolical language of mathematics, but each with its own interpretations—each with its own laws; and together with much that is obviously common—so much, indeed, as to have fostered the idea that algebra is merely an application of logic—there will be seen to exist real differences and agreements hitherto unnoticed, but not without influence on the course of human thought. The conception of the universe in the one system will occupy the place of that of unity in the other, not through any likeness of nature, as was once supposed, but through subjection to the same formal laws. Moreover, at the root of the logical system there will be found to exist a law, founded in the nature of the conception of ‘class,’ to which the conceptions of quantity, as such, are not subject, and which explains the origin, though it does not furnish the justification, of the dualistic tendency above adverted to. I conceive it unnecessary to show that a law of the mind may produce its effect upon thought and speculation without its presence being perceived. Whatever, too, may be the weight of authority to the contrary, it is simply a fact that the ultimate laws of logic—those alone on which it is possible to construct a science of logic—are mathematical in their form and expression, although not belonging to the mathematics of quantity.”

The speculative truth of the principles of logic has often been doubted, sometimes slighted, but if it could be proved that its whole procedure partakes of the perfect character of the sister science mathematics, this would be hereafter impossible. The science of the laws of the action of thought would co-ordinate itself with the science of the necessary matter of thought, and the ultimate calculus of operations employed in each would be seen to be closely allied. Both are sciences capable of exhibition in the rigour of technical forms, and though neither can supersede the other, it is yet a most legitimate exercise of philosophic insight to trace their ground-plan, and to show how nearly their ultimate forms and processes are alike.

To this subject, however, we must recur again; meanwhile we may note, that among other affiliations of himself to the city of Cork, its interests, and institutions, he became a member of the Cuvierian Society; and when leisure came to him, he took his share, not only in the remarks on, but in the production of, papers. Of the latter we may note, and no more, the subjects of the following:—In session 1852-53, under the presidency of R. J. Lecky, he read remarks “On some astronomical figures from a manuscript of the fourteenth century, representing the earth’s motion,” and a “Mémorial of Robert Grossetête, Bishop of Lincoln, who died in 1253;” and, in 1853-4, a notice of “A remarkable echo.” In 1854 he was chosen president of this society; and under his rule a splendid series of *conversazioni*—on the occasion of the inauguration of the Cork Athenæum, which was opened by the late able Earl of Carlisle, in May, 1854—were held: of these the former was intended for and



attended by the educated classes of the city; and the latter was specially got up for the benefit of the working classes. On opening these Dr. George Boole delivered an address on the "Union of social enjoyment and intellectual activity," from which we quote the following excerpts:—

"Each generation as it passes away bequeaths to its successor, not only its material works in stone and marble, in brass and iron, but also the truths which it has won, and the ideas which it has learned to conceive; its art, literature, science, and, to some extent, its spirit and morality. This perpetual transmission of the light of knowledge and civilization has been compared to those torch races of antiquity, in which a lighted brand was transmitted from one runner to another until it reached the final goal. Thus it has been, as generations succeed each other, borrowing and conveying light, receiving the principles of knowledge, testing their truth, enlarging their application, adding to their number, and transmitting them forward to coming generations,—

*'Et quasi cursores vitæ lampada tradunt.'*

Now this connection between intellectual discovery and the progressive history of our race gives to every stage of the former a deep human interest. Each new revelation, whether of the laws of the physical universe, of the principles of art, or of the great truths of morals and of politics, is a step not only in the progress of knowledge, but also in the history of our species. . . . Science, while it is thus a revelation of the laws of the material universe, is also a manifestation of the intellectual nature of man; so, too, all those arts which depend upon the perception of proportion, whether it be in forms, or in sounds, are at least as dependent upon the existence of certain faculties of our nature, which faculties they make known to us, as upon any relation of external things. What a world of sweet and solemn emotions, for instance, does not music awaken within us!—a world of whose existence we should, but for that divine art, be wholly unconscious, and of whose possible limits we are still ignorant. It is not in the instrument, nor in the pulses of the air, nor in the mechanism of the human ear, that the harmony resides, but in ourselves. In the mysterious depths of the human spirit these faculties have their abode, for whose calling forth all these external movements are but a preparation."

These are only two brief quotations from a speech full of good sense, social urbanity, and popularized thought, and which supplies a lofty idea of the fluency and fertility of the Cork professor of mathematics, when he had seen fit for a season to—

*"Let Euclid rest, and Archimedes pause;"*

and how he could enliven social intercourse with "subjects of thought and conversation, whose interest is not merely of the present time."

The previous summer (1853) must have been an anxious and busy one for him. He had planned and partly commenced a work on the philosophy of the thinking faculty, of a singularly bold and original character. He had succeeded in thinking together logic and mathematics, and in linking together into one form of thought syllogistic reasoning and algebraic computation. He sedulously and earnestly devoted himself to the completion of this notable

production. The book was printed in Dublin, and hither and thither flew the proof sheets, for long months, between author and printer, author and friends, &c., causes of great anxiety and care. On St. Andrew's day, 1853, he saw the work concluded, and wrote the preface, but the business arrangements of publishing kept the work from the hands of readers till the spring of 1854. Considering that Dr. Boole was known to many by his contributions to the *Cambridge and Dublin Mathematical Journal*; for the papers of note, in the scientific world, he had read before the British Association; and for the well-sustained position he had attained, as well as for his former productions, it is surprising that this work attracted so little attention as it did among the cultivators of either of the two great branches of formal science. It has been bitterly remarked of this incident, "It sought audience fit though few, and found the latter." Too many of the every-day critics, we fear, gave its pages scant survey, because they would have required to educate themselves up to the power of noticing a work of such consistency and skill, in the searching for and tracing out of ultimate principles and fundamental laws.

The author having given orders for the distribution of copies among those thinkers who were interested in the subject it discussed, and were supposed to be able to comprehend the relations of its speculations to foregone or cognate thought, the writer of this paper had the honour of receiving the book, "with compliments." It is only candid to confess that the treatise was felt to be one on which much study must be expended, and that it came to hand when leisure and health were both scanty. From our note-book of readings we quote the following sentences of the opinion, formed after our first perusal of the work:—"The writer displays singular sagacity, stretch and tension of reasoning, an enviable power of lucid exposition, a wonderful capacity for abstract speculation and recondite thinking. The author is profound and erudite; he has brought the far-grasping power of an able mind to the consideration of the subject, and has given in clear, distinct, and expressive language a large development to the philosophy of thought. The subtlety, power, and persistency shown in carrying out the strict and unyielding system of symbolical expression and interpretation for which the author contends are indicative of a mind of superior order. The book opens up views of the relations and forms of thought capable of vast results."

Our opinions, after a special reperusal, prior to commencing this paper, do not substantially differ from those formed upwards of ten years ago. It is a bold and grandly conceived work. In it, world-old investigations, whose elements were regarded as irrevocably settled, are re-submitted to analysis and found to afford new results; familiar and trite assumptions are subjected to re-questioning, and what before seemed palpable as daylight revealed unnoticed facts in thought and mind. No volume has been, for many years, presented to reflective men containing so much vigorous

reasoning, and so successful in gaining so very large an accession of truths relating to apparently exhausted fields of inquiry. It is not only far in advance of previous theories, but in a great measure it takes fresh ground, and proceeds according to new tactics. The work presupposes in its readers a knowledge of the most important terms of logical science, and an acquaintance with the principles of algebra, but we hope in the following outline to lay before our readers an intelligible abstract of the main theory of the treatise,—a treatise fertile in suggestiveness, and not less rich in fulfilment than in promise. The quotations, though sometimes separated by considerable intervals, are believed to be sufficiently knit together to give a concise epitome of the author's main logical ideas.

The design of this treatise "is to investigate the fundamental laws of those operations of the mind by which reasoning is performed; to give expression to them in the symbolic language of a calculus, and upon this foundation to establish the science of logic, and construct its method; to make that method itself the basis of a general method for the application of the mathematical doctrine of probabilities; and, finally, to collect from the various elements of truth brought to view in the course of these inquiries, some probable intimations concerning the nature and constitution of the human mind. . . . The operations of the mind are in a real sense subject to laws," and "a science of the mind is therefore *possible*.

. . . . Like all other sciences, "that of the intellectual operations must primarily rest upon observation. . . . Our knowledge of the laws upon which the science of the intellectual powers rests, whatever may be its extent or its deficiency, is not probable knowledge; for we do not see in the particular example the general truth, but we see it also as a certain truth—a truth our confidence in which will not continue to increase with increasing experience of its practical verifications.

"All sciences consist of general truths, but of those truths some only are primary and fundamental, others are secondary and derived. . . . Shall we err, then, in regarding that, as the true science of logic, which, laying down certain elementary laws, confirmed by the very testimony of the mind, permits us thence to deduce, by uniform processes, the entire chain of its secondary consequences, and furnishes, for its practical applications, methods of perfect generality?

"There is not only a close analogy between the operations of the mind in general reasoning, and its operations in the particular science of algebra, but there is, to a considerable extent, an exact agreement in the laws by which the two classes of operations are conducted. . . . There exist, indeed, certain general principles, founded in the very nature of language, by which the use of symbols, which are but the elements of scientific language, is determined. To a certain extent these elements are arbitrary. Their interpretation is purely conventional; we are permitted to employ them in whatever sense we please. But this permission is limited by two indispensable conditions—1st, that from the sense, once conventionally established, we never, in the same process of reasoning, depart; 2nd, that the laws by which the process is conducted be founded exclusively upon the above fixed sense or meaning of the symbols employed." The tenets of this work "exhibit logic, in its practical aspect, as a system of processes carried on by the aid of symbols having a definite interpretation, and subject to laws founded upon that interpretation alone. But at the same time they exhibit those laws as identical in form with the laws of the general symbols of algebra, with this single addition, viz., that the symbols of logic are farther subject to a special law ["the rule of interpretation that any expression in which several of these symbols are written

together shall represent all the objects or individuals to which their several meanings are together applicable; and to the law that the order in which the symbols succeed each other is indifferent"], to which the symbols of quantity, as such, are not subject. . . . This law constitutes the germ or seminal principle, of which every approximation to a general method in logic is the more or less perfect development.

"Logic is conversant with two kinds of relations—relations among things and relations among facts. But as facts are expressed by propositions, the latter species of relation may, at least for the purposes of logic, be resolved into a relation among propositions. . . . We may then say that the *premises* of any logical argument express *given* relations among certain elements, and that the *conclusion* must express an *implied* relation among those elements, or among a part of them, *i. e.*, a relation implied by or inferentially involved in the premises.

"The requirements of a general method in logic seem to be the following:—1st. As the conclusion must express a relation among the whole, or among a part of the elements involved in the premises, it is requisite that we should possess the means of eliminating those elements which we desire not to appear in the conclusion, and of determining the whole amount of relation implied by the premises among the elements which we wish to retain. Those elements which do not present themselves in the conclusion are, in the language of the common logic, called middle terms; and the species of elimination exemplified in treatises on logic consists in deducing from two propositions, containing a common element or middle term, a conclusion connecting the two remaining terms. But the problem of elimination, as contemplated in this work, possesses a much wider scope. It proposes, not merely the elimination of one middle term from two propositions, but the elimination generally of middle terms from propositions, without regard to the number of either of them, or to the nature of their connection. To this object neither the processes of logic nor those of algebra in their actual state present any strict parallel. 2nd. It should be within the province of a general method in logic to express the final relation among the elements of the conclusion by any admissible *kind* of proposition, or in any selected order of terms:" *i. e.*, "given a set of premises expressing relations among certain elements, whether things or propositions; required explicitly the whole relation consequent among *any* of those elements, under any proposed conditions, and in any proposed form."

In reply to the assumed objection, "that the logic of Aristotle, in its rules of syllogism and conversion, sets forth the elementary processes of which all reasoning consists, and that beyond these there is neither scope nor occasion for a general method," he remarks, "1st, that syllogism, conversion, &c., are not the ultimate processes of logic; . . . they are founded upon, and are resolvable into, ulterior and more simple processes, which constitute the real elements of method in logic;" and asserts, "Nor is it true in fact that all inference is reducible to the particular forms of syllogism and conversion, 2nd, if all inference were reducible to these two processes (and it has been maintained that it is reducible to syllogism alone), there would still exist the same necessity for a general method."

The "*directive* function of Method constitutes its chief office and distinction. In logic, the aid of a directive method, such as a calculus alone can supply, is indispensable. . . . These considerations furnish a sufficient answer to all protests against the exhibition of logic in the form of a calculus. . . . It is the business of science, not to create laws, but to discover them. We do not originate the constitution of our own minds, greatly as it may be in our power to modify their character. And as the laws of the human intellect do not depend upon our will, so the forms of science, of which they constitute the basis, are in all essential regards independent of individual choice."

So far the statement of the strictly logical part of the author's aim. He, however, insists that "the subject of probabilities belongs equally to the science of number and to that of logic." "It is," he says, "in recognizing the co-ordinate existence of both these elements" that "the present treatise differs from all previous ones." Into this department of his work it is impossible for us, within our limits, to follow the keen-sighted thinker. Indeed, we can now only faintly indicate the chief topics on which in the body of the work he employs his remarkable intellectual powers. The work consists of a system of logical processes carried on by the aid of symbols nearly analogous to those of algebra. Thus the characters  $x, y, z, &c.$ , are made to represent *things as subjects of our conceptions*; the signs  $+$ ,  $-$ ,  $\times$ , are employed as marks of *those operations of mind by which our conceptions of things are combined or resolved* so as to form new conceptions involving the same elements. The sign  $=$  indicates *identity*, and the laws of thought are expressed by equations. The laws of these symbols of logic are deduced from a consideration of those operations of the mind which are implied in the strict use of language as an instrument of reasoning. This idea may, perhaps, be better given in his own language:—

"That language is an instrument of human reason, and not merely a medium for the expression of thought, is a truth generally admitted. . . . The elements of which all language consists are signs or symbols. Words are signs. . . . A sign is an arbitrary mark, having a fixed interpretation, and susceptible of combination with other signs, in subjection to fixed laws dependent upon their mutual interpretation.

"All the operations of language, as an instrument of reasoning, may be conducted by a system of signs composed of the following elements, viz.:—

"1st. Literal symbols, as  $x, y, z, &c.$ , representing things as subjects of our conceptions.

"2nd. Signs of operation, as  $+$ ,  $-$ ,  $\times$ , standing for those operations of the mind by which the conceptions of things are combined or resolved so as to form new conceptions involving the same elements.

"3rd. The sign of identity,  $=$ .

"And these symbols of logic are in their use subject to definite laws partly agreeing with and partly differing from the laws of the corresponding symbols in the science of Algebra."

"Let us conceive, then, of an algebra in which the symbols  $x, y, z, &c.$ , admit indifferently of the values 0 and 1, and of these values alone. The laws, the axioms, and the processes of such an algebra will be identical in their whole extent with the laws, the axioms, and the processes of an algebra of logic." "The respective interpretations of the symbols 0 and 1 in the system of logic are *Nothing* and *Universe*;" hence "if  $x$  represent any class of objects [*e.g.*, men], then will 1 [Universe] —  $x$  [men] represent the contrary or supplementary class of objects, that is, the class including all objects which are not comprehended in the class  $x$ ,"—in other words, will furnish the *dichotomous* division, "men" and "not men." "The principle of contradiction which affirms that it is impossible for any being to possess a quality, and at the same time not to possess it, is a consequence of the fundamental law of thought whose expression is  $x^2 = x$ ."

We are afraid that our zeal to epitomize this system is carrying

us too far. One of the notable thinkers of our day strove to dissuade the writer from attempting in a periodical to interest readers in Boole's logic. "He would be a bold, even a rash man," said he, "who should venture to invite readers of serials to peruse in abstract the deep issues of Boole's intellect." Were we addressing common readers we should fear we had overstepped all limits with ours; we hope it is otherwise, and that we have stimulated curiosity, not evoked tedium. If the former, let us commend such of them as possess a little algebraic culture and some mathematical taste to acquire and study this fertile book; if the latter, let us plead the human interest of Dr. Boole's life as a set-off against the weariness which may supervene upon an endeavour to condense into an abstract essence that which to many is abstruse enough when given *in extenso*. Let us farther appease their angry minds, ready to cry out "Impractical and impossible! Who could use a system so intricate and cumbrous?" by assuring them that Dr. Boole has no desire to introduce this *x-y-z-ity* into speech or writing. "The perfection of the method of logic," he says, "may be chiefly valuable as an evidence of the speculative truth of its principles. To supersede the employment of common reasoning, or to subject it to the rigour of technical forms, would be the last desire of one who knows the value of that intellectual toil and warfare which imparts to the mind an athletic vigour, and teaches it to contend with difficulties and to rely upon itself in emergencies." It is as an educational agent he proposes his scheme, as a gymnastic training that we press its study. We commonly reason by the aid of words, and in the forms of a well-constructed language. This is both an actual condition of and an important safeguard in the reasonings and discourses of common life; for thus not only every step of the connected train of thought, and every mediate result established in the course of thought, is thus brought forward to show its correspondence with experience and intelligible expression; but in doing so we seldom attend to the ulterior grounds upon which the forms alike of language and of thought have been established; and we often remain quite unconscious that any (or at least what) law underlies the processes by which premiss and conclusion are knit together. It is to force our contemplations below the mere surface of reasoning that symbolic logic is employed, and it is to prove that these symbols may be not only representative of what is thought, but of what is in thought, that George Boole has elaborated his interpretation of formal thinking by mathematical laws yielding general axioms involved in all the operations of the mind. "The object of science, properly so called, is the knowledge of laws and relations. To be able to distinguish what is essential to this end from what is only accidentally associated with it is one of the most important conditions of scientific progress." This is precisely what is aimed at in this treatise on the Laws of Thought.

The author, however, sees in these indications of law, which he has traced out with such pertinacity, glimpses of higher truths

than those with which mere logic is concerned, as may be gleaned from the following quotation:—

“ Among those conclusions relating to the intellectual constitution which may be considered as belonging to the realm of positive knowledge we may reckon the scientific laws of thought and reasoning, which have formed the basis of the general method of this treatise, together with the principles (Chap. V.) by which their application has been determined. The resolution of the domain of thought into two spheres, distinct but co-existent (IV., XL); the subjection of the intellectual operations within those spheres to a common system of laws (XL); the general mathematical character of those laws and their actual expression (II., III.); the extent of their affinity with the laws of thought in the domain of number, and the point of their divergence therefrom; the dominant character of the two limiting conceptions of universe and eternity among all the subjects of thought with which logic is concerned; the relation of those conceptions to the fundamental conception of unity in the science of number,—these, with many similar results, are not to be ranked as merely probable or analogical conclusions, but are entitled to be regarded as truths of science. Whether they be termed metaphysical or not is a matter of indifference. The nature of the evidence upon which they rest, though in kind distinct, is not inferior in value to any which can be adduced in support of the general truths of physical science. Again, it is agreed that there is a certain order observable in the progress of all the exacter forms of knowledge. The study of every department of physical science begins with observation; it advances by the collation of facts to a presumptive acquaintance with their connecting laws; the validity of such presumption it tests by new experiments, so devised as to augment, if the presumption be well founded, its probability indefinitely; and finally, the law of the phenomenon having been with sufficient confidence determined, the investigation of causes, conducted by the due mixture of hypothesis and deduction, crowns the inquiry. In this advancing order of knowledge the particular faculties and laws whose nature has been considered in this work bear their part. It is evident, therefore, that if we would impartially investigate either the nature of science, or the intellectual constitution in its relation to science, no part of the two series above presented ought to be regarded as isolated. More especially ought those truths which stand in any kind of *supplemental* relation to each other to be considered in their mutual bearing and connection.”

It can scarcely be denied by any impartial inquirer that Dr. Boole has shown that there is a very singular supplemental relation between logic and mathematics—so great, indeed, as amply to justify Professor De Morgan's statement,—

“ The connection of the formulæ of probability with those of logic in general has been most strikingly illustrated by Professor Boole, in his ‘*Mathematical Analysis of Logic*,’ Cambridge, 1847, 8vo.; and subsequently in his ‘*Investigation of the Laws of Thought*,’ London, 1854, 8vo. In these works the author has made manifest that the symbolic language of algebra, framed wholly on notions of number and quantity, is adequate, by what is certainly not an accident, to the representation of all the laws of thought.”\*

But “ the mathematical laws of reasoning are, strictly speaking, the laws of *right* reasoning only, and their actual transgression is a perpetually recurring phenomenon. The moral duty, therefore, of the study of logic is undeniable, while the *design* exhibited in the possibility of reaching the selfsame formal laws of thinking from

\* See Prof. A. De Morgan's “*Syllabus of Logic*.”

inductive experience, or from mathematical excogitation, proves that right reasoning, because easily possible to, is justly demanded of man." Originality is the test of a great mind, but it must be the originality of good sense joined to keen thought and freshness of mind.

Interesting, however, as are the far-reaching ideas suggested by the perusal of Dr. Boole's "exceedingly subtle and able book," the most interesting point in connection with it, to our mind, is, that it is the product of a mind chiefly self-trained, and that, spurred on mainly by the in-felt energies of his own soul, he has been able to explore the whole region of logical science, and to discover the reign therein of formal laws, precisely similar in essence to those which hold sway in the mathematical sciences, and thus lay open to mankind a new and independent theory of the order and system of trustworthy reasoning.

In 1855, Dr. Boole was married to Miss M. Everest, daughter of the late Rev. T. R. Everest, rector of Wickwar, in Gloucester. This lady possesses high intellectual faculties, and has made notable scientific acquisitions. She is the niece of Dr. Ryall, Vice-President of Cork College, and of that Colonel Everest after whom the loftiest peak of the Himalayas has been named. Five daughters have been the fruit of this union, which was one of great mutual happiness. In his new family relations he found fresh spurs to exertion, and he was helpfully assisted by Mrs. Boole in all his efforts. Of his later labours we may note an important memoir, following up the subject-matter of the twenty-first chapter of "The Laws of Thought," and treating of "The Combination of Testimonies and of Judgment," read before the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Shortly afterwards the Society honoured itself by electing him Fellow. This honour was succeeded by the greater one of his being selected by the University of Oxford as a fit and proper person upon whom to confer the honorary degree of D.C.L.

In 1857 he had projected and in part prepared a work, which was to bear the title of "The Philosophy of Logic," which Messrs. MacMillan and Co., of Cambridge and London, were authorized to announce as "nearly ready." He was, however, so ill to satisfy with himself that he shrunk from laying the work before the public at that time; and we understand that he had laboured long and diligently upon the matter it contains, and that he had renewed arrangements for putting it in press. When the Queen's Colleges were united, so as to form the Queen's University of Ireland, he was appointed one of the public examiners for degrees, thus giving a sort of national recognition of his merit and worth. In 1860 he published another very admirable mathematical treatise, on "The Calculus of Finite Differences," just issued under the able editorship of I. Todhunter, himself an admirable instructor in mathematics.

In 1862 he added to the "Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh" a paper which he had read on the 19th June, "On the Theory of Probabilities." His work on "Differential Equations"



had acquired such authority on the subject that a re-issue was called for. To accomplish this he set himself gladly, but the singular originality of his mind was such that this treatise grew into quite a new book, with developments stretching into farther reaches of the science. He gave himself thoroughly to whatever he had in hand, and the latest vacation season he enjoyed he occupied a portion of it in researches in London tending to extend or complete his work. He was looked upon in all scientific circles with hope, and his reputation had widened and greatened so much that the honours of the French Academy were about to be proposed for him, when the unrelenting hand of death struck him to the heart and called him hence. The work on equations is announced now as republished.

The lesson of Boole's life for us is of high value. It proves, by another important example, that the right method of action is that which is determined by duty; that the true manliness is that of conscientious conviction; that self-sacrifice is the real heroism of humanity; and that self-culture is fitted to attain the greatest heights, if steadily persevered in, not for mere worldly ambition, but from a determination to work out the divine purpose implied in the possession of the powers of thought. We hold it to be of high importance in the midst of material aspirations and secularizing influences to be convinced that persistence in duty, however apparently adverse it may seem to self-enjoyment, will ultimately and unmistakably lead to a happiness and an elevation of character which self-indulgence never reaches. Dr. Boole's life never rose above the need—and he never fell below the love—of work. Mind-sweat earned him all that he had, and effort made him all that he was. Let us be faithful in our several life-paths to the duties which the Giver of life imposes on us. Be it ours to work His will; let us leave with Him the results fearlessly, "either in this life or that which is to come."

In his anxiety to compass his college-work, and yet supply the much-wanted work on which he was employed, Boole overtaxed his strength. When, therefore, fever attacked him, he had but a scanty stock of strength to resist the effects of the derangement of functions of which his disease was the result. Hence his illness ran a rapid course; and after only a short intermission of labour this hard-wrought toiler was taken to his rest, and died Dec. 8, 1864, having but shortly before entered the fiftieth year of his age. Immediately on his demise being made known a general sorrow was expressed. He was carried to his resting-place amid the regrets of men of all parties and sects, the sadness of devotedly loving students, and the ardent grief of friends. His fine Christian enthusiasm imparted to all he did a sort of radiance from heaven. Without obtruding his religious views upon any one, he had the happy tact of showing that a spirit suffused his entire nature which was not of this world. A rare tolerance and magnanimity, and an almost rarer humility, combined with steadfastness of principle and conscientious seriousness in regard to every matter of duty, were

always manifest in him. His sense of responsibility to the great Father of Lights, his lowly reliance on the merits of Jesus, his sanctified use of the gifts of intellect, might be noted, but cannot be enlarged upon. These affairs concern the inner sanctuary of home life and the individual conscience, and are not on slight occasion to be brought out into the garish light of common day. But it seems right in our times to mention that in him there co-existed the hardest independence and the bravest originality of scientific thought with the most composed and serene Christian faith and the most elevated practical piety. From the word of the living God he drew much of the wisdom and worth which gave a genuine nobility to his life and a solemn grandeur to his death. It is seldom, so far as we know, that there passes from the jostled pathways of professional life a man so justly admired, so deservedly loved, as Dr. George Boole.

He has left behind him a large quantity of manuscripts on various subjects of scientific inquiry, which had occupied his mind during his later years. These, we believe, are in the hands of literary friends, and some of them may yet—indeed, we trust, will—be issued as a memorial of their self-raised and justly celebrated author.

Other memorials, too, are about to be instituted, so that the life, works, and genius of George Boole may not pass from the recollections of men. In Cork, the scene of his later labours, whose cemetery is enriched by his dust, a monument over his early grave is likely to be erected; a mortuary tablet will preserve the remembrance of the earliest mathematical professor in his old class-room in Cork college; and, that the influences of his life and worth may not be lost, a scholarship bearing his name is about to be established in Cork, which shall combine the two useful purposes of preserving the renown of a deservedly notable man and of stimulating and rewarding succeeding students of the formal sciences. His own city and county, Lincoln, will honour themselves by placing in their splendid cathedral a memorial window worthy of themselves, the building, and the dead illustrator of science, thought, and life, who has added a glory to the land we live in. We are happy to note that Government, rightly appreciating its duty in this instance, has conferred on Mrs. Boole a civil list pension of £100 per annum, "in consideration of her late husband's distinguished attainments as an original mathematician, and of his remarkable labours towards the extension of the boundaries of science." This is as it should be. The memories of her great men are a nation's best treasures. They prove her glory in the past, they encourage the children of the future to strive, too, to be worthy of their land, of themselves, and of the Mighty Life-Giver.

S. N.

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## Religion.

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### IS THE DESTINY OF NATIONS DISCOVERABLY INDICATED IN THE PROPHECIES OF SCRIPTURE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

**DOES** this question confine the subject of debate to the destiny of existing nations only? Or does it not rather embrace the past as well as the present and the future? On these points we feel ourselves constrained to disagree with the writer of the opening negative article. Perhaps we have misunderstood the scope and meaning of the question; but, viewing it as we do at present, we decline to make any such limitations as those which we have mentioned. We regard it—and here we find ourselves also unwillingly differing from our coadjutor, “W. C. Markham”—as involving the reality of prophecy, and therefore as bearing immediately upon the divine commission of the prophets, and mediately upon the inspiration of the Scriptures.

There are undoubtedly predictions in the Bible referring to the future destiny of existing nations, and, assuming their truth, “W. C. Markham” rightly enough argues that they would be altogether useless if they contained no discoverable intimations of things yet to come. But there are numbers by whom the truth and value of these predictions are disputed; most likely some of this description will be found ranking themselves on the opposite side of the present debate, and how are we to deal with these? We cannot show them that the destiny allotted to existing nations in the Scriptures will be their real destiny; for whatever that destiny may be, it is yet, in fact, hidden in the future. There are, however, predictions in the Scriptures, also, concerning the destiny of nations whose subversion is already matter of history. Here, then, is a proper field on which the present question may be profitably contended. And if, so far as time has gone, we discover that the word of the Lord has ever undeniably stood sure, then we have gained a good position from whence to argue that, with reference to those predictions yet unfulfilled, we may rely with assurance upon the truth of their deliverances.

It is alike strange and sad that, although constituting so large a portion of the inspired word of God, prophecy receives so little attention from those who profess themselves to be the religious instructors of the people. It is absolutely painful to observe the shallow and flimsy comments which we so often have upon these subjects when introduced—comments which only indicate the small

acquaintance of the preacher or the writer with his theme. Equally remarkable is the fact that almost invariably the very weakest in the field—whether to cover his own great ignorance, or for some other reason—never leaves the subject without casting contempt of some kind upon all who, more conscientious than himself, have devoted a portion of their time and attention to this solemnly important part of God's word.

J. J., on behalf of the negative, has produced an article which, whatever may be its other defects, will not "be found wanting" in this latter characteristic. Commencing his attack with certain feeble squibs of ridicule, he goes on throughout in the same strain, and, true to his tactics, ends with a sneer. But it is time that J. J. had learned to distinguish between ridicule and argument. Terms of abuse and contempt, with strong phrases and assertions, may perhaps startle the timid, but they neither convince nor move the independent mind. When J. J. made his rabid attack on Dr. Cumming and those who with him fix the end of the world at some date not far distant, he should have informed his readers what this has to do with the subject. It is, we apprehend, events, and not the time of the events, with which we have to do at present. And yet the only attempt at argument which we have been able to discover in the midst of his superabundant ridicule rests only upon this, that the time of the end is not and cannot be known. But if the exact time of the end is unrevealed, which we believe it is, does this do away with the possibility of the nature of the end itself being made known?

It would be an unpardonable trifling with time and space were we to follow J. J. through all the mazy intricacies of his most confused paper, as it would indeed be unprofitable to follow any one who could question whether God himself knows the future, for even to this degrading position our opponent has been constrained to descend, and who can call conscientious students of any part of God's word by such names as "charlatans," "fanatics," whose inquiries, carried to "extremes in belief"—whatever that may mean—may ultimately "lodge them in their proper resting-place, the lunatic asylum." J. J. either does not know, or does not care to know, that Daniel was a student of prophecy, and of prophecy relating to the future (Dan. ix. 2); that Paul wrote, "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable," &c. (1 Tim. iii. 16); that Peter wrote, "We have a more sure word of prophecy, whereunto ye do well to take heed, as unto a light that shineth in a dark place" (2 Pet. i. 19); and that concerning the book of Revelation—"the revelation of Jesus Christ"—John was taught to write by the Lord himself, "Blessed is he that readeth, and they that hear the words of this prophecy, and keep the things that are written therein;" "Blessed is he that keepeth the sayings of the prophecy of this book" (Rev. i. 3; xxii. 7). "Nay, nay," replies J. J., "God has evidently not made known His purposes to man, whatever His purposes and designs may be. It is drivelling triviality to indulge

in calculations and speculations upon His intentions and designs, which are expressly declared to be 'a great deep.'" We leave our opponent to settle the matter with himself, the Bible, and his God as best he can.

It is granted that there are many predictions in Scripture concerning the destinies of nations, which are comparatively obscure and enigmatical; but there are others also, so clear and unambiguous, that the only wonder is that sensible minds can evade the force of their testimony. We may instance the prediction referring to the sons of Noah (Gen. ix. 25—28). We see the descendants of Shem and Japheth ruling and enlarged in Asia, Europe, and America, while the curse of servitude has long been resting on the unhappy descendants of Ham in Africa. We may refer to the prediction concerning Ishmael (Gen. xvi. 12), whose descendants, in fulfilment of it, are still a free and independent people, "their hand against every man, and every man's hand against them." We may point to the numerous predictions concerning the Jews—all fulfilled, so far, to the letter; giving us the assurance that though at present "plucked from their own land, and removed into all the kingdoms of the earth" (Jer. xxiv. 9), "wanderers among the nations," yet, in fulfilment of other prophecies, they shall again be gathered back to their own land, when "the times of the Gentiles are fulfilled,"—an honoured and converted people. The prediction of Moses concerning the destruction of their nationality by the Romans, and their subsequent dispersion and reproach, is almost as circumstantial and explicit as history itself (Deut. xxviii. 49—68). We might point to Daniel's graphic and extended prophecies concerning the Chaldean, Medo-Persian, Grecian, and Roman empires—outlined in the great symbol image of the Chaldean monarch, and filled up in the other parts of his book (Dan. ii. 31—45; vii. 17—20; viii. 11); and with reference to all these predictions we call upon our opponents to defend their position that there are no indications of national destinies in Scripture. In fulfilment of prophecy, the once-powerful Egypt is now the "basest of kingdoms;" Babylon—"Great Babylon"—"a desolation for ever," a possession for the bittern and pools of water; Tyre has become "like the top of a rock, a place for fishers to spread their nets on;" while the calcined alabaster of Nineveh's disentombed palaces speak for the veracity of the Hebrew seer who, long ages ago, minutely predicted the mode of its destruction. (See the Book of Nahum.)

What then shall we say of the predictions which still pertain to the future? Simply this: our uniform experience is that the prophecies of Scripture relative to the destinies of nations are true and trustworthy, so far as they have been fulfilled, and therefore that we are acting in accordance with reason and experience when we endeavour, not for the gratification of a morbid curiosity, but for the strengthening of faith and hope, to read "the signs of the times" in the light of God's word. We feel convinced, from what

we find there, that we are swiftly hastening on to that glorious climax of all earthly history, when, the power of every adversary subverted, "The God of heaven shall set up a kingdom which shall never be destroyed"—"whose kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and all dominions shall serve and obey him." Prophecy seems to point to dark and terrible days in store for the church of Christ, before the dawn of that better morning breaks on earth; but though "the sea roars, and the fulness thereof," yet "the Lord on high is mightier than the noise of many waters, yea, than the mighty waves of the sea."

J. O.

*Glasgow.*

## NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

Is the question to be discussed in a general or in a particular sense? Are all nations included, and is it their destiny to all futurity which is said to be indicated in prophecy? The question, it would seem, can only be taken in this latter sense; for that there are in Scripture prophecies concerning many nations existing in the time of the prophet, and that the destiny of those is to a certain extent foretold, is a fact patent to all acquainted in the least degree with the contents of the sacred volume; and that these prophecies have in many instances been already fulfilled to the letter, is equally evident to the explorer of Bible Lands and to the reader of any trustworthy work on the subject, such as Keith on "The Evidence of Prophecy." Take the prophecies of Isaiah and Jeremiah against Egypt, Moab, Idumea, and the countries adjacent to Palestine, of Ezekiel against Tyre, and the utterances of divine prophecies against Assyria, Babylon, and Nineveh, and comparing them with what we know of the present condition of the countries, we cannot but acknowledge that the destiny of these nations was indicated in the uttered prophecy. But these, which, with the Jews, are the chief nations indicated in Scripture prophecy, form but a very small part of the nations of the earth, and many are not now counted among the nations. Of the destiny of the existing nationalities of the earth, there is no indication beyond general allusions to the reception of the Messiah by the Gentiles, and the assertion that "The knowledge of the Lord shall cover the earth as the waters cover the sea." The proof of this will be seen from the following considerations:—

1. All Scripture prophecies against nations then existing are plain in their terms and unmistakeable in their application. Consult Isaiah xiii. 17—22; xix. xxiii. with Jer. xxv., and Ezek. xxvi. xxvii. In all the passages which concern the fate of nations, everything is clear and distinct—the name of the nation, its fate, and the instrument of its downfall. The same holds good in relation to the few prophecies given in the New Testament concerning the encircling of Jerusalem with Roman armies, the total destruction of the city and temple, and the dispersion of the people. To

these may be added the revelations to Daniel of the signification of the image and of the vision of the four beasts. Adding then Greece, mentioned by name, and Rome as clearly indicated, shall we find any of the present nationalities mentioned in such a precise and unmistakeable manner, or even prophecied of at all? The answer must be in the negative. True, some have tried to show that the invention of the steam-engine and the railroad is prophecied of, that the revolution of 1848 was clearly indicated in Scripture prophecy, and that the *coup d'état* and fall of the Papedom have been no less clearly set forth. The year of the final consummation of all things is on the same authority clearly revealed. But no reasonable proof of such things can be given. The data are too uncertain, and the mode of obtaining a solution of the prophecy too profound and mysterious for any dependence to be placed upon the result. The difference between the language used in the passages cited in support of these conclusions, and that employed when a prophecy, still future in its fulfilment, is uttered against a neighbouring nation, is most striking. The destiny of nations has been discoverably indicated in prophecy, but this will not prove that the destiny of existing nations may be found there. It is, as will be shown presently, an argument against it. Can any such plain indications of the future destiny of England, France, Russia, India, China, or America, be met with in Holy Writ, as is to be found concerning Babylon, Edom, Tyre, and Egypt? Assuredly not. These nations are nowhere mentioned, and with regard to their destiny there is a total blank. Nor is this surprising when the purport of prophecy is considered; for—

2. The prophecies levelled against ancient nations were destined to show the Jews that their God was a "jealous God," and would assuredly visit the nations for their neglect and contempt of Him; that similar crimes would bring similar punishment to them; and, as they might see with their own eyes, the word of prophecy was sure, and would in no wise fail. To the nations around, whom in most cases we may reasonably suppose to have been acquainted with such prophecies as concerned themselves, and whom we know in some instances to have been so acquainted, they served as warnings to repentance and the forsaking of vanities for the service of the living God. Therefore, besides not leaving himself without witness in the law of conscience written on their hearts, and giving them rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling their hearts with joy and gladness, they might, from their frequent contact with the chosen people, become acquainted with God's displeasure against them, and the terrible fate in store for them if they persisted in walking in their own ways. Thus they were without excuse. We now live under another dispensation, the fulness of time has come, the Son has been manifested, the Gospel proclaimed, and the days of prophecy and revelation are at an end. We have the prophecy of old time, and it is given for our instruction, analogically—that is, knowing the denunciations levelled against sin

in general, and divers nations in particular, we may rest assured that our transgressions will be similarly punished; for nations receive their punishment on earth, and, while righteousness exalteth a nation, sin is a snare and reproach to any people. The destiny of existing nations, then, is not discoverably indicated in the prophecies of Scripture. And to assert this, is not to attack the inspiration of Scripture, as some seem to think, but the contrary. The Scriptures have indeed been written for our instruction, and the things related happened for our ensample; but the Scriptures were not written to instruct us in all things; therefore to maintain that they do not inform us regarding any particular subject, such as the future destiny of nations, is not to attack their inspiration, but to set bounds to their scope; for the things that are revealed belong unto us and to our children, but the secret things belong unto the Lord. Many things are revealed only in part. Thus the final judgment and the destruction of the earth is the destiny of all, and is set forth as a verity; but of that day and that hour knoweth no man, not even the angels in heaven; and it does certainly appear impious to pry into such matters and attempt to fix the time when it will take place.

3. If the destiny of nations were discoverably indicated in Scripture, they would, as shown above, be indicated in an unmistakeable manner. Now there is nothing concerning which doctors differ so much as the application of prophecy. The outward form of the prophecy, as applicable to co-existing circumstances, presents little difficulty, but how few agree in the inner meaning and more distant fulfilment of a single prophecy? Some even deny the existence of a secondary meaning. And to take a prominent case:—What prophetic book is there without reference to the restoration of Israel to their own land? It forms the groundwork of Old Testament prophecy, and winds up almost every distinct prophecy either of God's wrath against Israel, or of the services in store for the favoured people. It is not unfrequently alluded to in the New Testament, and to some seems an absolute certainty. Yet not a few good, pious, conscientious Christian men, including ministers of all denominations, whose hearts may be said to yearn towards Israel, have, as they tell us, entirely through an attentive study of prophecy, been forced to the conclusion, that there is no hope for the final restoration of the Jews. Numerous other instances might be cited, but this is taken as the principal one of Old Testament times. Notwithstanding the publication of Apocalyptic sketches and the coming tribulation, men are as undecided as ever as to the interpretation of the vision and seals, and so will remain till the end of time, and it is no disparagement of the value or inspiration of the sacred volume to say so. The revelation of God's will to man had a special object in view; to point out his state by nature, the plan of salvation, and to set forth those duties to be performed in this life in order to prepare him for a future and eternal state of existence. These are so plain that none need err therein. Scripture does, it is



true, set forth the general destiny of the human race, but its object is not to predict the future of each particular individual or nation ; and accordingly the assertion is repeated that "The future destiny of nations is *not* discoverable from the prophecies of Scripture."

S. ARNOTT.

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## History.

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### IS A SCIENCE OF HISTORY POSSIBLE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

IN seeking a solution of this question, it will be necessary to give a definition of history and science, and also to note the essentials of all science, so that on applying ourselves to an investigation of the main facts presented to our view in the stream of history, we shall be in a position to decide whether history does or does not possess the essentials of a science. History, then, concerns itself with societies of men, more or less extensive, bound together by the same language, institutions, and laws. Such communities we call states, kingdoms, or empires, and it is the rise, progress, or downfall of these which history undertakes to record. The acts of the government, as well as the condition of the governed, are set forth, and history thus becomes the biography of a society.

Science presupposes knowledge—facts are collected, examined, and arranged ; influences, causes and effects are fitted into one harmonious chain. These are presented as logical sequences, and the mind is compelled to admit the accuracy of the reasoning, and by implication the justness of the conclusions which then become laws. But these laws are not immutable ; on the contrary, they are continually shifting, as further facts are obtained from the subjects amenable to science. And this arises not from any bias in the mind, or any flaw in the induction, but from the fact that, as the premises change, the conclusion, that is, the laws of the science, must change also. But we do not on this account say there is no science of the subject. To take a few pertinent illustrations. Few will deny that there is now a science of astronomy. But there was also a science of astronomy in the days of Ptolemy, notwithstanding the cumbrous mechanism with which he loaded the heavens. Knowledge, as far as then perfected, was made use of, and conclusions fairly drawn, which became the laws of the science. The sun then (as was supposed) went round the earth ; now the sun is the centre of the system and the motive power of the earth's revolution. But suppose, as is (ex hypothesis)

likely enough, it be some day proved that the motive power is not resident in the sun but in some other part of the universe, then the larger law will annul the lesser, and the science be placed on a new footing. Yet we still have a science of the subject. There may be a science of any subject without the ultimate teachings of that subject being known. We may also be ignorant of its onward bearings, and of the impression it receives from external objects. In other words, science does not require perfect knowledge, or demand a detailed acquaintance with the whole subject from the beginning. With such a demand finite intelligence could not comply. It would involve a knowledge of the infinite. But the chain may be taken up at any link; and a sufficient number of facts being taken, the connection and dependence of the succeeding links on this and on one another may be shown for a certain distance. Thus the science of the subject is formed, and as the demonstration is carried backwards or forwards the science becomes more perfect. Logic is the base of all science. Without it science is impossible, but as soon as one logical deduction has been made—no matter whether the premises be true or false,—science begins. Science then is capable of being perfected. That this is so will appear when we reflect on the usual modes of speech employed by man on this subject. Thus we often say that the science of meteorology is in its infancy; and so of phrenology, geology, &c. Now what is meant by these terms is, not that a science of these subjects does not exist, or is impossible, but that the facts already known do not warrant us in considering the subject complete, or in being too dogmatic in our conclusions. These conclusions are correctly drawn, and science has fairly entered on her office; but there may be disturbing influences at work which we do not know, or which, when we do, will enter as exceptions, and modify our conclusions. Thus in the first subject, the "red sky in the evening" and morning form part of the science of the subject, and these and a few similar premises constituted at one time the whole of meteorological science, for it was a science even then. Consider the complicated calculations now made, the many influences which have to be taken into the account, all of which will modify a conclusion formed from a single fact. But because various sets of elements enter into the account, no one will say that the science of any subject is becoming more and more impossible. On the contrary, it rests on a surer because on a broader basis. Brain indicates mental power. The simple science is that large heads show that their possessors are men of great mental power. But there are many exceptions, and we find that the lower part of the brain counteracts the upper; hence the comparative size of these must be considered, then the temperament of the individual and the quality of the brain fibre. Whether a science of phrenology be possible or not is not the question; the above shows the nature of the steps through which most sciences pass. In the case of phrenology, many, in consequence of these numerous exceptions and modifications, have denied

that it is possible to form a science of the subject, who would have given their adhesion to it had it been presented in a simpler form.

The preceding paragraphs, needless as many may perhaps account them, will not have been written in vain if they have been sufficient to establish the principle, that science can exist without an infinite knowledge of the past or an exact knowledge of the affairs of the present. That science does not require foreknowledge, as "Philalethes" thinks, is evident from the nature of science. The object of science is to give us this foreknowledge; had we it, there could be no such thing as science. The knowledge obtained from science is neither strictly absolute nor independent, but conditional, and dependent upon laws evolved from previously acquired knowledge. We know what will be, not from ourselves, but from reasoning based on what is and what has been. History is biography: biography is a record of the lives of individuals. It records their acts, shows the results, and not unfrequently is able to trace the motives which originated, and the influences which produced those acts. Granted that in many cases it is impossible to unveil all the motives and grasp all the influences which produced any given act, still, we have the act, and we have its effect, which effect will be found to be the cause of other effects or actions. We have not every link of the chain complete, but we have many complete series. Are these sufficient to form a science of biography? In the above view of science they certainly are, and in the opinion of all who speak (and who does not?) of the lessons or the teachings of biography. We are to learn some one thing, suppose from the career of an eminent man. We find from reading and observation that other men similarly circumstanced have acted similarly, and a law is evolved and the science of biography begun. It matters not how short or how simple the deduction may be, if it be obtained in a logical manner it is a link in the science of the subject. All conclusions logically deduced, no matter how profound the premises, appear simple, and can never appear otherwise when once the premises are understood. A science of biography is possible, nay more, it is already in existence. Is not a science of history possible too?

There can be no *à priori* argument against it, for once in possession of the necessary data, the science would be accurately and rapidly developed. No one can assert that it is absolutely impossible. The objections can only have reference to the obscurity, intricacy, and multiplicity of the details, and these we think have been unduly magnified by Philalethes, and by Carlyle, on whose ideas he depends.

Observation and experience go to show that "man is the same in all ages, and among all nations. His feelings and his passions are the same. The laws of thought are the same on all subjects and among all people. The prime movers and influences of action are in all ages the same as to nature. History is a biography of society, but

society is made up of individuals and of states, with which history deals, the motive power and the drag are confined within the vulgar herd as one entity, and a few daring spirits, who raise themselves above them and become their masters and their rulers." A science of mind is not only a possibility but an actuality. Hence the matter is simplified to a consideration of the actions and the motives which influence them, of a few select individuals in a state considered as individuals. Often it is but one that we have to consider, and the people as one, for they may at all times be accounted one; when inert they are as one mass in their lethargy; when roused, it is always at the call of some leader, whom they as one man obey and follow. The science of history need not be, as Philaethes assumes, absolutely predictive—no science is so. All that is required is that we can determine, by reasoning from the past, what will, from a given set of data, probably occur in the future. This is now done, and has been done for generations. So far we have a science of history, but when we take note of the counteracting influences, and calculate the chance of their acting, and allow for them, then we ascend into the higher branches of the science. Thus we believe it is acknowledged as an historical truism, that oppression engenders resistance, and that when we see instances of it we feel assured that sooner or later there will be an uprising. We are able now to tell pretty nearly the time when the revolution will occur, because we, as historical students, know its infallible precursors, and can discern them afar off.

That luxury of living and effeminacy of manners pave the way for a nation's decline and fall is pretty generally acknowledged, and has been acted upon in many publications addressed to our countrymen upon the social and moral condition of our nation. We have been told that our glory had departed, and that our kingdom would be brought to nought; and before we call such persons alarmists and fanatics, we should consider whether since these times we have not made a revolution in our social and moral condition, or what counteracting influences, not found amongst others, have been at work to avert the threatened blow. Some again consider these counteracting influences chiefly, hold them forth as our glory and birthright, and with fervid exhortations beseech us not lightly to neglect them, or allow any to wrest them from us. In both cases is not a science of history acknowledged?

Again, is there a truth more plainly to be read from the pages of history than that the progress of the human race is as the ebb and flow of the tide, now action, then reaction, and the more violent the action the more violent and the more enduring the reaction. Does not history show that those who overthrow a despotism erect on its ruins a government ten times more despotic than that which is just subverted. But we are not called upon to form the science of history. It is a possibility, and to assert the contrary is to declare that the past has no lessons for the present, no guidings for the future, and that the world has made no progress. But the

world has made progress, and the study of history should teach us these two things—first, that we are not in ourselves superior to our fathers; and second, that we are shamefully and monstrously inferior to them if we do not advance beyond them, every day showing among us as individuals—

“Something attempted, something done,  
To earn our night's repose.”

R. S.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

“To us, my friend, the times that have gone by  
Are a mysterious book, sealed with seven seals;  
That which you call the spirit of ages past,  
Is but, in truth, the spirit of some few authors  
In which those ages are beheld reflected,  
With what distortion strange, heaven only knows.  
Oh! often what a toilsome thing it is  
This study of thine, at the first glance we fly it.  
A mass of things confusedly heaped together;  
A lumber room of dusty documents,  
Furnished with all approved court precedents,  
And old traditional maxims! History!  
Facts dramatised, say rather—action—plot—  
Sentiment—everything the writer's own,  
As it best fits the web-work of his story,  
With here and there a solitary fact  
Of consequence, by those sage counsellors  
Pointed with many a moral apophthegm,  
And wise old saws learnt at the puppet-shows.”

*Goethe's "Faust."*

EVERY individual life is a new problem. What will it become? The throbs of desire and hope are in his heart. As he dashes into the sea of experience will he rise with the pearl of great price in his hand, or the mere earthly potsherd of disappointment? Surely it is vain to guess. “The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing is of the Lord.” Shall that man grow up strong or weak, inclined to right or wrong? as he passes through the fiery trials of life shall he give forth the rich gold or drossy slough in greater abundance? A knowledge of all the preceding biographies of all preceding men would not help us to work out that fresh problem of history. Shall he be self-relying and self-directed in the midst of drudgery, calamity, exasperation, and want, and grow glorious in his country's annals? or shall he be entangled in the nettles, and briars, and thorns of earthliness, and, if his name be writ in the annals of his country at all, fill a page in the “Newgate Calender”? Who can prophecy unto us truly of this matter? Who is sharp-sighted enough to see the seeds of the beautiful and the just lying side by side with the tares of folly and guilt, and tell us truly which shall fructify and which fade, or whether both shall grow together

until harvest? If the lot in life of one single individual be a mystery transcending the might of foresight to predetermine, how can there be a science of history? Individuals coming and going, we neither know when, why, how, nor whither make up an age. These ages are subject to plague, famine, volcano, earthquake, flood, storm, war, revolution, persecution, political turmoil, or social outbreak—the sources of many of which lie beyond man's perceiving. Who can set down the result and guarantee the sum until the work has been worked out between life and event? If no one can do so, a science of history is impossible; and we may not contentedly employ the history of a past age as a means of understanding this present time. If we affirm that the calculation is too intricate in itself, will our opponents show that human life is simpler than we have represented it? will they tell us by what signs in heaven or portents upon earth—by what skill in divination or prevision in science—they can tell in what cradles shall be laid the Alexanders, Cæsars, Charleses, Clives, Napoleons; the Socrates, Bacon, and Comte; the Colbert, Franklin, and Gladstone of coming years? Tell us—O person named like an Egyptian sphinx, even Chepenom!—tell us in what strange ways a knowledge of such births in the past will enable us to calculate the advent of their successors! Dare we say then—if you relinquish the test—that your assertion must be cast into the limbo of unproved and unprofitable speculations? every new man, as we have said, being a new problem in the statics and dynamics of humanity, in the history of the world. Multiply the number of men in a generation, and that by the number of generations, which, as Homer has it, come and go like the leaves of trees in uncertainty and in number, and having cast up this, if a science of history is possible, show us what singular currents of vital force passed along the vitality of ages to bring into being “a Borgia or a Cataline,” a Napoleon, a Lawrence, or a Grant; for then we shall have a something of proof that history is a science.

If, however, we demand that the good historic rules of Richard Baxter be attended to—if we agree with him that we can only freely believe history—1. If the person show that he is acquainted with what he saith (speaketh about). 2. And if he show you the evidences of honesty, and conscience, and the fear of God—which may be much perceived in the spirit of a writing. 3. If he appear to be impartial and charitable, and a lover of goodness and of mankind, and not possessed of malignity or personal ill-will and malice, nor carried away by faction nor personal interest, how shall “Chepenom” answer our demand? Will he quote garrulous Herodotus or lying Livy; refer us to Geoffrey, Monmouth, or Froissart; lay before us Lord Clarendon or Rapin; call our attention to the infidels Hume and Gibbon; ask us to rely on Fox or Burnet; supply us with a criterion which shall enable us to judge between Grote and Thirlwall, Niebuhr and Sir G. Lewes, Totleben and Dr. William Russell, Cæsar and Napoleon III.? The new Apocalypse which he will then reveal may help to convince

us that a science of history is possible. But how else can we believe it? Not while we recognize the free will of mankind. Could we even do it if we gave our credence to the doctrines of the necessitarians, who bind men's souls with withes of iron, acknowledging no inner causation in the thoughts of men.

The *conditions* of a science are—that all the facts may be thoroughly observed either in themselves or in their effects—that these facts should be the same and constantly recurrent—that the traces of causation, either direct or indirect, should be perceptible—that facts as they arise should be explicable by the laws of induction, through which observation has tracked them in their progress. The *results* of science are—that prevision and precalculation become possible—that men may avoid the effects or control the issues of given causes—that the artificial production of similar causes or similar effects is seen to be within the compass of man's power—that on the occurrence of a given cause we can foretell and foreknow the effect, or from the occurrence of an effect we can infer the activity of a given cause. We believe that both the conditions and the results of science are such as to show that history cannot become one. The conditions of history are becoming more and more complex, events never recur in it, circumstances are unpredictable, consequences are continually arising that are unforeseen, the chain of events, though lengthy and well knit, is many-linked, and there is no single chain upon which events are suspended to the chair of Jove. We cannot eliminate chance and accident from history as we can from science.

History is the grandchild of fable. Curiosity is only her nurse, not her mother. She is unknown. Many affirm she is a foundling begotten by the banks of the Nile, though carried over and laid down in the Grecian Peloponnesus. She has led a wild, irregular life, and her genealogy or her posterity are quite unable to be identified. She has attempted to acquire letters of legitimization and naturalization in many countries, but has not as yet found any sure and certain godfather and godmother, though gossips she has many. She is a wanderer and a telltale, whom even "Chepenom" (is this puzzler Saxonico-Latin for market-name?) cannot manage to bring into good repute.

But a truce to trifling, although "*dissipere est in loco.*" The one unfathomable thing for us is life—the one mystery is history, or the biography of time. Can we ever fully understand that of which we are a part, and from the whirl and stir of which we cannot extricate ourselves? We are as it were in a network of wishes, desires, impulses, laws, inducements, enticements, hopes, fears, and duties. What can our life work out of these? What can issue from all lines as the results of these? What science is able to register the effects and influences, the changes and the differences these occasion? In other words, Is a science of history possible? "Chepenom" says, Yes! And, No! is the answer of

PHILAETHES.

## Social Economy.

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### OUGHT CORPORAL PUNISHMENT TO BE EMPLOYED IN EDUCATION ?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THERE is now-a-days a very erroneous opinion prevalent as to what constitutes education ; and this is the more to be regretted, as it may possibly vitiate the reasoning and nullify the conclusions of some who take part on the other side of the question for debate. By many, education is considered to be nothing more than book-learning, a sheer cramming of facts ; and he or she who has stowed away in his or her brain the greatest number of such facts —no matter to what they relate,—and so, most resembles a walking dictionary or encyclopædia, is supposed to be the best educated. A certain curriculum of study has to be gone through, a certain number of subjects are to be mastered, that is, learnt by heart, and then your education is finished ! And hence if you do not, as indeed very few seem to do, take it all out at one school, do not on that account be cast down. Does not the principal of the Teleutania Academy offer to finish off and perfect the education of the sons and daughters of those who confide their children to his care, and with all the accomplishments besides ?

Of those who look upon education in the above light, some few consider that if so much has to be got through, the sooner it is done, and the finishing touch given to it the better ; and therefore if the child does not get through his stages fast enough, apply the whip pretty smartly and he will mend his pace. Formerly, in the palmy days of Busby and Keats this class was in a majority, few in fact thought otherwise ; but now many who look at the education of a child as equivalent to cramming his brain in a certain number of years with the contents of the text books of the various subjects of the school-curriculum, argue that all intelligent and diligent children can be so educated, while the dull and the lazy will never learn, do what you will ; and that therefore it is wrong to inflict corporal punishment upon the former, because it is not their fault that they are so ; their memory is defective, or other of their faculties are impaired, and you cannot remedy the matter ; and as for the lazy, they are made so by Nature, and when she sees fit, their minds will develop in a wonderful manner, and they will assuredly become great geniuses and ornaments of their country ; for have not all great men been notably lazy or dull at school, with, of course, a few trifling exceptions ?

Now were education in reality to consist of nothing more than



the mere outline work sketched above, it would be easy to show that the opponents of corporal punishment, who generally take their stand on the above grounds, are in error; but before this is done, a more correct view of education must be given. It is not the mere filling of the brain with facts: intellectual development alone is not education, but to educate is, as Emerson says, when combating some of the views noted above, "To train 'the mind in its most tender years according to the laws of health, so that it should be strong to resist disease; to fill the mind with useful knowledge; to educate it to comprehend all the relations of society; to bring out all its powers in full and harmonious action; to educate the moral nature in which the very sentiments of duty resides, that it may be fitted for a worthy and honourable fulfilment of the public and private offices of life;" or as Mr. Fox declared, "Education has reference to the whole man—the body, the mind, and the heart; its object, and, when rightly conducted, its effect is to make him a complete creature after his kind. To his frame it would give vigour, activity, and beauty; to his senses correctness and acuteness; to his intellect power and truthfulness; to his heart virtue. The educated man is not the gladiator, nor the scholar, nor the upright man alone, but a just and well-balanced combination of all three." Human nature will not assume this combination of itself, or there would be no need of education at all; and it is plain that to obtain the desired end rewards and punishments must be introduced. There can be no education without punishment of some kind or other, and this is perfectly analogous to our own state of probation in the moral world. We are being educated for a future and a better state of being, and the means to accomplish this end is a system of rewards and punishments, present and prospective. We know that a certain line of conduct procures us ease and happiness, while the pursuit of the opposite lands us in difficulty and distress; we know that every sin and every vice in which we indulge brings now its sure punishment, although we see not the hand which inflicts it; and we believe that there will be corresponding rewards and punishments in a future state. We have obtained our knowledge by experience in our own persons, or from observations in the case of others: that even now we sometimes see a just action bring its author into distress, while an unjust one is praised, does not invalidate the general rule, which is, that our happiness or misery in this world is to a very great extent in our own hands; and that, being conscious of this, if we neglect to follow or run counter to the precepts which the moral Governor of the universe has laid down to promote our happiness, we shall assuredly be punished for our disobedience and neglect.

But our conduct as men is very much influenced by our habits formed as children. True, we may totally alter our conduct; but it is extremely improbable that we shall ever do so, for our habits grow with our growth, and if we have the power we have not the disposition to change them. Man is verily a bundle of habits,—

of habits formed in childhood, for as the proverb expresses it, "the child is father to the man;" and as Solomon declares concerning the training of children, when they are old they will not depart from the way of their childhood.

Children, however, know nothing of the future. They know not that evil passions encouraged or unrepressed in childhood will grow upon them, and embitter much of their after life. The educator knows this, and he has an ideal of what the children committed to his care ought to be. He strives to bring them to this, and he acts entirely for their own future good. The first thing he must secure is thorough obedience, and this should not be secured by the bribe of reward, but simply because he determines he will have it, and therefore it must be. Children in after life will have to render obedience to others, and they will not be rewarded for so doing; it is a part of their duty in life; therefore children should never be bribed to obey. Children yield readily enough to discipline when it is once thoroughly established, and prefer it to disorder; but each one is very loth to fall in with the existing state of things and make it general. As obedience must be enforced, the disobedient must be punished in some way or other. This point of obedience lies at the root of the whole matter; because, once allow the teacher to be absolute,—and he is useless if he be not,—then all other things follow as a matter of course.

An intelligent teacher will, as far as possible, treat his children as reasonable creatures, and endeavour to show them the results likely to follow in after life from their conduct at the present time; and this cannot be too frequently impressed upon them, as they seldom reflect upon such things of themselves. But still there are many things from which children think it a hardship to be prohibited, and the reason of which they do not see, or could not understand, in which the teacher's command must be the sole restraining motive, and a violation of which must be punished. Take even the case of book-learning,—which, by the way, is not education itself, but only one means to it. A boy sees no earthly use in learning Latin and Greek. His master knows it is of use, and of great use, though not perhaps in a pecuniary point of view. He therefore forces the boy to learn it, and if the task be not beyond his strength, rightly punishes him if he fail to perform it. The thing must be done, difficult though it be. No learning is easy; there is no royal road to it; and the good teacher, while animating the boy with a desire to achieve a victory over a difficulty, will never deceive him by representing that as easy which he knows is not so. It is not the mere facts learnt from books which cause these to play such an important part in all education, though they form an essential part of it, but it is the habits of attention, industry, perseverance, judgment, and dogged determination not to be beaten, developed during study, and which in after life will be of more value than ten thousand pages of facts known by mere rote.

It is now sufficiently shown that punishment must, from the nature of the thing, form an ingredient in education. Education lops off and prunes as well as encourages and develops. The subject of it resists this, but the teacher must be paramount, and he must have some means of making it felt that his word must be obeyed,—that is, he must, to be impartial, punish the offenders in some way or other.

It only remains to be considered whether this should be done by corporal punishment or otherwise. The previous part of the article has been written to combat a notion very popular just now, viz., that by certain systems of rewards you may get children to do what you will, and those who disobey lose their reward, and that is all. But you have no right to bribe children to be obedient; it is their duty so to be, and they must be made to know this, and those who disobey must be punished—but how?

The child disobeys, and therefore he, and he alone, should suffer. Children will be soonest deterred from wrong-doing when they find the punishment lights on their own heads, and on theirs alone. A teacher has no right to keep a child in after hours, because this generally punishes himself or some one else who has to watch the offender. This, in fact, will form a great consolation for him; he will rejoice in thinking he has inconvenienced his teacher or some one else, and the punishment, besides failing of the effect intended, will only have given rise to a malicious feeling in his breast. It is therefore unjust, both to teacher and child, to pursue such a course. Impositions, or setting lessons to be done at home, fall under the same censure. The teacher or some one else must revise or hear the lesson. If this be done in school hours, others are deprived of instruction or superintendence; if out of them, then the teacher punishes himself or some one else, as in the previous case. Besides, the more this plan is resorted to the more it will need to be resorted to; for the very name of school becomes distasteful to the pupil, and the sight of a book disgusts him with learning altogether. There only remains corporal punishment; and in addition to what has been advanced above, we may only add that it obtains the sanction of the highest authority, that no one thinks it is wrong in the case of parents, and they educate, properly speaking, as much as the schoolmaster, or even more so; that the schoolmaster is, or ought to be, their coadjutor and deputy, and therefore what we do not condemn in them we have no right to condemn in him; and lastly, because some form of punishment must be used, and no other so likely to accomplish its purpose and punish the guilty alone can be devised. That it is liable to be abused or administered in a wrong spirit is true, but this does not argue against its use; and even here the evils will be much less in reality, though at the time more apparent, than those incurred in enfeebling the frame by confinement, or weakening the intellect through overtaxing the memory in the way of impositions and similar forms of punishment.

R. S.

## NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

BEING amongst those who firmly hold the opinion that the most efficacious means of elevating the human race must be found in the intelligent education of the young, we naturally looked forward with interest to the discussion of the important subject of corporal punishment. Nor have we been altogether disappointed; for though the articles that have already appeared are brief, they are very suggestive, and are very valuable because evidently they are the productions of observant men, who are practically acquainted with the topic on which they write. In saying this, let it not be thought that we undervalue the opinions of philosophic theorists, but we maintain that all opinions and theories on this and similar subjects are valueless if they will not stand the test of practical life. We think it right, therefore, to add that the views which we shall advocate in this brief article have, during a number of years, been put to the test we have mentioned; for "we speak that we do know, and testify that we have seen."

It is worthy of notice that the terms of the question have not been defined by any of the previous writers, and this doubtless has arisen from the fact that they are so simple, and in such frequent use. It may, however, be useful to remind our readers that the term education is derived from the Latin word *educo*, which literally means *to lead forth, to draw out*, and not to drive out or flog out! Further, education, in the common acceptation of the term, and in the sense in which it is obviously employed in the question before us, means simply that of the school or college, and does not include that of the family; and hence the scriptural quotations our opponents are so fond of are utterly beside the mark, and do not touch the point in dispute.

The education of the school we regard as not merely confined to the impartation of knowledge, but as including intellectual and moral training; and in all these respects corporal punishment is not only useless, but positively prejudicial; for we hold, with Stowe,\* "that corporal punishment tends to harden the heart or break the spirit." Do we desire to secure the attention of our scholars to their lessons? The use of the stick will not assist us in doing this? Do we wish to stimulate their moral qualities? The infliction of the cane will only excite in their breast feelings of anger and hatred; for—

"Angry looks can do no good,  
And blows are dealt in blindness;  
Words are better understood  
If spoken but in kindness."

We remember hearing some time ago an intelligent Sunday school superintendent narrate his experience in respect to this subject, and telling us how one of his own teachers had declared in utter

\* "The Training School."

hopelessness that she could "beat nothing into her disobedient scholars:" and no wonder at it; the only wonder being that any lady should try to perform such an operation!

The secret of successful teaching is the liberal but intelligent use of kindness rather than of severity, and the judicious employment of rewards, and not the frequent infliction of punishments. God has so constituted us that—

"There is a golden chord of sympathy  
Fixed in the harp of every human soul ;  
Which by the breath of kindness, when 'tis swept,  
Wakes angel melodies in savage hearts ;  
Inflicts sore chastisements for treasured wrong,  
And melts the ice of hate to streams of love ;  
*Nor ought but kindness that fine chord can touch."*

But here our friend "Malvern" objects that the necessity of corporal punishment in education has been maintained by men who are regarded as authorities on this subject; such, for instance, as John Locke, and his commentator "J. A. St. John;" and inferentially by the poets Goldsmith and Burns. This list of "authorities" is a very meagre one, and the only name in it which will command the deferential respect of educators is that of John Locke; and it should be known by all that this great man in his day was the greatest opponent of corporal punishment; and although he did not advocate its disuse in every case, he declared that "such sort of slavish discipline makes a slavish temper."

But we may inquire as to what has been the experience of the most celebrated practical educationalists of the present day. That great and good man, Dr. Arnold, of Rugby, introduced an important reform in this respect into the vast establishment over which he presided, by abolishing the infliction of corporal punishment, except in a few extreme cases. But it may be replied that if the Rugbeian scholars could be managed without flogging, it should be remembered that they are the sons of well-to-do parents, and that the example which this case affords is inapplicable to schools for the children of the humbler classes.

In answer to this we cannot do better than cite the testimony of Dr. Guthrie, the philanthropic founder of ragged schools in Scotland. In the second edition of his deeply interesting "Plea for Ragged Schools" he says, "From the beginning we put our faith in kindness: it has been tried, and not found wanting. . . . We remarked in our first 'Plea' that these children were not to be moved by hard words and harder blows, being too much accustomed to these at home, and having learnt to be as indifferent to them as the smith's dog to the shower of sparks." If any other proof in favour of our position be needed it may be found in the fact that corporal punishment has been banished, by common consent, from our best conducted Sunday schools. On this subject Mr. Collins, in his excellent work entitled, "The Teacher's Companion," ad-  
1865.

dresses teachers thus :—"Never strike, or even touch, a scholar to enforce obedience. Lay this down as a settled rule, and let nothing induce you to depart from it." And the Rev. James Inglis, in his small but comprehensive work, "The Sabbath School," says, "In schools where the children are very rough and untutored, blows are the worst of all ways of influencing them, as they are so used to them at home; and though you may beat a child into silence, you will never beat him into attention." To these precepts we will make but one addition, and that is by quoting the words of an experienced teacher of a class of 150 infants: "In my own school there has never been punishment further than the detention of a child for the purpose of a little quiet talk about a fault, or a refusal to shake hands at parting. This has been enough for children of all temperaments and characters." If, therefore, as we have seen, Sunday school teachers, who meet their children only one day in seven; if ragged school teachers, who gather their scholars from the lowest haunts of vice, can do their work without having recourse to corporal punishment, surely it might at once be prohibited in every educational institution in the land.

But there is still one other claim for the infliction of corporal punishment in the education of very young children, and this is brought forward by our friend "Scholasticos." He asserts that "children are not reasonable creatures. . . . For several years they are only animal, not intelligent. They have no perception of consequences that are not immediate. . . . Corporal punishment is simply the means of keeping the mind open to the consequence of actions." Amiable man! He would flog the infants! We do not know what his domestic relationships are, but it is evident that he knows nothing of the feelings of a parental heart, or his head would never have been allowed to concoct an argument like this. But not only are the assertions of "Scholasticos" contradictory to the natural instincts of our nature,—they are opposed to his own subsequent remarks. After advocating the flogging of little children, because they "are not reasonable creatures," and "have no perception of consequences that are not immediate," in the very next paragraph he maintains that "punishment ought to be given only when the fault is one of temper, and is known to be wrong by the party doing it" (*sic*). And in order to prevent any ambiguity, he adds, "Where there is no law there is no transgression, and there ought to be no punishment." To make any comment on these conflicting statements is unnecessary; and we leave for our friend the performance of the delightful task of self-reconciliation when he favours us with his "Reply."

But "Scholasticos" would have all corporal punishment to be "solemnly deliberative;" and his friend and supporter, "Malvern," asserts that "even the Hopleys of the profession abstain from wanton cruelty; and, indeed, only employ the rod on occasion and cause given." As, then, the corporal punishment which Hopley inflicted upon his unfortunate scholar, in such a barbaric manner

that the poor lad died from its effects, was not "wanton," we suppose we must believe Hopley himself when he declares that it was "solemnly deliberative." If this be the case, we can only regard it as a striking illustration of the dangerous and direful character of that remedy for childish folly which both "Scholasticos" and "Malvern" prescribe. Nor is Hopley's case a solitary one. We have known others which, if not equally serious, have been very damaging to all parties concerned. We can recall to our mind several instances in which corporal punishment has been so severely administered that the children have been personally injured; their parents have been so excited against the schoolmasters as to summon them before the magistrates to answer for their conduct; and though the masters may have been told by the court that they could go forth without any stain attaching to their characters, they must have felt sadly humiliated by the position in which they were placed, and have been painfully sensible of the fact that while many of their neighbours really censured them, some might pity, but none could admire or love.

If, then, corporal punishment be, as we have shown, not only unnecessary but positively pernicious, our readers, we are sure, will join us in maintaining that it ought not to be employed in education.

J. M. S.

## Literature.

### IS THE PERUSAL OF WORKS OF FICTION RIGHT OR WRONG?

#### RIGHT.—REPLY.

Fiction is the offspring of imagination, and in all its forms nothing is more deeply wrought; in its higher branches nothing is purer, nothing more ennobling than the vivid colours of character—the resources which a refined but well-moulded intellect places before us in a mature plot. In the novelist we have a man who possesses the power of making us scorn the ignoble, and, whilst we appreciate the good, our minds are stirred to better impulses; for, according to the course of thought, so are our will and inclination fashioned.

S. S. does not appear to have set forward any very powerful argument in his paper. The objection raised against fiction in his first clause has, we think, just the opposite effect on the well-regulated mind. The fancy does not rush away with most men in the way he has described, and such, we doubt not, he will find to be the case when he extends his knowledge of character. The art in novel literature is to bring out forcibly the good and the bad in their every complexion;—in fact, to adapt characters of all sorts to present day

life, that we may fully comprehend the influence and the result of each quality on the mind;—by this alone we can live rightly and learn—learn to apply each different phase of character to ourselves. Thus, then, the perusal of works of fiction, so far from being wrong, teaches us at least one great lesson—to *know ourselves*.

Now the study of mathematics and the physical sciences, on which S. S. lays great emphasis, expands the mind, and causes its workings to be accurate and concise. But what more? They do not elevate or refine it; they afford no examples of what is noble—no illustrations of the beautiful,—and such examples only can be found in classic literature, of which fiction is the foundation.

We are very sorry to see S. S. condemn us all so freely. "The majority of people now read much, and think little." Is it possible to disunite the reading and the thinking man? Again, in No. 3 of his propositions, S. S. states that "the perusal of works of fiction encourages persons of ability (?) to waste their time on unworthy objects." *Persons of ability!* Such persons would scarcely be classed under the intellectual in our opinion, nor do they seem worthy of having a whole paragraph devoted to them.

"Life is short," as our friend says in his fourth clause; but yet there is a time for all; a time for religion and a time for fiction and leisure. Of works of fiction, some had certainly better never have been published; but surely these idle papers could never influence the mind of the sound man; and with regard to females, as he terms them, S. S. must suppose that such low novels could not possibly find their way into the drawing-room of a lady. The sixth section of the paper before us consists of assertions wholly void of proof. Is S. S. acquainted with novel literature? Will he examine the principles of Kingsley's novels, not to mention others, and he will see whether they tend to make him a liar or a hypocrite, or whether they inculcate any evil lesson.

"Samuel's" paper is vaulting and dreamy. We can find no argument in it. "Samuel" should not avoid, as in the present instance, touching the subject he has undertaken to write upon.

"Philaethes" comes next with his pious proofs. Let us see if his paper will bear examination; it is seldom the pietist by his advocacy ameliorates the aspects of a case. His first clause is only an *attempt at proof*,—for on looking into it he assumes that fiction is the "father of lies." Now this is hardly an argument. "Philaethes" should not conclude "*hence*," for his so-called argument is really nothing. He continues, "But this line of argument (P P) may not satisfy," &c. Who could *such* a "line of argument" satisfy? But our readers will judge for themselves. "Philaethes" makes an objection to the word "imagination," which is quite properly used by "Nam Der;" and the former's definition and long explanation is not to the point. "Imagination" might be better defined than "the imagining the impressions of the senses" (?). Since our opponent, then, has descended to verbal criticism, we will return it tenfold. His definition is wrong. It is not usual to use



the verb in definitions from the substantive which we define; and "the senses" mean only sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, or feeling: perhaps "Philaethes" meant "the sense." "Imagination" is the faculty by which the mind produces its peculiar thoughts, and combines new ideas; and fiction is the result—which is not "a lying imagination," as "Philaethes" supposes. Here is another of our friend's very strange "lines of argument:"—"The intellectual evil of the perusal of fiction is that all our associations become warped and distorted," and so on, making as stated facts things we wish he could prove. Then, to finish this absurdity, he concludes, "This [viz., his unfounded statement] proves that works of fiction are not good sources of instruction." "Philaethes" should not permit little provincialisms to creep into his sentences, as in the following:—"A lurking suggestion lying hidden *for long* (!) in the recesses of the mind inactive."

"Philaethes" seems to us one of those unfortunates who read nothing else except the Bible, from a mistaken notion of what is right and what is wrong. "Is he an English scholar?" We can answer, Certainly not, unless he has read some of those books which he deems unfit for perusal: for what better model of English is found than in the plays of Shakspeare, Otway, and Beaumont, and Fletcher, and several others of the older writers and dramatists, whose works, if "Philaethes" should ever read, we fear he will throw aside through his silly scruples? Such a man is to be pitied; for his stock of knowledge must necessarily be always small. Our readers then will see that "Elpisticos" was not guilty of uttering such a "fearful" thing.

"We have had enough of "Philaethes" for the present, and wish him better success next time. Once more again "Samuel" comes on the scene. Unasked, he gives us an account of his boyhood, interesting enough, perhaps, but which we, who have nothing to do with anything but his arguments, must pass by. "Pickwick" has been read and scrutinized so many times, that a review of such a book is very jarring to the ears. This, too, which we must perforce pass by, makes about half his paper, is quite foreign to the subject.

"Nam Der" is not so far wrong as "Samuel" supposes, in stating that "works of fiction are necessary." Our winter evenings would pass slow enough if we slept in our arm-chairs; and during a wet day, when we cannot enjoy ourselves otherwise, a good novel indoors is almost indispensable, and we doubt not that the professional man in his spare time finds his novel a great boon, as it carries him away from his business. "Samuel" evidently is not a classical scholar, to repel the "Athenian Comedies." We should be sorry to be told that our university career was spent merely to spoil our morals, and to repulse that "healthy virtue." This is a bad state of affairs for the nineteenth century, and, we hesitate not to say, shows ignorance which doubtless even novels might remedy to a certain extent.

How exceedingly awkward a man would be who entered into fashionable society, where perhaps a little conversation on the last sensation novel might take place, or some new play or burlesque (for this also is fiction)! he would be considered ignorant and ungentlemanly. And must he suffer all this because he will not read his novel and attend the theatre? We doubt not that there must be some who would undergo even this, but happily now-a-days they are not many.

If our readers condemn those who peruse fiction, they must also condemn those who write it. Poetry, for the most part, is fiction; accordingly all our authors, except, perhaps those few who write upon a few historical subjects, must be authors of "lying abomination," and must have the credit of opening to humanity a road to ruin. Most of our literature is ideal, and must therefore be condemned. This argument is so absolute, so entirely void of anything like proof, that it must find but few proselytes. Men like Tennyson, Shelley, Scott, and others, have done so much for their country's reputation in the eyes of the world, that it would be hard to condemn them, to believe them guilty of such a crime towards their fellow-men.

But some minds have no sense of appreciation of literature, because they are straitened by scruples, and narrowed from the want of that reading which they so much condemn. Could such men know how the world looks upon them,—and yet these characters are so blind that they cannot see how they are written against every day, and thus learn what an estimation they have gained in the minds of their countrymen. Surely our poet laureate has denounced the pietist properly and well in his beautiful verse; what further, then, need we argue with him?—

"Leave thou thy sister, when she prays,  
Her early heaven, her happy views;  
Nor thou with shadowed hint confuse  
A life that leads melodious days."

MARWOOD H.

WRONG.—REPLY.

THERE is in some a ruling propensity to view and represent things as just the reverse of what they really are. Evil is called good by them, and good is called evil. This is strikingly the case with our opponents in the present debate, so prone is it with them to give a misrepresentation of things. "Nam Der" is in this respect an object of pity. Pity we feel for him, and will not therefore deal so harshly as to seriously notice the trivialities and errors of his opening article, but gently dismiss it as unworthy of our further consideration.

Amongst other arguments employed by "Elpisticos" in favour of works of fiction is the fact that impure books are employed throughout Europe in the education of youth, and that the highest

**dignities** in spiritual offices sanction this use of them. But is everything that is sanctioned by spiritual dignities right? Is the sanction of spiritual dignities the test and proof of rightness? If it be so, then it would follow that should any spiritual dignity shortly commit an act that has always been viewed as immoral, such an act must for the future be viewed as right, because it is stamped with the sanction of a spiritual dignity. What utter puerility is this!

The sanction by spiritual dignities of the use of impure books in education is no proof whatever that such use of them is right. "Elpisticos" imagines that he shows that the immorality of a book does not render it an improper work for one's study. But he flatters and deludes himself. He shows no such thing. He attempts to show it, but his attempt fails; and we ask, Had not men better be without the light and information imparted by impure books, and at the same time escape the moral pollution they cause, than have the instruction combined with their pollution, especially as an equal amount of light and information may be obtained without pollution? Indeed, those works which do most in expanding the intellect and enlarging the field of knowledge are those which are the most free from all polluting tendencies.

"Elpisticos" speaks of works of fiction which are solely devoted to virtue and decorous living to such a degree that he fears they lose some of their force. Strange doctrine this! that books which are exclusively devoted to virtue and decorous living are less forcible than such as are not so greatly devoted thereto. Surely this greater forcefulness of books must be a force of an injurious kind, and therefore better be dispensed with than possessed.

"Elpisticos" has sufficient daring to class the Bible with impure books—a degree of irreverence this which shows to what sophistic arguments "Elpisticos" is capable of descending. A novel is a fictitious representation of what never has existed, and never will exist. Portraits are given of characters in whom such qualities are made to meet as never did meet in a real living person, and they are represented as passing through a series of circumstances such as no living person ever did pass through. In Bunyan's allegories, on the contrary, Christian and others are represented as feeling, doing, and suffering exactly what a Christian does feel, do, and suffer. In the "Holy War," Mansoul is represented as passing through just such changes as the soul of a redeemed man does pass through; while all the parables of our Lord are representations of facts in spiritual life; and though the representations are figurative, yet are they no less actual and solemn verities. The parable of the sower and the seed accurately represents the preaching of the word, the various classes who hear it, and the different effects which attend it. The parable of the ten virgins faithfully portrays the mere professor and the possessor of true religion; and what is represented as taking place at the coming of the bridegroom are not mere imaginary circumstances, such as we have in a novel, but what will actually occur

at the coming of Christ. Novels represent what may be; the parables of our Lord set forth what is.

Look, again, at the vast difference in the nature of the subject dwelt upon in works of fiction, and those dwelt upon by Bunyan in his allegories and by our Lord in His parables. How absurd is the comparison drawn between them! Works of fiction have worldly matters for their subject, but Bunyan and our Lord speak on spiritual matters and the things that belong to our everlasting peace.

To excuse the indecorum of novels by the fact of certain subjects being dwelt upon in the word of God is irreverent in the extreme, and merits the severest rebuke. Can "Elpisticos" say that the writers in novels of such things as suggest impurities and indecencies are influenced by the same spirit as were the writers of the sacred Scriptures? or can he say that the former have the same ends in view as the latter? A novel-writer records the circumstance of one of his imaginary personages getting drunk. A writer in the Scriptures records a similar circumstance of a real personage. The way in which the former writes of drunkenness excites a laugh. With the narrative in the Scriptures the same book reveals the displeasure of God against that sin, and His determination to punish it. These are set forth in words so burning and terrible as to cause all hearts but the obdurate to tremble. So with other sins. The writer in novels speaks of sin lightly, and in such a way as to allure to it. The writers in Scripture speak of sin as an awful act, and in such a way as to deter from it. Where, then, is the validity of the comparison between works of fiction and the Bible employed by "Elpisticos"? W. B. S. argues that the reading of works of fiction is beneficial, because fiction has been universally employed, and receives a large amount of public favour; *ergo*, whatever is universally employed and receives a large amount of public favour is right. But modern science has proved many medical and other practices, that were once universally employed and received a large amount of public favour, to be entirely wrong. W. B. S. argues in favour of fiction, because by its aid writers have endeavoured to supply the omissions of the historian. But we should be better without these fictitious supplies, as they only mislead us. In reading a book containing them how are we to know what to credit and what to reject? If we receive the whole, we believe what is only imaginary. If we reject the whole, we reject what is true. Better to have great gaps in history, and acknowledge that we know nothing about certain periods, persons, and circumstances, than have those gaps filled with the mere creations of the imagination. W. B. S. argues in favour of fiction, because it has moved to both laughter and tears; but of what advantage were these movements? W. B. S. "cannot conceive it to be possible that anything would receive a large amount of approbation throughout the whole world unless there could be some good obtained from it." Really! Does not the employment of some one or other intoxicating substance obtain a large amount of approbation throughout the whole world, and the

employment of it to the production of intoxicating effects?—and is any good obtained therefrom? Does not the practice of selfishness, fraud, injustice, and oppression, obtain a great and world-wide approbation?—and is good received therefrom? We believe the last-mentioned argument of W. B. S. needs only to be glanced at to be refuted. We as firmly believe the arguments of “Philalethes” to be unanswerable. The instances adduced by him of the evil effects of fictions are a sufficient answer to the assertion of “Elpis-ticos” that, as a general rule, the tendency of works of this class is wholly on the side of virtue and decorous living, as also to the assertion of W. B. S. that works of fiction exercise a beneficial influence in the wide and important field of practical morals.

The article of H. M. is so little to the point as to require no remark from us; and notwithstanding all that has been advanced by our opponents in debate, we still feel our position to be impregnable.

S. S.

THE PLEASURES OF READING.—As the Italian proverb says, *chi legge regge* —“he who readeth ruleth.” Not always, perhaps, over a kingdom of this world; although, when action joins with study in a rich and vigorous nature, the world obeys the thought, word, or deed of an educated king. But *chi legge regge* in another sense too; the bookworm is the monarch of a shadowy realm. Think of what he is master when, one by one, he has furnished himself with those golden keys to his palace chambers which we name the languages. He does not dangle them at his girdle in what is called conversation; it was for his brain, and not his tongue, that he hung them one by one upon his memory. And you call him shy, *distrail*, stupid; but look what company he keeps, and judge if the real bookworm can descend to modern manners at any given moment. He unlocks the Greek chamber, and Plato comes forth to tell him in stately Attic how Socrates died when the chill of the hemlock cup mounted to his heart, and they covered up that divine smile upon his face. He unlocks his Latin gallery, and Cicero thunders in the Senate, or Horace braids the roses in Pyrrha’s hair, or Tacitus talks State with him in stern, condensed sentences. Or he turns the jewelled key of the Oriental courts, and the kings of the solar and lunar dynasties are his companions. Old, old civilizations live for him again; the Pandhara Princes fight under his eyes; he talks Buddhism with Guatama; he hears the elder gods explain themselves; he knows the secrets of Zoroaster; he looks in at the palaces of Assyria; he walks Bagdad with Haroun-al-Raschid, and sails the Indian Sea with Sindbad. Pan is not dead for him, nor Aphrodite, nor Pallas; and those eternal granite gods of old Nile say to him, “Who readeth, ruleth! read the meaning of our immortal calm, and rule the kingdom of thy mind in majesty and contentment.” Nor are modern times less his: he turns the silver Italian key, and *chi legge regge* is true in its own tone. He is free of heaven and hell with Dante, soars to the moon with Ariosto and Astolfo, reads Petrarch’s sonnets over Laura’s graceful shoulder, can go into Armida’s garden when he likes, or loll at Fiesole with Boccaccio, laugh with Cervantes, make love with Camoens, look right through man’s heart with Goethe, launch into infinite (mental) space with Kant and Hegel, or come back and scoff with melancholy Heinrich Heine, and then let Emerson regild the worn world with his wise optimisms. This is the society the real bookworm keeps. Stupid did we call him? He has come out of “kings’ treasures and queens’ gardens,” and the glitter and the glory are in his eyes—our owl-light embarrasses him.—*Telegraph*.

## Poetic Critique.

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OUR poetic critique has been delayed longer than we anticipated, not for want of matter, but of space. We shall therefore defer introductory remark at this time, that we may be able to do ampler justice to the claimants for admission into this department of our serial, whose patience—that unpoetic faculty—has been taxed, ought we not to say overtaxed, by a waiting of six months. To proceed.

The following lines have been in our hands long. “They were penned on the occasion of the author’s determination to make progress in his studies.” They will now be read by their writer with a feeling of freshness, and their appearance may “a momentary bliss bestow.” We suggest a few verbal corrections, which seem to us to intensify or improve the expression :—

Oh ! let me grasp “the trailing skirts of truth,”	
And cling, and cling, and make a part mine own,	
To twine <i>it</i> round my brows, in early youth,	[that
And wear it as the earnest of a crown !	

Oh ! let me <i>grasp</i> the beautiful, the good,	[reach
And gorge thereon with tender <i>doting</i> eyes ;	[lov
’Tis these can <i>yield</i> the soul immortal food,	[grant
And <i>lead</i> it onward, upward to the skies.	[tempt

Oh ! let me look along life’s rugged shore,  
 Commingling darkly with eternity ;  
 Where many a shattered craft, and broken oar,  
 Tell the sad tidings of adversity.

Yes ; I will look, and looking, learn, and <i>work</i> ,	[mark
And soar, and live <i>to</i> high and higher things ;	[for
And then, nor gathering rust, nor death’s <i>dark murk</i>	[fell dark
Shall <i>clog</i> the spirit on its heavenward wings.	[stay

*A Highlander.*

We know not where “Canny Banks” are, but fancy they must be in canny Scotland—a land famous for poets. Of the verses sent by J. W. B. we can only quote two, the others being “out of keeping”—a fault than which there can be none greater in poetry.

Oh, Canny Banks, bedecked with flowers !  
 Oh, banks replete with pleasure’s stores !  
 Oh, banks of childhood’s happy hours !  
 Where still the stream’s full current pours ;

Where in my youth I roamed alone,  
 Unlike by fellow-roving boys,—  
 To walk thy flowery banks was once  
 The choicest of my joys.

The laureate of Canny Banks has made a better effort in his other attempt. But there is an uneasy echo in it of one of the lays of Burns which stirs the soul like a war-trumpet—which ought always to be avoided, upon the well-known principle that “comparisons are odious.” As imitative exercises, they may be tolerated. Unless a writer is quite able to outdo his predecessor, it is unwise to copy so nearly the action, feeling, sentiment, and rhyme of any widely-appreciated song or poem. We print the lines that they may become an illustration of the principle laid down.

#### BRUCE'S ADDRESS TO HIS ARMY ON LOUDON HILL.

The sun shone bright on Loudon Hill,  
 And all around was calm and still,  
 Save one loud voice that uttered shrill,—  
 “Warriors, stand, your task fulfil,  
 Fight for precious liberty !

“Here they come ! in War's array,  
 Our foes we'll scatter every way.  
 Soldiers ! soldiers ! ne'er dismay,  
 Fight from dawn till eve of day  
 For glorious victory !

“Here they come ! in armour bright,  
 Borne by steeds in swiftest flight ;  
 Here they come ! all trained in fight—  
 Some decked with crimson, some with white,—  
 Edward's savage revelry.

“On ! on ! ye Scots, your lances draw,  
 Fight for king and freedom's law ;  
 Strike each blow on brother man,  
 Strike and dare when once began—  
 On ye brave to victory !”—J. W. B.

Turn we now from War to Love. The two following specimens of verse show capacity, although they seem to have been dashed off at a heat. This is a good way of giving vent to passion, but it does not do full justice to a fine idea, which generally requires polishing. The molten metal may be run hot and fiery into the mould, but dressing and burnishing require to be employed to give the high tone of artistic finish. Yet there is a *tone* about the lines we quote first, which, though a little like that of the verses made in the time of the second Charles, we like. We should infer, however, from the verses, that the writer, though downcast at first, is yet heart-whole:—

## TO A FICKLE, FAITHLESS FAIR ONE.

Tears relieve a burning sorrow,  
 Words will ease an aching breast  
 (Would these lines of mine could borrow  
 Grace from thee to give them rest).  
 You who know, but cannot pity,  
 Cannot feel how deep my pain,  
 Let me view my "phantom city,"  
 Let me bid "farewell !" again.

True, the earth was made for weeping,  
 Made for sorrow, made for care.  
 Perhaps, as time is onward creeping,  
 I may forget that you were fair—  
 May forget our early meeting,  
 May forget the troubled sigh,  
 When afterwards, without a greeting,  
 We have passed each other by.

F. S. M.

These stanzas are jaunty, nonchalant, and Lockeresque:—

## AT PARTING.

So I wept like a child when we parted,  
 True tears from the depths of my soul ;  
 They say man should be braver-hearted,  
 But we cannot *all* feelings control.  
 With a smile some can hide all their grief,  
 And be merry with hearts that are dead ;  
 But, alas ! it is little relief,  
 'Twill not heal the deep wounds that have bled.

But some wear the soul in their faces  
 (Not mocking at "sunshine in rain"),  
 And expose all the tenderest places,  
 In hearts not yet callous to pain.  
 So I wept like a child when we parted,  
 When the sun of my life passed away ;  
 Hope alone made me braver-hearted,  
 Hope in what the future may say.

F. S. M.

Why are poets so often "minions of the moon"—so subject to lunar influences? What poet has ever been known to neglect the lady moon in her journeyings? Hesiod (not to speak of Homer or of Ossian), no less than Tennyson and Alexander Smith,—

"Private in his chamber pens himself,  
 Shuts up his windows, locks fair daylight out,  
 And makes himself an artificial light ;"

only that he with the more certainty in fancy might be able

"To be consorted with the humorous night ;"

and may be privileged to asseverate,

"By yonder blessed moon I swear," &c.



M. H. has been at this old, old game too, and has produced "this pretty piece of poetic trifling," in which there is not a little earnest of versifying power:—

## TO THE MOON.

## AN ODE.

Roll on, thou fair, refulgent Moon !  
 Ascend the lofty dome of Night,  
 Whose arch the glowing stars festoon,  
 And blend with thine their mellowed light.

Roll on ! Beneath awaiteth thee,  
 The pilgrim, in a dubious way ;  
 Illume the mist that, like a sea,  
 Swells o'er the vale, bereft of day.

Roll on ! He marks thy red orb rise,  
 And longs to see thee gain the height ;  
 Thy lessening form he joyful eyes,  
 And cloudlets tinged with silvery light.

Roll on ! The lover seeks the bower,  
 Ardent as doth the eager bee  
 At morning seek the opening flower :  
 Love lights the eye that watcheth thee.

Roll on ! The blissful hour when he  
 Shall clasp the loved one to his breast,  
 Is when thou shinest, full and free,  
 Above the dim horizon's crest.

Roll on ! How slow thou climb'st the steep !  
 Thou seem'st to move not on thy way !  
 Oh ! haste thee, for that bosom deep  
 Owns potent Love's mysterious sway.

Roll on ! for who, with human heart—  
 (Alike, in this, with hearts above)—  
 Can bear unmoved the piercing dart  
 Sent by the magic hand of love ?

Roll on ! The *mariner* spreads the sail [seaman  
 To catch the light breeze stealing by ;  
 He joys to see the bright stars pale  
 Their *little* lights as thou draw'st nigh. [lesser

Roll on ! He views thy rising form  
 Impictured on the deep sea's breast ;  
 And thinks he there, by some swift storm,  
 Ere morning's dawn may lie at rest.

Roll on ! Not he alone doth mark  
 Thy white orb through a tear-dimmed eye ;  
 Beside that lovely cottage, hark !  
 A mother and her children cry :

"Roll on, fair moon ! our father's bark  
Is riding on the swelling wave ;  
Should clouds thee hide—the night fall dark,  
Ah ! he may find a watery grave.

"Roll on ! Should storms descend in wrath,  
The breezes, that now waft him home,  
May bear him off his trackless path,  
To sleep for aye where wild waves foam.

"Roll on ! Till day has vanquished night,  
Cease not to shine on sea and earth ;  
Guide him with an auspicious light,  
Long absent, to his home and hearth."

Roll on ! and pour thy borrowed streams  
Of light around that sylvan cot ;  
Bear peace upon thy welcome beams,  
And Hope, where *these* are nigh forgot.

[joys

Roll on, thou fair refulgent Moon !  
Ascend the lofty dome of Night,  
Whose arch the glowing stars festoon,  
And blend with thine their mellowed light.

Of the other verses we have in store, some are quite unable to appear in type. They are wanting in some of the mere elements of composition, *e. g.* :—

Like the corn-grains Pharaoh's daughter  
Held within her mummied hand  
For a period long or *shorter*, (1)  
Truths spring up in every land.  
Though long hidden and forgotten,  
They arise and re-appear ;  
Though from distant ages *broughten*,  
They give glory to the *years*.

J. M. D.

W. S. has an ode on "Friendship," the sentiment of which, so far as we can see what it means, we like ; but it is disfigured by irrelevant epithets and false rhymes, and grows inconsistent as it proceeds. These inconsistencies are sometimes very annoying. There is something in this sonnet—

## IN MEMORIAM.

JOHN CLARE.

The peasant-poet of Helpston. N. 13th July, 1793 : M. 20th May, 1864.

When revolutions rent the nation, thou,  
Hut-born and pauper-nurtured, camest to show  
That Thought within Life's lowest ranks may grow,  
As choicest fruits oft line the lowest bough.  
The fitful yearnings of a poet's soul,  
By mist and moor, and fen and flower were stirred,  
And song rose thence as rises lay of bird  
Out of the mere joy nothing can control,

Of the fresh feel of life, and love, and earth.  
 Then came the dusk of hope, the blank of thought  
 Upon thy nature finely strung, o'erwrought.  
 Then the long night of madness and the dearth  
 Of love, wrecked in a sea whose foam  
 Ceased not to rave around until thy going home.—D. F. C.

Our next poetic effusion is excellent in idea, and thoroughly as well as consistently wrought out. There is a quiet and pleasing beauty in it, but *we* can scarcely read it into rhythm. We have a feeling of dissatisfaction with the *Cæsuras*, and some of the lines seem to *catch* up too quickly, we cannot explain how; yet we admire the tone, feeling, and management of the subject, and are constrained to assert that it is true poetry, though less skilfully executed than we could wish. We observe, too, that the second line of the fifth stanza would require some alteration.

### THE CHRISTIAN AND DEATH.

How sweet,—when the day with its toil is ended,—  
 To the weary frame is rest ;  
 When peace and hope, *together* blended, [in friendship  
*Elate* the languid breast ; [Delight  
 When Memory drops the veil that fondly shieldeth  
 The sacred Past (which only Memory sees) ;  
 And we bow to Sleep, as the willow yieldeth  
 To the soft summer breeze !

But—for those whose guide o'er Life's troubled ocean  
 Is "the Bright and Morning Star,"  
 A bliss remains, whose rapt emotion  
 Is sweeter, holier far :  
 A rest is reserved, where the pang of sorrow,  
 Or the mourner's wail is unfelt, unknown ;  
 A rest, *unbroken* by a dawning morrow— [untinged  
*Untinged* by sigh or groan. [Exempt from

DEATH brings this rest ; and yet we mortals wonder  
 Why his hand should interpose ;  
 Why loving hearts are torn asunder—  
 Friends fall alike with foes ;  
 Why he who revels most where victims gory  
 Do groaning writhe, or corpses silent lie,  
 Should be the keeper of the Gate of Glory,  
 Through which blest spirits fly !

This mortal life is to the life immortal  
 As the dawn is to the day !  
 Death lifts the latch of that dread portal  
 Which bars the solemn way ;  
 And we pass Time's bound, making a full transition  
 From the thorns of Earth to celestial bowers—  
 From *its* care and toil, to a rest Elysian [Times  
 In amaranthine bowers.

Where "the dead in Christ" have their names unspoken,  
 And in Lethe's wave a tomb;  
 Their spirits live, in joy unbroken,  
 Beyond Earth's transient gloom:  
 There, incorrupted, they as victors muster  
 In glowing ranks around the Conqueror's throne,  
 Like stars that, when the sunlight veils their lustre,  
 In their blue depths shine on.—H. M.

J. S. has got at the true thought which constitutes poetry in his sonnet on "Winter," which we annex here as a precedent to the preceding verses, which we have not hesitated to designate poetry.

#### WINTER.

The Spring hath come and fled. Sweet Summer-blooms  
 Have ripened into luscious Autumn fruit,—  
 And now, in many a mean, unsightly root,  
 Beauty lies sepulchred in floral tombs!  
 So blossoms into life the human flower,  
 Emitting odours exquisite and rare;  
 So droops at length the "pride of the *parterre*,"  
 A victim to remorseless Winter's power!  
 Yet not for ever shall earth's lovely things  
 In darkness and imprisonment remain:  
 For a brief interval they fold their wings,  
 Soon to emerge to life and light again:  
 What we call death, and shrink from with dismay,  
 Is but the prelude to immortal day!

Newcastle-on-Tyne.

J. S.

In this invitation to the woods, the same writer has reached a high mark in composition. The lines are vigorous, sincere, and expressive. To some they will recall memories, in others they may revive hope.

#### COME TO THE WOODS!

Come to the woods! Hark! the sweet birds are singing;  
 Come, for the wild flowers profusely are springing;  
 Come, do not tarry, the blithe lark is winging  
 Up to mid-heaven his eloquent flight!  
 Come to the woods, brother;—leave the close city,—  
 They who can't do so are *worthy* of pity,— [Those—needful  
 "Work, ceaseless work!" their unvarying ditty,—  
 First thing at morn, and the last thing at night.  
 Come to the woods! and make pleasure a duty;  
 Steep thy young soul in the essence of beauty,—  
 Till, richly laden with exquisite booty,  
 Thou shalt exult o'er thy new-gotten spoil.  
 Come,—for kind Nature of care would relieve thee;  
 See! she hath donned her best robes to receive thee,  
 And a May-chaplet doth lovingly weave thee,  
 To garland thy brows with, brave son of toil!  
 Heart-sick of the world, its shams and gold-madness,  
 Flee to the woodlands, and bury thy sadness:  
 Spring is the season of music and gladness,—  
 Therefore, desponding one, smile and be gay!

Come to the woods ! intermit thy repining,  
 Sol to invite thee is lustrously shining ;  
 Thou shalt find pleasure, exalted, refining,—  
 Come to the woods, brother ; come, come away !—J. S.

We owe to J. S. also the following pleasing

### CHRISTMAS HYMN.

Hail ! lustrous Morning Star !  
 Resplendent from afar ;  
 Whose wondrous Advent ancient seers foretold :  
 Thou with supernal light  
 Incomparably bright,  
 Dost fill Heaven's arches with celestial gold !  
 From vast eternity,—  
 Ere time began to be,—  
 Co-partner of Thy Sire's effulgent throne ;  
 Ere mighty Cherubim,  
 Or burning Seraphim,  
 Pealed forth their worship to the Eternal One !  
 O condescending grace !  
 For Adam's guilty race  
 He laid his dazzling regal vestments by  
 On this auspicious morn,  
 Of virgin-mother born,  
 For man to labour, agonize, and die !  
 Goodwill and peace to earth  
 Came with Messiah's birth ;—  
 Angelic minstrels poured their sweetest lays ;  
 While sages, at His feet,  
 Laid down their offerings meet,  
 In grateful homage to Immanuel's praise !  
 Then shall not we rejoice,  
 And, with symphonious voice,  
 A tribute of thanksgiving render Thee ?  
 But not with lip alone,  
 Unite our hearts in one,  
 To warble forth the soul's true melody !  
 Accept our offering,  
 Divine, Incarnate King !  
 To celebrate Thy natal day's return :  
 And when from earth we rise,  
 To meet Thee in the skies,  
 Our souls shall then with nobler raptures burn !

We must adjourn to another opportunity consideration and quotation of the other verses in our hands, and any others which may be forwarded to our care. We shall resume the critical duty again with the same desire to do justice to each writer, but at the same time to be true to the Muses.

## Coiling Upward.

ROBERT LEWIS GERRIE,

FOUNDER OF THE BRITISH LITERARY SOCIETY, AND EDITOR OF  
"THE OLDHAM CHRONICLE."

THE name of Robert Lewis Gerrie deserves embalmment in these pages, though it has not yet got into the books which narrate the struggles of the humble in the upward course of life.

"Ah! who *can* tell how hard it is to climb  
The steep where Fame's proud temple shines afar;  
Ah! who can tell how many a soul sublime  
Has felt the influence of malignant star,  
And waged with Fortune an eternal war;  
Checked by the scoff of pride by Envy's frown,  
And Poverty's unconquerable bar,  
In life's low vale remote has pined alone,  
Then dropped into the grave unpitied and unknown."

Among the real heroes of humanity I count the "early called" one to whom death grudged more than a quarter of a century of effort and suffering, and who was taken hence while the path of life lay yet green before him. We dare not open our notice of his uneventful history, "the short and simple annals" of his biography, without recalling his own words,—words written out of the red-leaved book of his own experience. "It is *said* that genius overcomes all obstacles; but more truly may it be said, that we hear only of that which does so overcome. We forget how accidental are the victories of genius; we humble ourselves at its objective shrine, and think not of its long sleep in our own souls. Genius is too beautifully delicate and too expansive to grow and thrive among brambles and thorns; and for want of that encouragement which sensitive minds look for, the springs of intellectual development are broken or give way."

Robert Lewis Gerrie was born in Aberdeen, 27th Jan., 1831, on the labour-level of life. His father belonged to the wage class. Both he and his wife were well educated and respectable, though occasionally pressed with anxieties as to the wherewithal the children of their household might be fed and clothed. They were a God-fearing, industrious couple, to whom the bread of independence was sweet, and who abhorred debt as the deepest enslavement of the soul to which a man can sink. The food they could provide, if scanty, was wholesome, and the garments their children wore, though homely, were whole; for the mother was an adept at the

too-much despised art which enables thrifty housewives, in the language of Burns, to—

“Gar auld claes look maist as weel’s the new.”\*

Like most earnest Scottish parents, they laid great stress on education. He was born just in the height of the infant school fever in Aberdeen, and was sent, when little more than two and a half years of age, to the nursery-cage of a seminary, for children; whence he was successively passed on from school to school until the West-end Academy was opened, under the rectorship of Mr. Peter Robertson. He was the first scholar enrolled on the books, and he was one of the most eager of the learners who thronged its benches. After four years’ training there, he went to the mathematical classes of Mr. Gray, which he left to become an apprentice in the office of the *Aberdeen Herald* as a compositor. At this time he was fourteen years of age, and he was bound for seven years. Though pretty severely worked in the office, he did not relinquish his studies, but continued to read, study, and think. During this time he attended various classes for improvement in mathematics, modern languages, and general science. It was to a sedulously conducted series of readings, however, that he owed most. He was a lover of books, and he especially loved such books as lit up nature with a fresh meaning, imparted grandeur to human life, explained the mysteries of mind, or taught the course and tendencies of thought, while realizing themselves in action. Of poetry he was an ardent student, and he began to aim at verse-writing when he was little more than fifteen. He did not, however, plume himself on being born a poet, or insist upon that as his vocation. His mind was of a more practical cast. The private joy of versifying he never intermitted, and as he grew in years his facility of expression increased, while its beauty and energy became more marked. In 1850 he ventured to imp his flight beyond his native city, by offering a contribution to Cassell’s “Working Man’s Friend.” That essay on “Social Distinctions” obtained a prize from the proprietors. He early became a reader of, and a contributor to, the *British Controversialist*. The papers on “The Art of Reasoning,” contained in the early volumes, opened a new and delightful field for him. He studied them eagerly, carefully, sought an introduction to their author, and poured out his heart’s thanks to him for the thought of opening the secrets of collegiate halls to working men, and for his faith in their appreciation with which it was done. His taste for such studies developed his mind rapidly, and he sought the best books on these topics. The popularity of the papers above mentioned led the proprietors of this Magazine to devise a plan for widening their utility. This at last resulted in the projection of “The Young Writer and Student’s Assistant,” suggested by Mr. Neil. In this educational scheme Gerrie took a

\* To make worn clothes appear nearly as well as new ones.

great interest, and was a diligent student of the various lessons imparted in it. Robert L. Gerrie saw in the idea a germ capable of great expansion; and he entered into a correspondence with the conductors of this serial, which led to the inauguration of what was then called "The Neophyte Writer's Society," of which the first president was Samuel Neil, Esq., whose productions are known to our readers. Mr. Gerrie, in conjunction with Mr. E. S. Jones, of Coleford, laboured diligently to bring the new guild into working order. It was numerously adhered to, and quite a success. A few of the more impatient spirits, looking on the Institute rather as a band of literary brothers than of students in training, yearned to bring before the public their efforts in authorship. Mr. Gerrie, borne, we believe, contrary to his better judgment, by the impulsive stream, consented to a reconstruction of the association on a wider basis, and extended the constitution of the Society by the institution "of an honorary council of such men of established reputation in literature and science as may be favourable to the Society's objects." The conditions of fellowship in this Society were—"decided literary taste, and sufficient literary ability." This reconstruction was completed in 1854. That year was a notable one in his life. He had continued in the *Herald* office as a journeyman compositor nearly a year after the completion of his apprenticeship, but now he was casting about for some opening towards a course of life which would enable him to use the talents with which he felt he was endowed, and was anxious to be engaged in urging on, through the press, the moral, intellectual, and social progress of the masses of the people.

Our scene now changes from the university city of the north of Scotland to the brisk manufacturing town of Oldham, about six miles north-east of Manchester. There had been started in this hat-manufacturing centre a Liberal newspaper, in the days of excitement regarding the Crimean War. The earliest number of *The Oldham Chronicle* is dated May 6th, 1854. The proprietors did not continue to look upon their speculation long as one likely to suit them. They sought to dispose of it; Gerrie heard of the intended transfer, and having been a saving, provident young man, entered into negotiations for becoming the proprietor. This six months' old newspaper had apparently been run up to a temporary and but seeming success. The advertisements, which were understood by the purchaser to be *bonâ fide*, turned out in many cases to have been inserted on the mere chance of being paid for; and the circulation, which was guaranteed at a high figure, turned out to have been distributed in a great measure gratuitously to push a sale. The purchase was a great though unintentional mistake on R. L. Gerrie's part, and it had grievous consequences. All his available capital was absorbed in the copyright money, and the price of the (so-called) goodwill. He became its proprietor on 5th Sept., 1854, and soon found himself in the midst of a disorganized and ruinous concern, with failure alone apparently before him. Even to this emergency he was equal.



Robert Lewis Gerrie knew the value of insight as a preliminary to foresight. He set himself to learn the real position of himself and his venture. The printing office furnishings were there, and so was his own indomitable heart. Upon these he could depend, upon naught else. Even the workmen had become so demoralized that they unfitted themselves by drink for bringing out the paper at the appointed hour, and more than once Gerrie required to hasten off to Manchester and supplicate hands to help him to work off the news-sheet in time. He went through all the reputed subscribers and advertisers, and asked candidly how they stood in connection with the paper; he looked seriously and earnestly for trade, and gained by his sterling honesty confidence and interest. He found himself not only compelled to dismiss his official editor, but to take his duties upon himself; and while he acted as business manager and literary conductor of this harassing journal, his own hand performed the usual labour of a compositor at case, and handled the reporter's pencil when that was required. All this head-labour and heart-racking he found himself compelled to undergo, or consent to enter the Bankruptcy Court, and confess himself both cheated and defeated. He preferred death in harness to life in disgrace and discomfiture.

Nobody could understand him. There he was, now indefatigably canvassing for advertisements, again at meetings of council or assemblies of the people, jotting down the proceedings with energy and attention, and then, composing-stick in hand, he did the work of a man in the odd hours snatched from these external duties. But withal he was plodding on into the far hours of morning, writing the leaders required by circumstances, and clipping his extracts from the batch of exchanges with which he furnished himself, and keeping his books posted up with a regularity and minuteness which would have been admired in a head clerk. The rumour went that these leaders were the composition of a number of gentlemen resident in, or connected with Oldham; but they were not. They were spun out of the after-hours of a body-wearied young man. Day by day he visibly thinned. By-and-bye his step lost its elasticity, his eye its brilliancy, and his cheek its former hue. Scarcely had a year of this intense labour been undergone before consumption fastened on his vitals, and held her grip like one of the vultures which preyed on Prometheus, and marked him infallibly as one who would soon be her own.

Even then and thus he scorns to yield; he has duties to do, ties to his task, his mother and sister, though not wholly, yet partly dependent upon him. He must work up the worth of his property—and then death will be welcomer the more terrible the struggle after which it comes. We owe the following account of a visit to him at this time, to a dear friend of ours and his, a friend, too, whose life also might be cited as an instance of "Toiling Upward" from the shopboard to the pulpit:—"An hour and a half spent in Manchester, and then we hurry off for Oldham. Having arrived,

we make our way to a rising ground in the outskirts of this smoky, scattered, and uncomely town, yet containing some 60,000 of a population, and at length reach a neat row of houses with garden-plots before the doors, and lying at right angles almost with the Blue-Coat School of Oldham. We have been seen approaching, and a blythe bonny Scotch girl, the sister of the friend we seek, bids us "welcome." We can see a subdued sorrow on her countenance, notwithstanding the smile of friendliness our visit has occasioned. By-and-bye we are conducted into a neat bed-room upstairs. Stretched on his bed there lies a young man, pale and emaciated, with a winning face, sparkling eye, and massive brow. Around him are quite a number of books and papers. In his long bony fingers is a pencil, and as he lies on his back, he is engaged in writing, with a book for his desk, the leading article for the next number of the *Oldham Chronicle*." This was in August, 1856. He rallied a little so as to be able to take an autumn tour back to his native country, and amid the scenes of his boyhood's interest. But the cares of life abode with him, and the seal of death was upon him. He returned to his "fighting off of death" again, and all the winter, under the shadow of the funeral yew, he continued his journalistic toil—for now it was toil. In February he had resigned himself to a speedy release from the bondage of fate, felt that all that was left to him was "a departure," and in his earnest love for those who watched his sick bed, he prayed that death might come upon him alone, that his struggle with the grisly enemy might not be left as a memory of pain with them. He arranged his earthly affairs for their sakes and behoof, and found a solace even on his couch of death that his efforts had not only succeeded in rescuing his small original capital from absorption by a failure, but that his property had so risen in value that it would bring him in the possibility of leaving those whom he loved in some measure provided for against the unkindness of the world, for the circulation of the *Oldham Chronicle* had increased, under his management and despite all his difficulties, from 300 to 3,000.

One morning in July the exhaustion of death came upon him. He laid his head on his mother's breast, and with a gentle aspiration passed away—away from the woes of earth, away to the mercy of the Saviour whom he trusted. Before twenty-seven years of life had glinted upon him, 16th July, 1857, he departed at the command of "the shadow cloaked from head to foot."

Looking at such a life, thinking of the aims and efforts which vitalized it, the noble conscientiousness which overarched and glorified it, the humanity which formed its very core and essence, are we not justified in giving this "frail memorial" of a man of worth as an instance of "Toiling Upward," and in saying with the Laureate—

"Contemplate all this work of Time,  
The giant labouring in his youth;  
Nor dream of human love and truth  
As dying Nature's earth and lime;

But trust that those we call the dead  
Are brothers of an ampler day,  
For ever nobler ends?"

At a meeting of members of the Neophyte Writers' Society, held in Manchester, August, 1857, "numerous affectionate testimonies to the sterling worth and many amiable qualities" of Robert Lewis Gerrie, founder of that association, were evoked, and "an address of sympathy and condolence with his relatives" was voted. Shortly after his demise, an agitation arose in the society for a more imposing title, and it was called "The British Literary Association," but perhaps its best testimony, as yet, is the life and labours of its founder—the Robert Nichol of our day—R. L. Gerrie.

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## The Eloquence of the Month.

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### LORD STANLEY ON SOCIAL PROGRESS AND WORKMEN'S HALLS.

[The Right Hon. E. H. S. Stanley, M.P., was born at Knowsley, 21st July, 1826. He was educated at Rugby, under Dr. Arnold, and at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he graduated first class in classics, with mathematical honours, in 1848. Having contested Lancaster unsuccessfully, he went on a tour in America. In his absence he was chosen to succeed Lord George Bentinck (deceased), as Member for King's Lynn. His next tour was taken to India, where he spent much effort in acquiring a knowledge of the state of that great empire. On the accession to power of his father, the Earl of Derby, in 1852, he was appointed Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In 1853, Oxford conferred the degree of D.C.L. on him. In 1855, Lord Palmerston offered him the seals of the Colonial Office, which he, however, declined. In 1858 he accepted the same dignity and office under his father, and proposed his famous plan of Indian Reform, conceived and sketched in 1853. On Lord Ellenborough's resignation, Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton succeeded Lord Stanley, and he became President of the Board of Control, which was subsequently merged into Secretary of State for India. He is devotedly attached to Social Reform, and speaks with earnestness on such topics. The following speech was delivered at the inauguration, 3rd of August, of the Birkenhead Workmen's Hall and Club House, erected under limited liability, in 5,000 shares at £1 each, many of which are held by working men. It is admirably fitted up.]

After some remarks by the Chairman, H. J. Candler, Esq.,—

The Right Hon. Lord Stanley said—Ladies and gentlemen, friends and neighbours, I thank you most sincerely for the kindness of this reception, but, although I feel it very deeply, yet I feel also that I have not much right to stand upon this platform. It is hardly the part of those who take no share in the battle to come forward most prominently in celebrating the victory. But I have

come here with great pleasure to be present at the opening of this hall. I am sure you will agree with me that it is quite time that some undertaking of this kind was set on foot in Birkenhead. Wherever a new city grows up rapidly, wherever a vast population gathers itself in a few years round some new industrial centre, it will inevitably happen that many social wants will, for a time, remain unprovided. Men feel about such a place as if it were to them rather an inn, or an encampment, than a home. Employers look forward to the time when they shall be able to leave off business. Working men have not the leisure, and in many cases have not the means, to assist in providing what is required. Now, that is a case more or less in all such towns as this, and it is peculiarly likely to be the case here. I don't flatter you in saying that there is nothing in England—and hardly anything in America or in the Colonies—more remarkable than the progress of Birkenhead. The rateable property of this township has doubled in the last ten years; only forty-four years ago—in 1821—Birkenhead contained a population of no more than 200; between 1821 and 1841 that population multiplied itself fortyfold,—from 200 to 8,000; and, further, in less than the quarter of a century that has elapsed between the year 1841 and the present time, these numbers have been again multiplied fivefold, and for 8,000 then you have nearly 40,000 now,—when I hear all these things (and I have my figures upon what I believe to be good and undoubted authority), I am reminded, not so much of anything which we see in Europe, as of those new cities which grow up on the edge of the Western prairie, where, with the traffic, the crowded streets, and along with every luxury and convenience of life, you see here and there, in corners and byways, the stumps still sticking out of the ground to mark the remains of that old primeval forest that has hardly yet been cleared away. I think your progress is, upon the whole, more extraordinary than that to which I allude; because these things take place in the new country, whereas you have grown up in a very old country. Nobody is astonished if the schoolboy whom you have not seen for a year or two has grown a couple of inches in height since you parted, but it is a very remarkable phenomenon if he has become a grown man. Yet, when one thinks of it, that growth is not so extraordinary as at first sight it appears. We are in the habit of talking about Old England,—and no doubt, as far as our laws, our customs, our institutions, and our history is concerned, we are a very old country. But when one comes to look at those things which are characteristic of England at the present day, when one looks at our trade, our manufactures, our colonies, and our Indian empire, it is almost startling to see the rapid growth of these things, and how much of all that has made England what she is among the nations of the world is really the work of only three or four generations. That is a digression, but it is one to which both the place in which I am speaking and the subject naturally leads.

Now, to come to what is more immediately before us. I understand the primary object of this building to be a club—a place of meeting, that is, either for business, refreshment, or society, for the use of all those who choose to avail themselves of it among that vast population of mechanics and artisans who inhabit this shore of the Mersey. And I will tell you why I, who am not very fond of making speeches without any practical object, and who think that in this part of the world we are perhaps rather too much given to make a great display about inaugurations and openings of buildings, laying first stones, and ceremonies of that kind—why I, holding that opinion, nevertheless think that the opening of this building is an event which deserves to be celebrated in a public and formal manner. Buildings of this kind are at present very rare, yet they ought to be very common. I am not going to say one word on the old hackneyed subject of keeping men from the public-house. Artisans are not children, and if they, working hard and earning largely, choose to spend their money in that way, they have as much right to do so as anybody else has to do a thing which is simply foolish. It is a question between their families and themselves, and I think we may leave them to the conjugal eloquence which is very likely to be exerted on such occasions. I have always thought that it was not for those who live luxuriously to speak of them harshly in that matter. It is more their business than ours. But no man ought to be driven to the public-house for want of any other place to go to. He ought not to be forced to go there because his club meets there, and he does not like to miss a club meeting, or because there is no other convenient place where he can enjoy friendly talk and a fire on a cold wintry night, or simply because he has nowhere else to go. Of course it may be asked, why cannot people stay at home? Well, my answer to that is that men in the richer classes, having a great deal more time at their disposal, and having materials for making far more comfortable homes, do not make it a universal rule to pass their evenings with their wives and children.

I say nothing of that class—I am bound to speak of them as an unfortunate class—whose home is a lodging, and who shelter their families whenever they put on their hats;—but I say this, that social intercourse—free, friendly, easy talk—is as necessary to men as food, or sleep, or fresh air. A man does not live a healthy life without it, and therefore whatever enables him to enjoy that kind of intercourse in a comfortable and civilized manner is not only a pleasure to him, but a benefit intellectually and morally. I think, therefore, that places of meeting like this, which are meant to be real clubs, or places where clubs may meet—not schools in disguise; not institutes, although institutes are very good things in their way; not lecture-rooms, although this room will no doubt serve that purpose admirably, if it be required, but places where talk, and newspapers, and refreshments may be had with a security against disturbance from drunken or rough and disorderly persons. I say

that places of this kind ought to exist, and I believe they shortly will exist in every great town in England, and in many of the little towns also. At present there are only a few here and there, but fashions spread fast; it is only the first step that gives trouble. It is not our habit in these districts to lag behind when anything useful is doing. Then we have in these parts more money—especially in the artisan and working classes—than is to be found anywhere else, except, perhaps, in Manchester and in London. I am afraid we must admit that there are very few parts of the country where the outdoor aspects of nature are less agreeable than they are here in the neighbourhood of Liverpool. We are not favoured in that way, and that is all the more reason why we should endeavour to make compensation, as far as we can, by providing indoor comforts for the absence of that which we cannot have, however pleasant it might be in this summer weather—for the absence of the green fields, and the shady lanes, and the pleasant open commons of the south. Well, then, the question is asked, "What security have you that an erection of this kind will be supported?" My answer is that we hope, and we confidently believe, that it will not only be managed, but also to a great extent owned, by those for whose benefit it is established. Expressly for that purpose the shares have been made of very small amount. It is the anxious desire of the promoters that they should be so held, and they are so at present to some extent; they will be so, I believe, to a much greater extent when the thing is fairly in operation; and if they are not so held it will not be for want of encouragement, because by a stretch of liberality which appears to me even extreme, if I understand the arrangements rightly, preferential advantages have been granted to those who are holders of more than two or three shares over those who hold a larger number, so that the former class are sure of their return. One thing more I must say. If this club does not receive the support—or rather, if this hall, intended for the reception of a club, does not receive the support which is expected, that may arise from mismanagement—everything is possible—or it may arise from indifference, but of one thing I am sure, it is perfectly idle to contend that that may arise from the want of power in the working men to keep it going. A curious fallacy, a kind of mental confusion, arises in the minds of newspaper readers from the use of that very vague, and indefinite, and unsatisfactory term, "the working classes." People think, when that name is mentioned, of labourers in rural districts, and immediately picture to themselves a family whose weekly earnings barely suffice to meet their weekly wants. I need not tell the audience I am now addressing that a skilled artisan in these parts is not only above the reach of distress, except in such extraordinary circumstances as the breaking out of a war, a cotton famine, or the like, but that he is better off, so far as money goes, than very many of those educated men who embark upon the honourable perils of professional life. I have lately seen—it was drawn up for me—a statement of the rate of wages here-

abouts, and I find that they range (I am speaking, of course, of skilled labourers) from thirty shillings to two guineas weekly, that is, allowing for those occasional holidays which we are all of us the better for having, and which I suppose none of us can do without. Allowing for those, it is an income of from £70 to £100 a year. I am told that if a skilful artisan is employed by piece-work he may generally command a higher rate. Now, I do not think that men living upon these wages are unable to support a club, and I think they might do much more than support a club. I see no reason why a large proportion of them should not, if they think fit, and supposing that the proper agency of supplying the demand is provided, as I am told it is here—I see no reason why a large proportion of them should not, if they chose it, live in their own freehold houses. I have always looked upon five things as going together,—cheap schools and Institutes, which are only schools continued; cheap books and newspapers; the savings bank and the insurance office, which is another form of savings bank; the club; and the freehold house. Three of these you have already; the two others you may have if you choose to provide them for yourselves. And I am not in the least afraid, speaking in the interest of the employer, that a man will work one bit the worse for feeling himself in a higher and more satisfactory social position. I do not talk here about independence. Independence is a word which is sadly abused; nobody is independent except the savage. We are all dependent upon one another—the rich upon the poor, the poor upon the rich, and the rich just as much as the poor. Civilized society cannot exist otherwise; but I believe every thinking and feeling employer desires those who work under him to feel themselves independent in one sense, in the true sense of the word—that is, to feel that they are above the pressure of immediate distress, that they are not living from hand to mouth, and that they are not liable to the caprice or the dictation of any single individual. My belief is, that the more you cultivate the feeling of self-respect, the more you cultivate independence in that sense among working men, the better, the pleasanter, and not more difficult you make the relations between them and their employers. Now, gentlemen, it only remains for me to wish success and prosperity to this undertaking, and to express a hope, which I am confident will be realized, that those who have given their money, and—more than money—who have given their time and their trouble to its promotion will be, as they deserve to be, long and honourably remembered among you. (Loud cheers.)

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## The Reviewer.

*The Theological Works of the Rev. J. H. Hinton, M.A. Vol. III.: Systematic and Controversial Divinity. Vol. IV: Practical Divinity.* London: Houlston and Wright.

[For notices of the two previous vols. see *B. C.*, Dec., 1864.]

THE Critic who requires to sit down deliberately to the perusal of two massive volumes of divinity from a sense of duty is in quite a different condition from the student who reads them under the excitement of professional requirements, or the co-religionist who lays them on his shelves as treasures to be resorted to again and again as occasion warrants, need suggests, or inclination prompts. We shall confess to a sense of taskwork. That impatience did not hurry our rise, that the revolt of the mind natural in such circumstances did not affect our perusal is, we think, a proof of the ability and of the effectiveness of the author's statements of his case. We have already intimated our intention to refrain from sectarian topics in this department, and for the present, and while the series is incomplete, to confine ourselves to the more useful task of noting the precise contents of each volume and remarking on the worth of the several items as contributions on the theological questions concerned. By doing this we shall disencumber our review from disturbing influences, and shall most beneficially to our readers perform the duty assigned to us, of noting the value of the books put before us.

Vol. III. commences with the author's "Athanasia; or the Natural Immortality of Man," in which he maintains "that man is immortal;" viz., that "he is by his nature adapted to endless existence, and that he will exist without end, unless the course of his nature be interfered with by a superior power." This is a treatise written, the author intimates, "for the studious and reflecting reader, whose habit of patient inquiry requires the field of controversy to be thoroughly, and step by step, explored;" for "the search for truth is open to all, and mankind has no greater benefactors than those who, with sufficient wisdom on the one hand and sufficient courage on the other, endeavour to rectify deeply-rooted and prevalent mistakes." Introductory to the main treatise, we have "A Review of 'Notes of Lectures on Future Punishment'" by the Rev. H. H. Dobney, of Maidstone, republished from *The Eclectic Review*, August, 1845; a pamphlet on "Who shall Live for Ever?" and two rejoinders—one to the Rev. Edward White, the other to Rev. W. Morris—to replies made to that pamphlet and that article by these divines. The treatise on "Immortality" was itself issued in 1849, and consists of four books, tracing the arguments in different forms, but always controversially, through 27 chapters. There is



often a remarkable force, precision, and solidity imparted to the matter of this work, which, with a good deal of controversial tact, gives a high value to his consideration of a most important question.

To this chief matter there succeeds a "Lecture on the Divine Inspiration of Holy Scripture," delivered at the chapel of Stepney College, 18th September, 1850, and directed against the incorrect and "inadequate notions of inspiration which are now more or less extensively advocated," with numerous critical notes. Supplementary to this, we have two brief papers, re-issued from *The Baptist Magazine*, 1850, on "Divine Inspiration, not a Dynamical Process, and Divine Revelation, not a Mode of Intelligence;" "Strictures on J. B. Brown's 'Divine Life in Man;'" and on "J. H. Godwin's Congregational Lecture 'On Biblical Exigesis'" follow this; and some good points are made in both articles. A fragment "On the Support of the Gospel Ministry," and "Remarks on Infant Baptism," close a volume of 500 pages, well packed with clear, explicit, and well-put argument, very highly charged with controversy, spirited, clever, and impressive, though including a good deal that is of ephemeral interest and importance.

Vol. IV. begins with "The Elements of Moral Philosophy," written for and published in *The Oxford Encyclopædia*, in 1828, which are for the first time re-issued. It is by no means a recondite or deeply-based scheme of human duty; but it is plain, practical, and easily comprehended, both in its grounds and in its teachings. It keeps to the main levels of the subject, and neither considers the deep questions of Kant nor the far-reaching ones of Jouffroy. It is a close practical comment on Christianity as a moral law.

A lecture on "Completeness of Ministerial Qualification," containing some valuable and excellent remarks on the matters and method of preparation for the occupancy of the pulpit, succeeds the treatise on "Morals"; and to that there follows a series of discourses on "Revivals." There is first a sermon on the "Means of a Religious Revival," then a treatise on "Individual Efforts for the Conversion of Sinners," enforced in a series of lectures, the substance of which is good and praiseworthy, though the manner is somewhat haughty, severe, and sometimes, we must say, exceptionally harsh in tone: for the command is given us to speak the truth *in love*. "The active Christian" directed in regard to individual effort, is a higher piece of thought and writing; and is altogether a commendable series of practical lectures, in which experienced piety and thoughtful Christianity are well shown and exemplified. This volume closes with a finely-toned and useful paper on "The Formation of an Industrial Character," which is reproduced from a work on "The Useful Arts: their Birth and Development," issued in 1851 by the Young Men's Christian Association.

We believe we are quite justified in saying that wealthy members of Baptist congregations would do well in presenting these volumes to their clergymen, and placing them in their church libraries; and that they contain matters of worth, excellence, and intrinsic merit.

*A Grammar of the Latin Language.* By ARCH. H. BRYCE, LL.D.  
London: Nelson and Sons.

IN November, 1862, we noticed the then Mr. (now Dr.) Bryce's "First Latin Reader" and "First Greek Reader." He has not since been idle, but has prepared a "Second Latin Book" (which, however, we have not seen), edited an "English Poetry Book," we think, and published this "Grammar of the Latin Language."

In several points this Latin Grammar is an improvement upon the older forms of school-books. The paradigms are much more numerous, and take in, in fact, almost every form and variety of declension and conjugation. The rules of gender and of formation are brought closer under the eye by being exhibited immediately after the declensions and conjugations to which they relate. The irregularities of the language are carefully taught apart from, instead of being intermixed with, the regular forms. The facts of grammar are clearly stated and distinguished from the laws of it. The indeclinable parts of speech are lucidly arranged and exemplified. The syntax is given rationally as well as empirically,—the former being taught on the new form of the analysis of sentences, and the latter being reproduced in the set of sound words given to them by George Ruddiman. Both orthography and prosody receive a larger amount of care than in common school grammars.

If there is any mistake at all, it is in making it a sort of an appendage to his First and Second Latin Books, instead of making it an entirely independent treatise. This, however, we must say, is little felt. We strongly recommend those who are desirous of acquiring a knowledge of the grammatical rudiments of the language of Rome to procure this work, and even those who have studied on the old rule form, to read the syntax as given in this work,—particularly those portions relating to the syntax of clauses, 197—206; *obliqua oratio*, 206—208; and the sequence of tenses 208—211. To notice in detail the separate beneficial changes made in the exhibition of the elements by difference of type, &c., would be tedious. Our impression is, that for self-tuition Bryce's Grammar would be found very valuable. It is so much more intellectual, and so much less mechanical, than the ordinary run of school grammars. We are not quite sure that it would be so much better for schoolboys than the old routine system,—unless they were more thoughtful than boys used to be, when our school-days were in their prime. It is, however, a matter for thankfulness that teachers are really employing so much thought to compose practically useful books, appealing more to the reflective faculties than to the mere memories of boys. Among such teachers A. H. Bryce—one of the masters of the High School of the metropolis of Scotland—deserves a high place.

## The Topic.

### SHOULD POLITICS BE MADE A PROFESSION?

#### AFFIRMATIVE.

**YES.** We have professors of history, of astronomy, of geology, of languages, and why not of politics? Is the science of government less abstruse, or less important than these sciences? Other sciences are rightly made a profession; for otherwise their intricacies, subtleties, and depths cannot be known. So vast is the field of knowledge, that a man cannot be expected to attain proficiency in any part of it unless he devote his time and attention to it chiefly. And what important matters are connected with the science of government! The welfare of individuals and of states; the relations of nations with each other, &c. Mere dabblers in any science are not to be trusted. We do not entrust our health and lives to a quack, but to the professional doctor. In important matters connected with property we employ the professional lawyer. And who can be so well qualified to govern us as the men who have made politics their study? With our own representative system it is specially desirable that politics should become a profession, for under that system, as now carried out, men are returned as Members of Parliament to legislate, to govern, who know nothing of politics. Many seats in Parliament are obtained by money; by family influence, or some other connection, without the slightest reference to qualifications. The sooner politics are made a profession the better, and as we allow none to engage in legal or medical practice who have not qualified themselves for it by a suitable course of study, so let none be eligible for a seat in the House of Commons who are not politicians by profession.—S. S.

The duties of man are very comprehensive, and never can be realized by even the wisest. The whole course of man is one continuous chain, constituted by means insignificant in themselves, but which, when united, undoubtedly form the elements of greatness. Society is very intricate, its principles of cohesion often unsettled, and the results of its general character never properly defined. Certain tactics must be adopted, to meet the requirements and necessities of society. Therefore, to secure weal and prosperity to the State, different classifications of trade and professions are voluntarily selected by different classes, generally arranged to meet the exigencies of the public. Each individual chooses his own profession. The lawyer would never suit the doctor, more than the merchantman (in general) the anatomist. Surely it is as consistent that politics should be made a profession, when all others in importance sink into insignificance before it. Politicians form the laws of the kingdom and declare war, regulate its finance and levy its taxes, dispense justice and control, to a great extent, the habits of society. When their duties are so multifarious—so high above all others,—should politics not be made a profession—studied in all its details, and practised in all its branches,—by properly qualified and trained persons, for the administration of such a responsible office? For these reasons I think politics should become a profession.—G. M. S.

In the great business of life all men have interest, because connected with it by some tie or another; the connection induces the interest, and the interest impels to an acquaintance with the

character of the connection and its phases as they bear upon individual well-being. This latter process is education. The office of education is altogether directive; whatever duties are attached to conduct, ignorance of their claims necessarily entails failure in the course of life, for without the knowledge essential to success, disaster is imminent; hence the necessity of education for the practical working of duties.

In the question, whether education should be especial in its bearing upon political science? must be considered the nature of the science itself; for, between the work and the worker, the science and the operator, there must exist a co-relationship—the man must understand his work, or he is incapable of executing it. Thus we narrow the question to this point, if political science or politics has connected with it special work and duties, then special education is necessary to learn the duties and to understand the work. That politics has special work none will, we think, deny. Since the departments of the science are numerous, its phases many, their investigation abstruse, and their subjects profound, and man, with his little time and much to do in the world, can hardly be expected to grapple with subjects so multitudinous, without the disciplined order which their connection and mutual relation one with another requires. Why should it be thought that political science has less claim upon intellectual efforts than the thousand-and-one other departments of art, science, philosophy, and religion? The physician, the lawyer, the divine, each are fitted for their several works by special education; and if political science and the art of government are subjects not less profound than those to which special education is already directed, they also have equal claims in speciality. In these days, professions are generally followed for pecuniary results, either for livelihood or to give status in society. Medicine, the law, divinity, and the science of arms, are studies at once remunerative and honourable, but

it does not appear that the same holds good with politics. The executive of a country being made up of few members, and the chances of securing office being remote, renders it hazardingly doubtful whether it is worth while to prosecute a special education for their relative duties. Hence we think that politics, in days of pounds, shillings, and pence, shares and consols, is an unlikely study to be popular if made special or professional; but this improbability in no way militates against the necessity of special education in the science by those purposing to *understand* it, and determined to risk the chances of obtaining office in executive or legislative government. On the contrary, while there always will be a number honourably ambitious of taking part in the councils of the country, and who can only meritoriously fulfil the duties of the several offices by special education, we are compelled to think that for a proper understanding of the subject, politics should be made a profession.—D. STROUD.

To be conversant with the daily events of life, is not only useful in the pursuit of business, but improving to the mind; and as such, a study which, I think, every one should be acquainted with politics. Comparatively few are able to give sufficient time to its study to make it their profession, but to those who can it is an honourable one, and worthy of encouragement. That public opinion is in favour of professional politicians, is, I think, fully demonstrated by the fact that they are invariably selected to guide the wheels of State.—D. M.

#### NEGATIVE.

I am not aware that any English statesman except Mr. Gladstone has put forward the doctrine that politics should be made a profession: and I was content to think it one of those gentle heresies to which he has a tenderness, which makes him, like a woman with a weakness, test the love of his admirers by their attention or inattention to the reigning foible of the time. It is well

that the editors have challenged the subject, and brought it forward for consideration. It will be a welcome topic of debate in many a society. My own impression is most decidedly against it. I think the higher offices of the State ought to be filled by men who can be magnanimous and patriotic. But professional patriotism, I am afraid, will be at a discount in Britain.—**LAMBDA.**

We wish men to conduct the business of the State with conscientiousness and conviction. We do not want for our governors haranguers and special pleaders. We do not wish to exchange government by party for government by professionals. We wish men round our Queen's throne of honour, uprightness, and principle. Professional politicians are seldom so.—**R. G. M.**

Do we ever expect disinterested advice from professional men? Does not professional training give the mind a bias, and professional etiquette give a tone to life? Well, if we make political life professional, are we likely to secure sound, ingenious, and disinterested political managers? Would it be well for this country to give up her tried style of government, that it might create bureaucracies like those on the Continent? Surely not. Let us keep to honest thought and endeavour, and do not let us make it the interest of professional politicians to embroil our country for their own advancement.—**L. S. D.**

To make politics a profession would destroy confidence. The rush for place, pay, pension, and titles, is bad enough already. What would it be if it were generally accepted by society that politics was rightly a profession—a profession by which a man might honourably live? What security would there be for honesty of advocacy in such circumstances? Who could avoid suspicions regarding the motives of the men who went into Parliament as a profession? Would all the contests engaged in be for the public good? We much fear not. That politics should be a study is right; that it should be a profession is an over-stretch of the money-making

limit, of which Englishmen ought to be extremely jealous.—**THOM.**

Trading politicians have always been detested in England. We hope this good old English fashion will be held to. France has shown us the solution of a great number of social problems, and amongst others, the folly of allowing professional politicians to hold the chief places in a nation. The State machine requires to be guided by persons who can afford to be impartial, and who would rather suffer any amount of disrepute than do a wrong to his party and his conscience. Professionals must have no scruples. Like lawyers, they must take their *cue* with their fee. We hold that professional life ought not to be intruded into English government.—**G. W. Y.**

What is meant by a professional life, we suppose, is a gentlemanly sort of business, which can be taken up and followed as a mode of gaining a livelihood or of retaining a position. Law is a profession, so is medicine, and so is divinity. There are, too, professional literary men. Are we prepared to extend this system of money-making, after a gentlemanly fashion, to parliamentary life as a whole? We do not think it would be wise to bring such a form of social life into vogue. It would scatter suspicion broadcast over the whole government of this country. There have, doubtless, been men who did make politics a profession, but they have hitherto been stigmatized and disliked—often discredited. Were this new notion to be widely adopted, we could scarcely ever fix our confidence on any gentleman as one who had the real and tangible good of the country at heart. There would always be the fear that he was engaged in whatever advocacy he was most intent on, because he was hired, or expected to be hired, or otherwise rewarded for his political services by the party with whose aims he identified himself. It would not be a satisfactory state of things, and we ought to strive to keep the notion from becoming popular.—**GARDE.**

## The Inquirer.

### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

557. Being desirous of learning the Latin language, I solicit your advice in the selection of a method,—to join a class or to study alone; if the latter method, will you advise what book, or books, to study, and where procurable?  
A WORKING LAD.

558. A concise account of the French constitution as it is at the present time would greatly oblige—SAMUEL.

559. Is the present Earl de Grey and Ripon the same person as that Lord Goderich who was premier in 1827?—SAMUEL.

560. I should be glad to be informed what is the precise value of "Sharpe's New Testament, translated from Griesbach's text," as a translation, and as a means and medium for the nourishment of the spiritual life of the evangelical Christian. I would seek more especially an explanation of the fact, that throughout the epistles the *personality* of the Holy Spirit is unrecognized, seems studiously ignored. There are passages also in the Gospels, which, as compared with those of the commonly-received version, appear markedly to subordinate the Son to the Father. As the subject is one of exceeding moment, I should much like a scholarly, and therefore a dependable and really *informative* answer being afforded me. If I may be pardoned, I would venture to commend my query to the learned attention of one or the other of our highly-esteemed editors.—O. D.

561. Please favour with a note of any pamphlets on "Calvinism and Arminianism Compared."—CARACTACUS.

562. Be kind enough to inform the price and author of "England the Civilizer," mentioned by J. J. in the debate on Civilization, page 194 of vol. for 1864.—E. B.

### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

340. The papers now publishing in the *Fortnightly Review* (that able periodical which G. H. Lewes edits, and which ought to find a place in every young man's improvement society library if its members are at all thoughtful), entitled "On the Principles of Success in Literature," seem to be almost written to satisfy the demand of H. C. H. for some good summary of "the principles of literary criticism." The perusal of these papers I should commend to your inquirer, and to all others seeking light on this great question. I concur in J. T. Thornton's recommendation of Whately and Neil, but the rest are old-fashioned and effete; add Lewes and some of the writings of Trench, and H. E. H. will find himself well-informed.  
—GEORGE JACKSON.

542. *Montaigne* is the earliest philosophical writer of France. A biography of the genial and egotistic essayist appeared in *The British Controversialist* in July, 1864. The earliest English translation was that of the resolute John Florio (1545—1625), author of "A Worlde of Wordes," a dictionary in Italian and English. This translation appeared in 1603, and is dedicated to "The Right Honourable patrons of virtue, patterns of honour, Roger, Earle of Rutland; Henrie, Earle of Southampton; Lucie, Countess of Bedford." To Shakspeare's patron he thus addresses himself,—“Your courteous Lordship, most noble, most honourable Earle of Southampton, in whose paie and patronage I have lived some years.” Of this edition a copy bearing the autograph of Shakspeare (as is believed), is in the British Museum. With its contents it is very evident Shakspeare was highly familiar. This translation, which is spirit-

edly, if not delicately done, delights us frequently by its quaintness and simplicity—in these very nearly assimilating itself to the original. The next, and in many respects the best transposition of Montaigne's thoughts into English words appeared in 1685, from the pen of Charles Cotton (1630—1687). He was quite a cognate spirit to that of the old Gascon, and hence has Englished the "Essays" well. Hazlitt wisely adopted this version in his edition of the "Works of Montaigne," which is the only complete collection of his works that has appeared in the English language. We notice that Montaigne's "Essays" are intended to be brought out in a prize-book series. We think this would be found to be a mistake. No reading we know of could be less suited for a boy's perusal, and unless upon the principle once enunciated in our hearing by a young student—"Nobody ever thinks of reading his prizes,"—we know no justification for the intention. Though Hallam says, "a gentleman is ashamed not to have read" these essays; he certainly does not mean "young gentlemen in boarding schools, and the higher classes of our academies." As "there is a time for everything," there is a time for reading Montaigne's "Essays;" but it is *not* when "dove-feather down" is sprouting from the upper lip. Montaigne is a book for men and gentlemen, and, perhaps, for ladies of intelligence and ripe thought. In fact *immaturity* is a disqualification for the perusal of Montaigne. The following are a few of the opinions which have been expressed regarding these "Essays." The elder Disraeli, in his "Curiosities of Literature," says, "Montaigne's immortal history of his own mind, for such are his 'Essays,' have assumed, perhaps, too modest a title, and one not sufficiently discriminative." "In the greater part of authors," says Montesquieu, "I see the man who writes, in Montaigne the man who thinks."

"Of those books to which we have

recourse for pleasure or recreation, we have a particular fancy for a gossiping book—a collection of choice *morceaux* and short dissertations, in which an author gives us the cream of a diversity of subjects, without calling upon us for any rigid attention or nice examination of his arguments: a kind which resembles the very best conversation, but which is, at the same time, more artificially dressed up, and more elegantly turned.

"We feel no sympathy with the works of those authors who would do everything by the square and compass; who would rudely snap the springs of feeling, and torture us unto wisdom and virtue. It is the author who gives utterance to the promptings of the heart—who mingles human feelings with all his knowledge, that lays hold of our affection—and whom, above all, we love and venerate,—and such a one is Montaigne."—*Retrospective Review*, vol. 2.

"No language possesses a more delightful essayist than Montaigne; and we admire him, not so much for depth of thought as for a charm which he has spread over all his writings, even by his very defects.

"The degree which nature claims in the diversity of talent, the efficacy of education, the value of the learned languages, the usages of society, the passions that actuate private life, the singular customs of different nations, are the subjects chiefly handled in his essays. In the period from Socrates to Plutarch, such questions had been well treated before. But Montaigne was evidently the founder of popular philosophy in modern times."—Lord Jeffrey in the *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 27.

"The diary of his travels, discovered many years after his death, never copied nor corrected, is singularly interesting: it seems to tell us more of Montaigne than the 'Essays' themselves; or rather, it confirms much said in those by relating many things omitted, and throws a new light on various portions of his character.

"The description which he gives of Rome, of the Pope, and all he saw, are short, but drawn with a master's hand—graphic, original, and just,—and such is the unaltered appearance of the eternal city, that his pages describe it as it now is, with as much fidelity as they did when he saw it in the sixteenth century.

"The profoundest and most original thinkers have ever turned to his pages with delight. His skilful anatomy of his own mind and passions; his enthusiasm, clothed as it is in apparent indifference, which only renders it the more striking; his lively and happy description of persons; his amazing narrations of events; his happy citation of ancient authors, and the whole instinct with individuality, perspicuity of style, and the stamp of good faith and sincerity that reigns throughout,—these are the charms and merits of his 'Essays,' a work that raises him to the rank of one of the most original and admirable writers that France has produced, and one of the most delightful writers in the world."—Lardner's "Cyclopædia," vol. 105.

"The 'Essays' of Montaigne make, in several respects, an epoch in literature. No prose writer of the sixteenth century has been so generally read, nor, probably, given so much delight.

"Montaigne is superior to any of the ancients in liveliness, in that careless and rapid style where one thought springs naturally, but not consecutively, from another.

"He is the earliest classical writer in the French language—the first whom a gentleman is ashamed not to have read. So long as an unaffected style, and an appearance of the utmost simplicity and good nature shall charm—so long as the lovers of desultory and cheerful conversation shall be more numerous than those who prefer a lecture or a sermon—so long as reading is sought by the many as an amusement in idleness, or a resource in pain—so long will Montaigne be among the most favourite authors of mankind."—Hal-

lam's "Literature of Europe," vol. 2.

The best French editions are,—1580, the first, at Bourdeaux; the second, Paris, 1588; third, Paris, 1595; fourth, Paris, 1625; Amsterdam, 1659; London, Toulson, 1724; Paris, 1802, 1818.—R. M. A.

544. Dr. William Smith was born in London, 1814. He was one of the early students of the London University, where he was educated preparatory to advancing to the bar, to which we believe he was called by the Society of Gray's Inn. His taste for the study of the classics was, however, so great as to lead to a change of life. He was called to be Professor of Humanity in the Colleges of Highbury and Homerton, subsequently united, in 1850, with that of Coward, under the title of New College. Having previously edited a few classical works, he planned, in 1840, his two first great lexicons, viz., "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities," 1842; "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology," 1841-1849. In 1850 he projected his adaptations of these great dictionaries for school purposes, and issued these in 1852. He is the author of a "History of Greece," 1853. In 1854 he began the publication of his "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography," completed in 1856; and superintended the issue of Gibbon's "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," 1854. In 1853 he was chosen examiner in classics at the London University. In 1855 he published a "Latin-English Dictionary." Of these works we may quote the following opinions of the press:—

"The light of other days has faded in more senses than one, if we are giving the go-by to our ancient works of reference. We are compelled, however, to revolutionize our lower bookshelves, for the old oil-lamps are not more obsolete than most of the *old dictionaries* which have been superseded by the series of which Dr. Smith is the editor. Such specimens of the Lempriere style of miscellany, with other loose workman-



ship, are out of date, because they have been *superseded by something infinitely better, a thousand times more full and discriminative and profound.*"—*The Times*.

"It would be superfluous to commend in detail a series of works to which every scholar pays the tribute of habitual and constant reference. They are as complete and critical a digest of the whole range of subjects which they treat as could reasonably be expected from even the strong phalanx of able contributors which the learned and accomplished editor has united for his undertaking, and will long remain the *best and completest works on the important body of subjects which they embrace.*"—*Quarterly Review*.

"An Illustrated Classical Manual;" "The Student's Gibbon;" "The Student's Hume;" "The Student's History of Rome;" "The Student's Manual of the English Language," &c., &c., have also been edited by the indefatigable Dr. Smith. "The Dictionary of the Bible," recently completed, is a highly valuable addition to works of that class, although the usual editorial consistency of opinion and statement have not been observed in the several contributions, the rank and position of the contributors in some measure making this impossible. Dr. Smith is, we believe, at present engaged upon a "Dictionary of British Biography," which is to be highly elaborate, not only in the clear and concise statement of facts and in the enunciation of critical opinions, but also in the completeness of its bibliography, &c. Few lives have been more industriously passed than that of Dr. Smith. Without, as we think, any specially original endowments, he has a keen sense of the suitable, and his general shrewdness makes him a dependable literary workman. A quarter of a century of hack compilation is a good proof that, on the whole, his publishers find him a trustworthy agent in the get-up of such books, while his own position, combined with the pecuniary and business position of his publishers, secures him the best help that the

learning of the day can yield. Among his students Dr. Smith is popular, and as they, like other folks, find it a hard matter to state a concise difference between their head and the various other members of the extensive *genus* Smith, he has received from them the cognomen of *Dictionary Smith*.—R. M. A.

545. The best popular encyclopædia is that now being published by Messrs. W. and R. Chambers, London and Edinburgh. It is issued in monthly parts at sevenpence each, and in volumes at 9s. Seven volumes are already issued, and it is to be completed in nine.—S. W. YOUNG.

546. If T. V. wishes to accustom himself to persevering thought, he should study those subjects which frequently require a continuous train of reasoning to perceive the connection between the conclusion and the antecedent from which it is deduced. We all prove by experience that the capacity for deep thought does not necessarily increase with advancing years; it must be educated. We have studied the "Art of Reasoning," by Mr. Neil, and have just commenced Algebra and Euclid. These studies we have found to increase our capacity for persevering thought, and we therefore recommend them to T. D. When from flagging interest thoughtful reading is accompanied with drowsiness, T. V. will find that such works as Macaulay's brilliant essays and eloquent history will arrest and fix the attention; but, as an incentive to thought, Alison's suggestive histories are far more effective than Macaulay's sparkling rhetoric. If T. V. has sufficient leisure, he would do well to join the "Manuscript Magazine and Literary Society," about to be established as announced in last month's *British Controversialist*. We would also advise T. V. to take a volume of this Magazine, and read carefully all the articles on one subject, thoughtfully review the arguments *pro* and *con*, and then form his own opinions upon the debated point. T. V. must—

"Learn to labour and to wait," and then he will have good reason to expect such a reward as will amply repay him for all his labour.—SAMUEL.

548. Dr. Charles Richardson's "Dictionary of the English Language" (1836-7), republished about two years since, seems to me to be best suited for E. H. R.—MARWOOD H.

In the absence of the larger editions of Richardson and Johnson, E. H. R. will find Hyde Clark's little dictionary extremely useful. It contains 60,000 more words than any dictionary published. The old or obsolete words, provincial words, technical terms, &c., &c., are explained. In my own course of reading I have come across dozens of words unexplained either in Webster or Walker, but have found them in Hyde Clark. Published by Weale, price 3s. 6d. Had "Ruddy" a copy of this little work, it would have saved him the trouble of writing to you.—E. H.

549. *Esoteric* signifies scientific, taught to the initiated, as opposed to *exoteric*, general, popular, unsystematic. It was used formerly regarding the Greek mysteries, whose secrets were revealed only to the initiated, and were thence transferred to the private doctrines of Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, &c. The modern use of these terms is somewhat cognate to that of the ancient, viz., to indicate that there is a distinction, more or less, between that which is taught to the public in general and that which is taught in the schools and to students. The words are not at all uncommon, and are found in many dictionaries. They are of course both of Greek origin.—R. M. M.

550. Rev. John Frederick Denison Maurice was born in 1805. His father was a clergyman of the Unitarian persuasion. Being anxious to obtain a University education, he entered Trinity Hall, Cambridge, 1823, and his name appeared on the Civil Law tripos 1826-7 in the first class. Here he was a contemporary of John Sterling's. Not being a member of the Church of England, and being unwilling to subscribe

the tests, he left Cambridge without a degree, and commenced a literary career in London. Through the influence of S. T. Coleridge and Archdeacon Hare, he, as well as John Sterling, were reconciled to the Church. He then entered Exeter College, Oxford. He took his degree, second class, in Lit. Hum., in 1831. He edited the *Athenæum* 1830-4. In 1831 he sold to Mr. Bentley the novel, "Eustace Conway," which, however, was not published till 1834, in which year the author had taken orders, shortly after which he acted as chaplain of Guy's Hospital. An anonymous work of his, "Subscription no Bondage," created some sensation. He was chosen by the editors of the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana* to write "A General History of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy," displaying the principles on which the greatest thinkers in these departments have endeavoured to found their systems, pointing out their difficulties, and marking how far each has contributed to the progress of these sciences. These contributions have been reproduced in a greatly enlarged form, in four vols., bearing the dates respectively of 1850, 1854, 1857, 1862. These volumes are highly valuable, though less valuable as a record of, than as a critique on, the progress of human thought. The individuality of Maurice is too strong to keep the task of expositor apart from that of the advocate. They form a book of worth on many accounts, but chiefly for this—that they exhibit an honest mind standing before the thought of the past and looking at it in the light of the present. Hence it is full of reflected lights. Maurice can never get back into the twilight of the early ages; he is hence not a good reporter, though an excellent disquisitionist. The point of view taken by the author is perhaps rather Coleridgean and ideal; hence it may be advisable to read it part by part along with the "Biographical History of Philosophy," by G. H. Lewes, as well as Cousin's "Modern Philosophy," and Enfield's "Abridgement of Brucker." At all

events, Maurice's work should be read by any one wishing to be up to the mark in philosophy as it is. In 1846 Maurice was appointed Professor of Divinity in King's College, London. In 1849 he instituted the Queen's College for Ladies, in London. He held the office of chaplain of Lincoln's Inn. In 1853 he was ousted from his professorship with a hideous outcry for heresy on the matter of eternal punishments. He was in 1860 appointed incumbent of Vere-street Chapel, London. He is one of the warmest and most enlightened of the friends of the working classes. He has had the honour of founding the first working man's college in London. He is one of the most voluminous as well as the most popular writers of the age. His style is pellucid and exquisitely chaste. A little mysticism appears in his thought, never in his expression. He is most frequently classed with the "Broad Church," but he is not at all a party man. He has, as most men of sterling honesty are in our days, been both misunderstood and misrepresented. He is the author of upwards of twenty volumes, many pamphlets, sermons, and lectures, and innumerable contributions to periodicals. He married the sister of Archdeacon Hare, who married the sister of Maurice, John Sterling becoming the husband of the other sister. G. H. will perhaps find the foregoing enough for his purpose. It would be impossible in the "Inquirer" to offer an epitome or estimate of a mind so varied, manifested so variously. S. N.

551. A fine genial article on David Gray appeared in the *Cornhill* last year, from the pen of Robert Buchanan, who, in his "Idyls and Legends of Inverburn," under the title of "Poet Andrew" gives a poetic version of the poet of Markland, for whom a monument was inaugurated, 2nd of August, 1865, of the ceremonial, &c., at which, I forward a report, to be used at the discretion of the editor of the *British Controversialist*.

Those who are interested in David

Gray will, we have little doubt, be gratified to see the following extract from the *Spectator*, in which Robert Buchanan and his friend David Gray are compared and contrasted with Wordsworth. It is a fine specimen of philosophical criticism. It occurs in a review of Mr. Robert Buchanan's "Inverburn":—

"Wordsworth has often been spoken of as a poet completely outside the direct line of poetic tradition, as standing apart in a still backwater, as it were, from the great stream of our national poetry—as being without parent and without offspring. Whatever may be the truth as to the former point—and we readily admit that we know of nothing like Wordsworth before Wordsworth—it certainly cannot be said since the publication of David Gray's lyrics and Mr. Buchanan's fresh idyls that he is without poetical offspring. The former of the two, indeed, the brilliant young poet whose pale sweet light rose only to set before its brightness had been seen, except by the eyes of the few, had much more in him of Wordsworth than has Mr. Buchanan. His genius was fed from the lyrical side of Wordsworth, while Mr. Buchanan's has been fed from that perhaps less striking side of his genius, which delighted in the meditative delineation of simple village characters and of natural griefs or joys. Not that even Wordsworth's genius was eminently lyrical. He kept the themes of his poetry too steadily to the focus of his own meditative thought, as an astronomer steadily keeps the image of the star he is observing in the centre of his reflecting mirror, to give the full involuntary rush of lyric emotion to his verse. If the adjective 'lyrical' implies perfect spontaneousness, as to a large degree we think it does, David Gray's poetry is even more lyrical than his master's. Its rhythm suggests the musical lapse of falling waters more distinctly to our ears. Wordsworth's deepest and fullest lyrics suggest the strong and rapturous plunges of the mind swimming freely and alone in the

infinite ocean of Nature, David Gray's far thinner and fainter, but yet sweeter, strains, the flowing away of the very essence of his own nature in streams of melody. But if David Gray took his inspiration from the most lyrical side of Wordsworth's genius, Mr. Buchanan takes his from the most dramatic—perhaps we ought to say the least undramatic—side. In such poems as the very fine ones on 'Michael,' 'The Mad Mother,' 'The Idiot Boy,' and some others, Wordsworth showed a very considerable power of entering up to a certain point into the emotions of other minds, though he never failed to steep them with something of his own meditative rapture. It is from this side of his poetry that Mr. Buchanan seems to have fed his own mind,—such poems as 'Willie Baird' and 'Poet Andrew,' for instance, reminding us in their type of Wordsworth's 'Michael,' though showing less meditative genius than Wordsworth, and borrowing just a shade of the long-drawn dramatic sketches of Browning. The chief characteristic in which David Gray and Robert Buchanan alike resemble Wordsworth is the cool, white, transparent tone of their thoughts, the absence of prismatic colour, of multiplex ornament, in their workmanship,—the complete predominance of the single conception which runs through the whole, over the various elements which constitute the parts. Tennyson's workmanship is all rich,—Browning's is all grotesque and singular; in both, the whole is sometimes forgotten in the richness of the odd emphasis of the parts. But in Wordsworth every picture is imaged on the cool surface of deep still water, which mellows the colours, softens the lines, and gives each a wholeness of effect. And here both David Gray and Mr. Buchanan resemble their master. Theirs is not the poetry of metaphor, simile, or imaginative *tours de force*. There is always some single thought or mood of which the poem is an embodiment, and which is as simple and transparent in struc-

ture as a crystal. There is nothing tropical in either of them. The mountaineer poet has been succeeded by other mountaineer poets. The mountain stream ripples audibly in both: the 'power of hills' is on both; in both the wild flower is a deeper passion than the garden flower.

"But though true of Mr. Buchanan, it is less true of him than of his helpless brother poet. Mr. Buchanan's poems, as we have already hinted, are less simple in structure, less crystalline, less entire, partly perhaps because they are less lyrical and enter deeper into the minds of others, than David Gray's. Their form is less perfect, their rhythm less musical, their breath of inspiration less pure, and less free from half-assimilated materials, but the materials which Mr. Buchanan strives to assimilate are more various and rich than those of David Gray's clear, thrilling, and delicate musings on the beauty of nature. On the other hand, also, it is quite possible that Mr. Buchanan's poems promise for his genius a fuller and more vigorous growth. He has been advised by an able and friendly critic—and no critic who has any true feeling for poetry can do anything but echo that advice—to abstain in future from his little legendary fancies, his elves, and fays, and trolls, and the rest of them, and stick to real and simple life, in the semi-dramatic delineation of which his true power lies. There is as broad a gulf between the poetry of 'Poet Andrew,' or 'Willie Baird,' or the beautiful 'London Idyl' he recently published in the *Fortnightly Review*, as there is between Tennyson's 'Ulysses' and his 'Airy, Fairy Lillian'—between the pleasure which sinks deep into the imagination and the heart, and the pleasure, if there be any, in a gentle tickling of the fancy."—J. LANGTOWN.

553. Jane Taylor (1783—1824), second sister of Isaac Taylor, was the author of "Twinkle, twinkle, Little Star."—MARWOOD H.

554. Before it is possible to give a definite answer to J. W. B.'s question,

"For a beginner in Greek what author is it best to begin with?" it is necessary to know what he means by a beginner. If he is perfect in the elements of that language, having the declensions of nouns and conjugations of verbs at his finger's ends, and has already done something in construing and in exercises, then the best author is undoubtedly Xenophon's "Anabasis," since the matter is easy to understand, and the words are constantly recurring, which renders it an admirable book for beginners. The best edition is perhaps Macmillan's. Arnold's is no doubt excellent, as are all the works edited by him. But here I would offer J. W. B. an advice, which, if followed, will save him immense time and trouble in his acquisition of the dead languages—Latin and Greek, I mean. If he has mastered the grammar, and has done a little in translation, let him get a copy of Xenophon, and Giles's "Key" to the same, and, after having read two or three pages of the "Key," which is a word for word translation, and having marked on the margin the words he does not know, and having learnt them, let him take the text only, and proceed to translate it without any assistance from key or lexicon. We add lexicon, because in so simple an author the difficulty, except in a very few cases, will be in the words. Words, after the beginner has learnt the elements of the grammar, form a stumbling-block. Let him proceed on this plan almost entirely—that is if he merely wants sufficient knowledge of the language to read it and not to compose in it; occasionally construing with no helps but the grammar and lexicon, in order that he may have sufficient groundwork to build upon. After he has read three or four books *thoroughly* in this manner, that is, till he knows all or most of the words therein—he will find himself able to read a harder author—a Greek play, perhaps. I strongly recommend him to proceed on this plan *extensively*, and with other authors than Xenophon. In Latin the same system will save endless

trouble and time. Let J. W. B. remember, that to be able to read the classics with any facility is, according to the old plan, a work of many years; and the system I recommend I feel confident, with young men of fair abilities, industry, and knowledge of the elements, will effect the same, and much more agreeably, and in far less time. The Greek Testament, too, I would strongly recommend as a beginner's book. It is the easiest, though not the best Greek; and can be read by the merest tyro, especially when the English translation is brought in use. If J. W. B. works without the assistance of others, let him in all cases get translations or keys to what he is engaged upon; they are not to young men in earnest of that pernicious nature that was formerly ascribed to them; they serve as a master, and will often help when help is absolutely necessary. If J. W. B. read Xenophon's "Anabasis" and the four gospels,—St. John is the easiest, so the best to begin with—*thoroughly*, he will find that he has a considerable knowledge of Greek.

If J. W. B. refer to the first volume of this magazine for 1864, he will find this system explained more fully in an essay headed "Classical Studies." It was written in haste, and not at all so fully explained or exemplified as was intended. I have not read it since, but as it was written with the same opinion and for the same purpose as this reply, I feel sure it will contain something that J. W. B. is anxious to learn. Of all books, not *authors*, I consider Arnold's "First Greek Book" the best and by far the most adapted for an earnest learner of the language. If J. W. B. has not "done" this, and finds an author too difficult, or wants exercises in English to turn into Greek, let him begin this excellent book, and if he seeks further information in this or its kindred subject—Latin, I shall be most happy to reply, through the medium of "The Inquirer," to any questions he may find necessary to ask.—ELPISTIÇOS.

# Our Collegiate Course;

OR, AIDS TO SELF-CULTURE.

## STUDIES IN ENGLISH LITERATURE.

### POPE'S "ESSAY ON CRITICISM."—PART II.

[The language and style of a poem ought not to be attended to solely, to the exclusion of a consideration of its meaning and scope—false, discriminated from true taste.]

*Others for language all their care express,* 105  
*And value books, as women men, for dress;*  
*Their praise is still,—the style is excellent;*  
*The sense they humbly take upon content,*  
*Words are like leaves, (25) and where they most abound,*  
*Much fruit of sense beneath is rarely found,* 110

### MEANINGS OF WORDS IN ITALICS, AS SUGGESTIONS FOR PARAPHRASING.

Line 105. Some; phrases; desire.  
 106. Esteem; outward show.  
 107. Commendation; ever; diction.  
 108. Signification; meanly; trust.

109. Foliage; exist numerously.  
 110. Valuable matter; seldom; attained.

- (25) "Ut silvæ foliis pronus mutantur in annos  
 Prima cadunt; ita verborum vetus interit ætas,  
 Et juvenum ritu florent modo nata vigentque.  
 Debemur morti nos nostraque. . . . .  
 . . . . . Mortalia factu peribunt;  
 Nedum sermonum stet honos et gratia vivax.  
 Multa renascentur quæ jam cecidere, cadentque  
 Quæ nunc sunt in honore vocabula, si volet usus,  
 Quem penes arbitrium est et jus et norma loquendi."  
*Horace, "Ars Poetica," lines 60—63, 68—72.*

"As woods whose change appears  
 Still in their leaves, throughout the sliding years  
 The firstborn dying; so the aged state  
 Of words decays, and phrases, born but late,  
 Like tender buds shoot up, and freshly grow,  
 Ourselves and all that's ours to death we owe.  
 . . . . . All mortal deeds  
 Shall perish; so far off it is, the state  
 Or grace of speech, should hope a lasting date.  
 Much phrase that now is dead shall be revived,  
 And much shall die that now is nobly lived,  
 If custom please; at whose disposing will  
 The power and rule of speaking resteth still."

*Ben Jonson's "Translation."*

*False eloquence*, like the prismatic glass,  
 Its *gaudy* colours *spreads* on every place;  
 The face of nature we no more *survey*,  
 All *glares* alike, without *distinction* gay;  
 But *true expression*, (26) like the *unchanging* sun, 115  
*Clears* and *improves* *whate'er* it shines upon;  
 It *gilds* all objects, but it *alters* none. (27)  
*Expression* is the *dress* of *thought*, and *still*  
*Appears* more *decent* as more *suitable*;  
 A *vile conceit*, in *pompous* words express'd, 120  
 Is like a *clown* in *regal purple dressed*.  
 For different *styles* with different subjects *sort*,  
 As several *garbs*, with country, town and court.  
 Some by old words to *fame* have *made pretence*,  
 Ancients in *phrase*, mere moderns in their *sense*; 125  
 Such *labour'd* nothings, in so *strange* a style,  
*Amaze* the *unlearned*, and *make* the *learned smile*. (28)  
*Unlucky* as *Fungosa* (29) in the *play*,

- |                                      |                                      |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 111. Sham poetic diction.            | 121. Peasant; kingly robes; arrayed. |
| 112. Showy, but tasteless; bedaubs.  | 122. Because; modes of expression;   |
| 113. Behold.                         | suit.                                |
| 114. Glitters painfully; difference. | 123. Dresses.                        |
| 115. Correct speech; impartial.      | 124. Reputation; laid claim.         |
| 116. Brightens; beautifies.          | 125. Diction; ideas.                 |
| 117. Adds glory to; changes.         | 126. Farfetched; peculiar.           |
| 118. Words; drapery; ideas; ever.    | 127. Astonish; fools; cause; laugh.  |
| 119. Seem; becoming; correct.        | 128. Unsuccessful; drama.            |
| 120. Low flash of fancy; gorgeous.   |                                      |

(26) "A man should so deliver himself to the nature of the subject whereof he speaks, that his hearers may take notice of his discipline with some delight; and so apparel fair and good matter that the studious of elegancy be not defrauded; redeem arts from their rough and brakey seats, where they lay hid and overgrown with thorns, to a pure, open, and flowery light, where they may take the eye and be taken by the hand."—*Ben Jonson's "Discoveries."*

(27) "Poetry and picture are arts of a like nature, and both are busy about imitation. It was excellently said of Plutarch, poetry was a speaking picture, and picture a mute poesy. For they both invent, feign, and devise many things, and accommodate all they invent to the use and service of nature. Yet of the two the pen is more noble than the pencil; for that can speak to the understanding, the other but to the sense. They both behold pleasure and profit, as their common object; but should abstain from all base pleasures, lest they should err from their end, and while they seek to better men's minds, destroy their manners. They both are born artificers, not made. Nature is more powerful in them than study."—*Ben Jonson's "Discoveries."*

(28) "Now this overdone, or come tardy off, though it make the unskilful laugh, cannot but make the judicious grieve; the censure of which, one must, in your allowance, overweigh a whole theatre of others."—*Hamlet*, III., 2.

(29) *Fungosa*, a character in Ben Jonson's "Every Man out of his Humour," acted 1599. He is the son of Sordido, who is "a wretched hob-nailed chuff." *Fungosa* is a student and a reveller who "follows the fashions, like a spy, afar off. He makes it the whole bent of his endeavours to wring sufficient means from his wretched father, to put him in the courtier's cut; at which he earnestly aims, but

These *sparks* with *awkward* vanity display, -  
 What the fine gentleman wore yesterday; 130  
 And *but* so *mimic* ancient wits at best,  
 As apes our grandsires, in their doublets dressed,  
 In words, as fashions, the same rule will hold,  
 Alike *fantastic*, if too new or old;  
 Be not the *first* by whom the new are *tried*, 135  
 Nor yet the last to *lay* the old *aside*.  
 But *most* by *numbers* judge a poet's song;  
 And smooth or rough, with them is right or wrong; (30)  
 In the *bright muse*, though thousand *charms* *conspire*,  
 Her *voice* is all these *tuneful* fools *admire*; 140  
 Who *haunt* Parnassus (31) but to *please* their ear,  
 Not *mend* their *minds*; as some to *church* *repair*,  
 Not for the *doctrine*, but the *music* there.  
 These equal syllables alone require,  
 Though oft the ear the open vowels tire; 145  
 While *expletives* their *feeble aid* do *join*,  
 And ten low words oft creep in one dull line: (32)

- |  |                                       |
|--|---------------------------------------|
| 129. Would-be's; ill-fitting; egotism. | 140. Expression; sound-weighing;      |
| 131. Just; imitate badly.              | think much of.                        |
| 134. Unsuitable.                       | 141. Habitually frequent; gratify.    |
| 135. Earliest; employed.               | 142. Improve; intellects; worship go. |
| 136. Put; out of use.                  | 143. Practical instruction; melody.   |
| 137. The greater part; rhythm; form    | 146. Needless expressions; worthless  |
| their opinion of.                      | help; supply.                         |
| 139. Genuine poet; delightful excel-   |                                       |
| lences; combine.                       |                                       |

so unluckily, that he still lights short a suit." He is a mere imitator, without mind.

(30) "Every poet, then, is a versifier; every fine poet an excellent one; and he is the best whose verse exhibits the greatest amount of strength, sweetness, straightforwardness, unsuperfluity, variety, and oneness,—oneness, that is to say, consistency, in the general impression, metrical and moral; and variety, or every pertinent diversity of tone and rhythm, in the process. . . . Any poetaster can be smooth. Smoothness abounds in all small poets, as sweetness does in the greater. Sweetness is the smoothness of grace and delicacy,—of the sympathy with the pleasing and lovely. Spenser is full of it,—Shakspeare,—Beaumont and Fletcher,—Coleridge."—*Leigh Hunt's "Imagination and Fancy,"* pp. 38 and 42.

(31) *Parnassus*, a range of mountains running south-east through Doris and Phocis to the Gulf of Corinth, though the name is usually restricted to the highest summit, 8,000 feet. Its sides were well wooded with myrtle, laurel, and olive trees. It contains caves, glens, and romantic ravines. It is one of the chief seats of Apollo and the Muses. From its sides, a little above Delphi, the Castalian springs issue. It is now called *Liakoura*, or *Zagora*, and is about sixty miles north-west of Athens.

(32) We may here quote a passage from De Quincey; "Take the 'Essay on Criticism;' it is a collection of independent maxims, tied together into a fasciculus by the printer, but having no natural order or logical dependency; generally so vague as to mean nothing; like the general rules of justice, &c., in ethics, to which



While they ring round the same *unvaried chimes*,  
 With *sure returns* of still expected rhymes;  
 Where'er you find "the cooling western breeze," 150  
 In the next line it "whispers through the trees;"  
 If crystal streams "with pleasing murmurs creep,"  
 The reader's threatened (not in vain) with sleep,  
 Then at the *last* and only couplet, *fraught*  
 With some *unmeaning* thing they call a *thought*, 155  
 A needless Alexandrine (33) ends the song,  
 That, like a *wounded* snake, *drags* its slow length along.  
*Leave such to tune* their own *dull* rhymes, and *know*  
 What's roundly smooth or languishingly slow;  
 And *praise* the *easy vigour* of a line 160  
 Where Denham's (34) strength and Waller's (35) sweetness join.

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 148. At the same time that; un-<br>changed answering notes.<br>149. Certain repetition.<br>154. Terminal; filled.<br>155. Incomprehensible; idea. | 157. Resembling; injured; pulls pain-<br>fully.<br>158. Allow these; give music to;<br>stupid; ascertain.<br>160. Approve of; masterly power. |
|---|---|

every man assents; but *when* the question comes about any practical case, *is* it just? the opinions fly asunder far as the poles. And what is remarkable,—many of the rules are violated by no man so often as by Pope, and by Pope nowhere so often as in this very poem. As a single instance, he proscribes monosyllabic lines; and in no English poem of any pretensions are there so many lines of that class as in this. We have counted above a score, and the last line of all is monosyllabic." This line contains the offending rule. The reader will observe that Pope does not object to ten words, but to ten *low* words, forming a *dull* line. Of monosyllabic lines in this poem we may note the following, and the reader can judge for himself whether they all and each contain "ten low words," of which the results are *dull* lines, and thus decide on De Quincey v. Pope,—lines 35, 73, 81, 107, 113, 226, 232, 254, 284, 303, 335, 338, 347, 358, 399, 426, 451, 504, 574, 599, 632, 673, 685, 727, 744.

(33) *Alexandrine verses*, in English, consist of twelve syllables, of which the sixth should end a word. Drayton's "Polyolbion" is written in Alexandrines, and the Spenserian stanza always closes with such a line. It is, however, in general used only occasionally in heroics, and in Dryden's poems most frequently terminates a triplet. It got its name from a French poem, entitled "The Alexandriad." It was made popular by Ronsard, and it now forms the regular heroic verse of French poetry. Lines 357 and 373 of the "Essay on Criticism" are Alexandrines.

(34) *Sir John Denham* was born in Dublin in 1615. He was educated for the law, and was a member of Lincoln's Inn. In youth he was much addicted to gaming, but eventually overcame that vice. In 1642 he issued his tragedy, "The Sophy." "Cooper's Hill," his next venture, is a highly successful descriptive poem. He translated "Virgil," and the "Cato Major;" and composed a metrical version of the "Psalms." He and Waller broke off from the metaphysical school of poets, and were among the earliest to attend to harmony of sound and sense, and the laws of poetic melody. He died 1688, and was buried in Westminster Abbey.

(35) *Edmund Waller* was born at Coleshill, Hertfordshire, 3rd March, 1605. He was at once a poet and a politician. In the latter capacity he was doomed to death for favouring the Restoration, but was reprieved. He composed a "Panegyric" on Cromwell, and a congratulatory ode "To the King upon His Majesty's

*True ease in writing comes from art, not chance,  
 As those move easiest who have learned to dance.  
 'Tis not enough no harshness gives offence,  
 The sound must seem an echo to the sense:* 165  
*Soft is the strain when Zephyr (36) gently blows,  
 And the smooth stream in smoother numbers flows;  
 But when loud surges lash the sounding shore,  
 The hoarse, rough verse should like the torrent roar.  
 When Ajax (37) strives some rock's vast weight to throw, 170  
 The line too labours, and the words move slow:  
 Not so when swift Camilla (38) scours the plain,  
 Flies o'er th' unbending corn, and skims along the main,  
 Hear how Timotheus' (39) varied lays surprise,  
 And bid alternate passions fall and rise:* 175  
*While at each change, the son of Lybian Jove (40)*

162. Proper readiness; composition;  
 well-directed labour.

164. Sufficient; creaking phraseology;  
 produces dislike.

165. Phrase; suggestive reproduction.

168. Noisy billows rush furiously  
 upon.

169. Grating harsh; ocean-storm re-  
 sound.

173. Moves lightly; scarcely touched;  
 floats gently; sea.

174. Listen; in what manner; de-  
 lightedly excite.

175. Cause differing feelings to come  
 and go.

**Happy Return.** His poetry is smooth, not strong; pure in diction, though slightly overstrained in manner. His faults are nearly balanced by his merits. He, too, died in 1688.

(36) *Zephyrus*, the west wind personified.

(37) *Ajax (Aias)* son of Telamon, King of Salamis, and grandson of Æacus, one of the heroes of the *Iliad*, second only to Achilles in bravery. The madness of *Ajax* is the subject of one of the tragedies of Sophocles.

(38) *Camilla*, one of the swift-of-foot servants of *Diana*, skilled in war and the chase, who assisted *Turnus* against *Æneas*, slew many Trojans, and was herself slain by *Arms*.

(39) *Timotheus*, a distinguished Theban flute-player,—

“*Timotheus, placed on high  
 Amid the tuneful quire,  
 With flying fingers touched the lyre,—  
 The trembling notes ascend the sky,  
 And heavenly joys inspire  
 The song began from Jove,  
 Who left his blissful seats above,  
 (Such is the power of mighty love)*

When he to fair *Olympia* pressed,

And stamped an image of himself, a sovereign of the world.”

*Dryden's “Alexander's Feast.”*

(40) *The son of Lybian Jove*, *Alexander the Great*, who was declared by the oracle to be the son of *Jupiter*,—

“High on a throne with trophies charged I viewed  
 The Youth that all things—but himself—subdued;

Now burns with *glory*, and then melts with love ;  
 Now his fierce eyes with sparkling fury glow,  
 Now sighs steal out, and tears begin to flow;  
 Persians and Greeks *like turns of nature found*,  
 And the *world's victor* stood subdued by sound;  
 The *power* of music all our *hearts allow*,  
 And what Timotheus was is Dryden (41) now.

177. Glows; thirst for fame; yields himself.

180. Similar alternations; disposition felt.

181. Earth's conqueror; overcome.

182. Subduing might; spirits admit.

His feet on sceptres and tiaras trode  
 And his horned head belied the Lybian god."

Pope's "Temple of Fame."

(41) *Dryden*, author of "Alexander's Feast," to which lines (374—383) allude, born at Aldwinkle, in Northamptonshire, of a knightly family, studied at Trinity College, Cambridge. He wrote a eulogy on Cromwell, as one of his earliest efforts for fame. He is author of twenty-eight dramas, many translations, several adaptations, epistles, fables, and original poems, seldom perfect but always vigorous. He was poet-laureate, and ultimately became a convert to Roman Catholicism, so being a co-religionist of Pope's. He died 1700, and was buried in Westminster Abbey, between Chaucer and Cowley.

## Literary Notes.

M. C. Baudelaire has translated the works of E. A. Poe into French.

Count Baudissin has translated Molière's comedies into German.

It is said that a large quantity of MSS. by Michael Angelo, painter, poet, and sculptor, has been discovered.

An "inexpressibly charming" correspondence between M. de Tocqueville, author of "Democracy in America," and his wife, is about to be published.

Signorina Bartolini (*née* Grace), translatress of Macanlay's "Lays of Ancient Rome," died at Pistoia, 17th June.

A Palestine Exploration Fund has been instituted.

"The Apostles," by E. Rénan, is expected in autumn.

A Sanscrit Text Society has been founded.

The *National Review* has become defunct.

A list of upwards of 700 names of students of natural and physical science in favour of a true relation between theology and philosophy has been issued.

Fifty thousand copies of the Boston (U.S.) edition of "Enoch Arden," at 25 cents (1s.), have been sold.

Mrs. H. B. Stowe is editing a volume of "Sacred Poems."

"The Person of Christ the Miracle of History," from the pen of Prof. Schaff, is in the (American) press.

"Genesis and its Authorship" is a work nearly ready, by Rev. J. Quarry.

W. E. Aytoun, Professor of Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, Edinburgh, author of "Bothwell," a poem, "Norman Sinclair," a novel, &c., died August 4th, aged 52.

In reply to a letter of invitation to assist at the inauguration of a statue to his father, François Arago, in his native town, on 31st Aug., Emanuel Arago refuses to "accept a half homage to his memory," and insists that he was greater as a statesman than as a man of science.

M. Augt. Alfred Thiry Albert, dramatic author, died at Fontainebleau, Aug. 5th, aged 79.

At the *Conservatoire Imperial* of music and declamation, in Paris, a young lady, named Augelot, gained the first prize in comedy and the second in tragedy.

A Dante festival is to be held in Dresden on the anniversary of the death-day of the poet, 17th Sept. Dr. Karl Witte proposes the foundation of a Dante Library as a memorial.

"A History of the Reign of Henry VII." by Mr. Thos. Parnell, Secretary of the Archæological Institute, is expected with great hope.

Two prizes, of 500 and 200 thalers respectively, have been offered by the Berlin Society for the Study of Modern Languages, for the best papers on the following subjects, viz., "The Influence of Shakspeare in the Development of the English Language," and "A Comparison of the Criticisms on Shakspeare by the German and the Romance nations."

Napoleon III. is said to be revising the second and third volumes of his "Life of Cæsar," for publication in the autumn.

An international congress of students, to be held at Liege, 29th October, has been proposed.

Dr. Livingstone passed through Paris while we were there, on his way to undertake an exploratory tour in inter-tropical Africa, especially in the sub-equatorial regions, and to survey the spots of the discoveries of Burton, Speke, Grant, &c.

A statue-monument to the celebrated jurisconsult, Antoine Favre, was inaugurated at Chambéry, 15th August.

Mr. Joseph Parker, who had been a thorough student of the age and politics of the time of Junius, and was engaged for nearly twenty years in preparing material for a history and exposition of "The Authorship of Junius," and who had also projected a biography of his grandfather-in-law, Dr. Priestly, is dead:

A new one-volumed edition of Judge Haliburton's "Sam Slick, or the Sayings and Doings of the Clockmaker," is in preparation, annotated by the author.

Sir W. J. Hooker, the eminent botanist, born at Norwich, 1785, is announced as dead.

Sala has "A Trip to Barbary, by a Roundabout Route," in the press.

Adolf Stahr is engaged in rehabilitating the Cæsars.

Strauss, Schenkel, and Hengstenberg, are engaged in a controversy about the "Life of Christ."

Hesiod's "Theogony" has been excellently edited by F. G. Welcker.

The Vienna University has conferred on J. S. Mill the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

A new edition of the "Poems" of David Gray are in the press.

An attempt to ascertain the state of Chaucer's works as they were left at his death has been made by Henry Bradshaw, of the Cambridge University Library, and the results have been embodied in a work which will appear shortly.

In his "Philosophical Crisis," M. Paul Janet opposes *positivism* as represented in the writings of Renan, Taine, Littré, and Vacherot; and M. Adolph Leblais in a work on "Materialism and Spiritualism," which has a preface from M. Littré's pen, maintains its correctness, and upholds its tenets.

## Controversies in Philosophy.

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MILL—HAMILTON—GROTE—HERBERT SPENCER, &c.

“Truth, like a torch, the more it's shook it shines.”

CONTROVERSY is accepted by all great thinkers as a beneficial exercise of intellectual activity. The bringing of opinions face to face for comparison and mutual contention, and the placing of them contemporaneously in our own presence and in the presence of others for adjudication upon their comparative value in respect to the truth they contain or imply, stimulate to a closer scrutiny of their credentials, to a more attentive study of their special qualities, and to a more cautious sifting of their claims, and all that is founded upon those claims. Controversy secures pertinent statements, precise distinctions, and an orderly evolution of evidence. It abhors irrelevancy of matter and disorder in exposition, but delights in promptitude of thought and strict adherence to the logic of proof. Controversy is the severest test of opinion. What strain will it bear? what force can it resist? against what opposition can it stand? with what can it cope? are questions which can be truthfully answered with regard to no thought until it has been subjected to strenuous and impartial controversy. Controversy provides both for the correct and forcible presentation of thought, and for its adequate representation. The true correspondence of words with thoughts, and of thoughts with facts, is, by it, carefully tested; all deficiencies are thus brought into prominence, that they may be supplied; all distortions are pointed out, that they may be rectified; and all irrelevancies are noted, that they may be eliminated. The criterion of controversy is sharp and keen. The education of controversy is quickening and exciting. The uses of controversy are many.

Controversy occupies a large space in literature and in life. The action and reaction of thought on almost all subjects on which it can employ itself is controversial. In politics it has a given place and duty. The press, the platform, and the parliament are alike devoted to the controversial consideration of social and political projects. The pulpit wages a constant warfare of controversy with worldliness and sin—not to mention its seldom intermitted contests of sect. Commerce employs some of its energies in conflicts regarding laws, customs, privileges, and forms of procedure, and sometimes even extends its controversial prowess into the regions

of statesmanship and finance. Science, whose claims have been so arrogant and so strenuously maintained, whose decisions have been held to be invulnerable, and whose doctrines have been laid down so dictatorially, has not been able to subdue the controversial spirit, but has been compelled to present her doctrines for critical discussion, and to wait for the determination of their accuracy until the tests which controversy proposes have been cogently applied. Controversy has even now taken the leadership of experiment and investigation, and has determined for them the essentials of proof. In philosophy, no less than in science, controversy has asserted her right to an active participation in the outworking of its doctrines and dogmas, its schemes and proposals. To elicit truth, controversy is essential.

A work of notable importance in philosophical controversy has been recently placed before the public, and has won for itself a large amount of consideration. It is a book of great force of thought, and one of great value to those interested in philosophical inquiries. It is entitled "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and of the principal Philosophical Questions discussed in his writings," by John Stuart Mill. Two names in logical science—Mill and Hamilton—hold the heights in men's estimation. They are the leaders of two camps, and under one or other of these distinguished thinkers most of the students of thought in Britain have ranged themselves.\* Hamilton is dead—but he lives in his disciples

\* The following "comparative" estimate of these two thinkers is due, we believe, to Professor A. C. Fraser, and is extracted from the *North British Review*, from an article on "Mr. Mill's Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton:"—

"With Sir W. Hamilton, nevertheless, Mr. Mill is to be classed as one of our two great contemporary systematic reasoners about the nature and methods of knowledge, and the laws which should regulate belief; while they are distinguished as leaders of what are commonly regarded as opposed and rival schools of philosophical doctrine. They are accepted representatives of the two contrasted methods of interpreting the world in its ultimate relation to our knowledge, which philosophy has presented throughout its history, and the discussion of which has been said to be its history. Whether this ought to be said we shall consider by-and-bye. Here, at the outset, we note distinctive marks in the aims of the two leaders whose respective answers to the principal questions of all philosophical inquiry are in this volume placed side by side and compared. These marks may be pondered by those who want to appreciate the human interests which this otherwise purely intellectual discussion concerns; for it is their broadly distinguishable intention, as much as their metaphysical formulas, which gives to such systems power.

"The spirit which seeks to conserve faith in God, free will, and other super-sensible realities, is to be found working in Sir W. Hamilton, amid a crowd of learned references to the grand historic past of speculation, and by means which have for their avowed end the promotion of intellectual activity as in itself a good thing. Mr. Mill, on the other hand, is inspired with the hope of intellectual progress in the future, and on this behalf he struggles for present freedom of thought from the bondage of assumptions imposed as necessary by the past. In Hamilton a reverential intellectual conservatism animates a series of discussions, dogmatically confined round a centre of supposed necessary principles or intuitions, which

as a vital power in speculative science. Mill lives, a force in himself, and largely reinforced by an active and able host of men of like habit of thought. Of the lives and doings of these "leaders of men" in the science of logic our readers have already been furnished with an outline and a criticism. Those sketches of the systems of logic propounded by Mill and Hamilton were rather expository than controversial, and did not enter into the comparative merits of theories at all. No good ground existed in the circumstances of the case to justify us in initiating a formal controversy regarding the respective merits of the speculations put before us by the Westminster reviewer and the Edinburgh reviewer. In the whole works of Sir Wm. Hamilton the name of John Stuart Mill does not, if we remember rightly, occur; nor do any of his specific doctrines receive from the leading philosopher of Scotland any explicit reference or distinctly avowed discussion.

We are not aware either that in any previous work by John Stuart Mill a formal and distinct examination of any of the tenets of Sir William Hamilton has been made. Sir William Hamilton was unfortunately stricken with paralysis but a short time after the appearance of Mr. Mill's book; and all his subsequent efforts were fugitive and fragmentary. He could not but feel that to gird up his loins for a controversy with John S. Mill in his shattered and maimed condition would be but to court defeat, or at least failure. He could, he doubtlessly believed, trust his thoughts to the future and to his disciples. It is perhaps to be regretted that his disciples have but ill fulfilled their implied trust. Several Hamiltonians already possess place fit and opportunity inviting for the promulgation of their master's doctrines and the defence of his speculative orthodoxy, who have been long expected in the field of controversial logic. But they have treated the public to a surfeit of "hope delayed;" and though nearly ten years have elapsed since his decease, there has not yet appeared any distinctive treatise on a logical subject from the pen of a disciple and pupil, either expository, illustrative, or defensive of his theories and teaching. Even from reviews his name has been allowed to vanish, and logical science has had, so far as depended on his pupils, but a languishing existence. If their discipleship is at all honest,—if

are assumed to be given originally to our weak, because finite intelligence. Mr. Mill encourages intellectual movement in any direction to which we are conducted by experience, consolidated by invariable mental associations, and animated by expectancy. With Hamilton, the most important questions are assumed to be finally foreclosed. With Mr. Mill all questions are always open questions; what is yet to happen may modify our answers to them; the human race is on a hopeful voyage of discovery—any whither. The Hamiltonian starts with propositions believed by him to be universally necessary; the disciple of Mr. Mill declines to admit the claim of any proposition to eternal universality or necessity. And yet each writes in large letters, on the very front of his philosophy, that whatever knowledge can be attained by or attributed to man is essentially finite and relative."

they have any of the fine enthusiasm of admiring students,—an opportunity is now furnished to them of maintaining and extending the fame and honour of their master, and the renown of the Scottish philosophy, of which he was at once an expounder and an ornament.

We have no inducements to partizanship. We seize upon truth (as it appears to us) wherever it is found, and welcome the logical speculations of France and Germany as readily as those of England and Scotland. As recorders and reviewers of the modern history of logic, we believe that we have no temptation to misstate or misinterpret. Hence we hope, that in giving some notice of those "Controversies in Philosophy" which have been brought into a palpably debatable form by the issue of the work to which we have already referred, we may be able to explain with candour, and review with honesty, the several philosophical theses started in this work of England's chief living thinker in logical science. We must, however, precede our concise abstract and criticism by a brief narrative.

In 1836 Sir William Hamilton became Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, under specific conditions, as a public teacher, that his philosophy should conform to (or at least should not outrage) the national faith. By the year 1840 he had so far consolidated his teaching as to have his two courses of lectures (since published under the editorship of Dr. Mansel and Professor Veitch) written out for delivery, except a few modifications regarding the syllogistic extensions, on which he prided himself not a little, and which occupied a good deal of his time and attention.

In the year 1843 there came the great schism of the National Church of Scotland, both the antecedents and results of which affected Sir William Hamilton much. In this same year of terrible contestings in Scotland, the "System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Deductive," of John Stuart Mill, appeared. During this season of intense anguish in Scottish hearts and homes little leisure for reconsidering the entire foundation and structure of logical science could, we imagine, be had. Church, University, society, private friendships, and literary associations were all "disrupt" for the time being. A rival institution—New College, containing a rival chair to that which Hamilton occupied—was set on foot in opposition to the University. Hamilton, always worked up to the highest pitch, and sadly overstrained by the task of composing his lectures, preparing his text-books, arranging class exercises, and taking part in the literary, political, and religious movements of Edinburgh, succumbed to paralysis, and was never afterwards the indomitable investigator and indefatigable hunter after truth that he had been. The light of his intellect burnt low, and sometimes flickered. An irresistible pressure weighed upon every effort, and made each an irksome toil. Any revision of his system or reconstruction of his lectures thus became impossible. When, therefore, we consider the conditions which overruled the original form of the lectures,



the conditions arising from the class for which they were written, and the accidents which prevented any vital reconsideration or revision of them, we cannot avoid feeling that to be judged mainly by these lectures is in reality to be in a great measure misjudged.

The sources of misjudgment are fivefold, viz. :—1. The lectures were written in haste to meet the immediate necessity of daily delivery ; they cannot, therefore, but be less consecutively thought out, less formally exact in expression, and less precise in systematic coherence than productions more deliberately arranged and written. 2. The lectures were intended for students whose minds were in a great measure uninformed on philosophical topics and unaccustomed to philosophical reasoning. Many of the nicer distinctions of speculative science, and several of the minuter arguments in favour of, or in opposition to, given opinions, were incapable of being brought before their minds effectively. Not only strong and reiterated statements of opinions, but powerfully urged arguments in support or in confutation of them, became necessary to produce any effect upon such minds as they were required to influence. 3. The lectures were composed under a conscious constraint arising from the condition regarding the conservation of orthodoxy under which his appointment was granted. 4. The lectures were arranged to afford salient points for exciting thought and giving out exercises founded upon those passages, and hence often appear indefinite and indeterminate, although their author held fixed opinions on these points. 5. The lectures, as compositions partaking of the nature of all didactic oratory, are thrown into a form as far as possible likely to be popular, and are, therefore, not only more repetitive, but less precise in expression and in reference than a published treatise would have been, and ought to be.

The other works of Sir William Hamilton are liable to similar discounts. His annotations on "Reid" are mere fragments, and the supplementary dissertations, interrupted by his illness, were never completed. Able, clear, and concise as they are, the very nature of their construction was detrimental to systematic exposition ; they are at best only excerpts from his philosophical thoughts, arranged as developments or corrections of his class text-book. Of the "Discussions" it may be remarked that, like all contributions to periodicals, they were in part adapted to the organ of opinion in which they were to appear, and they underwent editorial supervision, and, to some extent, excision and alteration. When they were republished their author was ailing, and they received rather the minimum of care than the maximum of revision. Everywhere in them the marks of a failing memory and the halting hesitancy of an affected brain are observable. All these circumstances have resulted in the publication of the ideas of one of the most methodical of modern thinkers in nearly the most unmethodical manner that could be imagined. All arguments, therefore, opposed to his philosophical speculations derived from verbal inconsistencies and slight variations of phrase or definition are likely

to include a fallacious element, as resting upon the assumption that as every philosophy is a system of thought, the philosophy under consideration has been systematically arranged and expressed. Sir William Hamilton, no less than De Quincey and Coleridge, requires to be judged by the entire tenor and effect of his teaching, rather than by the dis severed items of thought of which we have the undoubted record. So far in explanation of the position occupied by Sir William Hamilton's writings in regard to controversies in philosophy. Let us now turn to his examiner, John Stuart Mill, M.P.

John Stuart Mill is the son of a philosopher, from whose doctrines Hamilton, in a large measure, dissented, and whose tenets, though adopted with considerable readiness, and maintained with much ability by Thomas Brown in Edinburgh University, were pretty effectively eliminated from the Scottish philosophy through Hamilton's efforts. Mr. Mill himself received, so far as we are aware, no public recognition as a logician from Sir William Hamilton. He was apparently ignored, but not, as we think, really contemned by the Edinburgh thinker. The circumstances of Sir William's "death in life," as it appears to us, giving him no option but to leave till a hoped-for, but never found, opportunity the consideration of a work so weighty as that which John Stuart Mill had laid up in the permanent archives of philosophy. Perhaps these two circumstances may have increased the trenchancy of the criticism to which the younger author has considered it right to subject the elder, not more certainly with the desire of self-assertion than in what he regards as the interests of philosophical speculation in Britain.

The need having arisen for "Controversies in Philosophy" upon several highly important topics, among others—the origin and nature of knowledge; the conditions of human thought; consciousness, and the interpretation of its impressions; man's belief in an external world; matter and its qualities; the laws of mental association; the theory of causation; the nature and aims of logic; the laws of the human will, &c., &c.,—it is evident that Mr. Mill could only accept as an antagonist the highest thinker of modern times—a man "justly recognized as, in the province of abstract speculation, one of the most important figures of the age." "The acknowledged position," he says, "of Sir W. Hamilton, at the head, so far as regards this country, of the school of philosophy to which he belongs, has principally determined me to connect with his name and writings the speculations and criticisms contained in the present work. The justification of the work itself lies in the importance of the questions, to the discussion of which it is a contribution." England is often reproached by Continental thinkers with indifference to the higher philosophy. But England did not always deserve this reproach, and is already showing, by no doubtful symptoms, that she will not deserve it much longer. Her thinkers are again beginning to see, what they had only tem-

porarily forgotten, that a true psychology is the indispensable scientific basis of morals, of politics, of the science and art of education; that the difficulties of metaphysics lie at the root of all science; that those difficulties can only be quieted by being resolved, and that until they are resolved, positively if possible, but at any rate negatively, we are never assured that any human knowledge, even physical, stands on solid foundations.

"My subject, therefore, is not Sir W. Hamilton, but the questions which Sir W. Hamilton discussed. It is, however, impossible to write on those questions in our own country and in our own time without incessant reference, express or tacit, to his treatment of them. On all the subjects on which he touched, he is either one of the most powerful allies of what I deem a sound philosophy, or more frequently by far its most formidable antagonist, both because he came the latest, and wrote with a full knowledge of the flaws which had been detected in his predecessors, and because he was one of the ablest, the most clear-sighted, and the most candid. Whenever any opinion which he deliberately expressed is contended against, his form of the opinion, and his arguments for it, are those which especially require to be faced and carefully appreciated; and it being thus impossible that any fit discussion of his topics should not involve an estimate of his doctrines, it seems worth while that the estimate should be rendered as complete as practicable, by being extended to all the subjects on which he has made, or on which he is believed to have made, any important contribution to thought."

So far, then, as personal position in respect to their special schools of philosophy, to their merits as thinkers, and their acknowledged leadership in British speculation, the parties to the discussion are "equally yoked;" for almost every word of Mill's eulogium on Hamilton might be uttered by a Hamiltonian in regard to John S. Mill. But to set a right value from the first upon these "Controversies in Philosophy," we must have regard to the differences of circumstance under which the debate takes place. One immense difference is gracefully touched upon and acknowledged by Mr. Mill in these expressive terms:—"In thus attempting to anticipate, as far as is yet possible, the judgment of posterity on Sir W. Hamilton's labours, I sincerely lament that on the many points on which I am at issue with him, I have the unfair advantage possessed by one whose opponent is no longer in a condition to reply. Personally I might have had small cause to congratulate myself on the reply which I might have received, for though a strictly honourable, he was a most unsparing controversialist; and whoever assailed even the most unimportant of his opinions might look for hard blows in return. But it would have been worth far more, even to myself, than any polemical success, to have known with certainty in what manner he would have met the objections raised in the present volume. I feel keenly with Plato how much more is to be learned by discussing with a man, who can question and answer, than with

a book which cannot." "But it was not possible to take a general review of Sir W. Hamilton's doctrines while they were only known to the world in the fragmentary state in which they were published during his life. His "Lectures," the fullest and the only consecutive exposition of his philosophy, are a posthumous publication; while the latest and most matured expression of many of his opinions, the "Dissertations on Reid," left off, scarcely half-finished, in the middle of a sentence; and so long as he lived his readers were still hoping for the remainder. The Lectures, it is true, have added less than might have been expected to the knowledge we already possessed of the author's doctrines; but it is something to know that we have now all that is to be had; and though we should have been glad to have his opinions on more subjects, we could scarcely have known more thoroughly than we are now at last enabled to do, what his thoughts were on the points to which he attached the greatest importance, and which are most identified with his name and fame." This is well and truly put; but yet it does not fully reveal all the advantage which Mr. Mill possesses in the controversy as it at present stands. Let us note a few other items in which he has had, as well as still has, an advantage over Sir W. Hamilton.

1. Mr. Mill expressed his opinions free from any clogging conditions as to the conservancy of theological consistency between his philosophy and the popular creed of his country. This is an immense advantage, not only because it leaves the mind its *sense* of freedom unimpaired, but also because it allows thought to be expressed without guards and fortifications, qualifying terms, and conditional phrases calculated to square emerging thought with foregone creed, as well as to avert or calm the terrible suspicions of sects. It is well known that Germanism and neology were the awful terms used to flutter the Edinburghians, and that a keen outlook, greedy and pitiless as sectarian animosities could make it, was made for heresies in Hamilton's Lectures. Mr. Mill has been privileged to defy all extraneous constraints, and to write freely and with a full sense of freedom from within. We do not believe, any more than did Sir W. Hamilton, or than Mr. Mill does, that a correct philosophy and true religion are at enmity with each other. They are rather complements of each other. But we affirm that to be compelled to write with an outward pressure on conscience and consciousness was a disability under which Hamilton laboured, and from which Mr. Mill was happily free. 2. John Stuart Mill chose his own audience—an audience of thinkers—of the highest and best trained minds in the country. Sir Wm. Hamilton's audience was given to him in his class, and he was bound to conform his teaching to their wants more than to his own wishes. This also forms no slight disadvantage—a disadvantage only felt the more the greater the thinker. That Sir W. Hamilton felt the restraint is known to all who have read his Discussions. The Lectures are in reality a compromise; they contain a minimum of what Sir W. Hamilton

wished to convey, the maximum which his students could, at their age and with their training, receive. Mr. Mill, on the contrary, was free to import into his works and writings the maximum of pure thought his own mind could achieve. 3. Sir W. Hamilton was compelled to subordinate his teaching to the conditions implied in lectures,—that they should be rhetorical and attractive, arranged so as to occupy daily a specific time, and to cover the entire ground of metaphysics or logic, as the case might be, in a given number of lectures within the course of each session. Hence there arose a need for amplification here and condensation there, to which a lecturer must succumb, from which a book-maker is free. 4. The original haste with which the Lectures were written. Sir W. Hamilton was appointed to his professorship in July, 1836, and his daily prelections commenced in the ensuing November. In less, therefore, at the utmost, than nine months the whole series of his Lectures on Logic required to be arranged, composed, and delivered; while his next year was burdened with the arrangement and composition of a subsequent series on Metaphysics. To which followed again the preparation of his edition of "Reid," as a text-book for his class. This writing against time, and constructing Metaphysics and Logic under pressure, were, as we have said, not followed by the opportunity of leisurely revision, by which defects of haste, taste, judgment, and thought might have been rectified; for health failed under the taskwork of his professional duties and the busy polemics of his time in church and state. It is not only, therefore, that Mr. Mill is—fortunately for the reputation of British Philosophy—alive, and blessed with

"Wealth,  
Time, talent, energies, occasion, health,"

that he has "the unfair advantage," but in those other circumstances as well. We note these in no spirit of depreciation of the philosophy of John Stuart Mill, but as being absolutely necessary to a candid appreciation of the state of the question as it lies between Mill and Hamilton. With our notice of the "Controversies in Philosophy," brought before the public by the issue of Mill's "Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy," we intend to combine a few references to a work entitled "Exploratio Philosophica; Rough Notes on Modern Intellectual Science," by John Grote, B.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge; a book exhibiting great force of thought, but strikingly defective in literary expressiveness and tact. In this work the opinions of Mill and Hamilton, among others, are subjected to severe scrutiny, and handled with power, intelligence, and definiteness. Being closely connected with the very controversies in hand, it seems expedient to include it also in our consideration of the important debatable questions arising out of Mr. Mill's publication. Another thinker, who has made definite and valuable additions to philosophy, Mr. Herbert Spencer, in a paper on "Mill

v. Hamilton," in *The Fortnightly Review*, has taken part in this philosophical debate; and of his contribution to the better understanding of the matter we may require to give some heed, for it involves ideas upon "the test of truth" of much worth in philosophical speculation.

Mr. Mill's book, let us say at once, is one of the most able and thoroughgoing pieces of philosophical criticism which this century has produced. It is almost unparalleled in acuteness of insight, vigour of intellect, precision of language, and clear enunciation of distinctions and differences. So keen is the vision of his mind that, with regard to philosophical terms, the minutest shades of meaning, and the slightest divergences in usage reveal themselves to him at once; and all the consequences resulting, or likely to result from them, unfold themselves immediately before his intellect. Words are with him signs rather than symbols, and he insists distinctly on the constant and invariable employment of them with the selfsame connotation and denotation. Ideas take, before his intellect, a palpability and form so express and clear-cut that there is no tolerance in him of haze, or mist, or sophistry. In verbal criticism it is quite a masterpiece, and in the criticism of fact and idea it is inferior to the writings of no philosopher except Sir William Hamilton, though we scarcely think that in this point it equals the rare felicity of the thinker who is subjected to examination in it.

The work opens with a few "Introductory Remarks"—the gist of which we have quoted—on Hamilton and the Hamiltonian philosophy, which "unites to the *prestige* of independent originality the recommendation of a general harmony with the prevailing tone of thought," and passes thence to consider "the doctrine which is thought to belong in the most especial manner to Sir W. Hamilton"—"The Relativity of Human Knowledge." This, by the way, we cannot but think is a singularly unhappy method of opening the subject—an initial fundamental defect. "All theories of the human mind profess to be interpretations of consciousness; the conclusions of all of them are supposed to rest on that ultimate evidence, either immediately or remotely. What consciousness directly reveals, together with what can be legitimately inferred from its revelations, compasses, by universal admission, all that we know of the mind, or indeed of any other thing. When we know what any philosopher considers to be revealed in consciousness, we have the key to the entire character of his metaphysical system" (p. 108). "According to all philosophers, the evidence of consciousness, if only we can obtain it pure, is conclusive" (p. 126). "The verdict, then, of consciousness, or, in other words, our immediate and intuitive conviction, is admitted on all hands to be a decision without appeal" (p. 121). This being the case, we think that to begin with an examination of the root-element of philosophy would have been at once more logical and more effective than that which Mr. Mill has adopted, unless an ulterior design underlay the critique.

It is our duty, however, to follow our author. He defines with

specific clearness four different significations which may be or are attached to the phrase, "the Relativity of Knowledge":—1. "That we only know anything by knowing it as distinguished from something else; that all consciousness is of difference; that two objects are the smallest number required to constitute consciousness; that a thing is only seen to be what it is by contrast with what it is not" (p. 6). 2. "All the attributes which we ascribe to objects consist in their having the power of exciting one or another variety of sensation in our minds; that to us the properties of an object have this and no other meaning; that an object is to us nothing else than that which affects our senses in a certain manner; that we are incapable of attaching to the word object any other meaning; that even an imaginary object is but a conception, such as we are able to form, of something which would affect our senses in some new way; so that our knowledge of objects, and even our fancies about objects, consist of nothing but the sensations which they excite, or which we imagine them exciting, in ourselves" (p. 8). 3. "What we term an object is but a complex conception made up by the laws of association out of the ideas of various sensations which we are accustomed to receive simultaneously. There is nothing real in the process but these sensations. . . . Those who hold this opinion are said to doubt or deny the existence of matter" (p. 8). 4. "There is a real universe of 'Things in themselves,' and whenever there is an impression on our senses, there is a 'Thing in itself' which is behind the phenomenon, and is the cause of it" (p. 9).

This idea takes again the following forms:—*a.* "We are compelled by our nature to construe things to ourselves under forms; but they are not forms of the thing. The attributes exist only in relation to us, and as inherent laws of the human faculties—laws of our intellectual, not of our sensitive faculties, technically termed categories of the understanding" (p. 12). *b.* "Place, extension, substance, cause, and the rest, are conceptions put together out of ideas of sensation by the known laws of association" (p. 13). *c.* "Though we are assured of the objective existence of a world external to the mind, our knowledge of that world is absolutely limited to the modes in which we are affected by it" (p. 13). *d.* "Our faculty, it may be said, of perceiving things as they are in themselves, though real, has its own laws, its own conditions and necessary mode of operations: our cognitions consequently depend, not solely on the nature of the things to be known, but also on that of the knowing faculty; as our sight depends not solely upon the object seen, but on that together with the structure of the eye" (p. 16);—and he asks, "in which, if any, of these various meanings was the doctrine of relativity held by Sir W. Hamilton?"

The answer is given in these terms:—"It has thus been shown by accumulated proof that Sir W. Hamilton did not hold any opinion in virtue of which it could rationally be asserted that all human knowledge is relative; but did hold, as one of the main elements of his philosophical creed, the opposite doctrine of the

cognoscibility of external things, in certain of their aspects, as they are in themselves, absolutely" (p. 31); or again, "The conclusion I cannot help drawing from this collation of passages is that Sir W. Hamilton either never held, or when he wrote the 'Dissertations' had ceased to hold, the doctrine for which he has been so often praised, and nearly as often attacked—the relativity of human knowledge. He certainly did sincerely believe that he held it; but he repudiated it in every sense which makes it other than a barren theory" (p. 28).

Without impugning either the extent or method of the collation and induction, we do not think this is fairly argued. In all writing intended to be popular and striking, opinions are stated in broader and looser terms than would be used in actual controversy with a known opponent,—firstly, because the mind feels the opinion strongly; and secondly, because it does not perceive the utility of guarded speech. A third reason might be alleged, viz., that the introduction of qualifying phrases hinders clear perception and ready acceptance. Sir W. Hamilton's writings were, as we have explained, in a peculiar manner subject to these drawbacks, so that the very conditions of the inductive collation are vitiated.

The induction required was not a collation of *phrases* but of *ideas*—an induction from all his teaching of its tenor and tendency. We judge of the harmony and fitness of a dress as a whole, not by a separate and individual examination of all the different tissues of which it is made up. The doctrine of the relativity of knowledge emerges as Sir W. Hamilton's refutation of Cousin's doctrine of the absolute. He postulates, like Cousin, consciousness as the prime element of philosophy. The intuitions of consciousness, according to Cousin, are threefold—self, *not-self*, and the infinite, i. e., God. Hamilton denies the last as an intuition, but accepts it as an inferrible belief. Self-consciousness implies consciousness of something other than self, which may or may not be God. Self is *conditioned*, is given to us in time, place, manner, and form. Not-self (everything else) is *to us* unconditioned, affects our consciousness without being affected by it. Man cannot transcend, but he can examine consciousness; and, after examination, he can interpret what it informs him of. When it is exercised, that is, exposed to repeated experience, we gain, as facts implied in thought, *pre-cognition*, cognition, and recognition. Self underlies and precedes thought, and this same self (*eus*), acted on by experience (*existens*), regards itself as a personal unity (*consistens*) under all the forms which experience assumes. All that is *in* consciousness, as self-hood, it knows and trusts. All that is *brought into* consciousness, as experience, it knows in effect, but not in essence. In *this* correlation we know the non-ego, but only in this. The absolute, as absolute, we cannot *know*. Of the absolute, in its relations to us, we may infer and hence believe whatever consciousness and experience combine to offer reasons for.

This, we apprehend, is "the relativity of human knowledge"



maintained by Sir William Hamilton, "not as a law of things, but merely as a law of thought."\* In all his thinking, in all his teaching, he is consistent in maintaining that; in some of his expressions he may have given unguarded or loose utterance to phrases capable of other and modified significations. But his entire philosophical system is based on this fact,—all thinking is conditioned; the thinkable, as not-self, is *to us* unconditioned. Hence we think that though the verbal criticism to which Sir William Hamilton's writings have been subjected by Mr. Mill is highly valuable, especially as a gymnastic for the mind, yet the argumentation founded on it is invalid as not being the result of a properly founded induction. We are not called upon to pronounce upon the accuracy or inaccuracy of Sir William Hamilton's tenets. We are interested in seeing all the "controversies in philosophy" conducted on principles of discussion likely to result in conclusive settlements of the questions raised. In this case we do not think that Mr. Mill has employed the proper form of argument for the confutation of Sir William Hamilton's theory of the relativity of human knowledge.

In Chapter V., the heading of which is "What is rejected as knowledge by Sir W. Hamilton brought back under the name of belief," Mr. Mill has been much more successful in finding an unquestionable flaw, by showing that Sir W. Hamilton held the opinion that "belief is a higher source of evidence than knowledge. Belief is ultimate, knowledge only derivative; knowledge itself rests finally on belief; natural beliefs are the sole warrant for all our knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, is an inferior ground of assurance to natural belief" (p. 59). This detection of the ambiguity of the word "belief" hits, we believe, the chief source of error in the Scottish philosophy—that which vitiates all its speculations. It is true, as Sir William Hamilton says, that "consciousness in its last analysis, in other words, our primary experience, is a *faith*." It is so in the sense of its being necessary for us to put our faith in, that is, to trust it. There would be no progress for man unless he trusted his consciousness; but the "common sense" philosophy, misled by an ambiguity, postulates certain inferences from consciousness as "first truths," and having drawn them up as "articles of faith"—a philosophic creed—misnames them "intuitive beliefs." They are *knowledge*; for consciousness is their ground; but when expressed in set terms, they are *beliefs*; for these expressions are accepted by our intelligence as precise exponents of the revelations or contents of consciousness. Penetrating this ambiguity, and seeing its origin, we observe at once that misconception is imminent in any controversy held with one who—as Mr. Mill does—justly relies on the fact that "in common language, when belief and knowledge are distinguished, knowledge is understood to mean complete conviction, belief a conviction somewhat short of complete; or else we are said to believe when the evidence is probable (as that

\* "Discussions," p. 579.

of testimony), but to know when it is intuitive or demonstrative from intuitive premises" (p. 60). But the ambiguity—the history of which is curious but lengthy—being once comprehended, Hamilton's *speculations* are not in the least at fault, although the technical terms in which he expresses them are.

"In cognizing a mere affection of self we objectify it; it forms a subject-object, or subjective object, or subjectivo-subjective object,"\* as Hamilton says; when objectivized in expression it is a creed and a premise. Out of those premises (regarded as beliefs) we construct, or from them, as original sources, we derive all our knowledge of what is other than ourselves. The difference of name is not indicative of a difference of fact, but a difference of statement—a difference of statement vitiating the whole Scottish school of philosophy, because not keeping clearly in vision the distinction between nascent thought and expressed thought. Should Mr. Mill's exposure of this ambiguity lead to a reform in expression on this matter, the Scottish philosophy will have much to thank him for—still more will its readers.

"The Philosophy of the Conditioned" is simply the exposition and enforcement of the opinion "that all *positive* thought lies between two extremes, neither of which we can conceive as possible; and yet, as mutual contradictories, the one or the other we must recognize as necessary."† Mr. Mill is right in saying that "though suggested by Kant's 'Antinomies of Speculative Reason,' in the form which it bears in Sir Wm. Hamilton's writings it belongs, I believe, originally to himself. No doctrine which he has anywhere laid down is more characteristic of his mode of thought, and none is more strongly associated with his name" (p. 62). This law is, in part, opposed to what has been named "the law of inseparable association, an element of our nature of which" (Mr. Mill affirms) "few have realized to themselves the full power. It was, for the first time, largely applied to the explanation of the more complicated mental phenomena by Mr. James Mill, and is, in an especial manner, the key to the phenomena of inconceivability" (p. 63). Inconceivable may mean (1), "that of which the mind cannot form to itself any representation;" (2), "every combination of facts which, to the mind simply contemplating it, appears incredible;" (3), "simply the inexplicable." Though we agree with Mr. Mill that "inconceivable is not to be confounded with unprovable or unanalyzable" (p. 72), we are not prepared to accept implicitly his averment that "inconceivability is a purely subjective thing, arising from the mental antecedents of the individual mind, or from those of the human mind generally, at a particular period, and cannot give us any insight into the possibilities of nature" (p. 64); and this for two reasons:—1st. Because consciousness must exist under the government of law, and must *ab initio* accept as inconceivable everything not in harmony with the inherent laws of its being. 2nd. Consciousness

\* "Discussions," p. 80.

† Hamilton's "Reid," p. 911.

must exist antecedently to experience, and must contain within itself the power of conceivability and inconceivability prior to its excitement by experience. The mind's earliest *conceivable* experience may not be—is not indeed likely to be—its earliest experience. Its primary constitution, its self-hood, its capacity, its impulses and instincts, so to say, must affect the conceivability of things, and hence the test of conceivability cannot be what Herbert Spencer calls it, "the net result of our experience up to the present time."

The law of inseparable association cannot act until there has been association—the mutual alliance of two or more impressions; and association is impossible without a *prior* power of conceivability. Whatever can establish a relation with the mind is thereby rendered, and is so far forth conceivable by it; all that fails to do so is inconceivable—in the sense of inappreciable, not of unbelievable—by it. But neither the conceivable nor the inconceivable give us a measure of existence—of the absolute. Must we really *disbelieve* all that we cannot conceive, i. e., form an adequate representation of, in, and to our own minds? Does conceive signify image, mental picture? Are there concepts without images as well as with them? Professor De Morgan regards this question as opening "a wide chapter in psychology, and one which is little read."\* All that is possible in thought is possible in reality; but is the measure of mental possibility consciousness or experience? This is answered by saying we can transcend experience, not consciousness. Much is conceivable which is unbelievable; may not much also be believable which cannot be contained and imaged in our minds? Hamilton's law is sufficient, when regarded as *regulative*, but not as *restrictive*. Mill's objection to the law that experience (and its derivatives) only is conceivable requires a further discussion. He has succeeded in showing that Hamilton's language, perhaps his thought, on this subject was variable; but he has failed to disprove the regulative value of the philosophy of the conditioned as a law of thought.

In the chapter on "The Philosophy of the Conditioned, as applied by Mr. Mansel to the Limits of Religious Thought," Mr. Mill has successfully championed the right of human thought to free speculation, and proved that "Mr. Mansel has not made out any connection between his philosophical premises and his theological conclusions" (p. 105).

We come now to Chapter VIII., "Of Consciousness as understood by Sir Wm. Hamilton." "It appears that he gives two definitions of consciousness. In the one it is synonymous with direct, immediate, or intuitive knowledge; and we are conscious not only of ourselves, but of outward objects, since, in our author's opinion, we know these intuitively. According to the other definition, consciousness is the mind's recognition of its own acts and affections" (p. 114). Between these two definitions there is a considerable difference, and we are indebted to Mr. Mill for bringing out the

\* A. De Morgan, "On Infinity; and on the Sign of Equality," p. 10.

lurking fallacy running through Hamilton's lectures on this subject. "If Sir Wm. Hamilton's theory of consciousness is correct, it does not leave the difference between belief and knowledge in a state of obscurity, but abolishes that distinction entirely, and along with it a great part of his own philosophy" (p. 123). "But when a thinker is compelled by one part of his philosophy to contradict another part, he cannot leave the conflicting assertions standing, and throw the responsibility of his scrape on the arduousness of the subject." We must see, therefore, what is to be made "of the interpretation of consciousness" (Chapter IX.). "The facts of consciousness," Hamilton says, "are to be considered in two points of view; either as evidencing their own ideal or phenomenal existence, or as evidencing the objective existence of something else beyond them. A belief in the former is not identical with a belief in the latter. The one cannot, the other may possibly be refused." Mr. Mill says, "What admits of being doubted is the revelation which consciousness is *supposed* to make (and which our author considers as itself consciousness) of an external reality. This conscious revelation of an external universe, real in itself and not as phenomena, Mr. Mill denies, and holds to be inexplicable. Mr. Grote, in his "*Exploratio Philosophia*," has an able sentence upon this subject, which we quote:—"The phenomenal universe is a complicated play and mutual action of these various natural agents, one portion of their play and action being that which goes on from without to within, and from within to without, between the bodily frame of each of us and the rest of the universe" (p. 11). "We are born, intellectually, *into* a state of things, an universe, . . . and as early as we have the consciousness which answers to the language, '*our feelings*,' we have the idea of an universe, large or small, of which *we* are a part" (p. 23). "All our after knowledge is contained *seminally* in this first particular of it, and our progress in knowledge consists in the gradual making acquaintance with that which is thus revealed to us" (p. 24).

Sir Wm. Hamilton's view of the different theories respecting the belief in an external world (Chapter X.) is acutely epitomized and sharply criticised; but as the reviewer holds "that the belief in an external world is not intuitive, but an acquired product," great pains is expended on showing the inconsistency and self-contradiction of the advocate of "an ego and a non-ego in all consciousness." This is in a great measure successfully done, for language cannot be popularly employed with philosophical precision, and Hamilton was compelled, by his position, to be interesting that he might be instructive. This, however, amounts only to a palliation, not a justification of the self-confusion which Mr. Mill proves that he was chargeable with as an introspective thinker. Mill's own exposition of "the psychological theory of the belief in an external world" is not free from the possibility of severe criticism. This theory gives the following results, viz.,—1. That the human mind is capable of *expectation*. 2. The laws of the association of ideas, and our

belief in matter "is but the form impressed by the known laws of association upon the conception or notion obtained by experience of contingent sensations, by which are meant sensations that are not in our present consciousness, and perhaps never were in our consciousness at all, but which, in virtue of the laws to which we have learnt by experience that our sensations are subject, we know that we should have felt under given supposable circumstances, and under these same circumstances might still feel" (p. 192). The conception and form of the world existing at any "moment comprises, along with the sensations I am feeling, a countless variety of possibilities of sensation, namely, the whole of those which past observation tells me that I could, under any supposable circumstances, experience at this moment, together with an indefinite and illimitable multitude of others, which, though I do not know that I could, yet it is possible that I might, experience in circumstances not known to me" (p. 193). "The world of possible sensations, succeeding one another according to laws, is as much in other beings as it is in me; it has, therefore, an existence outside of me—it is an external world" (p. 197). "Matter, then, may be defined a permanent possibility of sensation" (p. 198).

Few definitions, we presume, could be more awkward than this of matter. The word *imparting* has surely been omitted from it. But even thus supplemented it is far from being clear and unambiguous. What, then, is mind, if it is not "a permanent possibility of [receiving] sensation"? What, too, we might ask, are possible possibilities of experience? and how can they be *supposed* as possible possibilities, lying out of consciousness as it is, and beyond experience as it has been? "Evidently," as Herbert Spencer affirms, "there is tacitly assumed something beyond the mind by which the 'experiences' are produced—something in which exist the objective relations to which the subjective relations correspond—an external world. Refuse thus to explain 'experiences,' and the hypothesis becomes meaningless. But now having thus postulated an external reality as the indispensable foundation of its reasonings, pure empiricism can subsequently neither prove nor disprove its postulate."

"Matter," says Professor Grote, "is a thing that we are conscious of; . . . so far as we can tell, *only* a thing that we are conscious of—a thought of ours supposed warranted, a mental creation properly created, a something the certainty of the existence of which depends for us on the certainty of our own existence and the trustworthiness of our own feeling—that the study of consciousness is higher than the study of matter (in my language, philosophy than phenomenalism), and that we ourselves, who are conscious, know ourselves pre-eminently, with a different knowledge from that with which we know matter, *of* which *we* are conscious, just as we know also our own thoughts and feelings with a consciousness more intimate and immediate than that with which we know matter, since we mean by matter something which we suppose to give occasion to

varieties of such feelings."\* "I" is not a phenomenon of the universe, but a something of which the universe itself is a belief or a thought" (p. 133).

While, therefore, it is perhaps impossible to hold, with Hamilton, that "the Ego and Non-ego are not only given together, but in absolute co-equality,—the one does not precede, the other does not follow; and in their mutual relation each is equally dependent, equally independent: such is the fact as given in and by consciousness,"—it is at least quite as impossible to accept the constructive theory of Mill as an entire explication of our belief in an external world. If we believe that "there is in our perceptions something which exists when we are not thinking of it; which existed before we ever had thought of it, and would exist if we were annihilated; and, farther, that there exist things which we never saw, touched, or otherwise perceived, and things which never have been perceived by man" (p. 192), can we believe them to be only a collective idea of "all the possibilities of sensation which experience guarantees"? Must we not rather seek an explanation of the belief in an outward universe in a discrimination between *self-consciousness* and a consciousness of that which is *not-self*, in so investigating the sense of selfhood as to perceive its difference from all that is *not-self*? for this latter alone is the external. Such a philosophy might probably yield us something resembling the following outline:—the conscious self, containing in it vital though latent wisdom, or the capacity of intelligence, which, being operated on by experience, educes thought. Thought, certified by repetition, experiment, &c., would yield knowledge; knowledge systematized, science; science, tested by a renewed and consciously arranged reference to experience and consciousness, giving truth, certitude, foundations for faith. However a theory of consciousness and externality is harmonized, it can scarcely be either by Hamiltonism or Millism; for consciousness cannot absorb experience, neither can experience alone impart vitality to consciousness and elicit the sense of selfhood.

It will be seen from the foregoing sentence that we are not prepared to regard the theory "which resolves mind into a series of feelings; with a background of possibilities of feeling," as conclusive or reliable. Mr. Mill seems himself to feel that it is unsatisfactory as a conception of mind; for he admits that "the thread of consciousness which composes the mind's phenomenal life consists not only of present sensations, but likewise in part of memories and expectations" (p. 212). This subsumption of a *thread* appears to us to show that we have more in our "conception of mind" than that of a mere series, and we do not think this *thread* should be rudely snapped as "a final inexplicability." We must regard "the mind or Ego as something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them."

"I, for each one of us, means one of a particular class of organ-

\* "Explor. Phil.," p. 126.

ized beings out of a universe of beings contained in space, the whole universe; and thus *I*, as a part of it, being composed of various elements and forces variously communicating together" (Grote's "Explor. Phil.," p. 83). This gathering of ourselves up into a personality, this differencing of ourselves from other persons and from other things, implies something more than a mere series, something in which the series begins of which it forms a sensible part, but of which it cannot be *all*. "By mind," as Harris says, "we mean something which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with ideas of its intended works" (*Hermes*, p. 227). "As an antagonist doctrine to that of Sir W. Hamilton and the Scottish school," it is, we think, singularly ineffective. As Mr. Mill says in his "Logic" (p. 67), "There is a something I call *Myself* . . . a something which I conceive to be not the thoughts but the being that has the thoughts." Does not this necessitate the acceptance of mind as other than "a succession of feelings and possibilities of feelings," even though "prolonged to eternity"? Introspection reveals but does not explain this fact; but phenomenalism adopts the inexplicability and denies the revelation, even although its favourite term for sensation, "the word impression, cannot be translated into thought without *assuming* a thing impressing and a thing impressed"! (*Herbert Spencer*).

We must pass without note or comment, but certainly not without calling attention to their interest and merit, the sections devoted by Mr. Mill to the discussion of "the primary qualities of matter" (xiii.), the law of inseparable associations (xiv.), and the "doctrine of unconscious mental modifications" (xv.). These chapters are all of the highest moment in philosophical speculation, and contain in themselves the elements of many controversies. Mill's criticisms require careful perusal, and go very strongly against Hamilton. Few chapters in psychology have been less thoroughly studied than that of the *latency* of mental operations, and few are more important. In the "Moral Freedom" of Dr. Cairns, and in some of the writings of Im. H. Fichte, some steps have been taken towards an exposition of the latent modifications of consciousness, which neither the laws of obliviscence nor of reminiscence can in our judgment fully explain.

In demolishing "Sir W. Hamilton's Theory of Causation" (chap. xvi.) Mr. Mill is peculiarly happy. The weak points are touched with the skill of a subtle analyst whose eye discerns, with a certainty little short of intuition, the defective tissue of an argument. Hamilton's opinion that our idea of causation originates not in a power to form the notion but from our impotency to think things in sequence without it, is an opinion about, not of causation. Most felicitously does Mr. Mill expose the fallacies of this theory. Is he himself more correct when he affirms that we "see nothing in causation but invariable antecedence" (p. 305); that it "informs us of nothing except immediate, invariable, and unconditional sequence"? (p. 306). We do not, I admit, *see* anything else; but we

are compelled, I submit, to think something else. How otherwise could we have the different ideas of succession and consequence? of lineal series and of resulting series? of progress *from* one thing to another, *through* a change effected *by* the former *in* the latter?

We have two words, causation and effectuation, both of which imply a relationship of qualities in the antecedent and in the consequent; such as is capable of producing a change if they are brought mediately or immediately into relation. So long as we think of qualities as effective, we must form the idea of their being effecting,—of their possessing and exerting power. A cause not only exists, but operates antecedently to its effects. There may also be complex causes as there may be compound effects.

We pass now from the chapter on Causation to that “on the freedom of the will,” the phenomena of causation (chap. xxvi.). The idea of causation again emerges in this controversy. Every one must “concede the co-equal inconceivability of the conflicting hypotheses,—an uncaused commencement, and an infinite regress” (p. 499). “In this case we must appeal to experience. Is this a correct report of its affirmations? What experience makes known is the fact of an invariable sequence between every event and some special combination of antecedent conditions, in such sort that wherever and whenever that union of antecedents exists, the event does not fail to occur. Any *must* in the case, any necessity other than the unconditional universality of the fact, we know nothing of” (p. 500). How then can we translate *unfailing invariability* but by *must*? or suppose “the unconditional universality of the fact” brought about but by such a necessity as *must* connotes? Is then the will subject to the whole law of causation? must it do as motives dictate? and if so, how does human responsibility arise?

These are grave questions. “The true doctrine of the causation of human actions maintains that not only our conduct but our character is in part amenable to our will; that we can, by employing the proper means, improve our character; and that if our character is such that, while it remains what it is, it necessitates us to do wrong, it will be just to apply motives which will necessitate us to strive for its improvement, and so emancipate ourselves from the other necessity: in other words, we are under a moral obligation to seek the improvement of our moral character” (p. 516). But what is “the true doctrine of the causation of human actions”? Is the will governed by the strongest motive? Yes. What gauges the strength of motives? *Self*. Self is that which is to be motivated, and the selfhood of man is the element to be moved by causes. Inasmuch as it requires to be moved (or hindered), it must possess a faculty (or be in a state) of self-determination. “The central point of our consciousness—that which makes each man what he is in distinction from every other man; that which expresses the real concrete essence of the mind, apart from its regulated laws and formal processes—is the *will*. Will expresses power, spontaneity, the capacity of acting independently and of ourselves” (Morell’s



"Philosophy of Religion," p. 3). Will is intertissued with self-hood. We are self-willed when we resist what are thought to be suitable motives; we are will-less when we abandon resistance, and move merely as we are moved. Man *cannot* believe life to be "an issue unalterable by human efforts or desires" (p. 520).

The statement and the consideration of these "Controversies in Philosophy" has carried us far beyond our primary purpose, which was, taking the important work with which John Stuart Mill has favoured the thinkers of the world as an occasion, to note the differing points requiring consideration and debate between the Introspective and the Psychological schools of modern philosophy. Our idea was to posit as questions those which follow:—Is consciousness investigatable? if so, what does it teach? Is knowledge possible only of the conditioned, or of the absolute as well? Is faith supersensual? Is science wholly experiential? Is religion attainable through and capable of being construed as a science? Does consciousness imply a moral law? and if not, whence arises the sense of moral responsibility? Is the will an essential element of selfhood, or a development of experience? Are logic and thinking co-extensive? Under these heads of reflection we believed we could arrange a few notes on "Controversies in Philosophy," such as might help those who were but beginning to read and study such subjects to comprehend the points at issue, and the possible modes of arguing upon them. Irresistibly, however, we have found ourselves carried into the regions of debate; and we find now, that in the shape of a review of a reviewer we have been conflicting rather than reflecting.

It would be unfair to ourselves did we not aver that the highest esteem for Mr. Mill as a philosopher, an economist, and a man of letters, pervades our thoughts. This much we have already, and that recently, expressed out of the fulness of our heart. We retract no syllable of that admiration. Then we considered him chiefly as a *logician*, and declared him to be a leader in the vanguard of human thought and progress. In the work more immediately considered in this paper he appears more distinctly before us as a *metaphysician*,—as a metaphysician controverting one of the chiefs of an opposing school, and wielding most dexterously the weapons of controversial warfare. No one can read the examination of Hamilton without admiring the courtesy, candour, vigour, earnestness, and philosophic acumen of the writer. It is a text-book of clear statement and terse argument; of nice distinctions and of thoroughly consecutive thinking. It is unquestionably a great work,—implying at once the highest possible compliment to Sir W. Hamilton's genius, and the most thorough conviction in the author's mind of the accuracy of the philosophy which he advances as opposed to the tenets of that great thinker.

We have been compelled to omit all notice of the most important portion of the book in our own estimation,—the series of chapters on "logic and its controversies." To these we may recur again.

## Religion.

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### IS THE DESTINY OF NATIONS DISCOVERABLY INDICATED IN THE PROPHECIES OF SCRIPTURE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

THE concessions of our opponents, in regard to the authority of the Bible, have greatly simplified the duty we are now called upon to perform. We scarcely ever imagined, in directing our thoughts to the possible modes in which this question might be argued, that any writer, professing a genuine reverence for the word of God, would be found among the defenders of the negative position. The dicta of the Scriptures upon the subject appear to our minds so clear, so oft-repeated, so perfectly unambiguous, that after reconsidering the matter, we are forced to the conclusion that our friends on the other side have really never given their testimony a candid examination. We were prepared to find only those ranged in support of the negative, to whom the very mention of the supernatural is matter for conceited ridicule; who, having, in their own estimation at least, "put away childish things," can now afford to laugh at the less advanced "pietist" who really, in the nineteenth century, believes in a supernatural revelation, in miracle and prophecy, in the doctrines of sin and a supernatural Saviour, and in an approaching supernatural termination to the existing state of affairs on earth. Of such, in the present day, there are not a few. We are glad, however, to see that in cherishing such an expectation as this we have been disappointed. Our opponents have made no direct attempts at impeaching the authority of the Bible. It is broadly avowed in the article of the last writer, it appears to be granted with sufficient explicitness in the former two, and we have now only to see how these two things agree,—this admission, and the ingenious reasonings of J. J., "Hawkeye," and "S. Arnott."

In this view of the matter, which, as we said, immensely simplifies our task, it deserves remark that these writers have never so much as attempted to ask the direct opinion of the Scriptures upon the question at issue: their reasonings in reference to the Bible have all been of an indirect nature, and their chief arguments quite independent of it. We suspect it was as well for themselves that such a course was chosen. The following scriptural statements, already quoted in previous articles, can by no possibility be reconciled with their position, and afford all that is needful in order to

subvert it. "Blessed is he that readeth, and they that hear the words of this prophecy, and keep those things which are written therein" (Rev. i. 3). What prophecy? "The revelation of Jesus Christ, which God gave unto Him, to *show* unto His servants *things which must shortly come to pass.*" And if the Apocalypse deals not with national destinies, we know not what can be the meaning of the phrase. Again, "We have a sure word of prophecy; whereunto ye do well to take heed, as unto a light shining in a dark place" (2 Pet. i. 19). But how can prophecy be a light in the dark if its import is inexplicably obscure? More passages might be quoted, or we might turn back to the Old Testament predictions, and show how it was constantly implied that they should be examined and pondered by those who care to hear what "God the Lord will speak;" but these are sufficient to show that, so far as a direct appeal to Scripture is concerned, our opponents may at once throw down their arms and retire.

J. J. appears, after all, to judge from his paper, to know remarkably little either about the Bible or its prophecies. He has plainly written with great recklessness, and very little real knowledge of his theme. Thus he writes on p. 20, "'He [God] knows the end,' says some one. So He may, or may not know, for anything you or I know." Of course, if God does *not* know the future, prophecy of any kind becomes absolutely impossible; and that "series of statements or prophecies declared in the Scriptures—given for our profit and advantage—some of which have been fulfilled, some of which have yet to be fulfilled," of which he writes on the same page, amount merely to guesswork. Is not this extremely reckless writing for any one professing to respect the Scriptures? We mark, for his special edification, the following passages from Isaiah, where he will find Jehovah distinctly claiming as His own the prerogative of bringing to light the hidden things of the future, and direct J. J. to his reference Bible for many more of a similar kind:—Isa. xli. 22, 23; xlii. 9; xliv. 7, 8. It appears to our mind that these very "statements or prophecies" of which he speaks, and of which also he furnishes a specimen, involve a good deal, and could hardly have been hazarded without some insight into the future; but the "statement" is as bold as it is worthless, that the Bible contains no prophecies more particular or definite than these. If J. J. chooses to read the article of his own coadjutor, "S. Arnott," and examine the references, he will find there, he will learn of many distinct prophecies, either fulfilled already or in process of fulfilment; these may help him to see things as they are. His Arminian disquisitions, however interesting from a philosophical point of view, are quite beside the subject, and worth nothing in the face of actual facts—numerous prophecies, whose manifest fulfilment is matter of history. Just as little to the point are his reasonings against those who would fix down "times and seasons" in prophetic interpretation. A broad distinction ever remains between the questions "When?" and "What?"

"Hawkeye" takes other ground. "The absolute truth of the prophecies of Scripture," he says, "does not need to be denied by those who adopt the negative of this question" (p. 99). "They would, I believe, wholly fail in being profitable for instruction, if they could be understood beforehand" (p. 101). Our vision is far from being as keen as that of "Hawkeye," and we cannot see this at all. After telling us of these remarkable discoveries of his, he should have enlightened us better than he has done as to what the value of these inexplicable prophecies can possibly be. He speaks of them as affording "registration and proof of the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God." True enough, so far as it goes, but for whose sake is the registration made? Not surely for the sake of God himself; not surely for the sake of those whose faith has been exchanged for sight; only, then, for us who are still in the flesh. But in order to this the very thing is required which "Hawkeye" refuses to grant, viz., that the coincidence between the prediction and its fulfilment should be distinct and discoverable. This writer, like his predecessor, has also confounded the *what* with the *when* in not a few sentences throughout this article.

Both J. J. and "Hawkeye" lay great stress upon human liberty, as an argument against man's capability to fathom the import of prophecy. Free will is certainly a fact, but neither can we see how our assertion that the meaning of the prophecies is discoverable, reduces that to "an idiot's thought;" nor, after all the argumentation of our opponents, can we discern "the fearful theological consequences" which are said to flow from our principles. Our friends have been contending with a man of straw. If the prophetic books of the Scriptures had consisted of several thousand ponderous tomes, relating with precision and circumstantiality all the minutiae of the life of the individuals whose aggregate makes up nations,—if, as "Hawkeye" most absurdly puts it, "God had discoverably indicated to *each person* (!) beforehand how he must act,"—then certainly there might be some ground for a fear of human liberty and prophecy coming into conflict; but who would ever seriously dream that this is necessary to the prediction of a national destiny? The Bible predictions give broad and general, but clear *outlines* of what the forthcoming facts are to be; but it is the place of history, not of prophecy, to fill up the individual parts allotted to those who shall act in the great drama. Our friends may argue as they please on a subject of this kind, but they have matter-of-fact against them in the *fulfilled* prophecies. Let them turn to any of these—to the prophecies, for example, about Egypt, Babylon, or Israel: while they find them to be general, they will find them also to be definite and characteristic; and when they have settled in their minds how these happened to be fulfilled without doing violence to human liberty, their own enigmas will cease to puzzle them.

Even were the prophecies much more circumstantial and explicit than they really are, there would still, we apprehend, be very little danger to man's freedom of action. A minute prediction concerning

his own kingdom was once read to a monarch of Judah; he took out his penknife, cut it to pieces, put it in the fire, and did as he pleased (Jer. xxxvi.). The *particular time* of the restoration of the Jews from Babylon was foretold, and known from that source by students of the prophecies during the captivity; but whose free will was, or could be, interfered with by the fact? The prediction was accomplished; but the details of its accomplishment were unknown until history revealed them, and the Hebrews were brought forth, in God's providence, by "a way they knew not." And so, once more, the termination of the Chaldean rule, and the succession of the conquering Medes and Persians, were made known in the clearest terms by Daniel to the king Belshazzar; yet in what respect was the liberty of any one destroyed? The conclusion of the whole matter is, that in insisting so much upon an argument like this, our opponents have been talking nonsense.

"S. Arnott's" paper refutes those of his predecessors better than it establishes his own position. His concessions are valuable; his logic is weak. We grant at once that the destiny of every nation under heaven is not delineated particularly in the sacred Word, although we would be inclined to lay more stress than our opponents have done upon the numerous prophecies which treat of all nations taken together, and point forward to the time when all shall merge into the one universal kingdom of Christ. But it is foolish to argue that because *names* are not mentioned, therefore the future destiny of *no* nation is indicated. Many of the predictions of Daniel are yet unfulfilled; and, so far as our inquiries have gone, we think that this is also true of a large portion of the Apocalypse. These prophecies are assuredly more obscure, because more figuratively expressed, than many belonging to the ancient dispensation; but certainly they *have* a meaning; certainly they refer to the destinies of *some* existing nations, or of others whose rise is yet future; and Christ's declaration that the student of these prophecies is "blessed" would be meaningless and foolish if *no* information could be drawn from their pages. "S. Arnott" himself finds no mention of Rome in the predictions of Daniel, but he tells us it is plainly implied. Is Rome less plainly implied in the more prominent of the predictions of St. John?

This writer has only partially explained the use of prophecy, and he has not explained at all the use of the prophecies with which we are specially concerned in this debate. In order to understand *that*, he must remember how all history in its progressive evolution is interwoven with the interests of God's church. He must remember how, as the first advent of the Messiah was placed in prophecy, in type, and in ceremony before the nations of old, as the object of their great desire and hope; now, Messiah having come, and having established His glorious spiritual kingdom in the world, the great hope of the church is the triumph of that kingdom over all its adversaries, and the grand ultimate second advent of the Lord from heaven at the time of the "restitution of all things."

It is, we believe, to sustain the faith and enliven the hope of His church in her anxious and desponding hours, that the great Revealer of secrets has placed the star of prophecy in her sky, and given in His word such a series of sublime predictions as those we find in the last book of the sacred canon.

Doctors do differ, as "S. Arnott" affirms, about the interpretation of prophecy; but doctors differ quite as much about almost everything else, even about those truths of salvation which he tells us are so plain "that none need err therein." But this cannot prove that there is no truth, that we ought not to seek for it, or that the search will be altogether fruitless.

Our opponents have all insisted a good deal on the extremes to which many have run in the interpretation of prophecy. We fear if the prophecies are to be cast away on this ground, so must a great many other things. Philosophy has been occasionally pushed to extremes about as absurd as we can well imagine; but why should we argue, on that account, that "the great problems of existence are unworthy our attention"? If this plea were admitted, soon would a universal Pyrrhonism desolate the intellectual world. There may be a way of explaining the excesses of some of our prophetic interpreters without dubbing them either "fanatics" or "charlatans;" just as the vagaries of some of the philosophers, who were otherwise very clear-headed men, admit of excuse and explanation. Much of the literature *à la* "The Coming Struggle" is fit only for the fire; much of it, on the other hand, has emanated from men of warm, earnest hearts, and genuine Christian principles. Living—as it would be well if many more now-a-days were living—under a deep realization of the personality of Jesus, watching and waiting for His "coming the second time, without sin unto salvation," as those only can watch who love and long for His appearing;" casting eager glances round about to catch a glimpse of the signs which herald His triumphal approach, what wonder if their strong desires sometimes lead their judgments into what appears to us to be excesses? These are not, by any means, so far-reaching and terrific in their results as our opponents would lead us to imagine. Let us fling the mantle of charity over them; it may be they are among the failings which "lean to virtue's side."

Glasgow.

J. O.

#### NEGATIVE REPLY.

"THE great want of the age," said an old friend, "is a want of logic." The opener of this debate has brought that admirable axiom to remembrance. That sapient gentleman quarrels with the editor for even admitting the discussion of the subject, and flourishingly asks, "Who, unless he is an infidel, doubts that the future destinies of nations are discoverably indicated in the prophecies of Scripture?" He then adds, "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, and for instruction;" and therefore, as "prophecies

form a large element in Scripture, they must be profitable for instruction, then." Does not "W. C. Markham," who ought to subscribe himself in any future article, "Want of Logic," see that he has made a mess of his argument? In order to induce him to make logic his first study, we present him with the following:—Heaven is the chief topic of the Bible; almost every page has something concerning heaven; and *therefore*, as "all Scripture is given for instruction," we must know all about heaven. And yet we know nothing about it, "for it doth not yet appear what we shall be." This is precisely by analogy the condition of the question of the debate, and he that believes so may not be an infidel, despite, "W. C. Markham" to the contrary, but, on the contrary, quite as good a Christian, and even a better; for the true Christian "thinks no evil"—rather a fault with "W. C. Markham" in his sweeping condemnation. "Prophecy," he adds, "is predicted history, whereby the future is unveiled, the purposes of Jehovah are made known, and the destiny of nations is revealed." How? but we had anticipated this exceedingly unphilosophical mode of treating the subject in our opening paper, and reiterate that if the "destiny of nations" is according to the settled purposes of God—that is, that their end will be according to His intention,—then there can be no personal responsibility; for as all must then work in harmony with the divine designs, all, good and bad, must *now* be working out the plan, and therefore there can be no free will or individual responsibility. "W. C. Markham" quotes from the author of "Two Years After and Onwards" to prove that it was needful that, prior to the advent of the Saviour, there should be prophecy;—very needful, everybody admits it; but the "destiny of nations" is quite a different matter; as we have shown, its revealment, if the Seer of Crown Court is correct, would be an unmitigated evil. But the most amusing thing is that "W. C. Markham" infers that if there has been prophecy relative to Christ, there must be prophecy relative to the "destiny of nations." After this it may not be silly to ask in the *Inquirer*, "If a cartload of hay costs so much, what will a cartload of turnips cost?" "W. C. Markham's" position is this;—there have been predictions relative to great events, there must *therefore* be predictions known and revealed relative to the "destiny of nations."

The "therefore" does not follow; and so we dismiss "W. C. Markham," and "Two Years After and Onwards."

"D. J. Miller," who next puts in an appearance, takes exception to our style, reminding us, in his correction, of the "knight of the woeful countenance." But for our own credit, as well as for the credit of the *British Controversialist*, for which we have written many years, we beg to say, that neither now nor at any time have we turned "matters of sacred importance" into jest; what we have done, and what we will do, is to laugh at the *stuff* which Dr. Cumming and similar seers put out as "matters of sacred importance." Let Dr. Cumming mind his true vocation, "warning men

everywhere to repent," and he shall have from us nothing but the fullest admiration and respect.

"D. J. Miller," in starting, falls into the same error as "W. C. Markham." He points out the line of predictions which ushered in the Saviour, and adds, "So has it been in the past with God's word, so we should say it is likely to be in the future." Ay, but we require something more than "so we should say." We must positively solicit our good friend, S. N., to write a *popular* paper, level to the meanest capacity, on logic. It might be graceful as well as useful to dedicate it to Messrs. Markham and Miller. This next sentence from "D. J. Miller" might well form the motto of the paper:—"Earnest students of God's word are expected, by our Saviour himself, to discern the signs of the times; and hence we must believe that the destiny of nations is discoverably indicated in Holy Scripture." Was there ever a sentence penned that manifested such an utter want of logic? Earnest students *were* expected by the Saviour from the facts of His life to discern the signs of the times in relation to Himself and His mission; but when they questioned Him, relative to some such subject as this under debate, He said, "It is not for you to know the times or the seasons, which the Father hath put in His own power." And because the present writer affirms that that statement is still true, "D. J. Miller" taxes him with being "in his own conceit wiser than Jehovah"! J. J. must himself be "a knight of the woeful countenance," not to laugh, and laugh heartily, at such absurdity. "D. J. Miller" clenches, as he imagines, the whole question by a quotation from Bishop Hurd, who says that Christ and His apostles "left behind them many predictions, recorded in the books of the New Testament, which profess to respect very distant events, and even run out to the end of time." But Bishop Hurd does not state that these predictions, whatever they may be, *discoverably indicate the destiny of nations*;—that is, for the sake of argument, if we grant that there *are* such predictions. The Professor of Divinity in the University of Glasgow—the Rev. John Caird, D.D.,—whose eloquent words are quoted in the number of the *British Controversialist* containing the quotation from Bishop Hurd, says, "What the future of our church is to be—nay, what is infinitely more important, what the future of Christ's church in the land is to be, who, in this strange time of seething thought and unsettled inquiry, can foretell?" Is this eminent divinity scholar "wiser than Jehovah"? or is J. J. "wiser in his own conceit than ten men who can render a reason," because he learns from men of pre-eminent ability like Dr. Caird? But in order to prove that there are prophecies relative to the destiny of nations, "D. J. Miller" quotes from Bishop Newton on "the fulfilment of the Mosaical prophecies concerning the Jews," "the greater part whereof we see accomplished in the world at the present time." It is scarcely needful to premise that any number of prophecies relative to a special matter does not affect this subject, which is the destiny of nations;



they are proof of prophecies, proof of the fulfilment of prophecies, but not "discoverable indications of the destiny of nations." The destiny of nations—and this is our argument—depends upon the elevation or moral depression of man; it is given to man by his own effort, or he would not be a free agent, not a responsible agent to ascend or descend in the scale of being. Just, therefore, as a man wills, determines, and acts, will his life be mean or exalted; just as the aggregate of men live, so of necessity will the destiny of nations be determined. Any other teaching, to be in agreement with man's free moral agency, is not possible. And we think that even this 28th chapter of Deuteronomy, quoted by Bishop Newton in proof of the truth of prophecy, confirms our position. The destiny of the Jews was *conditional*; if certain things were done, then certain blessings should follow; if the voice of the Lord *was not* hearkened to, then "these curses" should result. If the voice of the Lord had been hearkened to, then the result would have been blessing instead of cursing. There is always this *if*. It would have been the veriest mockery to have presented the choice of good and evil to the Jews, if they had not had the power to choose. And so of nations now: if they choose evil, evil will be their destiny; if good, good will be the result. But granting that many of the predictions in the chapter have had remarkable fulfilments, yet it must be conceded that others have been directly the opposite. For instance, in the 44th verse we are told that the stranger shall lend to the Jew, and not the Jew to the stranger. The fact is, that at the present moment the Jew is pre-eminent over all the earth as a lender—he lends to every nation on the earth. In the 65th verse we are told that among the nations the Jew shall find no rest, but instead he shall have a trembling heart, failing eyes, and sorrow of mind. Here, however, in the English nation, the Jew has rest, profit, and honour. He is to a proverb the most successful of tradesmen, town councils give him the highest seat at their boards, and special laws are passed so that he may be numbered and vote in the conclave of the nation. The non-fulfilment of these predictions, always cited in confirmation of fulfilled prophecy, ought to induce us to be chary in interpreting the letter of prophecy.

But "D. J. Miller," casting about for an illustration of what he considers prophecy, tells us, if he tells us anything, that it is to the nations what the chorus is to a Greek play. Not exactly: prophecy nearly always depends upon an "if;" the Greek chorus foretells exactly the action of the play. There is not the most distant analogy in the figure. "D. J. Miller" must think again. He has not enlightened us on the subject under debate.

J. O., catching the spirit of those who have gone before, writes an illogical paper, which, as the man in the play says, "signifies nothing." He, however, is bold enough to join with us in our belief that "the time of the end is not known;" this, then, puts Dr. Cumming out of court along with his feeble imitators, and we are reduced to the question of "events," and not of "time." To the

question, what are those events to be, echo answers, What? Is J. O., simple enough to imagine that because he quotes some prophetic predictions which have been fulfilled, therefore we must believe without proof or quotation that the "destiny of nations is indicated in Scripture"? Says J. O., "prophecy *seems* to point to dark and terrible days in store for the church of Christ." Why *seems*? it either does or it does not. If it *does*, then it does not *seem*; if it *does not*, then "the destiny of nations is not discoverably indicated in the prophecies of Scripture." We should advise J. O., who writes from Glasgow, to attend the public teaching of the eloquent Dr. Caird, when, as the result in any future paper, he may favour the readers of the *British Controversialist* with *reasoning* rather than *railing*; railing affecting the immediate object, J. J., as "the idle wind" which he respects not. The "idle wind," however, does not excite J. J. to laughter; the words of J. O. have quite a contrary effect. How could J. J. do other than laugh on reading these words?—"When J. J. made his rabid attack on Dr. Cumming, and those who with him fix the end of the world at some date not far distant, he should have informed his readers what this has to do with the subject." Has to do with the subject? why, everything. If the end is so near, what time can there be for the events which the modern seers foretell,—those "dark and terrible days" of which J. O. writes? If the end is one or two years hence the destiny will be pretty much, judging from the past, what it is now; if the end is 50,000 years hence, judging from the past, and that the word of the Lord will not return "void," then there will be 50,000 years of progress. Time has everything to do with the subject. Glasgow is famed for its school of thinkers; J. O. has evidently been playing truant.

In all seriousness, then, at the end of this debate, we have to say, from anything that has been written, that "the destiny of nations is not discoverably indicated in the prophecies of Scripture."

J. J.

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## History.

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### IS A SCIENCE OF HISTORY POSSIBLE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"PHILEATHES" throws down the gauntlet in rather a bombastic manner, "Surely no one can dream" that he can be wrong.

I venture to do more than that, even to dissent from his mode of treating the subject.

In order clearly to apprehend the question, we ought, I think, to come to a clear understanding of the two words "history" and "science," and by that means to ascertain whether history be of

such a nature as to render possible its scientific treatment. I take the word "history" first, as defined in one of the most comprehensive and fullest dictionaries of the day. This dictionary says that "history is an account of facts, particularly of facts respecting nations or states; a narration of events in the order in which they happened, *with their causes and effects*."

"Science" the same authority defines as, "in a *general sense*, the knowledge of many, methodically digested and arranged so as to become attainable by one; the comprehension or understanding of truth or facts by the mind." Also, "in *philosophy*, a collection of the general principles or leading truths relating to any subject." Again, "The term science is often used to signify that which we know inductively, or by the experience of particulars, from which we ascend to general conclusions not necessarily constituted by those particulars, yet warranted by previous experience and by analogies widely observed." Again, "Moral science" (which a science of history would be) "is that which, lying in great part beyond the reach of experiment, rests for its certainty on aggregated facts, supported by concurrent testimony, by experience, and by analogy, so as to leave no room for doubt, though not demonstrable."

The question therefore comes to this, "Can we so ascertain the facts constituting the life of any nation or collection of human beings, as from those facts, coupled with their causes and effects, to construct a logical system by the light of which we can assume with any degree of certainty what the future life of that nation will be?"

I say the *future life*, as I imagine that one of the chief uses of a science of history would be to warn men against approaching evil, tell them how to avoid or modify it, and guard against its recurrence.

I hope the readers of this controversy have not been wearied by these definitions.

In commenting on the article of "Philaethes" I shall be able to place before them quotations from eminent men and deep thinkers, which I consider warrant the opinion of the writers on the affirmative side, in opposition to what he advances.

But what says "Philaethes" in support of his theory of the impossibility of historical science? One of his starting-points is the assertion that "life is complex." I admit that fact. Without doubt life is complex, but is that any reason for his opinion? Are not the natural sciences complex? Is not all nature complex? But because nature is complex is the existence of a physical science impossible? If not, why *must* a science of history be impossible? He goes on, "Life is unfathomable, a mystery of insoluble intricacy." For this we only have his assertion. But mark the irrationality of his position. Because he asserts that "life is unfathomable," and "a mystery of insoluble intricacy," he denies the possibility of the construction of a system which would give us accurate knowledge of

life past and present, and teach us how to live in the future; and he would have us reject any attempt to fathom it, and at least to do something towards unweaving its "intricacy," which would assuredly not only be one of the main objects of scientific history, but one in which it must make considerable progress and attain considerable success in the course of time (and it must be borne in mind no science can be of mushroom growth).

After setting out the difficulties in the way of historic science, "Philaethes" asks, "Can man know the unknown?" I beg to assure him he can. What has man been doing through all time? What have all nations been doing? England and her children will, it is to be hoped, follow out the example of the past, and still go on learning and knowing the unknown. It is the work of all science, and would especially be the outcome of a science of history, to teach her students to know the unknown. This it seems to me is the *ne plus ultra* of life; nor does it cease with life itself, for death will teach us the unknown too.

No one can wish to see science converted into fortune-telling, but that is no argument why by the aid of true science we should not be able from the past and present and their experiences to judge what are the probabilities of the future.

To support his opinion "Philaethes" quotes a portion of the remarkable lecture of Professor Kingsley at his inauguration. It is unfair both to his readers and to Professor Kingsley to quote this one portion of a lecture of very great length. There is not in that lecture one passage which denies the possibility of the science of history. On the contrary, take the lecture as a whole, and a reader of it would, I think, come to the reverse conclusion. I venture to make a few quotations from this lecture, to show the injustice of "Philaethes'" assertion.

On p. 8 of his lecture will be found the following:—"Without doubt *history obeys, and always has obeyed*, in the long run, *certain laws*. But those laws assert themselves, and are *to be discovered* not in things, but in persons; *in the actions of human beings*."

This, I take it, admits the possibility of historical science, for the chief object of such a science would be to discover and enunciate the laws which "*history obeys, and always has obeyed*."

Of course this science, like all others, especially at its outset could not lay down infallible laws, as no doubt circumstances would start up in history which would seem to break those laws which it did lay down; but it is not to be supposed from that fact that the science is impossible, but rather the contrary. Experience alone could prove the fallibility or infallibility of its laws. On the occurrence of such apparent transgressions of law it would be the duty of the science to trace them to their origin, and either to modify the law which investigation may prove to have been broken, accordingly, or upon it to construct such another law as the circumstances would warrant. As Mr. Kingsley says, "the only philosophical method of looking at the strangest of phenomena is

to believe that it too is the result of law, perhaps a healthy result; that it is not to be condemned as a product of disease before it is proven to be such; and that if it be a product of disease, disease has its laws as much as health, and is a subject, not for cursing, but for induction."

Mr. Kingsley quotes an article by an anonymous writer, for which he expresses considerable admiration, and as it is on this same subject I may be permitted to extract one or two passages from it:—"It is the crown of philosophy to see immutable law even in the complex action of human life." "It is certain that the best intellects and spirits of our day are labouring to see more of that invariable order, and of that principle of growth in the life of human societies, and of the great society of mankind, which nearly all men more or less acknowledge, and partially and unconsciously confirm."

In speaking of this writer Mr. Kingsley says, "I have higher hopes of a *possible science of history*, because I fall back on those *old moral laws* which I think he wishes to ignore."

Even the passage quoted by "Philalethes" does not bear out his own inference.

On p. 44 of this same lecture Mr. Kingsley says "that a true philosophy of history ought to declare the laws—call them physical, spiritual, biological, or what we choose—by which great minds have been produced into the world, as necessary results, each in his place and time." "I do not deny that such a science is conceivable, because each mind, however great or strange, may be the result of fixed and unerring laws of life; and it is conceivable, too, that such a science *may so perfectly explain the past as to be able to predict the future.*"

Some persons there are who would have us take an average of mankind and announce the average man as the law for all men, and require this principle to be one of the foundations on which to raise the science of which we are speaking. Against this Mr. Kingsley very justly contends, and in order to hold the balance fairly I give his own language as follows:—

"The new science of little men can be no science at all; because the average man is not the normal man, and never yet has been; because the great man is rather the normal man, as approaching more nearly than his fellows to the true 'norma' and standard of a complete human character; and therefore to pass him by as a mere irregular sport of nature, an accidental giant with six fingers and six toes, and to turn to the mob for your theory of humanity, is (I think) about as wise as to ignore the Apollo and the Theseus, and to determine the proportions of the human figure from a crowd of dwarfs and cripples." I deny this principle of "average" being the guide most heartily, but at the same time I insist that it is not necessary that it should be one of the laws of a proper science of history.

It is not the object of this controversy to point out what are the laws which a science of history should include, but merely to inquire as to the possibility of the science; otherwise social laws laid

down by Mr. Kingsley could be pointed out which must be prominent in a true historical science; but I must not trouble the reader with any further quotations from this lecture, but recommend it to the careful perusal of any one who gives history a thought.

I repeat that nowhere in it does Professor Kingsley deny the possibility of the science, but, on the contrary, admits it, and even lays down some of the laws which such a science would enunciate.

He chiefly contends against the assertion that there are inevitable and infallible laws, and protests against the dogma that man is the irresponsible creature of circumstances.

"Philalethes" then goes to Mr. Carlyle, for whom I entertain a greater respect than for any other author; but "Philalethes" commits an error in concluding from the passage he quotes that Mr. Carlyle denies the possibility of a science of history. The article to which "Philalethes" refers is a most remarkable one, but the whole of it should be read in order to gather its meaning.

In it Mr. Carlyle says, "*History, as it lies at the root of all science, is also the first distinct product of man's spiritual nature; his earliest expression of what can be called thought. It is a looking both before and after, as, indeed, the coming time already waits, unseen, yet definitely shaped, predetermined, and inevitable in the time come; and only by the combination of both is the meaning of either completed.*" How can this be done except by science?

It would be well for "Philalethes" to reconsider his opinion; or if not, to reflect on his authorities.

He says that science is the "direct contradiction of the free will of man. It is the negation of human freedom. It is the impugner of human responsibility. It is the denier of one of the chief facts in the human spirit. Individual action, arising from freedom of will, alone distinguishes man from 'creatures of the baser sort.'"

These allegations are wild and entirely proofless. "Philalethes" forgets that there are persons of great talent and ability who assert that man's will is not free, and all must, I think, concur that on all points it certainly is not. The late Mr. Buckle, if I recollect rightly, denies the freedom of will, but history does not interfere with that theory either way, as what we want to know is what the man or men did, and the causes and effects, not caring one iota whether the will is free or not, and the science would take men as they are and were, would ascertain correctly what they did, how they did it, and why they did it, would put before us not only the picture of the past, but its reality, and from this it would surely not be beyond the limits of possibility to infer what men would do under similar circumstances and under dissimilar circumstances. This seems to me to be the likely outcome of the science of history.

But is man the irresponsible, helpless creature—nay, slave—of circumstances? Most assuredly not. I scout such a doctrine. Man is a responsible, immortal being. His inner life, his soul, his spirituality, cannot be bound by any laws; but history records their operations, and science can fairly make just inferences there-

from ; but, at the same time, entire, perfect freedom of will is impossible. Circumstances have begirdled us from our birth upwards, and will do so till our death, and after that. It is not necessary, and indeed would be wide of the question, to detail such circumstances ; they must be familiar to all. Man conquers some or all his circumstances. Be it so ; history records the conquest, and science will make its deductions ; for I take it there is no act of man's life from which a fair deduction cannot be made ; and bearing in mind that everything has a cause and an effect, I cannot avoid the conclusion above stated, that a science of history is possible.

What has been said of man is equally true of nations and states. Past revolutions and their surroundings enable us to opine with a considerable degree of certainty the occurrence of fresh revolutions in a certain condition of the nation, state, or society. The mere fact of the existence of order in the growth and life of men and nations, and in the actions of both, proves the proposition in favour of historical science.

Such a science, carefully constituted and properly worked, would be a glorious science ; for it would take each notable man separately, and record his actions, his surroundings, his wants, their causes and their consequences, pointing out to individual man the lessons he could learn therefrom. It would then take man in his collective form as a nation, treating it in a similar manner, from the certainties of the past and present showing the probabilities of the future, and would present to us that " power whereby the present ever gathers into itself the results of the past,—transforms the human race into a colossal man, whose life reaches from the creation to the day of judgment. The successive generations of men are days in this man's life. The discoveries and inventions which characterize the different epochs of the world are this man's works. The creeds and doctrines, the opinions and principles of the successive ages, are his thoughts. The states of society at different times are his manners. He grows in knowledge, in self-control, in visible size, just as we do."

All admit the vast amount of good such a science as the science of history would work, but some deny the possibility of its formation because of certain alleged difficulties which lie in the road to success in this as in all other things.

They deny that man is the creature of circumstances ; but (strange though it be) notwithstanding this denial, they insist that he is the creature of the very circumstances to which they advert, for circumstances cause the alleged impossibility.

Their position seems to me to be highly illogical. " History is philosophy teaching by experience."

I crave the reader's indulgence for making the numerous quotations above. My reason for making them is, that I consider it fairer to the reader to give the exact words of a writer than the conclusion arrived at from them solely, or my own impression from their words.

I conclude in the words of Mr. Carlyle, "praying only that increased division of labour do not here, as elsewhere, aggravate our already strong mechanical tendencies, so that in the manual dexterity for parts we *lose all command over the whole*, and the hope of any philosophy of history be farther off then ever; *let us all wish her great and greater success.*" H. K.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

WHAT is history? From Herodotus to Hallam is a good long journey through "the sounding corridors of time," and from Moses to Mottley is an increase of distance—if Dr. Colenso and the critics will permit us to believe in either or both of these historians by and of repute. One who could manage to get into his capacious intellect the entire matter contained in the so-called historians of the world would surely be presumed to have acquired a knowledge of history. Supposing this to be possible, would such a person be reputed to possess a full and complete knowledge of the men and events of time past? We rather doubt he would not. History is not only proverbially but provokingly equivocal. Its sum and substance is not at all easily able to be got at. "This province of literature is a debatable land. It is on the confines of two distinct territories. It is under the jurisdiction of two hostile powers; and, like other districts similarly situated, it is ill-defined, ill-cultivated, and ill-regulated. Instead of being equally shared between its two rulers, the reason and the imagination, it falls alternately under the sole and absolute dominion of each. It is sometimes fiction. It is sometimes theory. . . . It may be laid down as a general rule, though subject to considerable qualifications and exceptions, that history begins in novel and ends in essay."\*

This is the testimony of one who has gained a reputation as an historian, and therefore of one who knew something about how history was got at and how it was written.

Hear the same writer again upon historical truth:—"A history in which every particular incident may be true may, on the whole, be false. The circumstances which have most influence on the happiness of mankind, the changes of manners and morals, the transition of communities from poverty to wealth, from knowledge to ignorance, from ferocity to humanity—these are, for the most part, noiseless revolutions. Their progress is rarely indicated by what historians are pleased to call important events. They are not achieved by armies or enacted by senates. They are sanctioned by no treaties, and recorded in no archives. They are carried on in every school, in every church, behind ten thousand counters, at ten thousand firesides. The upper current of society presents no certain criterion by which we can judge of the direction in which the under current flows. We read of defeats and victories; but we know that nations may be miserable amidst victories, and prosperous

\* Macaulay's "Miscellaneous Essays," vol. i., on History, p. 275.



amidst defeats. We read of the fall of wise ministers, and of the rise of profligate favourites. But we must remember how small a proportion the good or evil effected by a single statesman can bear to the good or evil of a great social system."\*

If historical truth be so difficult to attain, and if even when attained it is capable of producing false impressions, how is it possible that there can be a science of history? how, out of a woof and warp of uncertainties, are we to weave the pure and entire web of a trustworthy history—a scientific history, and therefore all certain?

It has long been a proverb that "truth is stranger than fiction;" it might almost be affirmed in our day that fiction is truer than history. In our standard books of history few people find their realizable and available acquaintance with the past. We may have read Holinshed, but we remember Shakspeare. We study Hume, but we believe in Scott. We peruse Carte, but pin our faith to Fielding. We know Burnet, but we adhere to Addison's revelations of English life. We look on Oldmixon as a dull and commonplace proser; Mrs. Behn or Farquhar supply a more peculiar seeing, to our eye, than he. We may dip into Somerville, but we grow breathless over Thackeray's page; and those who would never read a single page of Russell's "Modern Europe" glow and brighten and burn before Bulwer's picture of "Richelieu." Who believes in Thiers' "Napoleon I.," in Carlyle's "Frederick the Great," in Stirling's "Charles V.," in Froude's "Henry VIII.," or Mottley's "Elizabeth"? They are kernels inserted into the shell of history, but they are most assuredly not the real products of time or circumstance. If we want to get close to the heart, near to the costume, a fair view of the actors, a glimpse of the age and body of a time, its form and pressure, we must go to the profane literature of the satirist, the dramatist, and the novelist, and not to the great imposing (in how many senses?) tomes of history—huge accumulations of wordy prolixity,—like Alison's "Europe," or Massey's "Times of George III."

Of all possible wrong-heads and dry-as-dusts, none ever equal the historiographer. When he does not endeavour to lie like truth, he falls into the opposite error of so rehearsing the truth that it has all the effect of a lie. I grant that history is often spoken of as a great body of facts, but I do not know anybody who is willing to go bail for historians as faithful witnesses. Does not every historian accuse another of perversion of facts, erroneous statements, garbling, and other offences against the morality of common life? How many times do succeeding historians accuse their predecessors, not of misapprehension, but of misrepresentation? and how many of the characters of history have been of late rehabilitated? All these things show that history is untrustworthy, that it wants the very first element of science—fidelity to fact, and impartiality in in-

ference. How many historians can we credit with calmness of passion, freedom from the spirit of sect or party, patience in research, energy in investigation, caution in deduction, sufficiently powerful in imagination to realize the past instead of painting and inventing it? Statesmen are too much engrossed in action to write history well and honestly. Students know too little of the business of the world and the ways of men to be wise interpreters of actions done under impulse or events originating in passion. Neither students nor statesmen, therefore, can write history as it ought to be written.

In history we can never reach the true motives of actions—that is, the grounds of their causes. These are hidden in the minds of the actors, and very frequently ostensible motives are given as those on which men act for the express purpose of hiding more effectively the true causes of their actions. We know well that historical documents are carefully kept in well-provided “safes,” in order that their revelations of the real motives of public proceedings may not become inconveniently known to those who might be inclined to detail or retail them. Now science is, above all things else, an investigation into causes, a systematic allotment of the causes and their effects of the matter which conveys information. Causation is the very key-word of science. It is held that we know nothing till we have learned the causes and effects of all phenomena. That alone is science. How then can we have a science of history? How are we to become perfectly acquainted with the real motives of the actors in history? How are we to test the ostensible as distinguished from the real? How are we to get “behind the scenes” in politics, and learn the primary stages of events? Are all political and social incidents so thoroughly honest and above-board, so simple and easily understood, so free from secrecy and activities requiring secrecy, that we can implicitly trust the statements of the actors in or the reporters of them? If science implies certainty, and history be a compound of uncertainties, how can there be a science of history?

Again, science deals with recurrent phenomena, as tides, eclipses, &c., not with independent and unrepeatable circumstances. History consists entirely of these unrepeatable phenomena. Every life in each successive generation is a new, fresh energy in nature. It differs from all that precedes it in original disposition, circumstances, culture, temptations, &c., and is, in fact, an incalculable force. Then the numerical proportions of life differ in each generation—population is in a constant flux. But even the relative proportion of the different classes of society is liable to continual change. This changeable thing, life, is acted upon, too, by changeable circumstances, as wealth and poverty, freedom or slavery, success or failure, health or disease, winds and weather, governments, laws, national vicissitudes, &c. Then there are the farther inducements to change in sermons, speeches, newspapers, controversies, conversation, and even intimidation or bribery. How are we to get at a science of all that these imply and produce? Yet

all this would only be a small part of history. The want of recurrence in history is, we think, an irresistible argument against the possibility of a science of history. We cannot think of science but as a revelation of the laws of recurring circumstances. But we cannot think of history as a statement even, still less as a revelation of a series of occurrences constantly repeated, and able to be foreseen, predetermined, and provided for or against.

Supposing, therefore, we grant to R. S. that "science does not require foreknowledge," he must at least confess that science must observe, know, and describe facts truthfully. Can we observe the facts of the past?—can we even observe the facts of the present? An attempt to read the historians of ancient times—the baby nonsense of Herodotus, the boyish nonsense of Livy, the sectarian nonsense of Sarpi, and the political nonsense of Mitford, will enable R. S. to answer the first part of our query; and an every-day experience—reading the newspapers—will convince him that he must answer the latter part in the negative. Can we know facts, or can we lay hold of witnesses who know them? In regard to the present they are hard to find; in regard to the past the difficulty is impossibility. R. S. must fail therefore to get even past knowledge or present information sufficiently correct to form a foundation for science, but no science is worth anything that does not lead to foreknowledge. Even the most untrained youngster of science—Miss Meteorology—attempts by her forecasts of the weather to ingratiate herself with the public. Science has no status unless foreknowledge follows upon her discoveries—she must be married to utility. History, as a science, has, so far as we know, only one small claim to enter on behalf of her prevision. She can refer, we believe, to the prophecies given annually in Zadkiel's almanack—therefore history has one of the accidents of science. History cannot be a science, because we have no system of registering facts, of experimenting upon them, and acquiring a knowledge of the motives in which events arise by which they are modified, and which they in their turn excite. The historian collects facts as isolated units, they crowd upon his vision, and they mob him. They all differ each from each. They cannot be classified. They are in constant flux, and he cannot hold them before his eyes for analysis. Like the witches in Macbeth, they refuse to be questioned, and flit from the inquirer's gaze. They cannot be mastered by any system. Then, should he try his imagination, he does not give history, but fiction.

As to history being "the biography of society," it is a very fine metaphor, but what meaning has it? Is society capable of being biographed? Has it a unity such that it can be regarded in a single light? We fear not. The family of nations is a large one, and if we are to look upon humanity at large as possessed of a unity of life—like Dr. Temple in "Essays and Reviews,"—it must be an imaginary, not a real humanity. R. S. must avoid attempting to reason by rhetoric, or to construct syllogisms out of similes. "It

would be as impossible to record all events as it would be to travel through all space, or to exist in all time. Omniscience alone could comprehend, Omnipotence alone could record, such a history."\* In using such language let us warn you, R. S., and through you each of your readers who puts his trust in your figures of speech,—

"Periculosæ plenum opus aleæ  
Tractas; et incedis per ignes  
Suppositos cineri doloso."†

We did not know that R. S. was a scientific historian. We only recognized in him a controversialist engaged in defending a given theme. He has given us some arguments—dull and ineffective ones, it is true; but then he apparently recollected the old saw about "history is philosophy teaching by example;" and the bright idea seems to have struck him that he too would teach by example. Hence he has given us some fine morsels of the philosophy of history,—1, on luxury and effeminacy of manners; 2, on the progress of the human race. After this he comforts Louis Napoleon on his uneasy throne by assuring him that "those who overthrow a despotism erect a government ten times more despotic than that which is just subverted" (p. 184). If this is true, the practical rule of civil life must be "Never let a despotism be overthrown." This may be a good rule, but we doubt it. If history as a science teaches this, we think it is justly to be regarded as—

"Vain wisdom all, and false philosophy."

PHILALETHES.

## Social Economy.

### OUGHT CORPORAL PUNISHMENT TO BE EMPLOYED IN EDUCATION?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

THIS age has grown peevish, whining, and puerile. Maudlin sentiment and meddling philanthropy are growing rampant, and becoming disgracefully powerful. Floods of bathos inundate newspapers and lecture-rooms about all sorts of manners and customs of the olden time, which require change and reformation. The alarming prevalency of these soft-sawder patriots and apple-tart preachers is a thing to grieve at and to sorrow for. We have

\* Sir John Stoddart's "Introduction to the Study of Universal History."—*Encyclopædia Metropolitana*, p. 8.

† Thou engagest in a labour full of imminent risk, and walkest through fires concealed by treacherous ashes.—*Horace "Odes,"* book ii. 1.

reached a terrible depth of demoralization when such things are possible as dog hospitals and cat asylums, anti-cruelty to criminals associations, and garotters' friend societies. Midnight meetings may have good effects, but what possible good can result from anti-corporal punishment advocacy as applied to the ill-deserving? Are flexibility and good-nature to snivel over the woes of humanity to their increase, or are we to lay a strong hand upon the early evidences of vice in the young, and—

"Whip the offending Adam out of him"?

Are superciliousness, disobedience, impatience of restraint, impudence, and vicious dispositions to be allowed to grow unchecked in children, because a few namby-pamby oracles of social science and similar associations have got it into their heads that corporal punishment ought not to be employed in modern education?

Scholastic discipline is not the less, but the more requisite in our day, just because of this absurd and pernicious notion. It has got into the heads of children that there is a dislike to chastisement among the public, and they use this idea to their own injury and the detriment of their parents' interests. This rash and petulant spirit of insubordination may be interpreted by the sentimentalists as the—

"Divinity within them, breeding wings  
Wherewith to spurn the earth."

In our opinion it is directly the reverse; it is a spirit "earthly, sensual, devilish," which needs reproof and demands correction. The one great want of our age is reverent obedience. Obedience is the indispensable pre-requisite of order; "order is Heaven's first law," and the only foundation on which society can rest securely. If, then, there is any duty incumbent upon a schoolmaster, it is to insist on obedience as the only safe ground of his pupils' future welfare, and of society and its institutions. He must teach them the advantages and the wisdom of obedience. He must fasten it into them by practice and habit until the hold is firm, and it becomes a principle constantly active. There is, therefore, an absolute need of a means of enforcing compulsory obedience until it becomes habitual, and the common way of doing this has been found to be practicable and wise.

No democratic teaching and preaching can ever be effective in persuading us that children ought to have their own will in everything. No possible practicable scheme of school or home training has ever been brought forward which has convinced men that children are able to be reasoned into the willing performance of their duty. Reasons they cannot understand, and inclination is in them singularly strong. Some temporary agency for the securing of attention, submission, and respect must be had, and what means can be adopted less injurious than the birch twig? If we accept one form of chastisement, viz., the attempt to bring upon the

offender the laugh of his fellows or their contempt by lecturing the gallery on his folly, criminality, or stupidity, do we better the teaching of the birch? Nay! we excite in the culprit a contempt for the judgment of his fellows, and a callous want of respect for public opinion, where we fail; and where we succeed we induce the idea that ridicule is the test of truth, and a slavish vanity which inclines the future man to ask, "What will Mrs. Grundy say?" In the gallery we excite malicious and uncharitable judgment,—judgment which never can be fair; for the schoolmaster is at once counsel for the prosecution and judge, while the culprit has no special pleader to defend him, and is seldom allowed to do anything else than to criminate himself.

Fines are impossible in common schools; and even if possible would be unfair, for they would press unequally, being nothing to the rich and a burden to the poor. Extra tasks are still worse; for punishment is usually necessary because the tasks are already indiscreetly heavy; and to double the burden does not make it more easily carried; besides, in the long run, either stupidity or stubbornness will break down the constancy of punishment and gain the victory. Imprisonment is ineffective on grounds shown by R. S., but still more so on this moral principle. Children ought to be accustomed to the utmost regularity of life. They ought to have fixed hours for fixed duties. The whole comfort of home depends on regularity. But if the teacher by imprisonment can throw the regularity of a household into disorder whensoever he chooses, he wields a power reaching beyond his proper sphere. Again, by making it possible for a child to have an excuse for lateness or absence from home, it puts in the power of the child an uncalled-for opportunity for lying by saying, "I was kept in at school," while the fact may be that play has been occupying the spare hours. Many dangerous accidents have occurred through this opening for desertion from home, and this chance of absenting one's self from the duties and requirements of moral training at the best of all schools—the domestic hearth.

Fool's-caps, disgrace-corners, exposure before classmates, and various other forms of punishment, are liable to grave moral objections. If coercion there must be, let us have the coercion which is most easily got over. Let the culprit pay for the pleasure found in transgression by the pain derived from the infliction of stripes, justly earned by neglect of duty. Let the young be taught to obey; let obedience be the first demand made and enforced, and let him know that obedience is the primary requisite to comfort of feeling, that disobedience is certain to be followed by discomfort. If a child is brought up to know this he is put in the way of docility, he is tractable. If you train up a child to ask the why and the wherefore of your conduct and of his, you culture impertinence and officious curiosity. Children have no right, while under training, to be previously satisfied of the righteousness of a law or a command before they yield obedience to it. If we attempt such a course, and

instead of saying, "Where there is no law there is no transgression," say, "Where there is no conviction in the mind of the righteousness of a law there is no transgression," we can always be outwitted by dulness, inattention, or stubbornness; by false assertions of non-conviction; and by lying paltering with conscience. A law is capable of being made plain and express; the reason of a law is not always able to be stated to children in such a way as to secure the assent of their understanding and will.

Can a child by any possibility be made to estimate the reasons for a command? He knows nothing of consequences; he is characteristically heedless of consequences. He cannot comprehend ultimate reasons. Now all orders must depend for their explanation either on ultimate reasons or on a consideration of the advantages consequent on attending to them, or the penalties incurred by transgressing them. To expose the law—whatever it is—to the criticism of a child as a pre-requisite to obedience is to put both the law and the child in a false position. Neither can have fair play. The law cannot lay before the child the whole extent of the grounds on which its righteousness is shown convincingly, because they cannot be presented intelligibly to the child. The child cannot look at the law and the evidences of the law but through its inclinations, feelings, and will, and his reason is called upon to act at a disadvantage. If we say, then, we shall not resort to constrained or compulsory obedience, but shall trust in truth, reason, and conscience, we base our cause on a fallacy. The child is shackled and disturbed in the consideration of truth by its own feelings, inclination confounds and obscures its reason, and its conscience requires culture before it can determine on the right or the wrong, and leading forth by practice before it can determine by theory. Christ himself has justified this assertion by saying, "If any man will *do* His will, he shall know of the doctrine."

No child who has ever grown up has been free from petulances, from tendencies and feelings which require restraint, rebuke, and opposition. Shakspeare knew human nature, and he represents boyhood as "creeping, like snail, unwillingly to school." This he does because he hates constraint and loves to do his own will; but constrained he must be if he is to be educated. Education means the training of the mind. But just as a tree requires lopping and pruning, so does a child's mind require restraint and constraint. Not the constraint of fretful anger or tyrannous violence, but the restraint of pain.

Pain is nature's educator. It does not argue or seek to convince or persuade. It lays down the law and affixes the penalty, and when the law is infringed the penalty is exacted. This shows that corporal punishment is a legitimate means of leading people to make changes in their moral conduct, and does away with the fallacy that bodily punishment cannot physic mental obliquities or perversities. We affirm that nature uses bodily pain to lead to reflection and reformation—that is, mental and moral change. The order of

nature giving us this clear intimation that corporal punishment is beneficial as a means of moving to thought and reconsideration completely refutes the fallacy that corporal punishment cannot beneficially act on the mind. Facts are the grandest of arguments.

If the arguments of "Elpisticos" were correct, nature would be at fault, for it uses corporal punishment "as an incitement to learning and duty" (p. 26). It gives hunger pains to teach us to eat; it gives nervous and muscular pains to check us for eating to excess. In these and other instances it leads the mind to do its duty, yet to control its appetites. It does not make all its plans for the furtherance of man's mental development depend on emulation, as "Elpisticos" advises, but makes use of pleasure and pain as agents in its labours.

Is emulation quite so good a thing as "Elpisticos" thinks? Does not emulation often change into envy? Do not malice and uncharitableness frequently rise out of the soil in which emulation has been planted? Does over-competition not often result from emulation? And does not every prize season show us that by the over-pressure of emulation vanity has become diseased, and has generated in the body the fellest of all monstrous punishments—consumptiveness? Emulation is an eminently unsafe agent in education. The rod is better than that. We hold that corporal punishment, if justly and rigorously inflicted on settled and known principles, is effective, safe, uninjurious in the long run, and quite calculated to promote education. We have no qualms of conscience about recommending the fair and judicious use of corporal punishment in education.

J. M. G.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

"Good instruction should be given without pain to the instructed." Such, Sir Wm. Jones informs us, is a portion of the Hindoo code. Plato sententiously settled this question by a counter query,—*"Are not dogs and horses rendered worse by ill-usage?"* The ferula, the rod, and the birch are instruments of torture fit for ascetics and barbarians, but not for teachers in a Christian land. We do not believe in the letter of Butler's Hudibrastic (and ironical?) eulogy of the flogging system when he says,—

"Whipping, that's Virtue's governess,  
Tutress of arts and sciences,  
That mends the gross mistakes of nature,  
And puts new life into dull matter."

Corporal punishment has been, by the force of public opinion, almost entirely extruded from gaols, penitentiaries, and reformatories, and yet it is retained in our common schools! Is it not shameful to think that England's children should be exposed to chastisement such as even criminals are exempted from? We cannot admit that it is utopian and fantastic to advocate the abolition of flogging in schools, since it has been all but wholly



abolished in prisons, and is seldom used on shipboard or in regiment. Common sense, humanity, and a true desire for the welfare of the young, ought to incite us to examine this question honestly, with a desire to find a right answer.

It is indeed a question of no mean importance; for on its proper settlement depends the success of education and the progress of man. How many can bear witness to the truth of John Locke's observation!—"Many children, imputing the pain they endured at school to their books they were corrected for, so join these ideas together, that a book becomes their aversion, and they are never reconciled to the study and use of them all their lives after; and thus reading becomes a torment to them, which otherwise possibly they might have made the great pleasure of their lives." This quotation, while it shows that "Malvern" has misunderstood John Locke's opinion, shows how the question of corporal punishment in schools affects the progress of man, and lays society at large under the birch of the schoolmaster. It cannot be doubted that ill-trained and ill-regulated tempers cause much annoyance, misery, and wrong in the world. How much of this is attributable to the schoolmaster's rod, and its effect in causing a distaste for learning, improvement, and industry! Whipping is a wretched substitute for true training. It is a lazy method of procuring instant obedience. But the obedience, in so far as it is given unwillingly and produced irrationally, is of no value; it is only lasting so long as the tingle of the birch is felt in the flesh and effective in the mind. It is at best animal only, not intellectual training, and cannot therefore be such as ought to be employed in the tuition of children to think and behave.

When, however, the "rod in pickle" is used, as it too frequently is, not as a punishment of viciousness or stubbornness of will, but as a corrective of inattention or a chastisement for inability, the offence of using it is much graver. It may be that corporal inflictions are necessary in some few cases to subdue the stubborn will or to impress the lessons given against vice—although we doubt it much,—but it can never be just to torture the flesh of a young and growing child by the lash for mental incompetence inherited from its parents, or caused by early neglect. This is a barbarism unworthy of heathendom, and one of which the permission in a country professedly Christian is a stigma and a reproach. Severity in such circumstances is worse than vengeance, for it is unprovoked by the will of the child. Inattention, again, arises not from the will of the child, but from some defect in the interest of the lessons taught, or the manner of teaching them. To punish for that is to give pain to the child for a fault belonging to the schoolmaster, and chargeable on him, not on the child.

These are a few general observations on the topic of corporal punishments, but we propose to make our arguments in the negative a little more effective by marshalling them in a more positive order, and beg to submit to the reader's attention the following reasons

for holding that corporal punishment ought not to be employed in education.

1st. Flogging depraves the moral character.

Flogging is meant to produce pain, and therefore to inspire fear. Fear is in itself one of the vilest and most cowardly feelings of man. Fear leads to equivocation, concealment, and lying. Its great aim is to escape. To effect this, almost any baseness will be submitted to; and the greater the severity practised, only so much more strongly does fear work in the spirit to effect concealment. When with a dissonant voice and enraged countenance, flourishing the weapons of vengeance and pain, the master calls upon the youthful culprit to criminate himself by confession, Equivocation plies her insidious temptations, and suggests a lie as the best method of concealing the fault and escaping punishment. Most probably the lie is discovered, perhaps a tell-tale neighbour, fearful of the lash in turn, throws all the blame upon his partner in the indiscretion, fault, or school crime. Here we see severity directly depraving the morals, and causing the promptings of fear to turn the child from the ways of truth and honesty. Experience improves his ingenuity for falsehood, and the rod gives him continual inducements to cultivate the art of lying with every appearance of truth, and to acquire a full acquaintance with the strategies of equivocation. He then comes to amuse himself with lying, which he at first learned only from the necessity of escaping from the rod of correction.

2nd. Corporal punishment is humiliating.

The capacity for feeling shame is a strong safeguard against evil-doing. The love of approbation buoys up the mind when the waves of temptation rise around the spirit. To train these powers for usefulness in after life is highly advantageous, nay, necessary. But corporal punishment, the most shameful of all indignities, is made a common agency for school discipline, and the sense of shame is worked out of a child. Even the old Roman dramatist had a higher and better maxim in education than prevails in many so-called Christian seminaries. At least in classical schools, where flogging is said to abound, it ought to be remembered that Terence said,—

*"Hoc patrium est; potius consuefacere filium  
Sua sponte recte facere quam alieno metu."\**

We contend that by accustoming a child to a punishment which excites shame, and then incites to shameful practices, is a most humiliating and absurd method. Let us rather keep the sense of shame and the feeling of fear for their true purposes—as safeguards—than break them down, and so humiliate the spirit of a child that it shall condescend to lie and equivocate through fear and shame, being led to do greater evil than the original fault.

3rd. Corporal punishment is cruel.

\* This is fatherly; rather to accustom a son to do right of his accord than from a foreign fear.

This scarcely requires remark. Severity is, of course, cruelty, when it is exhibited in corporal punishment; and in that sense the above statement seems to be self-evident. It is not in that sense, however, that we mean the remark to be understood. Childhood is extremely susceptible of pain, and that for wise ends—to protect the young life in it. The quiver of its nerves, and the fleshly correction administered by the lash, are, to a child, much more painful than we can imagine; for we have grown up through a course of painful experiences. But even supposing this were not the case, and that the fear of a flogging, as many assert, like “the fear of death, lies most in apprehension,” while the actual pain inflicted soon passes away, we could not exonerate the use of the rod from the charge of cruelty. That would rather heighten the charge, for not only is there inflicted on this supposition a certain adequate amount of bodily punishment, but also an uncertain and extra amount of mental horror originating in fear. When to this we add that more than one-half of the visitations of the rod are made for faults arising from natural incompetence, or educational error, or defective home training, or associations, we cannot but believe that we have made good the statement we have made—that, not to speak of the actual suffering caused, corporal punishment is cruel.

4th. Corporal punishment is absurd.

Anything that is self-defeating is absurd. John Locke explained to us a little while ago in what manner corporal punishment operated to produce a disgust for learning. We have endeavoured to show that concealment, equivocation, and lying were greatly increased by the use of the rod. Everybody knows that truanting is not nearly so frequently indulged in for the pleasure of absence from school as from the fears engendered by the possible floggings to be got at school. It is quite plain, therefore, that flogging as an agent to promote education is a failure, is an absurdity.

Again, flogging is an application of force to the body to effect a change or improvement in the mind. This is a highly indirect process. There must be ways of influencing the mind itself to do its own work,—that is, to live its own life. To use an indirect, when there is a direct means of accomplishing any object is absurd.

If the opinions advanced above be of any weight, they go to prove that corporal punishment ought not to be employed in education. The following illustrative anecdote, culled from the celebrated work of Sir Roger Ascham, the great schoolmaster of England in the time of Henry VIII., will show how ineffective corporal punishment is in comparison with sensible and loving training, and so establish the negative position we hold:—

“And one example whether love or fear doth work more in a child for virtue and learninge, I will gladly report, which maie be heard with some pleasure and followed with more profit. Before I went into Germanie, I came to Brodiegate in Leicestershire, to take my leave of that noble Lady Jane Grey, to whom I was exceedinge much beholdinge. Her parents, the duke and the duchesse, with all the householde,

gentlemen and gentlewomen, were hunting in the parke, and I found her in her chamber reading Phædon Platonis in Greeke, and that with as much delite as some gentlemen would read a merrie tale in Boccasse. After salutation and dewtie done, with some other taulke, I asked her why she leewe such pastime in the parke. Smiling, she answered me, 'I wisse with all their sport in the parke, it is but a shadde to that pleasure that I find in Plato. Alas! good folke, they never felt what true pleasure meant.' 'And how came you, madame,' quoth I, 'to this deep knowledge of pleasure, and what did chiefly allure you unto it, seeinge not many women, but very few men, have attained thereunto?' 'I will tell you,' quoth she, 'and tell you a truth which perchance you will marvell at. One of the greatest benefites that God ever gave me is that He sent me so sharp and severe parents, and so gentle a schoolmaster. For when I am in presence eyther of father or mother, whether I speak, keep silence, sit, stand, or go, eat, drink, be merie, be sad, be only playing, dancing, or doing anything else, I must do it, as it were, in such weight, measure, and number, even so perfittlie as God made the world, or else I am so sharply taunted, so cruelly threatened, yea, presentlie sometimes with pinches, nippes, stabbes, and other waies which I will not name for the honor I bear them; so without measure misordered that I thinke myself in hell, till time come that I must go to Mr. Elmer, who teacheth me so gentlie, so pleasantly, with such fair allurements to learninge, that I think all the time nothing whiles I am with him. And when I am called from him I fall to weeping, because whatsoever I do els but learning is full of grief, trouble, fear, and whole misliking to me. And thus my books hath been so much my pleasure, and bringeth daily to me more pleasure, and more that in respect of it all other pleasures in very deed be but trifles and troubles unto me.'—*Roger Ascham's Works, Dodsley's Edition, vol. iv., p. 222.*

This quotation is not adduced as a far-fetched and purposeless anecdote, but as a rejoinder of fact for fact against "Malvern's" allusion to Burns. We might quote many examples of the evils of severe or injudicious castigation in education. We might quote the opinions of pupils against N. Udal, Gill, Busby, Drury, Keate, &c.; we might name Milton and Johnson, Coleridge, Lamb, and Byron, as among those who deprecate the severe use of the lash. But we have no need to argue from the abuse of the rod to prove its use a mistake in education. We have given what we regard, and what we hope our readers will recognize, as good and sound reasons for believing that corporal punishment ought not to be employed in education. Neither "Scholasticos" nor R. S. has given us cause to alter our opinion, although they argue ably for their side. We think, however, that they are sufficiently answered if our reasonings are held to be correct.

B. C. N.

## The Eloquence of the Month.

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### ON THE NATURE, PROGRESS, AND RESULTS OF SCIENCE.

[John Phillips was born on Christmas-day, 1800; he was left an orphan at an early age, and was brought up under the care of his uncle, Wm. Smith (1769—1839), “the first in this country to discover and teach the identification of strata, and to determine their succession,” and who is hence styled *the father of English geology*. Under him his nephew studied land surveying and geology. In 1824 Mr. Phillips arranged the fossils in the Yorkshire Philosophical Society. In the following year he was appointed curator of its museum. In Nov. 1826 he read his first geological paper, “On the direction of diluvial currents in Yorkshire,” which was published in *The Philosophical Magazine*, August, 1827. In 1831 Dr. (now Sir) David Brewster proposed, in a letter to John Phillips, the formation of a general society of scientific men. Mr Phillips entered heartily into the project, and in 1831 (27th Sept.), “The British Association for the Advancement of Science” was instituted at York. In 1832 Mr. Phillips was appointed assistant-general secretary of the association, and editor of the reports and transactions annually published by it. In 1835 he was chosen Professor of Geology in King’s College, London. He was also attached, by Sir Henry De la Beche, to the Geological Survey of Great Britain. In 1837 he wrote for “Lardner’s Cabinet Cyclopædia” a treatise on geology. In 1840 he resigned his curatorship at York. In 1841 he issued his “Fossils of Cornwall, Devon, and West Somerset.” In 1842 he published a Map of “The British Islands.” He was appointed Professor of Geology in the University of Dublin in 1844: in which same year he issued a geological survey of “The Malvern Hills.” His uncle having died in 1839, Mr. Phillips added to the literature of scientific biography a “Memoir of William Smith.”

In 1845 the Geological Society awarded to him the Wollaston medal, an honour which his uncle had gained fourteen years previously. On the death of E. Strickland (1811—1853), Mr. Phillips was chosen Reader in Geology at Oxford, as assistant to Dr. Buckland, and obtained the full honours and emoluments of the chair on the demise, in 1851, of his chief. In 1853 his “County of York” appeared; in 1855, his “Rivers, Mountains, and Sea Coasts of Yorkshire;” in 1860, his “Life on the Earth, its origin and succession.” These are only a few out of the forty or more productions due to his indefatigable pen, besides contributions to reviews and encyclopædias. The following eloquent *résumé* of the progress of science during the existence of the British Association was delivered by him in the Town Hall of Birmingham, as president of the active and useful peregrinating society of *savans*. The newspaper press has been almost unanimous in regarding it as a fine, fluent, and fair exposition of the topic chosen. It is certainly clear, facile, and readily understood. The information it contains, though drawn from a wide range, is lucidly and artfully expressed; the transitions from topic to topic being especially well managed. We cannot doubt that many will consider it

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a valuable acquisition thus to have in a preservable and revised form this genial and able oration on the nature, progress and results of science.]

Assembled for the third time in this busy centre of industrious England, amid the roar of engines and the clang of hammers, where the strongest powers of nature are trained to work in the fairy chains of art, how softly falls upon the ear the accents of science, the friend of art, and the guide of industry! Here, where Priestley analyzed the air, and Watt obtained the mastery over steam, it well becomes the students of nature to gather; and when, on other occasions, we meet in quiet colleges and academic halls, how gladly welcome is the union of fresh discoveries and new inventions with the solid and venerable truths which are there treasured and taught! Long may such union last—the fair alliance of cultivated thought and practical skill; for by it labour is dignified, science fertilized, and the condition of human society exalted. Through this happy union of science and art, the young life of the British Association—one-third of a century—has been illustrated by discoveries and enriched by inventions in a degree never surpassed. How else could we have gained that knowledge of the laws of nature which has added to the working strength of a thousand millions of men the mightier power of steam, extracted from the buried ruins of primeval forests their treasured elements of heat, light, and colour; or brought under the control and converted into a messenger of man's thoughts the dangerous mystery of the lightning? How many questions have we asked—not always in vain—regarding the constitution of the earth, its history as a planet, its place in creation? probing with sharpened eyes the peopled space around—peopled with a thousand times ten thousand stars; floating above the clouds in colder and clearer air; traversing the polar ice, the desert sand, the virgin forest, the unconquered mountain; sounding the depths of the ocean, or diving into the dark places of the earth. Everywhere curiosity, discovery, enjoyment; everywhere some useful and worthy result. Life in every form, of every grade, in every stage; man in every clime and under all conditions; the life that now surrounds us, and that which has passed away: these subjects have been examined often, if not always, in the spirit of that philosophy which is slowly raising on a broad security of observed facts, sure inductions, and repeated experiments, the steady columns of the temple of physical truth.

Few of the great branches of the study of nature were left unconsidered in the schools of Athens; hardly one of them was, or indeed could then be, made the subject of accurate experiment. The precious instruments of exact research; the measures of time, space, force, and motion, are of very modern date. If, instead of the few lenses and mirrors of which traces appear in the Greek and Roman writers, there had been in the hands of Hipparchus, Eratosthenes, or Ptolemy, even the first Galilean or the smallest Newtonian telescope, would it have been left to their remote successors to be

still struggling with the elements of physical astronomy, and waiting with impatience till another quarter of a century shall have rolled away to give us one more good chance of measuring the distance of the sun by the transit of Venus? Had such instruments as Wheatstone's chronoscope been invented, would it have been left to Foucault to condense into his own apartment an experimental proof of the velocity of light, and within a tract of thirty feet to determine the rate of its movement through all the vast planetary space of thousands of millions of miles, more exactly than had been inferred by astronomers from their observations of the satellites of Jupiter? By this experiment, the velocity of light appears to be less, sensibly less, than was previously admitted; and this conclusion is of the highest interest. For, as by assuming too long a radius for the orbit of Jupiter, the calculated rate of light-movement was too great, so now, by employing the more exact rate and the same measures of time, we can correct the estimated distance of Jupiter and all the other planets from the sun. We have, in fact, a really independent measure of planetary space; and it concurs with observations on the parallax of Mars, in requiring a considerable reduction of the assumed diameters of the planetary paths. The distance of the earth from the sun must be reduced from above ninety-five to less than ninety-three millions of miles, and by this scale the other space-measures of the solar system, excepting the diameter of the earth and the distance and diameter of the moon, may easily be corrected.

The light and heat which are emitted from the sun reach the earth without great diminution by the absorptive action of the atmosphere; but the waste of heat from the surface of our planet through radiation into space is prevented, or rather lessened, by this same atmosphere. Many transparent bodies freely admit heat-rays derived from a source of high temperature, but stop the rays which emanate from bodies only slightly warmed. The atmosphere possesses this quality in a remarkable degree, and owes it to the presence of diffused water and vapour; a fact which Dr. Tyndall has placed in the clear light of complete and varied experiment. The application of this truth to the history of the earth and of the other planets is obvious. The vaporous atmosphere acts like warm clothing to the earth. By an augmented quantity of vapour dissolved, and water suspended in the air, the waste of the surface-heat of the earth would be more impeded; the soil, the water, and the lower parts of the atmosphere would grow warmer; the climates would be more equalized; the general conditions more like what has been supposed to be the state of land, sea, and air during the geological period of the coal measures.

Such an augmentation of the watery constituents in the atmosphere would be a natural consequence of that greater flow of heat from the interior, which, by many geologists, mathematicians, and chemists, is supposed to have happened in the earlier periods of the history of the earth.

By the same considerations we may understand how the planet Mars, which receives not half so much heat from the sun as the earth does, may yet enjoy, as in fact it seems to do, nearly a similar climate, with snows alternately gathering on one or the other of its poles, and spreading over large spaces around, but not apparently beyond the latitude of  $50^{\circ}$  or  $40^{\circ}$ ; the equatorial band of  $30^{\circ}$  or  $40^{\circ}$  north or south being always free from snow masses bright enough and large enough to catch the eye of the observer. Mars may therefore be inhabited; and we may see in the present state of this inquiry reason to pause before refusing the probability of any life to Jupiter, and even more distant planets.

The history of suns and planets is, in truth, the history of the effects of light and heat manifested in, or emanating from them. Nothing in the universe escapes their influence; no part of space is too distant to be penetrated by their energy; no kind of matter is able to resist their transforming agency. Many if not all the special forces which act in the particles of matter are found to be reducible into heat; as this is convertible, and practically is converted, into proportionate measures of special energy. Under this comprehensive idea of convertibility of force, familiar to us now by the researches of Joule, the reasonings of Grove and Helmholtz, and the theorems of Rankine, it has been attempted by Mayer, Waterston, and Thomson to assign a cause for the maintenance of the heat-giving power of the sun in the appulse of showers of aërolites and small masses of matter, and the extinction of their motion on the luminary. By calculations of the same order, depending on the rate of radiation of heat into space, the past antiquity of the earth and the future duration of sunshine have been expressed in thousands or millions of centuries. In like manner, the physical changes on the sun's disc, by which portions of his darkly heated body become visible through the luminous photosphere, have been connected, if not distinctly as a cause, certainly as a coincident phenomenon, with particular magnetic disturbances on the surface of the earth; the solar spots and the magnetic deflections concurring in periods of maxima and minima of ten or eleven years' duration. Thus even these aberrant phenomena become part of that amazing system of periodical variation which Sabine and his fellow-labourers—British, French, German, Russian, and American—have established by contemporaneous observation, as occurring over a large part of the globe.

With every change in the aspect and position of the sun, every alteration in the place and attitude of the moon, every passing hour, the magnetism of the earth submits to regular and calculable deviation. Through the substance of the ground, and across the world of waters, nature, the beneficent guide of science, has conveyed her messages and executed her purposes, by the electric current, before the discovery of Oersted and the magical inventions of Wheatstone revealed the secret of her work. Even radiant light, in the language of the new philosophy, is conceived of by



Maxwell as a form of electro-magnetic motion. And thus the imponderable, all-pervading powers, by which molecular energy is excited and exchanged, are gathered into the one idea of restless activity among the particles of matter,—

“*æterno percita motu:*”

ever moving and being moved, elements of a system of perpetual change in every part, and constant preservation of the whole. What message comes to us with the light which springs from the distant stars, and shoots through the depths of space to fall upon the earth after tens, or hundreds, or thousands of years? It is a message from the birthplace of light, and tells us of elementary substances which have influenced the refraction of the ray. Spectral analysis, that new and powerful instrument of chemical research (for which we are indebted to Kirchhoff), has been taught by our countrymen to scrutinize planets and stars, to reveal the constitution of the nebulae, those mysterious masses out of which it has been thought new suns and planets might be evolved—nursing-mothers of the stars. For a time, indeed, the resolution of some nebulae, by the giant mirror of Lord Rosse, afforded ground for opposing the speculation of Herschel and the reasoning of Laplace, which required for their very starting-point the admission of the existence of thin gaseous expansions, with or without points, or centres of incipient condensation, with or without marks of internal movement. The latest results, however, of spectral analysis of stars and nebulae by Mr. Huggins and Prof. W. A. Miller, have fairly restored the theory. Nebulae are indeed found to have in some instances stellar points, but they are not stars; the whole resembles an enormous mass of luminous gas, with an interrupted spectrum of three lines, probably agreeing with nitrogen, hydrogen, and a substance at present unknown. Stars are found to have a constitution like that of our own sun, and, like it, to show the presence of several terrestrial elements—as sodium, magnesium, iron, and very often hydrogen. While in the Moon and Venus no lines whatever are found due to an atmosphere, in Jupiter and Saturn, besides the lines which are identical with some produced in our own atmosphere, there is one in the red, which may be caused by the presence of some unknown gas or vapour. Mars is still more peculiar, and enough is ascertained to discountenance the notion of his redness being due to a peculiarity of the soil. To aid researches into the condition of celestial bodies, the new powers of light, discovered by Niepce, Daguerre, and Talbot, have been employed by Bond, Draper, De la Rue, and others. To our countryman, in particular, belongs the honour of successful experiments on the rose-coloured flames which extend from certain points of the sun's border during an eclipse; as well as of valuable contributions through the same agency to that enlarged survey of the physical aspect of the moon which, since 1852, the Association has striven to promote. By another application of the same beautiful art, in

connection with clockwork, the momentary changes of magnetic force and direction, the variations of temperature, the fluctuations of atmospheric pressure, the force of the wind, the fall of rain, the proportion of ozone in the air, are registered in our observatories; and thus the inventions of Ronalds and his successors have engaged the solar rays in measuring and comparing contemporaneous phenomena of the same order over large parts of the globe—phenomena some of which are occasioned by those very rays.

As we ascend above the earth, heat, moisture, and magnetic force decrease, the velocity of wind augments, and the proportion of oxygen and nitrogen remains the same. The decrease of heat as we rise into the air is no new subject of inquiry, nor have the views respecting it been very limited or very accordant. Leslie considered it mathematically in relation to pressure; Humboldt gave the result of a large inquiry at points on the earth's surface unequally elevated above the sea; and, finally, Mr. Glaisher and Mr. Coxwell, during many balloon ascents to the zones of life-destroying cold, far above our mountain tops, have obtained innumerable data, in all seasons of the year, through a vast range of vertical height. The result is to show much more rapid decrease near the earth, much slower decrease at great elevations; thus agreeing in general with the view of Leslie, and yet throwing no discredit on the determinations of Humboldt, which do not refer to the free atmospheric ocean, but to the mere borders of it where it touches the earth, and is influenced by it.

The proportion of carbonic acid gas in the atmosphere at great heights is not yet ascertained; it is not likely to be the same as that generally found near the earth; but its proportion may be more constant, since in those regions it is exempt from the actions and reactions which are always in progress on land and in water, and do not necessarily compensate one another at every place and at every moment. Other information bearing on the constitution of the atmosphere comes to us from the auroral beams and the meteoric lights known as shooting stars. For some of these have left waving trains of light, whose changes of form were in seeming accordance with varying pressure in an elevated and attenuated atmosphere.

Researches of every kind have so enriched meteorology since our early friend, Professor J. Forbes, printed his suggestive reports on that subject; and so great have been the benefits conferred by the electric telegraph, that at this moment in M. Leverrier's observatory at Paris, and the office so lately presided over by Admiral Fitzroy in London, messages are arriving from all parts of Europe to declare the present weather, and furnish grounds for reasonable expectation of probable changes. Hardly now within the seas of Europe can a cyclone begin its career of devastation before the warning signal is raised in our seaports, to restrain the too-confident sailor. The gentle spirit which employed this knowledge in the cause of humanity has passed away, leaving an example

of unselfish devotion, in a work which must not fail through any lack of energy on the part of this Association, the Royal Society, or the Government. We must extend these researches and enlarge these benefits, bringing the ends of the world together by the aid of the telegraph. Soon may that thread of communication unite the two great sections of the Anglo-Saxon race, and bring and return through the Atlantic happy, mutual congratulations for peace restored and friendships renewed!

The possible combinations of force by which the characteristic forms and special phenomena of solid, liquid, and gaseous matter are determined, may be innumerable. Practically, however, they appear to be limited, as natural products, to less than one thousand distinguishable compounds, and less than one hundred elementary substances. Of these elements the most prevalent are few on the earth, as of gases—oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen; of solids—silicon, calcium, magnesium, sodium, iron; and it is interesting to learn by the analysis of the light of stars and planets, that these substances, or some of them, are found in most of the celestial objects yet examined, and that, except in one or two instances, no other substances have been traced therein. Even the wandering meteoric stones, which fall from their courses, and are examined on the earth, betray only well-known mineral elements, though in the manner in which these are combined some differences appear, which by chemical research, and the aid of transparent sections, Professor Maskelyne and Mr. Sorby are engaged in studying and interpreting.

By the labours of Lavoisier and his contemporaries, chemistry acquired a fixed logic and an accurate nomenclature. Dalton and the great physicists of the early part of this century gave that law of definite combination, by proportionate weights of the elements, which is for chemistry what the law of gravitation is for celestial mechanics. A great expansion of the meaning of the atomic theory took place when Mitscherlich announced his views of isomorphous, isomeric, and dimorphous bodies. For thus it came gradually to appear that particular forces resided in crystals in virtue of their structure, lay in certain directions, and exhibited definite physical effects, if the chemical elements, without being the same, were combined in similar proportions, and aggregated into similar crystals. Some years later ozone was discovered by Schonbein, and it concurred with a few other allotropic substances in reviving, among philosophic chemists, the inquiry as to the relative situation of the particles in a compound body, and the effects of such arrangements—an idea which had been expressed by Dalton in diagrams of atoms, and has since exercised the ingenuity of Exley, Dr. MacVicar, and others.

Everything connected with this view of the modification of physical properties by the arrangement of the particles—whether elementary or compound—is of the highest importance to mineralogy, a branch of study by no means so much in favour, even with

chemists, as its own merits and its collateral bearings justly deserve. Yet it is in a great measure by help of this branch of study that the opinions now current regarding metamorphism of rocks *in situ*, and the formation of mineral veins, must acquire that solid support and general consent which they do not now possess. Crystals, indeed, whether regarded as to their origin in nature, their fabrication by art, or their action on the rays of light, the waves of heat and sound, and the distribution of electricity, have not been neglected by this Association or its members. In one of the earliest reports, Dr. Whewell calls attention to the state of crystallographical theory, and to the artificial production of crystals; and in another Prof. Johnston notices epigene and pseudomorphous crystallization; and for many years, at almost every meeting, new and brilliant discoveries in the action of crystals on light were made known by Brewster, and compared with the undulatory theory by Herschel, MacCullagh, Airy, Hamilton, Whewell, Powell, Challis, Lloyd, and Stokes.

The unequal expansion of crystals by heat, in different directions, first observed by Mitscherlich, has been carefully examined in the cases of sulphate and carbonate of lime by Prof. W. H. Miller, who has also considered their elasticity, originally measured in different relations to the axis by Savart. These and many other interesting relations of crystals have been attended to; but the Association has not yet succeeded in obtaining a complete digest of the facts and theories connected with the appearance of crystals in nature—in the fissures and smaller cavities of rocks; in the solid substance or liquid contents of other crystals. In such an inquiry, however, some steps have been taken by our own chemists, mineralogists, and geologists. But more abundant information on this class of subjects is still needed, even after the admirable contributions and recent discoveries of Bischof, Delesse, and Daubrèe.

Within our Association-period the nomenclature of chemistry and the conception of the atomic theory have received such an addition to its ordinary expression as the more general language and larger meaning of algebra have conferred on common arithmetical values. The theory of compound radicals—as these views of Liebig, Dumas, and Hofmann may be justly termed—embraces the consideration of groups of elements united in pairs by the ordinary law, these groups being for the purpose in hand treated as single elements of combination. The nomenclature which attempts in ordinary words to express these relations grows very unmanageable even in languages more easily capable of polysyllabic combinations than ours; but symbols of composition—the true language of chemistry—are no more embarrassed in the expression of these new ideas than are the mathematical symbols which deal with operations of much greater complexity on quantities more various and more variable. The study of these compound radicals comes in aid of experimental research into those numerous and complex substances which appear as the result of chemical transformations in organic bodies. Thus in some instances the very substances

have been recomposed by art which the vital processes are every moment producing in nature ; in others the steps of the process are clearly traced ; in all, the changes become better understood through which so great a variety of substances and structures are yielded by one circulating fluid ; and the result is almost a new branch of animal and vegetable physiology, not less important for the health of mankind than essential to the progress of scientific agriculture.

The greater our progress in the study of the economy of nature, the more she unveils herself as one vast whole, one comprehensive plan, one universal rule, in a yet unexhausted series of individual peculiarities. Such is the aspect of this moving, working, living system of force and law ; such it has ever been, if we rightly interpret the history of our own portion of this inheritance of mind, the history of that earth from which we spring, with which so many of our thoughts are co-ordinated, and to which all but our thoughts and hopes will again return.

How should we prize this history, and exult that in our own days, within our own memories, the very foundations of the series of strata, deposited in the beginning of time, have been explored by our living friends, Murchison and Sedgwick, while the higher and more complicated parts of the structure have been minutely examined by Lyell, Forbes, and Prestwich ! How instructive the history of that long series of inhabitants which received in primeval times the gift of life, and filled the land, sea, and air with rejoicing myriads, through innumerable revolutions of the planet, before, in the fulness of time, it pleased the Giver of all good to place man upon the earth, and bid him look up to heaven !

Wave succeeding wave, the forms of ancient life sweep across the ever-changing surface of the earth ; revealing to us the height of the land, the depth of the sea, the quality of the air, the course of the rivers, the extent of the forest, the system of life and death—yes, the growth and decay of individuals, the beginning and ending of many successive races of plants and animals, in seas now dried, on sand-banks now raised into mountains, on continents now sunk beneath the waters. Had that series a beginning ? Was the earth ever uninhabited after it became a globe turning on its axis and revolving round the sun ? Was there ever a period since land and sea were separated—a period which we can trace—when the land was not shaded by plants, the ocean not alive with animals ? The answer, as it comes to us from the latest observation, declares that in the lowest deposits of the most ancient seas in the stratified crust of the globe, monuments of life remain. They extend to the earliest sediments of water, now in part so changed as to appear like the products of fire. What life ? Only the simpler and less specially organized fabrics have as yet rewarded research among these old Laurentian rocks—only the aggregated structures of foraminifera have been found in what, for the present at least, must be accepted as the first deposits of the oldest sea. The most ancient of all known fossils—the *eozone canadense* of Sir W.

Logan—is of this low, we may even say lowest, type of animal organization. Then, step by step, we are guided through the old Cambrian and Silurian systems, rich in trilobites and brachiopoda, the delights of Salter and Davidson; with Agassiz, Miller, and Egerton we read the history of the strange old fishes of the Devonian rocks; Brongniart, Goppert, Dawson, Binney, and Hooker unveil the mystery of the mighty forests now converted to coal; Mantell, Owen, and Huxley restore for us the giant reptiles of the lias, the oolite, and the wealden; Edwards and Wright almost revive the beauteous corals and echinodermata which with all the preceding tribes have come and gone before the dawn of the latter periods, when fragments of mammoths and hippopotami were buried in caves and river sediments, to reward the researches of Cuvier and Buckland, Prestwich and Christy, Lartet and Falconer.

And what is the latest term in this long series of successive existence? Surely the monuments of ever-advancing art—the temples whose origin is in caverns of the rocks; the cities which have taken the place of holes in the ground, or heaps of stones and timber in a lake; the ships which have outgrown the canoe, as that was modelled from the floating trunk of a tree, are sufficient proof of the late arrival of man upon the earth, after it had undergone many changes, and had become adapted to his physical, intellectual, and moral nature. Compared with the periods which elapsed in the accomplishment of these changes, how short is the date of those yet standing monoliths, cromlechs, and circles of unhewn stone which are the oldest of human structures raised in Western Europe, or of those more regular structures which attest the early importance of the monarchs and people of Egypt, Assyria, and some parts of America! Yet tried by monuments of natural events which happened within the age of man, the human family is old enough in Western Europe to have been sheltered by caverns in the rocks, while herds of reindeer roamed in Southern France, and bears and hyænas were denizens of the south of England. More than this, remains of the rudest human art ever seen are certainly found buried with and are thought to belong to races who lived contemporaneously with the mammoth and rhinoceros, and experienced the cold of a Gallic or British winter, from which the woolly covering of the wild animals was a fitting protection.

Our own annals begin with the Kelts, if indeed we are entitled to call by that historic name the really separate nations, Belgian, Iberian, and Teutonic, whom the Roman writers recognize as settlers in Britain; settlers among a really earlier family, our rudest and oldest forefathers, who may have been, as they thought themselves to be, the primitive people of the land. But beyond the Κελταί who occupied the sources of the Danube and the slopes of the Pyrenees, and were known to Rome in later days, there was present to the mind of the father of Grecian history a still more western race, the Cynetæ, who may perhaps be supposed the very earliest people of the extreme west of the continent of Europe. Were those the people, the first poor pilgrims from the East, whose

footsteps we are slowly tracing in the valleys of Picardy and the south of England, if not on the borders of the lakes of Switzerland? Are their kindred still to be found among the Rhætic Alps and the Asturian cliffs, if not amid the wilds of Connemara, pressed into those mountainous recesses by the legions of Rome, the spear of the Visigoth, and the sword of the Saxon? Or must we regard them as races of an earlier type, who had ceased to chip flints before the arrival of Saxon, or Goth, or Kelt, or Cynetian? These questions, of romantic interest in the study of the distribution and languages of the families of man, are part of a large circle of inquiry which finds sympathy in several of our sections, especially those devoted to Zoology, Physiology, and Ethnology. Let us not expect or desire for them a very quick or, at present, a very definite settlement. Deep shadows have gathered over all the earlier ages of mankind, which perhaps still longer periods of time may not avail to remove. Yet let us not undervalue the progress of ethnological inquiry, nor fail to mark how, within the period to which our recollections cling, the revelations of early Egypt have been followed by a chronology of the ancient kingdoms on the Tigris and Euphrates, through the same rigorous study of language. Thus has our Rawlinson added another page to the brilliant discoveries of Young and Champollion, Lepsius and Rossellini.

Nor, though obtained in a different way, must we forget the new knowledge of a people nearer home which the philosophic mind of Keller has opened to us among his native mountains. There, on the borders of the Alpine lakes, before the great Roman general crossed the Rhone, lived a people older than the Helvetians; whose rude lives, passed in hunting and fishing, were nevertheless marked by some of the many inventions which everywhere, even in the most unfavourable situations, accompany the least civilized of mankind. Implements of stone and pottery of the rudest sort belong to the earliest of these people; while ornamented iron weapons of war, and innumerable other fabrics in that metal, appear about the later habitations, and correspond probably to the period of the true Helvetii, who quitted their home and contended with Cæsar for richer settlements in Gaul. The people of whom these are the traces are recognized on almost every lake in Switzerland as well as in the ancient lake-basins of Lombardy and among the Tyrolean Alps, and farther on the north side of the mountains; probably fresh discoveries may connect them with the country of the Sarmatians and the Scythians.

Thus at length is fairly opened, for archæology and palæontology to read, a new chapter of the world's history, which begins in the pleistocene periods of geology, and reaches to the pre-historic ages of man. Did our ancestors really contend, as the poets fancied, with stones and clubs, against the lion and the rhinoceros, and thus expel them from their native haunts, or have they been removed by change of climate or local physical condition? Was the existence of the hyæna and the elephant only possible in Western Europe while a climate prevailed there such as now belongs

to Africa or India? and was this period of high temperature reduced in a later time for the elk, reindeer, and musk ox, which undoubtedly roamed over the hills of England and France? If we think so, what a vista of long duration stretches before us! for no such changes of climate can be supposed to have occurred except as the effect of great physical changes, requiring a lapse of many thousands of years. And though we may think such changes of climate not proved, and probably careful weighing of evidence may justify our disbelief, still, if the valleys of Picardy have been excavated since the deposit of the gravel of St. Acheul, and the whole face of the country has been altered about the caverns of Torquay since they received remains of animals and traces of man, how can we admit these facts and yet refuse the time required for their accomplishment? First, let us be sure of the facts, and especially of that main fact upon which all the argument involving immensity of time really turns, viz., the contemporaneous existence of man with the mammoth of the plains and the bear of the caverns. The remains of men are certainly buried with those of extinct quadrupeds; but did they live in the same days? or do we see relics of different periods gathered into one locality by natural processes of a later date, or confused by the operations of men? Before replying finally to these questions, further researches of an exact kind are desirable, and the Association has given its aid towards them, both in respect to the old cavern of Kent's Hole, and the newly opened fissure of Gibraltar, from which we expect great results, though the best of our labourers has ceased from his honourable toil. When these and many other researches are completed, some future, if not our own great geologist, Lyell, may add some fresh chapters to the "Antiquity of Man." In judging of this antiquity, in counting the centuries which may have elapsed since smoothed flints, fitted with handles of wood, were used as chisels and axes by the earliest people of Scandinavia or Helvetia, and flakes of flint were employed to cleanse the skins of the reindeer in the caves of the Dordogne, or stronger tools broke up the ice in the valley of the Somme, we must be careful not to take what is the mark of low civilization for the indication of very remote time. In every country, among every race of men, such rude weapons and tools are used now, or were used formerly. On the banks of the Ohio, no less than on the English hills, mounds of earth, rude pottery, and stone weapons occur in abundance, and indicate similar wants, contrivances, customs, ideas, in different races of men living in different periods. Even when in the same country—as in Switzerland, or England, or Denmark—successive deposits of instruments of stone, bronze, or iron; successive burials of pines, beeches, and oaks; successively extinguished races of elephants, elks, and reindeer, give us a real scale of elapsed time, it is one of which the divisions are not yet valued in years or centuries. Towards a right judgment of the length of this scale of human occupation, two other lines of evidence may be thought worthy of notice—one founded on the anatomical study of the remains of



early men, the other on the laws of language. If the varieties of physical structure in man, and the deviations of language from an original type, be natural effects of time and circumstance, the length of time may be in some degree estimated by the amount of the diversities which are observed to have happened, compared with the variation which is now known to be happening. This process becomes imaginary, unless we assume all mankind to have had one local centre, and one original language. Its results must be erroneous, unless we take fully into account the superior fixity of languages which are represented in writing, and the greater tendency to diversity of every kind which must have prevailed in early times, when geographical impediments were aggravated by dissocial habits of life. It appears, however, certain that some differences of language, organization, and habits have separated men of apparently unlike races during periods longer than those which rest on historical facts. Since the days of Aristotle, the analogy existing among all parts of the animal kingdom, and in a general sense among all the forms of life, has become more and more the subject of special study. Related as all living beings are to the element in which they move and breathe, to the mechanical energies of nature which they employ or resist, and to the molecular forces which penetrate and transform them, some general conformity of structure, some frequently recurring resemblance of function, must be present, and cannot be overlooked. In the several classes this analogy grows stronger, and in the subdivisions of these classes real family affinity is recognized. In the smallest divisions, which have this family relation in the highest degree, there seems to be a line which circumscribes each group, within which variations occur, from food, exercise, climate, and transmitted peculiarities. Often one specific group approaches another, or several others, and a question arises whether, though now distinct, or rather distinguishable, they always have been, or will be always so until their disappearance. Whether what we call species are so many original creations or derivations from a few types or one type, is discussed at length in the elegant treatise of Darwin, himself a naturalist of eminent rank. It had been often discussed before. Nor will any one think lightly of such inquiries who remembers the essay of Linnæus, "*De Telluris orbis incremento*," or the investigations of Brown, Prichard, Forbes, Agassiz, and Hooker regarding the local origin of different species, genera, and families of plants and animals, on the land and in the sea. Still less will he be disposed to undervalue its importance when he reflects on the many successive races of living forms more or less resembling our existing quadrupeds, reptiles, fishes, and mollusca, which appear to have occupied definite and different parts of the depths of ancient time; as now the tiger and the jaguar, the cayman and the gavial, live on different parts of the terrestrial surface. Is the living elephant of Ceylon the lineal descendant of that mammoth which roamed over Siberia, Europe, and North America; of one of those sub-Himalayan tribes which Dr. Falconer has made known? or was it a species dwelling only

in circumpolar regions? Can our domestic cattle, horses, and dogs, our beasts of chase and of prey, be traced back to their source in older types, contemporaries of the *urus*, *megaceros*, and *hyæna* on the plains of Europe? If so, what range of variation in structure does it indicate? If not so, by what characters are the living races separated from those of earlier date? Specific questions of this kind must be answered before the general proposition—that the forms of life are indefinite or variable with time and circumstance—can be examined by the light of adequate evidence. That such evidence will be gathered and rightly interpreted I neither doubt nor fear; nor will any be too hasty in adopting extreme opinions or too fearful of the final result, who remember how often that which is true has been found very different from that which was plausible, and how often out of the nettle danger we have plucked the flower safety. At the present moment the three propositions which were ever present to the mind of Edward Forbes may be successfully maintained as agreeing with many observed phenomena; and around them, as a basis of classification, may be gathered most of the facts and most of the speculations which relate to the history of life. First, it may be admitted that plants and animals form many natural groups, the members of which have several common characters, and are parted from other groups by a real boundary line, or rather unoccupied space. Next, that each of these groups has a limited distribution in space, often restrained by high mountains or deep seas, or parallels of temperature, within which it has been brought into being. Thirdly, that each group has been submitted to, or is now undergoing the pressure of a general law, by which its duration is limited in geological time; the same group never reappearing after being removed from the series.

How important, in the view of this and many other questions, is that never-tiring spirit of geographical and maritime discovery to which through four hundred years Europe has sent her noblest sons and her most famous expeditions—sent them, alas! too often to an early grave. Alas! for Franklin, who carried the magnetic flag into the icy sea from which he had already brought trophies to Science! Alas! for Speke, who came home with honour from the head-waters of the Nile! Forgotten they can never be, whenever on occasions like this we mourn the absence of our bravest and our best; praise, never-ending praise be theirs, while men retain the generous impulse which prompts them to enterprises worthy of their country and beneficial to mankind!

If it be asked, what share in the discoveries and inventions of the last thirty-three years is claimed for the British Association? let us answer fearlessly, We had a part in all. In some of them we took the foremost place by the frequency of our discussions, the urgency of our recommendations, the employment of our influence, and the grant of our funds. For others we gave all our strength to support the Royal Society and other institutions in their efforts to accomplish purposes which we approved. Our elastic system responds quickly to pressure, and returns the friendly impulse.

Many of the most valuable labours of which we are now reaping the fruits were undertaken in consequence of the reports on special branches of Science which appear in the early volumes of our Transactions—reports in which particular data were requested for confirming or correcting known generalizations, or for establishing new ones. Thus a passage in Professor Airy's Report on Physical Astronomy first turned the attention of Adams to the mathematical vision of Neptune; Lubbock's Report on Tides came before the experimental researches and reductions which since 1834 have so often engaged the attention of Whewell and Airy and Haughton, with results so valuable and so suggestive of further undertakings.

Before the desire of telegraphic communication with America had caused the bed of the North Atlantic to be explored by soundings to a depth seldom exceeding three miles, there was reason to conclude, from the investigations of Whewell on Cotidal Lines, that a depth of nine miles was attained in the South Atlantic, and from the separate computations of Airy and Haughton that a somewhat greater depth occurred in a part of the course of the tide-wave which washes the coast of Ireland. The greater portion of the seabed is within reach of soundings directed by the superior skill and greater perseverance of modern scientific navigators; a depth of six miles is said to have been reached in one small tract of the North Atlantic; depths of nine or ten miles in the deepest channels of the sea are probable, from considering the general proportion which is likely to obtain between sea-depths and mountain-tops. Thus data are gradually being collected for a complete survey of the bed of the sea, including, among other things, information at least concerning the distribution of animal and vegetable life beneath the waters.

Waves, their origin, the mechanism of their motion, their velocity, their elevation, the resistance they offer to vessels of given form—these subjects have been kept in view by the Association, since first Prof. Challis reported on the mathematical problems they suggest, and Sir. J. Robison and Mr. Scott Russell undertook to study them experimentally. Out of this inquiry has come a better knowledge of the forms which ought to be given to the "lines" of ships, followed by swifter passages across the sea by sailing vessels and steamers of larger size and greater lengths than were ever tried before.

One of the earliest subjects to acquire importance in our thoughts was the unexplored region of meteorology laid open in Professor J. Forbes' reports. Several points to which he called attention have been successfully attained. The admirable instruments of Whewell, Osler, and Robinson have replaced the older and ruder anemometers, and are everywhere in operation to record momentary variations of pressure or sum the varying velocities of the wind. No small thanks are due to Marshall and Miller for their enterprise and perseverance in placing rain-gauges and thermometers amidst the peaks of Cumberland and Westmoreland. These experiments are now renewed in both counties and in North Wales, and

I hope to hear of similar efforts among the mountains of Ireland and of Scotland. Meteorological instruments of every kind have been improved; our system of photographic registration has spread from Kew into other observatories; and our corresponding member, Professor Dove, has collected into systematic maps and tables the lines and figures which represent annual and monthly climate over every land and sea.

In the same manner, by no sudden impulse or accidental circumstance, rose to its high importance the great system of magnetic observations on which for more than a quarter of a century the British Association and the Royal Society, acting in concert, have been intent. First, we had reports on the mathematical theory and experimental researches of magnetism by Christie, 1833, Whewell, 1835, and Sabine, 1835; afterwards a magnetic survey of the British Islands; then the establishment of a complete observatory at Dublin, with newly arranged instruments, by Dr. Lloyd, in 1838. On all this gathered experience we founded a memorial to Her Majesty's Government, made a grant of £400 from our funds for preliminary expenses, and presented to the meeting of this Association in Birmingham, in 1839, a report of progress, signed by Herschel and Lloyd. From that time how great the labour, how inestimable the fruits! Ross sails to the magnetic pole of the south; America and Russia co-operate with our observers at Kew, Toronto, and St. Helena; and General Sabine, by combining all this united labour, has the happiness of seeing results established of which no man dreamed—laws of harmonious variation affecting the magnetic elements of the globe in definite relation to the earth's movement, the position of the sun and moon, the distribution of temperature, and situation in latitude and longitude.

Our efforts have not been fruitless, whether with Mr. Mallet we make experiments on artificial earth-shocks at Dalkey, or survey the devastations round Vesuvius, or tabulate the records of earthquakes since the beginning of history; or establish the Kew Observatory as a scientific workshop where new instruments of research are made and proved and set to work; or dredge the sea with Forbes, Brady, and Jeffreys; catalogue the stars with Baily; investigate electricity with Harris, Ronalds, Thomson, and Jenkin; or try the action of long-continued heat with Harcourt—in these and a hundred other directions our attempts to gain knowledge have brought back new facts and new laws of phenomena, or better instruments for attaining, or better methods for interpreting them. Even when we enter the domain of practical art, and apply scientific methods to test a great process of manufacture, we do not fail of success; because we are able to join in united exertion the laborious cultivators of science and the scientific employers of labour.

Am I asked to give an example? Let it be iron, the one substance by the possession of which, by the true knowledge and right use of which, more than by any other thing, our national greatness

is supported. What are the ores of iron? what the peculiarities and improvements of the smelting processes? what the quality of the iron, its chemical composition—its strength in columns and girders as cast-iron, in rails and boiler-plate, in tubes and chains, as wrought iron? what are the best forms in which to employ it, the best methods of preserving it from decay? these and many other questions are answered by many special reports in our volumes, bearing the names of Barlow, Mallet, Porter, Fairbairn, Bunsen, Playfair, Percy, Budd, Hodgkinson, Thomson; and very numerous other communications from Lucas, Fairbairn, Cooper, Nicholson, Price, Crane, Hartley, Davy, Mushet, Hawkes, Penny, Scoresby, Dawes, Calvert, Clark, Cox, Hodgkinson, May, Schaffhaeuti, Johnston, Clay, and Boutigny. Beyond a question, a reader of such of these valuable documents as relate to the strength of iron, its various forms, would be far better informed of the right course to be followed in experiments on armour-plated ships and forts to resist assault, and in the construction of ordnance to attack them, than he is likely to be from merely witnessing a thousand trials of cannon against the target. Any one who remembers what the iron furnace was forty years ago, and knows its present power of work, or who contrasts the rolling mills and hammers of other days with the beautiful machines which now, with the gentlest motion but irresistible force, compel the strong metal to take the most delicately moulded form, will acknowledge that, within the period since the British Association began to set itself to the task of reconciling the separated powers of theory and experience, there has been a total change in the aspect of each, to the great advantage of both.

Our undertakings have not been fruitless. We attempted what we had well considered, and had the power to accomplish; and we had the more than willing help of competent persons of our own body, the friendly aid of other institutions, and the sanction of the Government, convinced of the sincerity of our purpose and the wisdom of our recommendations.

The same work is ever before us; the same prudence is always necessary; the same aid is always ready. Great, indeed, should be our happiness in reflecting on the many occasions when the Royal Society in particular, and other institutions older than our own, have readily placed themselves by our side to share our responsibility and diminish our difficulties. But for this, our wishes might not always have prevailed, and the horizon of science would not have been so clear as now it is. Of late years, indeed, societies formed on our model have taken up special parts of our work; and thus to some extent have relieved us of the pressure of communications relating to the practice of particular professions and the progress of some public questions. Not that scientific agriculture, social statistics, or physiology are neglected in our meetings, but that these and other practical subjects are found to have more than one aspect, and to require more than one mode of treatment. With

us, facts well ascertained, conclusions rightly drawn, will ever be welcome, from whatever quarter they make their appearance. Whatever societies cultivate these objects are our allies, and we help them if we may. With pleasure we receive proofs of the good work done in limited districts by the admirable field clubs formed by our countrymen; whether, like those of Tyneside and the Cotswolds, and, in this immediate vicinity, those of Warwickshire, Worcestershire, and Dudley, they explore the minutest recesses of our hills and glens, or, like the rangers of the Alps, bring us new facts regarding glaciers, ancient climate, and altered levels of land and sea. By these agreeable gatherings natural history is most favourably commended; and in the activity and enlarged views of the officers who conduct them, the British Association recognizes the qualities by which the vitality of scientific research is maintained, and its benefits diffused among the provincial institutions of the empire.

Such are some of the thoughts which fill the minds of those who, like Brewster, Harcourt, Forbes, Murchison, and Daubeny, stood, anxious but hopeful, by the cradle of this Association; and who now meet to judge of its strength, and measure its progress. When, more than thirty years ago, this Parliament of Science came into being, its first child-language was employed to ask questions of Nature; now, in riper years, it founds on the answers received further and more definite inquiries directed to the same prolific source of useful knowledge. Of researches in science completed, in progress, or beginning, each of our annual volumes contains some three hundred or more passing notices, or full and permanent records. This digest and monument of our labours is indeed in some respects incomplete, since it does not always contain the narrative or the result of undertakings which we started, or fostered, or sustained; and I own to having experienced on this account feelings of regret. But the regret was soon lost in the gratification of knowing that other and equally beneficial channels of publication had been found; and that by these examples it was proved how truly the Association kept to the purpose of its foundation—"The Advancement of Science,"—and how heartily it rejoiced in this advancement without looking too closely to its own share in these triumphs. Here, indeed, is the stronghold of the British Association. Wherever and by whatever means sound learning and useful knowledge are advanced, there to us are friends. Whoever is privileged to step beyond his fellows on the road of scientific discovery, will receive our applause, and, if need be, our help. Welcoming and joining in the labour of all, we shall keep our place among those who clear the roads and remove the obstacles from the paths of science; and whatever be our own success in the rich fields which lie before us, however little we may know now, we shall prove that in this our day we knew at least the value of knowledge, and joined hearts and hands in the endeavour to promote it.

[The address was frequently applauded, and a vote of thanks was given in recognition of its merit.]

## The Reviewer.

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*The Hebrew Scriptures; being a Revision of the Authorized English Old Testament.* In three volumes. Vol. I. By SAMUEL SHARPE. London: Whitfield, Green, and Son.

*The New Testament*, translated from Griesbach's text. By SAMUEL SHARPE. Fifth edition. London: J. R. Smith.

THE translator of these volumes, Mr. Samuel Sharpe, is, we believe, a nephew of the late Samuel Rogers, author of the "Pleasures of Memory," &c., after whom he was named. He is connected both by family ties and business with the banking-house of Olding, Sharpe, and Co., of Clement's Lane, London, of which his uncle was the head. The family of Sharpe has been for several generations members of the Unitarian body, and held a high place among the dissenters whose creed is so named, and in the nonconformist community who range themselves under the banners of Socinus, and describe their faith as rational Christianity. We presume we are violating no confidence in making these statements; for Mr. Sharpe is too honest to wish to secure readers under false impressions. Having said so, we need not scruple to note that there are certain appearances of doctrinal bias, not only in the translation itself, but also in the choice of the text from which the translation—especially of the New Testament—is made.

We do not mention this for the purpose of raising any prejudice against the translator, but to inform our readers what they may expect. We ought, in bare justice, to say that there is no appearance of straining the text to his own purpose, but that Mr. Sharpe adheres fairly to his conditions, viz., "He has made no change for changing's sake, being well aware how much every new word grates upon the ear that is accustomed to the beautiful simplicity of the authorized version. His aim has been to give the meaning and idiom of the corrected Greek text as far as possible in the well-known words." Familiarity with a certain form of words often obscures the signification; when, therefore, we read a fresh form, and find an unaccustomed phrase, it calls out with vigour the inquisitive faculties, and brings the intellect to bear at once upon the difference indicated by the change of terms. This is one great use to which such works as these may be put, and this excitement of the critical judgment on the meaning of Scripture is no mean benefit. We commend, therefore, on this ground, the perusal of these new translations. In 1862 a notice of "The New Testament" translation appeared in this serial, with the signature M. H. Our own opinion coincides with the one expressed there.

We think the translation of "The Hebrew Scriptures"—farther

removed as they are in the time, associations, state of life, feeling, and habits to which they refer—as by far the most useful addition to our means of learning the mind of the Lord in the Scripture. In many instances we can scarcely fail to perceive that Mr. Sharpe's translation is an improvement on the (so-called) authorized version, while some of the explanatory insertions, and more closely noted details, help exceedingly the comprehension of many passages. The text selected is Van der Hooght's, Amsterdam, 1705, collated with that of Dr. Benjamin Kennicott, 1776 and 1780. The text is divided into paragraphs; poetical passages are arranged into verse; quotations are printed in *italics*; speeches are given in inverted commas; a black line marks an abrupt change of subject; lists of names are sometimes thrown into tables; explanatory additions are inserted in square brackets, and great attention is paid to the chronology. The author has thrown great light, we think, upon ancient manners and customs, antiquities, geography, the meaning of proper names, the value of Hebrew weights and measures, references to other books of Scripture, and many other niceties of Biblical interpretation. The translation of proper names, when their meaning is suggestive or important, is also of great use. To the Scripture reader who desires to understand what he reads these are good helps; and while we would by no means wish to discard the authorized version, we are fully persuaded that a perusal of this translation along with it would often be productive of great insight into the signification of the sacred original.

We have as yet only the first volume of "The Hebrew Scriptures," reaching to the end of "the first book of Samuel." Two other volumes are required to complete "the Revision of the Authorized English Old Testament," which Mr. Sharpe contemplates. These it is expected will be ready early in November. We cannot but congratulate our readers on the possibility of acquiring these helps to Scripture knowledge so cheaply. No one except a gentleman of Mr. Sharpe's means could afford to make such a venture. We may here merely note that Mr. Sharpe is not a novice in literary effort. He has a well-earned reputation in Egyptology. He is, in that department, author of "The History of Egypt from the Earliest Times till the Conquest by the Arabs in A.D. 640;" "The Chronology and Geography of Ancient Egypt;" "Egyptian Hieroglyphics; being an attempt to explain their Nature, Origin, and Meaning;" "Egyptian Inscriptions, from the British Museum and other sources"—a magnificent book, with 216 plates, in folio; "Egyptian Antiquities in the British Museum described;" "Egyptian Mythology and Egyptian Christianity;" "Alexandrian Chronology;" and "An Historical Account of the Monuments of Egypt," in one of the handbooks of the Crystal Palace. He has supplied to Biblical criticism, "Historic Notes on the Books of the Old and New Testament," and "Critical Notes on the Authorized English Version of the New Testament"—signs of an industrious life in one who is free from the compelling power of poverty.



Since the foregoing passage was written, we have received Vol. II. of the "Hebrew Scriptures." We notice the same peculiarities carefully adhered to which we have already pointed out as having place in Vol. I. This new volume brings down the version to the end of the book of Psalms. The distinct arrangement of the genealogies of Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah is very observable, and cannot fail to be useful—almost as useful as a commentary, which in effect it is. The rhythmical arrangement of the books of Job and of Psalms imparts, in some instances, great freshness to the perusal, and heightens the beauties in many instances. One great advantage resulting from the reading of a version containing such diversities in form from the authorized translation, and one wholly independent of the question of the value of the emendations proposed as retranslations, is this—that it leads the mind to give itself to the signification, breaks up its old associations, and rouses the attention. For this reason—even were there no other—we should cordially advise the acquirement of this version, which seems to be superintended with great care, and to be the production of a reverent mind. We are not ourselves critical students of the old text; but we can say that the mere change in the mode of putting things adopted in this issue has quickened our sight regarding the meaning of many important passages. So may it be with others.

*Our Work.* Four Lectures on the Principles and Practice of Sunday School Teaching. By WILLIAM H. GROSER, B.Sc., F.G.S. London: Sunday School Union, 56, Old Bailey.

THE publication of such works as the one before us affords pleasing evidence of the increased attention which is being given by men of culture and experience to the elevation of the character of the instruction which is imparted in our Sunday schools. Mr. Groser, although a young man, has already done good service in this department of usefulness. His numerous lectures and addresses to teachers, and his previous publications, have made his name honourably known both far and wide. The present is, in our opinion, by far the most valuable of his works, and this is saying a great deal. He has regarded his subject in the light which philosophy sheds upon it, discussed it in the spirit of an intelligent enthusiast, and at the same time brought to bear upon it the results of his own extensive and varied experience. It seems to us impossible for any teacher to read *and study* this treatise without becoming thereby better prepared for the intelligent and efficient discharge of the important duties of his office.

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## The Inquirer.

### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

563. Being anxious to obtain a knowledge of the manners and customs of the Middle Ages, I have resorted to several historical works, but these have only supplied me with an unsatisfactory glimpse of what I require. Could you refer me to any work in which I may get a good insight into the moral and social position of England in those times.—J. S.

564. Will any of your readers be kind enough to furnish me with a list (with the prices) of books best suited for a poor young man who is anxious to study medicine. A few words as to the best mode of working would be welcome.—GWILLYM.

565. Could you, or any of the subscribers to the *British Controversialist*, inform me of a good and reliable work on "ornamental writing," containing practical instructions as to the size or other adhesive substance used in laying gold leaf on paper and vellum, as I have, as yet, experienced nothing but disappointment and failure in my endeavours to find out the process adopted in giving permanency to gold leaf laid on these materials.—PERSEVERANCE.

566. Could the undersigned be favoured with an account of the philosophy of Locke, the way in which he should be studied, his chief opponents, English or foreign, his influence as a philosopher, and any other information bearing upon the subject. Also an account of the author of the "Intellectualism of Locke," the worth of the book, and the characteristics of the author?—P. L. D.

567. Wanted, by a reader, an account of Dr. David Thomas, editor of the *Homilist*, and the replicant's opinion of him as a writer.—P. L. D.

568. Would you favour a reader

with advice as to preparing himself for the ministry; as to his studies, &c., books, &c., and the way in which he could become qualified to become a good preacher?—P. L. D.

### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

548. Hyde Clarke's "English Dictionary," 3s. 6d., cloth, Virtue Bros. and Co., Amen Corner, Paternoster Row, London, contains 100,000 words, or 50,000 more than any present work, and I think would suit E. H. R.'s purpose excellently. It is compact and beautifully printed, and contains every word of any utility to the reader or writer of English. It contains no extracts for proving the signification of words, but these are not met with except in the largest dictionaries.—S. W. YOUNG.

551. The following is, in a condensed form, the biography of David Gray, as given by Sheriff H. G. Bell, in inaugurating his monument:—It was said by the ancient Greeks that "those whom the gods love die young." The saying was a consolation to David Gray in his last hours, and he associated with himself in the fact of an early death other poets who had gone before him—Pollock, Kirke White, Michael Bruce, and Keats. His life was even shorter than most of theirs. As he says himself, it was "a piece of childhood thrown away, the sweet beginning of a tale unknown." His life had few incidents. There are seldom many in the lives of men of great intellectual power. Their life consists mainly in their own thoughts, feelings, and emotions. They are not men of the outward world; they do not share in its active business. He was born 29th January, 1838, and reared in his father's house here at Merkland till he reached his fourteenth year. His parents, seeing his disposition and his genius, thought they might find means

to bring him up for the church. With that view he was sent into Glasgow, and as he required aid in the prosecution of his studies, at that early age he became a pupil teacher. He contrived also to attend the famous university there for four successive sessions. But all that time his mind was brimming over with poetry, rising like a rising tide above his Latin, above his Greek, above his theological studies. He had an ardent and ambitious fancy, high aspirations, an earnest belief that he was born to be a poet, and to attain fame. In one so young it might be thought that this was an overweening conception of his own powers. But a poet is also a *Vates*, or prophet, and there is no reason why he should not be permitted sometimes to prophesy of himself. David Gray prophesied of himself that he had in him the elements of a poet, and that his name would yet be known to his countrymen as a poet and a teacher, for every true poet is a great teacher. In May, 1860, when he had so far completed his studies at Glasgow, and had nearly arrived at the age of twenty-two, he started alone for London. He had read of the great literary world, and he was fired with an ambition to mingle in it, and to make himself, if possible, known to some of the men there. He was fortunate in very soon forming the acquaintance of the then Mr. Monckton Milnes, now Lord Houghton, who at once formed a correct appreciation of the character and genius of David Gray. Lord Houghton found in him the making of a great man. Upon first seeing him he was strongly reminded of the poet Shelley. Gray had a light, well-built form, a full brow, an outlooking eye, and a sensitive, melancholy mouth. He formed in London also other acquaintances of value, including Mr. Oliphant, then private secretary to Lord Elgin, now member for the Stirling burghs. As to Sydney Dobell, the poet, I do not know that he actually formed the personal acquaintance of that gentleman, but he had frequent correspondence with, and received valuable letters, suggestions,

and assistance from him. Nearer home he had attained the friendly companionship of some whom he valued much—Mr. W. Freeland, David Gray's early and attached friend, now of the *Herald* office, Glasgow, and Mr. James Hedderwick, himself a poet and an editor of great reputation. Gray had not been long in London till he was seized with a cold, which rapidly assumed the character of consumption. Lord Houghton and others, feeling deeply interested in him, sent him to the south of England; but the disease made rapid progress, and David Gray was seized with an irresistible home sickness, and notwithstanding all the kindness and attention of his friends, in January, 1861, he reappeared at his father's house in Merklend. He lived there from Jan., 1861, to the 3rd Dec. of the same year, when he died. That is the brief record of this young poet's life—almost all the incidents in it, all the events connected with it. But who can or shall attempt to record the thousand thoughts and emotions that passed through his mind, that illuminated his fancy, and that kindled his genius? Who shall say how these familiar woods, and fields, and glens, and streams, were to him dearer, a thousand times dearer and more romantic, than any woods, or fields, or glens, or streams in the world? No man but a true poet has that warm affection for home scenes, for his country, for his native land, for the friends of his youth; no man but a true poet has those sentiments in their height and in their depth; and if ever a man entertained them, the poetical remains of David Gray prove that he had them in a deep, pathetic, and most earnest manner. It is a delightful thing to know that it was communicated to him upon his death-bed that that most eminent and liberal publisher, Mr. Macmillan, then of Cambridge, now of London and Cambridge, had, without any hesitation, undertaken to bring out an edition of his poems. David Gray's poetical susceptibility was of the most conspicuous description. He had a refined percep-

tion of the beautiful; he had noble and pure thoughts; and he has expressed those thoughts in very noble and pure language. "The Luggie," which is his longest poem, and earlier than some of his others, is not equal in poetical power and beauty to those which he calls "Under the Shadows," most of which were composed during the last year of his life. But "The Luggie" is a remarkable poem, containing many fine passages, inspired a little, no doubt, by a careful perusal of Thomson's "Seasons," and "Wordsworth's" "Excursion," and not, therefore, so entirely original as some of his subsequent poems, but with passages breaking out in it every now and then which neither Thomson nor Wordsworth inspired, and which are entirely the conceptions of David Gray. "The Luggie," as my friend Mr. Hedderwick has admirably said, "may not possess in itself much to attract the painter's eye, but it has sufficed for a poet's love." "In the Shadows," a series of sonnets written by the poet in his last illness—many of them bearing relation to his own condition, life, and prospects—appears to me to possess a solemn beauty not surpassed by many of the finest passages in Tennyson's "In Memoriam;" totally distinct and unlike the "In Memoriam," but quite as full of genuine gushings from the heart as could be conceived to come from the pen of any poet. He tells you that in reading these sonnets he admits you to the "chancel of a dying poet's mind," and he does so. You feel, when you are reading these sonnets, that they are written in the sure and immediate prospect of death; but they contain thoughts about life, the past, and the future, most powerful and most beautiful. We are here upon the occasion of the erection of a monument to David Gray—a monument erected on the spot where he is buried, in a beautiful old churchyard, standing upon the brow of a hill, from which a fine extensive view of the surrounding valley and hills is commanded. It is a granite monument, and will last, I hope,

for centuries. I am sure that in this neighbourhood it will often be visited by persons who feel some kindred emotions with David Gray, and they will be proud of this neighbourhood that it gave birth, in that humble cottage, to a man who has added charms to its natural scenery. The subscribers have been scattered widely; there were few people of cultivated taste, to whose knowledge David Gray's works were brought, but instantly said they wished to give their aid in erecting this monument. Lord Houghton was requested to write an inscription for this monument. It was a labour of love with him, and I venture to say that he has admirably succeeded in the simplicity and truth of that epitaph which has now been engraved on the monument:—

"This Monument of  
Affection, admiration, and regret,  
is erected to  
DAVID GRAY,  
The Poet of Merkland,  
By friends from far and near,  
Desirous that his grave should be  
Remembered amid the scenes of his rare  
genius and early death,  
And by the Luggie,  
Now numbered with the streams illustrious  
in Scottish song.  
Born 29th January, 1838.  
Died 3rd December, 1861."

Such is the young man whose fame we shall not willingly let die, because they who read his works aright derive moral improvement and intellectual benefit from them; because, young as he was when he died, he cherished pure and noble thoughts; and because he has left those pure and noble thoughts as a record of his life, and as an incentive to us to endeavour to cherish similar thoughts. We owe him a debt of gratitude, and therefore, without attempting to raise him upon a pinnacle too high—for his life was cut short before the highest aims of his ambition were attained—let it go forth that no true poet in this land, be his position in life what it may, be his birth humble or great—no true poet, no great teacher of

men, will ever find an ungrateful country in Scotland, as long as it remembers its great poets, as long as it knows that it is the land of Burns. David Gray died in true Christian faith and amity with all men.—R. M. A.

555. The best mathematical works for a beginner are Todhunter's "Euclid," and Todhunter's "Algebra." The "Euclid" is 3s. 6d., the "Algebra," the larger one, "for the use of schools and colleges," 7s. 6d. There is a smaller one expressly for beginners, about half the price, by the same man. He is or was one of the most popular "coaches" in Cambridge, and is still Mathematical Lecturer of his college, St. John's. The easiest "algebra" is Lund's, for beginners—too easy perhaps. Colenso's "Part I." is an exceedingly good one. The rest of the question I cannot answer with certainty.—ELPISTICOS.

560. This is not given exactly as an answer to O. D.'s query; but thinking that possibly the opinions of some writers on biblical criticism, as to the value of Griesbach's text, may be useful to him, and that he perhaps may not have the work at hand from which the extracts are made, I beg to submit the following from Kitto's "Biblical Cyclopædia," 3rd edition. Though it does not refer to Sharpe's translation, it gives us an account of the text on which it is founded. "Griesbach's labours on the text of the New Testament commenced an era in biblical criticism. Not only were his collections of various readings more extensive and more carefully sifted than those of any who had preceded him; not only did he carry out more thoroughly than any of his predecessors the principle of determining the value of a reading by its antiquity and its source; but he contributed more than any of them to place textual criticism on a scientific basis, and to furnish rules for the guidance of the critic in his work. His system of recensions may be unsound, and he may have been hampered or misled by it in some of his decisions; but there can be no doubt as to the important bearing,

both of the facts he has collected, and the theories he has offered to account for them, on the subsequent progress of biblical criticism. Even where he had little to guide him but his own judgment, more recent investigations have generally shown that his conclusions were correct."—Art. "Griesbach," by Dr. W. L. Alexander.

"The next scholar who is pre-eminently distinguished in the history of the New Testament criticism is Dr. John James Griesbach. He enriched the materials collected by Wetstein with new and important additions, by collating MSS. versions, and early ecclesiastical writers, particularly Origen, with great labour. The idea of recensions, recommended by Bengel and Semler, he adopted and carried out with much acuteness and sagacity. His first edition appeared at Halle, in 2 vols., 1774-75. The first three gospels were synoptically arranged; but in 1777 he published them in their natural order. The text is founded on a comparison of the copious materials he possessed. Nothing was adopted from conjecture, and nothing received which had not the sanction of codices as well as versions. In 1796 appeared the first volume of a new and greatly improved edition of Griesbach's New Testament, for which he had made extracts from the Armenian, Slavonic, Latin, Sahidic, Coptic, and other versions, besides incorporating into his collection the results of the labours of Matthæi, Alter, and Birch. The second volume appeared in 1806, both published at Halle. The prolegomena are exceedingly valuable. This edition is indispensable to every critic and intelligent theologian. In 1805 Griesbach published a manual edition, with a selection of readings from the larger one. The text of this does not always agree with the other. It presents the learned critic's latest judgments, and is therefore of peculiar worth. It was reprinted, but inaccurately, in 1825." From Art. "Biblical Criticism," by Dr. Samuel Davidson.—G. H.

## Our Collegiate Course; OR, AIDS TO SELF-CULTURE.

### STUDIES IN ENGLISH LITERATURE.

#### POPE'S "ESSAY ON CRITICISM."—PART II.

[Critics ought not to be too hard to please, to take offence at trifles, or lavish admiration on gay turns alone]

*Avoid extremes*; (42) and shun the fault of such  
Who *still* are *pleased* too little or too much. (43) 185  
At every *trifle* *scorn* to take offence,  
That always shows great *pride*, or little *sense*;  
Those heads, as stomachs, are not sure the best  
Which *nauseate* all, and nothing can *digest*.  
Yet let not each *gay* turn thy rapture *move*; 190  
For fools *admire*, but men of sense *approve*: (44)

#### MEANINGS OF WORDS IN ITALICS, AS SUGGESTIONS FOR PARAPHRASING.

Line 184. Keep free from indiscreet aims, thoughts, or opinions.	189 Sicken at everything; accept and use.
185. Constantly; gratified.	190. Sprightly movement of fancy; excite.
186. Little fault; disdain.	191. Express excessive wonder; praise duly.
187. Egotism; wisdom.	

(42) This maxim is given for *intellectual guidance*, not as a moral imperative; as may be seen from the following lines:—

"Tis Heaven each passion sends,  
And different men directs to different ends.  
Extremes in nature equal good produce;  
Extremes in man concur to general use.  
Ask me what makes one keep and one bestow?  
That Power who bids the ocean ebb and flow,  
Bids seed-time, harvest, equal course maintain,  
Through reconciled extremes of drought and rain;  
Builds life on death, on change duration founds,  
And gives the eternal wheels to know their rounds."

Pope's "Epistle to Allen; Lord Bathurst."

(43) "Qui statuit aliquid, parte inaudita altera  
Æquam licet statuerit, haud æquus est."

"He who decides upon anything while only one side has been heard, though he should decide rightly is not honest."—Seneca's "Medea."

(44) "Nil admirari prope est una Numici,  
Solaque, quæ possit facere et servare beatum.

Insani sapiens nomen ferat, æquus iniqui,  
Ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam."

As things seem large which we through mists descry,  
Dulness is ever apt to magnify. (45)

[It is wrong to suppose that excellence is to be found only either among the ancients or the moderns.]

Some foreign writers, some our own despise :  
The ancients only, or the moderns prize : (46)

195

193. Stupidity; prone; exaggeration.

"To overvalue nothing, O Numicius! is the chief and almost the only course which can make and keep one happy. . . . The wise man must consent to be regarded as a fool, the honest man unjust, if he seeks more than is right, even virtue herself."—*Horace's Epistles, Book I., VI., 1, 2, 15, 16.*

(45) "These are nothing but spectres that the understanding raises to itself to flatter its own laziness. It sees nothing distinctly in things remote, and in a huddle; and therefore concludes too faintly, that there is nothing more clear to be discovered in them. It is but to approach nearer, and that mist of our own raising that enveloped them will remove: and those that in that mist appeared hideous giants not to be grappled with, will be found to be of the ordinary and natural size and shape. Things that in a remote and confused view seem very obscure, must be approached by gentle and regular steps; and what is most visible, easy, and obvious in them first considered. Reduce them into their distinct parts; and then, in their due order, bring all that should be known concerning every one of those parts into plain and simple questions; and then what was thought obscure, perplexed, and too hard for our weak parts, will lay itself open to the understanding in a fair view, and let the mind into that which before it was awed with, and kept at a distance from, as wholly mysterious."—*John Locke's "Conduct of the Human Understanding," "Works," p. 58.*

(46) "Some will not admit an opinion not authorized by men of old, who were then all giants in knowledge. Nothing is to be put into the treasury of truth or knowledge which has not the stamp of Greece or Rome upon it, and since their days will scarce allow that men have been able to see, think, or write. Others, with a like extravagancy, condemn all that the ancients have left us, and being taken with the modern inventions and discoveries, lay by all that went before, as if whatever is old must have the decay of time upon it, and truth, too, were liable to mould and rottenness. Men, I think, have been much the same for natural endowments in all times. Fashion, discipline, and education have put eminent differences in the ages of several countries, and made one generation much differ from another in arts and sciences; but truth is always the same; time alters it not, nor is it the better or worse for being of ancient or modern tradition. Many were eminent in former ages of the world for their discovery and delivery of it; but though the knowledge they have left us be worth our study, yet they exhausted not all its treasure; they left a great deal for the industry and sagacity of after ages; and so shall we. That was once new to them which any one now receives with veneration for its antiquity, nor was it the worse for appearing as a novelty; and that which is now embraced for its newness will to posterity be old, but not thereby be less true or less genuine. There is no occasion on this account to oppose the ancients and the moderns to one another, or to be squeamish on either side. He that wisely conducts his mind in the pursuit of knowledge, will gather what lights, and get what helps he can, from either of them, from whom they are best to be had, without adoring the errors or rejecting the truths which he may find mingled in them.—*Locke's "Conduct of the Understanding," "Works," p. 44.*

Thus Wit, like Faith, by each man is applied  
 To one small *sect*, and all are damned *beside*.  
*Meanly* they seek the blessing to *confine*,  
 And force that sun but on a part to shine,  
 Which not alone the southern wit sublimed,  
 But *ripens spirits* in cold northern *climes* ;  
 Which from the first has shone on ages past,  
*Enlights* the present, and shall *warm* the *last* ;  
 Though each may feel increases and decays,  
 And see, now clearer and now darker days.  
 Regard not then if Wit be old or new, (47)  
 But *blame* the false, and *value* still the true.

200

205

[Criticism founded on hearsay, rank, title, or former reputation only, cannot be judicious or fair.]

Some ne'er advance a judgment of their own,  
 But *catch* the *spreading notion* of the town;  
 They *reason* and *conclude* by *precedent*,  
 And *own state* nonsense which they ne'er *invent*.  
 Some judge of authors' names, not works, and then—  
 Nor praise nor blame the writings, but the men.

210

197. Division or clique; except those.  
 198. Shabbily; endeavour; limit.  
 201. Exhilarates genius; regions.  
 203. Brightens; excite; the future  
 time

207. Disapprove of; regard with es-  
 209. Take; prevailing opinion. [team.  
 210. Judge; decide; what has been  
 said or done before.  
 211. Express as theirs; think out.

(47) "Si meliora dies, ut vina, poemata, reddit," &c.

*Horace's Epistles, Book II., L., 34—78.*

"If length of time will better verse like wine,  
 Give it a bricker taste and make it fine;  
 Come tell me, then, I would be gladly showed,  
 How many years will make a poem good.  
 One poet writ a hundred years ago:  
 Well, is he old, and therefore faded, or no?  
 Or is he new, and therefore bold appears?  
 Let's fix upon a certain term of years.  
 He's good that lived an hundred years ago;  
 Another wants but one, is he so too?  
 Or is he new, and damned for *that* alone?  
 Well, he's good too, and old that wants but one.  
 Then thus I'll argue on and bate one more,  
 And so by one and one waste all the store.  
 And so confute him who esteems by years,  
 A poem's goodness from the date it bears,  
 Who not admires nor yet approves a line,  
 But what is old, and death has made divine.

34—59, *Creech's "Translation."*

I feel enraged that anything's defamed—  
 Not for its faults or errors duly blamed,  
 But for its modern age,—while we regard  
 All that is old deserving of reward.

76—76, *Anonymous "Translation."*



Of all this servile herd the worst is he,  
 That in proud dullness joins with quality : 215  
 A constant critic at the great man's board.  
 To fetch and carry nonsense for "My Lord."  
 What *woeful stuff* this madrigal (48) would be  
 In some *starved hackneyed sonneteer*—or me !  
 But let a Lord once own the happy lines, 220  
 How the wit brightens ! how the style refines !  
 Before his *sacred name* flies every fault,  
 And each *exalted stanza* teems with thought.

[The love of singularity is not a justifying source of criticism.]

The *vulgar* thus through imitation *err* ;  
 As oft, the learned by being singular. 225  
 So much they scorn the crowd, that if the throng  
 By chance go right, they purposely go wrong :  
 So schismatics the plain believers quit,  
 And are but damned for having too much wit.

[Inconstancy as well as inconsistency is censurable.]

Some praise at morning what they blame at night, 230  
 But always think their last opinion right.  
 A muse by these is like a mistress used,  
 This hour she's idolized, the next abused ;  
 While their weak heads, like towns unfortified,  
 'Twixt sense and nonsense daily change their side. 235  
 Ask them the cause, they're wiser still, they say ;  
 And still to-morrow's wiser than to-day.  
 We think our fathers fools, so wise we grow ;  
 Our wiser sons, no doubt, will think us so.  
 Once *school divines* this *zealous isle o'erspread* ; 240  
 Who knew most sentences, was deepest read :  
 Faith, gospel, all seemed made to be disputed,  
 And none had sense enough to be confuted.  
 Scotists (49) and Thomists (50) now in peace remain

218. Wretched nonsense.  
 219 Hunger-bitten, hiring poet-  
 aster.  
 222. Reputable title; vanishes.

223. Exquisite verse abounds in  
 merit.  
 224. Common people; go wrong.  
 240. Dialecticians; impulsive; dwelt.

(48) A madrigal in poetry is a short lyrical poem on some pleasant topic, generally love. It always involves a sort of conceit, and must be graceful and elegant. By a madrigal in music is commonly understood a simple song performed to rich and varied music, vocal or instrumental, and is not quite so merry as a *glee*.

(49) John Duns Scotus, the subtle doctor (1265-1308). He prelected on Lombard's "Sentences" to 30 000 students at Oxford, where he was Professor of Theology in Merton College. He taught also in Paris and Cologne. His "Opera Speculativa" have been published in 12 vols. at Lyons; his "Opera Positiva" have not yet been printed. His mind was dialectic, acute, persevering, and inclined to quibble. Abstruse discussion and ingenious theories were his delight. He was the leader of the Franciscans against the Dominican Aquinas, in the Nominalist and Realist controversy.

(50) Disciples of Thomas Aquinas, commonly called "The Angelic Doctor,"

Amidst their kindred cobwebs in Duck Lane. (51) . 245  
 If *Faith* itself has *different colours* worn,  
 What wonder modes in wit should take their turn ?  
 Oft, leaving what is natural and fit,  
 The current folly proves the ready wit.  
 And authors think their reputation safe, 256  
 Which lives as long as fools are pleased to laugh.

[Party spirit and envy unjustly attend true greatness.]

Some, valuing those of their own side or mind,  
 Still make themselves the measure of mankind ; (52)  
*Fondly we think we honour merit* then,  
 When we but praise ourselves—in other men. 255  
 Parties in wit attend on those in State,  
 And *public faction doubles private hate*.  
 Pride, malice, folly, against Dryden rose  
 In various shapes of parsons, critics, beaux :  
 But *sense survived*, when *merry jests were passed* ; 260  
 For rising merit will buoy up at last.  
 Might he return and bless once more our eyes,  
 New Blackmores (53) and new Milbourns (54) must arise.

246. Religious belief; various outward expressions.

254. Foolishly imagine; praise deserted.

257. Political partizanship increases personal ill-will.

260. Wisdom lived on; racy jokes; ended.

born in the castle of Rocca Licia, 1227. He was an early and enthusiastic student, and entered a Dominican convent in his youth against the will of his parents and friends. He was "to study all devote." He was a pupil of Albertus Magnus, at Cologne. In 1255 the University of Paris conferred on him a Doctorate in Theology. He lectured with great acceptance in Paris and in Naples. The Parisian edition of his works is in 23 vols. folio. His "Summa Theologiæ," and his "Commentary on the Sentences" (perhaps alluded to in line 241) "of Peter Lombard," are his chief works. Dr. John Eadie says, "In concise and earnest simplicity of style, in subtle and daring speculation, in purity and loftiness of aim, in orthodoxy of religious sentiment, in acuteness and vigour, in breadth and depth of view, in intellect and heart, in piety and temper, Thomas Aquinas is the acknowledged "Prince of Mediæval Schoolmen and Divines."

(51) Duck Lane, near Smithfield, where, in Pope's days, old books were sold.

(52) The doctrine of the sophist Protagoras, "Man is the measure of all things," is peculiarly liable to abuse, as man individual, or mankind collectively, is regarded as the custodian of truth.

(53) Sir Richard Blackmore was descended from a good Wiltshire family, was educated at Oxford, where he graduated M.A., 1676. He was an honest man, a very indifferent poet, and a successful physician. He was knighted by William III. His epic poem, "Prince Arthur," was published in 1695; other epics on "King Alfred," "Queen Elizabeth," "The Redeemer," "The Creation," &c., were written amidst the duties of his profession, or as Dryden called it, "to the rambling of his chariot wheels." He died 1729.

(54) The Rev. Luke Milbourn, a Church of England clergyman, and a poet of little merit or repute, who died 1720.

Nay, should great Homer raise his awful head,  
 Zoilus (55) again would start up from the dead. 265.  
*Envy will merit, as its shade pursue,*  
 But, like a shadow, proves its substance true:  
 For envied wit, like Sol eclipsed, makes known  
 The opposing body's grossness, not its own.  
 When first that Sun's too powerful beams displays, 270  
 It *draws up vapours* which *obscure* its rays.  
 But even these clouds at last adorn its way,  
*Reflect new glories, and augment the day.*

266. Ill-feeling; worth; reflection  
 follow.

271. Absorbs moisture; darken.

273. Give back; grandeur; increase;  
 brightness.

(55) Zoilus, a grammarian, born in Amphipolis, who flourished in the reign of Philip of Macedon, and who was noted for the captious asperity of his criticisms on Homer. He presented these to Ptolemy of Egypt, in anticipation of a handsome reward. Ptolemy, however, ordered him to be executed.

## Literary Notes.

The Hon. T. C. Haliburton (b. 1798), author of "Sam Slick," "Nature and Human Nature," &c., died 27th Aug.

The Ven. R. C. Coxe, Archdeacon of Lindisfarne, author of "Lectures on the Evidence of Miracles," &c., died 25th August.

The Rev. R. P. Smith, author of "The Authenticity and Messianic Interpretation of the Prophecies of Isaiah Vindicated," &c., has been appointed Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Oxford.

"The Economic Position of the British Labourer" is to be discussed in a work by Prof. Fawcett, M.P., Brighton.

Prof. McCosh, of Belfast, is preparing "A Defence of Fundamental Truth," being a Review of J. S. Mill.

Henri Taine, Professor of Fine Arts at Paris, has issued a work on "The Philosophy of Art."

"The Literary History of France in the Fourteenth Century" has been published by Lévy, from the pens of V. Leclerc and Ernest Renan.

Sir Wm. Rowan Hamilton, born in Dublin, Aug., 1805, author of "Algebra, the Science of Pure Time," "A General Method of Dynamics," "Lectures on Quaternions," &c., and Astronomer-Royal of Ireland, died 4th Sept.

The Rev. Dr. Bosworth and G. Waring, Esq., are about to publish, in parallel columns, with preface, notes, &c., versions of "The Holy Gospels," in Gothic and Anglo-Saxon, by Wycliffe and by Tyndale, bearing the dates respectively of 360, 995, 1389, and 1526.

"The Reign of Henry VII." is to be rehabilitated by Mr. Thomas Parnell.

"Studies about England," by M. L. Blanc, are anticipated with interest.

"Revolution" is the capital subject on which Edgar Quinet is engaged.

Gustave Doré is illustrating Shakspeare!

"The Iliad" has been translated into blank verse by the Earl of Derby; into hexameters by J. H. Dart and by E. A. Simcox. J. C. Wright will close his blank verse rendering by the publication

of the last six books in October; and in November we are promised Professor J. S. Blackie's "Homer" in ballad metre.

F. W. Farrar has prepared twenty-two "Chapters on Language."

C. W. Hoskyns, author of "Talpa," has in the press a volume of "Occasional Essays."

Professor Conington has an English verse translation of Virgil's "Æneid" in preparation.

M. Berthelot has been appointed to the new Chair of Organic Chemistry in the College of France.

"A History of Florence," by M. Thiers, has been put into the publisher's hands for £20,000.

Miss Mayo, educationist, died 1st Sept., aged 72.

E. S. Dallas, of the *Times*, author of "Poetics," has in the press "Essays towards the Science of Criticism."

Dr. Pusey is about to issue a "Defence of his Position and Policy, and of the Catholicity of the English Church."

"A Life of Sir Walter Raleigh," based on new materials, is engaging the attention of J. A. St. John.

It is proposed to erect a monument to Robert Tannahill, the Scottish song writer.

Mr. Thorpe has two volumes of "Early Anglo-Saxon Charters," with notes and historical comments, just ready.

Dr. F. H. Hedge, one of the best American interpreters of "The Prose Writers of Germany," has in the press a work on "Reason in Religion," to which much importance is likely to be attached.

"Memoirs of George III. and his Times," by Mr. Jesse, and "The Letters of George III. to Lord North," edited by W. B. Donne, are in the hands of the printer.

"The site of Ancient Nineveh" is to receive elucidation in a splendid volume to be issued from the Imperial printing-office, Paris, by M. Place.

Jean F. Encke, the celebrated German astronomer. (b. 1791), editor of "The Astronomical Annual," and Director of the Royal Observatory of Berlin, died 5th September.

Rev. Julius H. Ward, of Connecticut, is writing a Biography of James G. Percival, the American poet, linguist, and geographer.

M. Sylvain van de Weyer has published, in the eighth vol. of the *Miscellanies of the Philobiblon Society*, a sketch of a conversation with Napoleon at Elba, a narrative communicated to Lord Holland in 1815, by his cousin, G. V. Vernon.

D. W. A. Hammond is about to publish a work on "The Health of Men of Letters."

Mr. Gibson, of the American Mission, has prepared a Chinese translation of the New Testament, with references.

Mr. John Bruce, editor of the *Aldine edition of Cowper's "Poems,"* has in preparation a Memoir, illustrated by new letters and documents, in which he will, we believe, tell the love story of the poet's life.

A vol. of "Christmas Carols," with music, edited, with notes, by W. H. Busk, will shortly be ready.

Jacob Larwood and J. C. Hotten are engaged on a "History of Signboards."

Admiral W. H. Smyth, founder and afterwards president of the Geographical Society, author of "A Cycle of Celestial Objects," "Celestial Chromatics," &c., died 9th Sept., aged 77.

A new work on "Natural Philosophy," by Professor William Thomson and Mr. Stirling, is announced.

Prof. D. Masson's expectation—"Something may surely be looked for from Prof. Veitch and Prof. Spencer Baynes"—is, we believe, about to turn out correct: the former will shortly put before the public his "Life and Writings of Sir William Hamilton," and the latter a defence of his master's logical theories.

Two volumes of the Works of Professor Ferrier, Philosophical and Literary, are in preparation. The first vol. will include the Philosophy of Consciousness, his criticisms of Berkeley, Bailey, Mill, &c., and Selections from his Lectures. The second will consist of Criticisms, Essays, Biographies, &c.

## Literary Culture ;

### ITS AIMS, METHODS, AND MEANS.

LITERATURE is the expression of thought. It ranges from the simplest form of speech in which a fact can be stated to the grandest anthem-like utterance of an aspiration for communion with heaven which can rise in the human soul ; and includes the whole of the intermediate possibilities of using words as signs and exponents of thought. In the intellect of man all things excite thought, and thought constantly aims at securing for itself, first the registering, and then the communicating aid of language.

"A being using *thoughtful breath*" is one of the elegant periphrases which a poet may justly use to indicate a man. The soul is the birthplace and the home of thought. In associating itself with language it becomes expressible and impressive. Thought is the growth, language the outgrowth of the mind. Speech, therefore, "a double nature has," an inner being and an outward life ; in which latter form it becomes, strictly speaking, literature. Literary culture signifies that training by which speech, as the expression of thought, may be most perfectly realized, and may be made most thoroughly effective. Culture is careful and well-directed management in the application of those means by which intended ends may be most certainly and readily brought about. Literary culture is the management of the means of making words the symbols and the interpreters of thought. That thought is cultivable is admitted by the recognition of a science of logic. That the power of expression is capable of improvement by skilful study and assiduous practice is a fact which, notwithstanding the existence of a science of rhetoric, many people are not indeed inclined to deny, but anxious to conceal. "Such is the distrust excited by any suspicion of rhetorical artifice, that every speaker or writer who is anxious to carry his point endeavours to disown or keep out of sight any superiority of skill, and wishes to be considered as relying rather on the strength of his cause and the soundness of his views than on his ingenuity and expertness as an advocate. Hence it is that even those who have paid the greatest and the most successful attention to the study of composition and of elocution are so far from encouraging others by example or recommendation to engage in the same pursuit, that they labour rather to conceal and disavow their own proficiency ; and thus theoretical rules are derided, even by those who owe the most to them ;"\* and men who will keenly

\* Whately's "Rhetoric." Introduction, par. 8

claim an acquaintance with the innermost secrets of logic will disclaim with equal earnestness any, even the least, knowledge of the arts and practices of the rhetorician. And there is a beautiful and human reason for this difference of feeling regarding these nearly related—in fact, twin-sister—sciences. It is felt to be a man's duty to be truthful—to give utterance to the thought that is in him. It is every man's ambition to be recognized as the possessor of correct thought—to be at least supposed to have taken the utmost care in forming his judgments and coming to the conclusions which he seeks to lay before others. Logic is admitted to aid the thinker, is indeed often believed to exert a magical influence in the precipitation of fallacies, so that if the speaker can persuade the hearer that he has employed all the safeguards of that science in the course of his inquiries and reflections, the impression goes a great way to incline the hearer to accept the speaker's argument as valid and unimpeachable. But on the contrary, when a man begins "to pick and choose" among words, to select his expressions with care, and to study the statement of his case, we are afraid of being duped; we suspect that the words which require so much deliberation, and the sentences on the turn of which so much care is bestowed, are so weighed and arranged for a purpose, and that purpose a deceitful one. This prejudice acts powerfully on thought, insinuates doubt into the hearer's mind, excites critical hesitation, and generally acts as a disturbing influence. Hence an avowal of familiarity with the processes of rhetoric deters from yielding assent to the opinions expressed, and the very chief end of rhetoric—persuasion—is more or less frustrated. Hence the sedulous concealment of a knowledge of the arts of persuasion, even of the arts of composition; hence the anxiety for acquiring credit for the spontaneous and unstudied utterance of thought which most men feel and strive after. On this account rhetoric is wooed in secret, while logic is gladly taken out to public places. But both of these impressions are fallacious. A knowledge of logic does not secure honesty of thought. For the reader will at once perceive that correctness is not quite convertible with candour of thought—the moral quality is not implied in it. A speaker's acquaintance with the processes of logical involution or evolution, however valuable in itself and to the possessor, is not necessarily a protection to the hearer; it may be very much the reverse. The word sophistry has been invented to express the dishonest use of the processes of logic to—

" Make the worse appear  
The better reason; to perplex and dash  
Maturest counsel—"

by sham wisdom, or no wisdom, wearing the garb of true thought. The practice of rhetoric is not necessarily pernicious. On the contrary it is often highly advantageous to the accurate and effective setting forth of truth. I should even go further, and assert that rhetorical skill is absolutely essential to the right expression,—that

is, in other words, the utilization of thought; "for," as Pericles said to the Athenians, after the second invasion of the Peloponnesians, "he that hath good thoughts and cannot express them, would have been as good if he had not thought at all."\* To transfer one's thoughts precisely into the mind of another with all their associations and consociations, it is needful to know not only our own thoughts as they really are, but what words and forms of words will duly and truly represent them as they require to be shown to those whom we wish to affect by them, so that they may suggest or imply neither more nor less than they should. To give an exact equivalent in words for the thoughts which we feel thronging in our own spirits is by no means an easy task. When, however, thought is emotioned the difficulty becomes vastly increased, for emotion bestirs the intellect diversely; and thought is not precisely expressed unless there is connoted along with it the emotion which excites, accompanies, or results from it, however "hot with swift pulses" it may be.

The literary expression of thought, then, we think ought to be clear, adequate, and distinct as to idea; and precise, perspicuous, and emotioned as to style. Literature is the full, free, fresh activity of the thinking faculty in its best state, truly set forth in whatsoever form is most suitable to produce the effect desired—whether that be the communication of information, the promotion of sociality, the excitement of delight, or the registration of experience, reflection, and imagination. Literary culture is intended to bring the mind into this best state of forth-giving power.

"Fine thoughts are wealth, for the right use of which  
Men are and ought to be accountable."

Men are not what they should be unless they are continually transmuting life into thought, and causing thought to permeate life again in constant interaction. This is the great secret of self-improvement. Thus alone can thought ripen into truth, and the appearances of nature, by a strange transition and metamorphosis, become converted into science, poetry, and faith,—

"Writ in the red-leaved volume of the heart."

A true, good heart, an active and productive mind, possessed of sight, insight, and foresight, a taste to which wit and beauty are alike welcome, and a power of expression so refined and accurate that—

"Thought takes a charm from its investuring word,"—

are the chief elements in a genuinely healthy human nature, and towards the development of which literary culture is exerted.

It is the duty of every one who either assumes or has laid upon him the guidance or instruction of any portion of the public, in serial, by books, or from the desk, pulpit, or platform, to contend

\* Thucydides, book ii., 60.

against the false notion of the last century, that literature is a mere art, in the sense of its being a simulation of nature. No merely simulative art is ever effective. All the grand periods of literary success were periods of earnestness, reality, and sincerity. The glorious energies of fresh national life gave form and stir to Chaucer's time; the vigorous pulses of those who had been quickened by the Reformation made the literature of Shakspeare's era palpitate with realized vitality; the Commonwealth inspired the religious element to energy and rush of effort, and Milton's poems demonstrate the efficacy of its influences; the earnest international contests and the strong upsurging tides of human passion excited thereby, imparted intense power to the thinkers of the days of Dryden; the feeling of settledness distilled its equability into the language of Pope's age, for the revolution settlement had quieted the currents of existence for a time, and *essayism* became possible; with the oncome of the Revolution Cowper and Burns appeared, and with its outcome in the Empire the names of Coleridge and Wordsworth, Byron and Scott, are connected; with the rise of the people and the passing of the Reform Bill, with the repeal of the Corn Laws and the institution of the Penny Post, we have the contemporary developments of cheap literature, newspapers, and serials, the growth of a new race of authors—not strictly thinkers, but multipliers of the results of thought.

The present age, like that which felt the reaction consequent on the accession of the house of Hanover, is liable to entertain the fallacious notion that earnest sincerity, vigorous purpose, and healthy personality, are not so requisite in human life as our predecessors seemed to have supposed. Out of this mistake we have been somewhat rudely roused by the fierce conflicts of which the Crimea, India, and America have been the scenes. These have shown us that in all life there must be ruling purposes, sterling honesty, and constant watchfulness against falling to the dull levels of selfishness and commonplace. Because our present life is various our literature is so; because it is so pre-eminently realistic, sculpture, painting, and philosophy have drivelled down to purveyors for utility. The use of a Psyche is to hold a gaslight, and of "The Light of the World" to form the centre piece in a shilling exhibition. Political economy has sunk to regulating tariffs instead of governing social life. But it cannot be so for ever. Life is grander than this. There never can be a noble life without noble aims. Sincerity must enter into and shine out of every occupation; the very habits of humanity must be honest, if the stir of true vitality is to be felt in the heart. Of all the issues of existence, however, it most behoves man to have those of his thoughts sincere. To widen and deepen knowledge usefully, truth must be sought, gathered, and arranged; then we may proceed to build "without fear, and with a manly heart."

We affirm this all the more readily, all the more steadily, because we write chiefly for those whose own efforts must carry them



upward and onward—who must turn the grindstone for the shaping and sharpening of their own mode of intellectual being. We do not care to speak in the take-it-for-granted-style. We wish rather that our words may come to our readers with “demonstration,” that they may be words of “power.” We urge this idea of literary culture, being in reality life-culture, not unsympathisingly but well aware of its taskwork tone and its stubborn difficulties. We believe, however, that all noble life is a conflict with and an overcoming of difficulties; and we think, moreover, that it is better thus than if such a life were easy-going. Enjoyment arises from the exercise of all power; but the supreme delight of humanity comes from the conscious greating of selfhood that results from a subduing effort employed against the mortifying disquietudes of time and sense. Hence we cordially endorse the sentiments of Thomas T. Lynch, “If learning, thinking, inquisitive—in one word, self-improving,—a man has reliefs in life’s work which no worry and trouble can utterly deprive him of. To self-improvers we do not talk exactly, claiming so much science and so much literature; but encouragingly, saying, the less scholarship and opportunity you have when you begin your work, the harder it will be, but the more honourable your success. Whenever a man effects a good work especially hard, it will be especially honourable, and shall win a blessing especially rich. We know that if the first strength put forth for the accomplishment of eager wishes does not succeed, human nature fails but too readily. But take the case of the self-improver who has persevered through years, fighting on towards knowledge and self-regulation, confirming himself in good principle by true observation,—has not his hard work won him a rich blessing? Business would have swallowed him up alive in its dusty pit but for his watchfulness and energy as a self-improver.”\*

“Till you begin to improve, you cannot tell all the reason there is for improving: you do not know the defects of the unimproved; the satisfaction of the improver; the help that the work offers to the worker. Nobody can understand the excellencies of a work without putting his hand to it. And the way to get your heart into a work is to put your hand to it”† and set about doing it,—

“Filling each moment with a moment’s task.”

What a revision of the whole course of the world’s activity would there be if men went whole-heartedly to the duties of life—not its mere routine, bread-gaining duties, but the entire round of personal, family, social, national, and religious duties—all the duties which are implied in the unique possession of intellectual life, and grudged every opportunity of fulfilling any one of them past by or neglected as so much waste of life and loss of power! What men we should be if the monitor, conscience, held us to our life-work, and compelled us to be as noble as the capacities within us would allow! In aid

\* “Lectures in Aid of Self-improvement,” i., p. 5.      † *Ibid*, p. 10.

of our becoming so, the following notes on the aims, methods, and means of literary culture are written and placed before the reader.

Literary culture aims at honest completeness of being. The law of activity is the law also of enjoyment.

"Without employ

The soul is on the rack, the rack of rest

To souls most adverse; action's all their joy."

But activity is never healthy, never free from irksomeness and distemper unless there is a consent and harmony of the faculties of men, unless the forces and issues of effort are balanced and equally moved. If the wheels of life's stir do not keep their own poise and movement, meet their own check and feel their due impulse, the ongoings cannot be retained in orderliness and effectiveness. Wholeness alone supplies the possibility of well-doing. We cannot neglect or overuse any faculty without causing disturbance and opening a passage to failure or defeat. However fine and fluent be the flow of thought, however ready the power of action, if it be a fluency or readiness gained by the over-burnishment of one faculty or the disregard of another, it is impossible for us to live a complete life—to be what we ought. Literature is life rescued from its transiency and reserved to "a life beyond life." Culture always strives to ripen, to heighten the worth of what it operates upon. To perfect that of which it is the fruit is therefore the most trustworthy means of effecting a thorough as well as useful and beneficial literary culture.

Literary culture aims at entire harmony of life. Appearances and shams are often said to be more prevalent in literature than in any other form of human activity. In so far as any literary work is an appearance only and not a reality—is not the product of well-exerted skill and fervour of endeavour—it lacks the very essence of true literature. Literature should be the simple and immediate expression of thought in the precise form in which it arises, or in the specific form in which it will best effect its purpose, whatever that may be. Disproportion of energy or effort disturbs the mind and disenchant it. Discordance of method and endeavour excites disapprobation. Dislocation of parts, discontinuity of argument, inaccuracy of expression, incorrectness of thought, inconsistency of thought—expression—from mistake to lie—originate one and all in a want of harmony, a want of fitness and appropriateness. A man may—

"Perform

The punctual functions of his daily life

With most admirable complacency,"—

yet have little heart-love set upon the work he does. But ever and anon the contradiction of feeling and function will appear, and the want of harmony of life will show itself. If any man seeks an outlet for the teeming issues of his mind in literature, he must warily provide that the aims of the writer harmonize with the life of the

writer ; for literary culture demands that such thought alone as is the outgrowth of life should be written under its auspices and by its help.

Literary culture aims at absolute sincerity of life. The true must permeate all thought and action. Without it the good is impossible, and the beautiful is deceptive as mirage, and fleeting as the colour of rainbows. Truth is the first want as it is also the necessary condition of life. Falseness is destructiveness. Sincerity is at once the chief and most requisite of moral attributes. Life is never safe unless sincerity characterises it. Sincerity, in looking at Nature and reading off the lessons she supplies, is indispensable to science. Sincerity in our standing before the ever-working laws of existence is requisite to secure health and happiness. Sincerity in social life is the foundation of trust and the stability which depends on it. Sincerity in work is the sure basis of character and worth. Sincerity of feeling is the main condition of successful oratory, and sincerity of reproduction is the greatest of all merits in the arts of sculpture, painting, and poetry. Sincerity in manufactures is the main requisite of trade, and political freedom depends upon the sincerity of feeling with which class looks on class. Of religion sincerity is not only a requirement but a sign. Life is dependent in all its foremost interests upon sincerity. Literature, as the highest form which the life of thought is capable of taking, demands that sincerity should animate its followers ; and literary culture, therefore, aims at instilling into every one who wishes to have share in her praises a perception of the need of sincere thought expressed sincerely.

Literary culture aims at securing the living permanence of thought. There is in every man a surcharge of vitality. Man was not made to live for himself alone. He was created to live with and for, as well as by and beside others. Thought is, of all his powers, that one which, out-growing from the soul, partakes of its life, and like it seeks to live for ever. That it may accomplish this, it flashes into many forms. It builds edifices and enstones itself for ages ; it imparts perennial statuesqueness to its ideas in sculpture ; it flings a copy of that which delighted it upon the canvas, and bids it glad others for ages ; it injects itself among wheels, pinions, and pistons, and gives being to machinery ; it mingles with the clay of the earth, and animates it to fertility by agriculture, or kneads it into forms of use or beauty through the fictile arts ; it projects itself into the past, and brings home history ; it woos nature till she by its impregnation produces science ; it fills the universe with emotion, and catches up the echoes it gives back as poetry ; it photographs itself in books, and it is literature in its common, though not its most correct signification. These books by being—and only so far as they are—ensouled become immortal, borrowing their destiny from the great life-principle of all things, thought. Literature is the thought of mankind embodied in words ;—so embodied as to have the effects of life, being quickening, reproductive, and social, and capable of an existence outlasting him the essence of whose life they are.

Literary culture aims at the ready diffusion of thought. Thought is the most precious of the outgrowths of life. To produce thought is one of man's highest functions, as to act from and in accordance with true thought is one of his noblest. Thought is not a personal possession. Its truest utility only arises when we diffuse it. Kept to one's self it is a solitary joy, revealed to another it becomes "twice blessed." Literary culture enables us to diffuse thought more pleasantly, usefully, and acceptably. It is indeed one of its chief objects to bestow upon thought that attractiveness and grace, that persuasiveness and power which will induce others to attend to and be moved by the results of our minds. Hence literature has always aimed at popularization. Among the rhapsodists of Greece, the troubadours of the Middle Ages, and the Magaziniests of the present age, the aim has alike been to acquire influence by impressing many. This is the secret of the yearning for publication; a fact which of itself fully proves the statement we have made. It is evident, then, that literary culture is not merely a selfish process, but has a root in the sympathetic feelings of our nature. No man ever cultures his literary faculty solely for the selfish delight and single pleasure its momentary activity produces. Letters would die and culture would cease if the freezing coldness of selfishness should ever acquire unchallenged dominion over the soul of man; for in its very nature literature aims at ready diffusiveness.

But wherever the human mind is stimulated by an ambition, and spurred on by an aim, there arises a need for a method. Literature, no less than any other form of activity, must work by a method, and determine for itself the way in which its aims may be best accomplished. The discharge of any duty slightly or slightly brings its own punishment with it—ineffectiveness. "A good method," Comte affirms, "imparts to the spirit such a power that it is able in some measure to act as a substitute for talent. It is a lever which bestows on the feeble man who employs it a force which cannot be had by the most powerful man who may be deprived of a similar help."\*

• Methods of literary culture are of course as various as the aims of the human spirit and the forms in which they may be worked out into success. No truth enters the mind in isolated loneliness. All truths are related to each other. They form one whole, one mighty system, although we cannot see it all. When we endeavour to unite them so as to frame them into a perceptible order, tending to the accomplishment of a given or determined aim, we methodize our thoughts; and this we do in express subserviency to our prior aim. Looking at literature in this point of view it may be variously considered. But of its several branches and subdivisions we are unable now to enter into any detailed exposition. The following table may suggest even more than we could say.

\* Auguste Comte's "Treatise on Legislation," Book I., c. i.

**I. Scientific** { 1. Expositions of new discoveries or theories.  
2. Popular statements of received opinions.  
3. Fresh developments founded on old opinions.  
4. Disquisitions suggestive of other hypotheses.

- As we prefer suggestiveness to exhaustiveness, we leave the contents of the preceding tabular synopsis as elements of thought for development in the minds of our readers. If, with the affluence of their own ideas, they fill up these outlines, they will

feel greater content than if we were fully to detail the considerations presiding over its form and classification.

But, every method implies that there are means by which the roadway it points out is made traversable, and by the use of which the object had in view in adopting it may be accomplished. To follow out into all their intricacies the means of pursuing the several specific methods of literary culture included in the foregoing synopsis would lead us far and occupy us long. We shall study the advantage of our readers more if we note now a few of the simplest and most readily available of those means of literary culture to which each may more or less give himself, apart from that great series of educational means with which our country abounds,—those, we mean, which are especially adapted to aid in the furtherance of self-culture in a literary sense.

The means of literary culture ought to be simple, and such as are likely to keep a sense of accountability and responsibility before the mind. They should be such as may be readily and conveniently made use of, less or more, by men in any circumstances of life or location. But they ought all to have added to them some social aspect by which the idea of engagement and duty might be utilized, and hence the feeling of responsibility may be effectively brought to bear upon the daily life and improvement of the individual. There are, of course, many means of literary culture which are open to men living in large communities; *e. g.*, schools, colleges, mechanics' institutes, free libraries, reading-rooms, on which we need not enlarge; and many inducements applied to residents in towns of which we cannot take account. Of these we commend the use to all who can avail themselves of them readily. We are desirous of bringing into notice a few of those means which lie within reach of most, and which are more particularly suitable for those employed in self-culture, and engaged in "works of earnest, true endeavour." They can be by no means lofty, but they may be useful; and as they may aid in the acquisition of a relish for intellectual pleasure, and a love of those delights which enhance and ennoble life, we commend them to the attention of those whose hearts are touched to fine issues; or who have the opportunity of influencing others for higher purposes than sense-enjoyments.

One of the simplest means of literary culture with which we are acquainted is self-improvement *Reading Societies*.

The office of a reading society is different from a book-club, a lending library, or a reading-room. These supply the means of study, but take no active part in securing the right employment of books and reading. The agency to which we at present refer has two forms, from each of which good results may be reaped, as we have seen them worked. A reminiscent description of one used in our youth-time may perhaps best explain the idea. Twelve lads thrown, by various chances, together, shortly after the period of school-training allotted to them was past, in the course of companionship discovered that the interest of books was greatly enhanced by

rehearsal and talk. This notion extemporised itself into a resolve that each should purchase a member's ticket for a library in town, whence each would procure a "History of England," and, after simultaneously perusing certain reigns, should meet, and in a rural walk talk over the events, incidents, and peculiarities of the period studied, and so undergo a sort of conversational competitive examination in English history. The same plan was also pursued with the histories of France, Rome, and the Church. Shortly after this, as it was noticed that each in his reading or thinking saw something which was unlikely to meet the eye of the others, it was proposed to copy out or write down these readings or thinkings on slips of paper, which, on being stitched together, formed an exchangeable "Repertory" of interesting home-reading. All quotations made, required to be verified by careful reference to author's name, volume, work, page, date of edition, &c. Frequently the walks were further enlivened by "repetitions" of passages from the works of select authors, in which the young critics thought they noticed any peculiarly fertile idea or specially attractive turn of expression. By-and-bye, one and another became connected with literary societies, and as one or other of these associations seemed to offer the greatest inducement, these youths attached themselves to different assemblies. And then a change became necessary. Preparation for meetings, meetings themselves, and other interests arose to make conversation-walks less frequent, but not to destroy their zest for knowledge. An early rising association was agreed upon—the hour of meeting, half-past four in summer, six in winter. The members formed into squads of four, or so, residing in the same quarter of the city, met at an appointed central place, and within ten minutes after the hour, exchanged cards, on which were written the date of the day preceding, and the literary labour accomplished during its leisure hours. These cards were signed and dated by the recipient, and were inspected by the secretary at a monthly meeting, to which social intercourse as an association had then become limited. After a morning salutation each betook himself to home and study, or afield with his book, his botanical *vasculum*, or his geological implements, according to his special taste, the state of the weather, &c. I believe the interchange of such lists of readings were highly useful in keeping up a constant habit of seeking knowledge, and prepared its members for afterwards more adequately fulfilling their duties as members of debating and mutual improvement societies.

Of the advantages, uses, and value of *debating societies* we have previously spoken in this serial. A very pleasing and improving addition to the usual routine of such societies has, however, been brought under our notice as in constant use in an association at Jarrow-upon-Tyne. The members of a society are often prone to criticize too favourably the known productions of known writers. To get free from this evil influence, provision is made by the appointment of an editor, who receives, arranges, and reads at stated intervals such

productions as the members confide to his care, without any clue being given, to the audience, of their authorship. These the members are called to adjudicate upon, and the editor notes the chief matters of critique passed on each performance, that they may be brought under the notice of the writers. Such a form of literary effort we think is highly judicious, and we hope to hear of the wide adoption and successful use of "stray leaves," as they are called.

These "leaves" are a sort of *Manuscript Magazine*, read and remarked on as the evening passes. There are, however, many persons of congenial tastes who would prefer to bring their productions to a wider and surer test, as well as to have a more extended circle of thought brought within their own reach. To such parties a magazine, founded on the principle of *The (MSS) Literary Journal*, in circulation, from Goole as a centre, might be commenced. It circulates per book post through the members; the editor alone knows the name of each contributor (or at least of the author of each specific contribution), and he is made the recipient of all the critiques, of which he supplies a copy of so much as regards his own production to the writer, keeping at the same time a register of the communications furnished to him by each. Each old contribution requires to be replaced by a new one on the receipt of the magazine in its stated course. A project of a somewhat wider range has been suggested in a communication in our "Societies' Section" (*ante*, p. 151), which promises to possess a distinct utility, and to open a large companionship in letters to many—especially to those who are otherwise restrained from extended literary intercourse from occupation, residence, or any other cause. Several similar magazines and associations have been brought within our knowledge, and we believe they are worthy of finding many willing *collaborateurs*.

Here we may remark perhaps better than anywhere else that we should strongly advise the appointment, in every literary association, of an assessor of disputed quotations or facts, and that a strict *surveillance* should be kept over all statements of importance on which arguments rest, that they be fairly recounted, and over every remark of a writer of note, on whose faith any opinion is advanced, that it be accurately quoted. Such an official, if he did his duty honestly, would greatly aid in putting down the great evils of debating societies—rash assertions, incorrect quotation, unsubstantiated statistics and statements regarding matters of fact; and the very existence of such a power of appeal would tend to induce careful reading, thought, and expression.

We intended to notice several other means of literary culture, *e. g.*, correspondence clubs; brotherhoods of inquirers; mutual book loan associations; serial circulating societies; "notes and queries" agencies; self-help students' classes, &c., &c.,—the names of which may suggest their main purposes and provisions. Should an interest be felt in the further *exploitation* of this subject, we may continue the topic in a future article on "the ways and means of self-improvement."



## Politics.

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### OUGHT PARLIAMENTS TO BE SEPTENNIAL?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE duty of Parliament is to introduce, consider, and bring into working order such legislative measures as the times and circumstances of this country requires; to originate and regulate all bills for levying taxes; and generally to hold a supervising eye over the concerns of the nation, subject to the prerogatives of the Crown, and in accordance with its own rights. The several members of Parliament require—that they may be able to apply themselves to the proper performance of their duties—intelligence, practice, and an acquaintance with the forms of procedure to which all legislative measures are subject. It is obvious that in a State such as Great Britain is, with interests at once wide and complicated, the duties of a member of the Legislature must be very onerous and difficult to perform. The problems of social philosophy and of political economy are many, and great skill in reasoning, and a far-seeing judgment seem to be highly requisite in dealing with them. The relations of the various classes of society, the allocation of their duties, the settlement of their rights, the arrangements of excise and taxation call for much discrimination. International difficulties are so apt to arise and so hard to get amicably settled, that cautious wisdom, and a good general acquaintance with human nature and the operations of the social feelings must be needed to manage them well.

From these general considerations we infer that a lengthy tenure of the office of parliamentary representative is necessary to enable those engaged in thus serving their country to do so effectively. We know, of course, that it is only a century and a half ago since what is generally understood as the Septennial Act was passed by the lawgivers of the reign of George I.; but we do not think that anything is to be gained in this discussion by long historic disquisitions upon that head. Our question concerns itself with the “living present.” We are asked by it, are our representative institutions, as they exist in respect to duration, what they ought to be? One need neither be a *laudator temporis acti*, nor an out-and-out maintainer of the theory that “whatever is, is right,” to defend the present system of septennial parliaments. We do not intend to be lengthy in argument, though we desire to be clear. We shall lay down certain propositions which seem to us to settle the question

in the affirmative, leaving our opponents to oppose and oppugn these as best they may. We think that this will help the reader to comprehend the question, while it will take it out of the risk of being treated as a political question bandied about between Toryism and Radicalism. It will be discussed then as a question, not as a state-subverting agitation.

Septennial Parliaments are right, because they give stability to the Constitution and power to the House of Commons.

The rise of the House of Commons into a power in the State has been gradual. But scarcely any event has more effectively aided that than the Septennial Act. Prior to its passage through the Legislature, the Sovereign and the Peers were always able by force or stratagem to keep the Commons in abeyance or pupilage. When they were unyielding, they required only to prorogue for a term, or to bring in bill after bill to be discussed until the term of the duration of Parliament was exhausted, and they had a new chance of gaining their ends. But the same argument goes in favour of parliaments entitled to sit for seven years, when we reflect on the fickleness of the mob and their readiness to clamour for change before experiments in legislation have had a fair opportunity of being tested. To give the House of Commons weight in the country, it must not be made too liable to change. It must have so much stability as will give it individuality, and as shall enable it to initiate a system of legislation and superintend its being brought into practical working. This cannot be done unless the House has the power to remain a corporate body, animated by a oneness of mind until its purpose is accomplished.

Looking to the interests of the country, we find that septennial parliaments possess an independence of the permanent conservative elements of the Legislature, the House of Lords, and the Sovereign, and of the flighty public, who are ever impatient of "the long results of time," and expect instant effects from political changes. Hence the upper ten thousand and the head of the nation must move, in some degree, as the people's representatives wish them to do; while the turbulent impatience and hot-headedness of the people is restrained within the limits of good sense and fair play. We think the arrangement most judicious for gradual and safe progress. It is not to be doubted that annual parliaments are quite useless for effecting any really sound system of legislation. There would arise a continual speculation upon the results of the next election. A judicious plotter could easily throw into the hot politics of the day such a set of bills as, when brought under discussion, would waste the most useful portion of a session; while he might readily take credit at the end for decrying hasty and impetuous legislation, and ask the House to leave these measures unpassed till a new House was called, fitter for his purpose. Equally readily might an annual parliament be hurried into premature legislation, if that was wished, on the plea that unless the proposed measures were passed then there would be little security for their passage in a

future parliament. The practical compromise which has been effected by the Septennial Act, between over-haste and over-deliberation, is highly beneficial, and is not likely to be disturbed so long as people admire well-considered and cautious legislation.

Septennial parliaments secure the country from ruinous expense and agitation.

We have all seen during the present year a vivid argument against extreme frequency of parliamentary contests. We all know the excitement into which men are thrown when the country is convulsed by political commotions. Political hates are stirred up or strengthened. Political partizanship is incorporated with life, and the zeal of men leads them to neglect business and duty to secure the triumph of their candidate and party. Canvassing and contesting involve heavy expenses, and are terribly destructive of vital energy and human repose. It is of the utmost consequence that the interests of men should not evaporate in the mere froth of electioneering, but that they should have time, leisure, and interest to spend in the actual duties of legislation. But this could not be done unless under septennial parliaments; and in life, property, and intelligence the country would suffer for any change it would make tending to cause elections to be held more frequently.

Septennial parliaments allow political and party divisions time to heal.

This is no mean benefit. Men are very apt to fall into that state in which—

“Public faction doubles private hate.”

When once, however, a contest is over and settled for seven years, men begin to look upon things as they are as inevitable for that time, and they can cool down to the state of feeling suited to daily life, and can go about their common duties without exasperation; till the advent of a new election rouses passion again, and brings the feeling of party strongly into play.

We think the foregoing argument sufficient for the present to show the position which the advocates of septennial parliaments can occupy. When we have had an opportunity of comparing notes with our opponents we shall be better able to carry on the debate. We have by no means exhausted all that can be said in favour of our seven years' parliaments.

SEPTENNIS.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

To dash at once, as Horace advises, in *medias res*, we may object to the septennial parliaments as at present held, that they are so held in accordance with an Act which was passed, not from wise considerations of national policy, but for the attainment of an incidental end. The circumstances of the country in 1715 may have justified the change for that time, but cannot be held as an availing argument for all time. Then there had been internal insurrection, invasion was threatened, parties were heated not only by contest,

but exasperated, on the one hand, by prosecutions not always impartially conducted, and inflamed, on the other, by the pride of victory. Government was unpopular, not only because of its success in quelling the rebellion of 1715, but on account of the heavy taxation, as it was then thought, incurred for the defence of the country and the upholding of the new dynasty. But the force of every one of these arguments for the Septennial Act has passed away, and we see no reason why the country should not now revert to the old established custom, which the Septennial Act altered, of having a new House of Commons elected every three years. To perpetuate exceptional legislation in normal conditions of society is inadvisable. Our septennial parliaments were introduced as a merely exceptional expedient for keeping the ministry in and the government strong. It was a sort of quiet *coup d'état*, and was, indeed, no more justified, except by expediency, than the sitting of the Long Parliament, or Cromwell's abrupt dismissal of the Commons' house. Exceptions should cease when the exceptional circumstances change.

So far, for the present, the historical argument leads us. We argue now, morally, that septennial parliaments are not beneficial, because they make it possible to tempt the representatives by valuable considerations much more effectively than if they held their appointments for periods of shorter duration. Frequency of temptation is very powerful in breaking down men's moral strength. In a period of seven years opportunities of temptation, and occasions when yielding may be looked for must occur frequently. A minister watching his opportunity would not fail to ply such means as would secure the adhesion of such as were temptable to his side, or at least would not fail to expose many to such temptations as might be alluring. Then a seven years' tenure of office affords better opportunity for a member to turn by little and little, while the distance at which his meeting his constituents is placed makes him less susceptible of the influence of public opinion as compared with the immediate advantage able to be offered by the ministry. The possibilities of tempting and being tempted ought to be reduced as much as possible. Seven years is long enough to permit a representative to forget his responsibility to his constituents ; it affords full time for him to take advantage of the position granted to him to secure himself from being greatly dependent on their favour again, should they feel disposed to punish him by a withdrawal of their confidence. We say then, that, morally speaking, septennial parliaments are objectionable.

Again, just in proportion to the opportunities of selling for place, honour, or emolument the vote entrusted to a representative by the Septennial Act, its worth as a possession is increased. The money value is heightened by the length of tenure. Hence every contest for a seat in Parliament must be embittered by the thought that a good speculation, if lost now, is unavailable again for seven years. Everything that tends to embitter political contests is disadvantageous ; and it is unquestionably the fact that the length of a par-

liament has an effect in embittering the election crisis. This we see in the case of elections occurring about the middle of a parliamentary term, for then neither are the contests so keen nor are the effects of the quarrel so lasting. The conquest is not so great; the defeat is not so humiliating. What is gained is not so valuable; what is lost is less worth. Here, again, we see the objectionable side of septennial parliaments, and the connection of this argument with the foregoing one should not be lost sight of, for the length of time for which services can be purchased has a material bearing on their price. No man goes into parliament without some object in view. To have seven years to work at the accomplishment of this is preferable to having only three, and hence the value of the post rises in his eyes, and this, as we aver, heightens the keenness of the contest.

To keep the consciousness of his representative function continually before the mind of a member of the House of Commons nothing is more necessary than to have the term of office short. With an annual parliament timid subserviency to ministerial, as opposed to national interests would be almost impossible, for a year's purchase of subserviency would scarcely be worth paying for, and almost not worth accepting, especially as a ready retaliation by dismissal would be in the hands of the constituency. But when we stretch the possible services of a member through seven years, and know how narrow a majority may help to keep a ministry from being ousted—even when odious to the nation, we see that a vote which is purchasable for seven years possesses a considerable value, a value the ministry can easily calculate and the member can easily discover. The length of time, too, which has to elapse before he is called to account, affords many chances of wiping out the traces of his conversion or perversion, or of securing himself elsewhere from the investigations which might be made if he presented himself to the same constituency for re-election. A desirable and creditable representative, who for three years might maintain honour and reputation, might easily fall were the term stretched to seven years, either because the worth of his vote would be so increased as to make its disposal tempting, or the change of his circumstances might make it seem expedient, or the distance of the reckoning-day might seem to promise forgetfulness or condonation.

Needy adventurers, we know, make great efforts to get into the House. Why so? Because they hope to make their membership serve their purpose. If we wish to keep such characters out of the House, we must lessen the worth or increase the difficulty of admission. Now the abolition of the Septennial Act would accomplish both of these objects. The time for coquetting with the ministry or with opposing parties would be abridged, and action on their part would be precipitated, hence discovery would be more certain, caste would be lost, and their end would be defeated. Again, the greater frequency with which they would be exposed to the competitive examination of a contested election would increase the difficulty of

effecting schemes for personal or private purposes. Once more, commercial speculations are often headed by members of parliament, and they often receive considerations for their services; but the temptations to commercial companies to ask the help of these gentlemen would be lessened by the decrease of the time there would be given to work out their schemes, and this would be a gain both to the commercial and political estates of the realm. Hence we affirm that parliaments ought not to be septennial if we wish the true, responsible, intelligent, and independent representation of the people, and desire parliament to be an honour and an advantage to the nation.

A MILLITE.

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE duration of parliaments is a question of greater public importance than many of those discussed with more zeal and louder manifestations of interest. A very good case can, we admit, be made out for a brief tenure of a parliamentary seat, if we assume that general society is so corrupt that dishonesty everywhere abounds, that all grades of society are willing, in this our day, to—

“Contaminate their fingers with base bribes;”

and that all candidates for the title of the Honourable Member for Nought-borough or Mentionless-shire stoop to the vilest deception and the most dishonourable trickery. Who are the virtuous persons who make this assumption? If voters, are they free from personal defilement, or do they judge all others by themselves? Are they non-electors? then what proof can they have of these vile and paltry practices? Can anybody believe that the majority of our House of Commons, and of those who elect them, have sunk to such a low level, that the latter should be amenable to be—

“Condemned to have an itching palm,  
To sell and mart their offices for gold  
To undeservers;”

and that the former would purchase their ill-gotten positions—as advisers of their Sovereign and legislators of their country—by such tangible admissions of their felt unworthiness?

The bribery argument for short parliaments therefore will not stand. It will stand all the less because there is ample provision made by the law for the punishment of bribery; while every inducement is held out to parties to bring erring members up to the bar. If we remember this, and consider the heat of party contests, the intense hatreds of political antagonists, and the ready defeat of an opponent and the sure triumph of one's own cause, attainable by filing a bill against the return of a candidate, on the ground of proven illegal or corrupt practices, we shall see ample ground for disbelieving the easily made assertion, that bribery and corruption prevail at our elections. There can be no such thing, at least little

or none, or appeals against the return of such members would be more numerous and more effective.

Equally far-fetched and unsatisfactory is the argument which accuses the majority of members of a design to sell their votes to the party who will most liberally reward them with place and pension, and with the intent of making the most of the chance they have attained. To argue on this ground, for the brevity of tenure of the seat of a parliamentary representative, is to found on a calumny, not on a fact; at least, until the premise has been most thoroughly and inductively proved.

It would be better to argue for the abolition of parliaments altogether, and submission to a wholesome despotism, than to advocate the shortening of the date of parliaments. For rogues in office, for however short a date, cannot be fit and proper persons to represent the electors of Twiddlethumbs in the British House of Commons; unless the era of fancy franchises comes on, and then we may have a constituency of jail-birds, who may find a suitable representative of rascality amongst those whom the advocates of short parliaments characterize as shameless bribers and regardless place-hunters.

Sometimes short parliaments are advocated on the ground that the influence of public opinion may have full effect upon the votes in the House. This is a great fallacy. No political foresight can predetermine the questions which may arise in national or international affairs during the currency of even one year's tenure of office; and hence no mode of abbreviating the sittings of Parliament, and bringing its members before the electors, could provide for the application of the foresight of the people to the choice of candidates likely to vote according to their wish in the coming events. This farther assumes that the foresight of the people would be right; which is an assumption not at all to be depended on.

If the electors choose honest and intelligent men, they ought not to be asked to give up their right to the seat before they have had time to learn politics, and apply their efforts to work out the lessons they have learned. A common tradesman requires a seven years' apprenticeship; a lawyer, a doctor, or a clergyman must undergo a long course of training; but legislators are to go into the House ready made, and should have only to begin to legislate, and all would go well. No man who had any ambition to do his work well and thoroughly would accept office for such brief terms; he would scorn to undergo the toil, risk, and expense of a defeat for an honour so short-lived and so uncertain. Besides, his harassment, even if successful, would never end. No sooner would his candidature result in victory than his opponents would set to work to undo the means of his success. The evil effects of political contentions and war-cries would never have time to subside; and one-half of the energy requisite for legislation would be employed in averting the chances of being ousted. Then what an evil influence would

this perpetuation of political broils and commotions have on the industry and social comfort of any place where partisanship ran keen! There would seldom be peace; and intrigue would exert a most disastrous influence over human life, and all the forms of social intercourse.

Fluctuation and change in politics are great evils. Public opinion is almost always in a state of insurgency and motion. To make the unsteady opinions of men actively influential on parliamentary life and political action would be highly detrimental. Short parliaments would lead to the interference of the public voice before it had been subjected to the criticism of discussion; when in fact it was clamour, and not a voice of thoughtful consideration at all. Current politics are proverbially *varium et mutabile semper*—always capricious and changeable,—and ought not to be allowed to have effect on national councils till they have undergone due research and revision. A seven years' tenure of parliamentary position enables a man to know the current politics of the time, and to preserve the balance between the existent and the proposed without hesitancy or fear. It allows time for the operation on political parties of the influence of men of principle, whose efforts would otherwise be unavailing. We cannot but maintain, therefore, however inadequately, the great need for preserving our septennial Parliaments and resisting the invasion into the House of Commons of the hasty legislation of the daily newspapers, and the public meeting of noisy agitators. There calm should reign, and thought be paramount.

VIGILANCE.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"The member ought not to have so long a tenure of his seat as to make him forget his responsibilities, take his duties easily, conduct them with a view to his own personal advantage, or neglect those free and public conferences with his constituents which, whether he agrees or differs with them, are one of the benefits of representative government."—J. S. MILL.

THIS question of the duration of parliaments is one that has not claimed of late the prominence it formerly occupied in reform agitations, and it is one the negative of which will probably be more readily conceded, and with regard to which there will be less expressed difference of opinion, than upon other reforms for which liberal politicians of the present day contend. Indeed, had the question come on for debate a few months earlier, when every one was grumbling about the hopeless length to which the "Moribund Parliament" was dragging its slow existence along, and when no one hardly could offer a reason why it should continue its sittings, the debates would have been all on the negative side of the question. But the elections have intervened, and our Conservative friends have revived their patriotism from the party cries of "Church and State Intact," "Lateral Reform," "Our Glorious Constitution, Perfect and Unaltered," and they will demand at our hands some



reason for the espousal of views of which they were in fact the advocates so shortly ago.

Why shorten the duration of parliaments? Because it will allow of a more frequent expression of public opinion. A man can exercise no very powerful influence upon state affairs if his sole privilege is to express his opinion about seven times in a lifetime (that is, supposing him to possess the privilege when he becomes of age, and to live till he is seventy). It should lie in the power of constituents to express, in some more tangible shape than in petitions, which may be totally disregarded, their opinion on public matters oftener than once in seven years. We boast that ours is a representative Government, but to be truly representative the intervals of parliamentary existence should be sufficiently brief to let the national voice, through the men it elects, tell upon those important phases of national policy in which from time to time we feel so deeply. Gentlemen are often elected because they are the advocates of some popular measure, and may not represent the general political views of the majority of their constituents, and after the carrying of the particular measure for which they were elected, their votes cease to represent the feelings of their constituents. One of the advantages of shorter parliaments would be that the constituency could remove the member, and replace him by one expressing their views on current politics. It is no proof that the man who represents our views to-day will do so on all great questions that may arise for the next seven years. Our nominee to support our views in regard to the malt tax, or parliamentary reform, may occupy the opposite pole in regard to half the questions of foreign policy. Elections are conducted with a view to the party cries of the moment, and the voters of 1859 never anticipated that the men they elected would have to deal with such questions as that of "Recognition of the Confederate States," or armed intervention for Poland or Denmark. So we do not know what those of 1865 will have to deal with; but in a question affecting the peace or war of the country should not the nation's voice be heard? Should not the duration of Parliament be short enough that the election horizon might include many of the questions likely to rise for solution during the term for which the members are elected?

A second advantage of short parliaments is that it would keep members in check by a wholesome fear of their constituents. The hustings and the polling-book would be visions to chide them, when tending towards any dereliction of duty. With too many of our M.P.s pledges and political creeds are fancy ball dresses, assumed for a country dance with their constituents, and thrown off immediately they enter Parliament. As long as the interval betwixt the election days is so great they do not scruple at any departure from the views they were elected to support, not doubting that, as the day for re-election comes round, they can assume the penitent and don the old dress. Such men, as long as money and influence will crowd our Parliament with them, need to learn political

honesty by having to play the penitent oftener. It is strange how much more fraught with wisdom the suggestions of a constituency appear to an M.P. as the election draws nigh, and it at least teaches him that a man's convictions are worth respect if he is about to enforce them in the shape of a vote against him. I have from a friend the following story illustrative of my meaning. One evening in the House of Commons, a member from the North introduced and supported a bill by a strongly argumentative speech; as the case is so recent I forbear giving names, &c. When he sat down, another member, witty, eloquent, and accomplished, rose, and for two hours, amidst plaudits and roars of approving laughter, poured out a torrent of ridicule and sarcasm upon the bill. It was rejected, and a few days later the witty orator travelled down to address his C—— constituency. There again the ready tongue answered to the active brain, and won the plaudits of the assembly. But when he sat down, an old man rose and said, "The hon. gentleman has told us much of the foreign policy of the government, of Sleswig Holstein, and other matters, but he has not told us why he voted against Mr. ——'s [mentioning the member from the North] bill;" and moved after a brief speech, that in the opinion of that meeting he had not done his duty on this question. It was seconded, very reluctantly put by the chairman, and carried amidst ringing cheers. Then the hon. gentleman rose, but the banter and ridicule was gone from his tone, and he said, "Gentlemen, I perceive that this is an important question." And he who had listened to lucid and crushing argument for hours unmoved in the House of Commons, learnt in that short ten minutes with his constituents the importance of the question. How many of our M.P.s would learn the importance of questions if the elections forced them oftener to face their constituencies!

Shorter parliaments would have a tendency to lessen the corruption and bribery attendant upon elections; for men will not be willing to pay so dearly for an honour if short-lived. The recently published election expenses of some candidates are enormous. In one constituency £15,000 were spent by the winning parties (?) in what are called legitimate expenses. If the duration of Parliament was limited to two or three years, I fancy the legitimate expenses would be much less. Thus intellect would be placed on a more equal footing with wealth, for men who are ambitious of the situation, simply from the social position it gives them, would seek some hobby less expensive, and would strut and fret their little hour upon a stage of more befitting shade. Parliamentary life should not be too expensive to lay it out of the path of the man of brains;—and yet such are the calls upon a man's purse, that few of our literati and men of thought can undertake to contest an election. Shorter parliaments, I am convinced, will do their share in remedying this evil.

It may be used as an argument in favour of septennial parliaments, that they seldom extend the whole length of the time; that

they are dissolved at the end of two, three, or four years. But this is no reason why a parliament in which the contending parties are so equally balanced that they can only check each other's movement should continue in a sea of talk to misspend seven years of a nation's existence. If it is found that the most active and most working parliaments—and I think it will be so found—are those lasting only two or three years, why should not the regular term be limited to three years? Thus briefly I have stated the most important arguments against septennial parliaments, and await the opinions of our affirmative friends.

NAM DER.

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## History.

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### IS A SCIENCE OF HISTORY POSSIBLE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

YOUR correspondent who opens this discussion affirms that it is not a question of "free will and necessity," and yet immediately after he says, "The activities of the mind and will are known. They follow and obey certain distinct and traceable laws." Now I do not like this blowing hot and cold on the same subject. When the discovery was made that the earth went round the sun instead of the sun round the earth, the discovery was thought to be opposed to the interests of theology; and a young theological student, at his examination, being asked, I suppose to test his orthodoxy, whether the sun went round the earth or the earth round the sun, replied, very judiciously, sometimes one and sometimes the other. Now this is exactly how our philosophers in the present day—Sir William Hamilton and others—are disposed to treat the subject of free will and necessity; they assume both to be true, that is, sometimes one and sometimes the other. It is most certain, however, that if mind does not "*obey* certain distinct and traceable laws," if it is "*free*," that is, can act or refuse to act under the same circumstances, then a science of history is impossible, or indeed any science whatever in which man is an element, as science is merely the expression of distinct and traceable laws, or, in other words, of the invariable order in which things take place. Science depending upon this "*invariableness*" calculates what will be from what has been; but if half the world—the world of mind—is left to chance, that is, free will, then all reasoning, which is merely this calculation, is out of the question. We shall not continue this discussion, but leave "*Philalethes*" to determine how that which is "*foreordained*" can be reconciled with free will, or how even Omniscience can foresee that which, if *free*, may not take place.

"*Philalethes*" says, "If a science of history were possible, our own consciousness would be guilty of absolute deception; for it asserts

the entire freedom of the human will, its self-moving power and capability of determining its own course." What Spinoza says is very true—"Human liberty, of which all boast, consists solely in this, that man is conscious of his will, and unconscious of the causes by which it is determined." We feel that we can *do as we please*; but we require an educated or corrected consciousness to see that what we please to do is determined by our bodily and mental constitution (what we call "ourselves") and the circumstances in which we are placed. Now although this is only an imaginary freedom, and we do not make either ourselves or our circumstances, still it is really all that we require, and it is, as we shall see, a freedom consistent with "law," and therefore with a science of history.

Oersted says, "Everything that exists depends upon the past, prepares the future, and is related to the whole." This is but the expression in another form of what is now called the indestructibility and persistence of force. The forces at present in existence, both physical and mental, are only those previously existing in another form. These forms are constantly changing; but this is always in a certain invariable order, which we call laws of nature, and science in the expression of those laws. "History," as "Chepenom" says, "is a record of the acts of men, their motives and their consequences;" and a science of history is simply a record of the invariableness of the order in which these things always occur—the way in which one always precedes another, or their connection in what we call cause and effect.

"The ordinary events of history," says Buckle, "instead of being causes, are merely the occasions on which the real causes act." Now it is these causes with which a science of history has to deal, and these causes are usually expressed under the heads of Anthropology, Ethnology, Physiology, Phrenology, and Sociology.

The laws of these several sciences make man what he is, and the actions of men make history. Of course where so many sets of laws are concerned, it makes a science of history difficult, but not impossible. Space will not allow of our touching upon the two first—the general history of men and the history of races; but let us take the last three, which teach us how we may best secure "a sound mind in a sound body," and the conditions or circumstances in which it may be best developed, which it is the province of social science to teach.

The sciences of physiology and pathology are yet young, still they have already made their mark on history, and the average term of human life has been lengthened by at least ten years, and "plague, pestilence, and famine" are not the mysteries "Philaethes" would have us suppose. If he consults the Registrar-General's Quarterly Return, ending June 30, 1861, he will find a page of history there showing to what extent we have already obtained a mastery over disease. The report takes 100,000 people of the London of 1660-79,

and compares it with the same number of 1859. There were then 357 deaths by small-pox against 42 now; 759 against 227 by fever, ague, scarlatina, quinsey, and croup; 1,079 against 611 by consumption and diseases of the lungs; 763 against 8 by dysentery; 142 against 2 by scurvy; 298 against 26 by dropsy; 1,175 against 136 children's deaths from convulsions and teething, and 86 against 17 women's deaths in childbearing. Surely this is some progress towards the *mens sana in corpore sano*, and much more may be expected when only the same attention is paid to the breeding of men as is now paid to the breeding of cattle. Jacob was the first photographer, when by reflected light from peeled sticks he produced speckled cattle; and almost any variety in form, size, and colour may now be produced by careful attention to the laws of descent; and I do not despair, when such laws are equally attended to among human beings, of being able to say how Alexanders and Cæsars, Socrateses and Bacons may be produced, if we cannot say exactly in what cradles they shall be laid. At present, however, we have an utter disregard of the laws of hereditary descent, and a licence to marry is considered to give a moral right to propagate every possible bodily and mental weakness and disease, and to have any number of children, without reference to the power the parents may have to bring them up. Life, although a mystery in its origin, is becoming less a mystery in its development every day; and the same may be said of mind, since Gall *proved* that the brain is the organ of mind, and, with his followers, has shown *what faculties and what parts of the brain are mutually connected*. When, therefore, we know the circumstances in which an individual is placed, and his natural powers, bodily and mental, his future lot in life is no longer a mystery, but we can predicate with tolerable certainty what it will be: and the same may be said of nations, which are composed of individuals. So also of sociology; that, too, is a science; and based upon the experience of the past as recorded in history, it teaches what to choose and what to avoid among the circumstances and institutions best calculated fully to develop all our powers and to make us most happy. Moral science teaches us our duties, and social science the circumstances in which they can best be performed. Political economy is a branch of social science, and its laws, by which wealth is accumulated, are becoming pretty generally known and acted upon; and when man's wants shall have been thus supplied, he will find time for the cultivation of his higher moral, religious, and æsthetic powers. History or philosophy, teaching by experience, proves that the best kind of government is that which tends to develop all man's powers, and which leaves him the fullest freedom of action. Self-government is the best, therefore, for this purpose. The wise head of a government may suggest and originate, but the people themselves should still execute. The present tendency of society is towards disintegration—towards the individuality of the individual; but when each atom or individual has been made quite free to move in any direction that

it chooses, society will crystallize into newer and happier forms: not only shall we have an "organization of industry," but a fuller co-operation and community of interest. Hitherto history has been a mere record of wars and schemes for the individual aggrandizement of nations, but in the future it must be a history of civilization, that is, of all that decreases the evil in the world, and multiplies and extends the range of the good. All these influences obey definite laws, and we shall have thus a history of science and a science of history.

Statistics furnish the test by which the uniformity of events in society is made evident. If we take care that the field of observation is large enough to neutralize the vital and mental peculiarities or idiosyncrasies of individuals, a "law" is obtained upon which we may always calculate for our guidance in the future. It is upon these laws that every kind of insurance is based, and that security is gained against every kind of casualty which is so essential to happiness, and to mental and moral growth. The elements of chance, or the disturbing influences that occur, only show our ignorance of some elements that ought to enter into the calculation. Lord Stanley said, in his opening address in the Statistical section at the British Association (Sept. 7, 1865):—

"We speak of chance—it is a word which we must use for convenience' sake,—but we really mean by it, not that the result or the thing discussed is in itself uncertain, but that some or all of the determining causes of such results are to us unknown. We imply, not the absence of a law, but inevitable ignorance, on our part, of what the law is. When you find uniformity, or something which closely approximates to uniformity, in such matters as the number of letters yearly posted without addresses, in the number of widows and widowers who exist, or in the number of detected offences of the same nature committed within the year, it is impossible not to be impressed, however trifling may be the illustration of them, with the permanence and steadiness of the laws which regulate our existence."

Some of the facts brought to light by statistics are certainly not such as might be ordinarily expected. Thus the number of marriages is not governed by love but by the abundance of corn, and the number of children, as was proved in Ireland, by its scarcity. Ignorance and poverty always lead to an improvident increase of children. The basis for calculation necessary to "precipitate" the "law" narrows as men are more and more governed by reason and the moral sense; so that it requires only one individual, when he is a *perfect gentleman*, to say what he will do on almost all occasions. We know he will not lie, or steal, or break any of the ten commandments, and that it is quite impossible he should ever do a dirty or a mean action; in fact, he is a law unto himself; and a century hence, as Buckle says, "it will be as rare to find an historian who denies the undeviating regularity of the moral world, as it now is to find a philosopher who denies the regularity of the material world."

C. B.

## NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

SCIENCE concerns itself with certainties. That which it predicts is recurrency. In history there is nothing recurrent. New men, new forms of life, new occasions of action—all necessitate new acts, not the repetition of old ones. Just as there is no standing still in national life, there are not recurrent phenomena in history. It is true that the analogy of law may be quoted in which precedents are adduced and made the basis of the interpretation and application of law to instances in court, and in which even where there is no real *lex scripta* the analogy of former decisions must be followed. But we submit that this is not quite relevant, for in this case there is a law whereon to model the decision and frame the application. Hence we do not admit that the inference of law from former decisions gives at all a ground for asserting that history may be regarded as affording recurrent events just as plainly as law affords recurrent cases. If, then, there are not in history regularly recurrent phenomena there can be no science—that is, a fixed and knowable order of nature, having regularity and connection, and going on in uninterrupted sequence and consequence from age to age in the same manner and in accordance with an educated human expectancy.

Science does not demand, as R. S. asserts (p. 183), “an infinite knowledge of the past,” but such a frequency of recurrence as shall be sufficient to establish an induction. Now if, as he asserts it is (p. 183), “history is biography, biography is a record of the lives of individuals,” we cannot but ask, How is it possible that there can be a science of things, each of which is different not only in situation, aptitudes, surroundings, and internal feeling, but called to live in different circumstances, and to act from motives suggested by these? “A science of biography” has, we think, never before been heard or thought of; but we are glad to learn from R. S. that “a law is evolved, and the science of biography begun.” When shall he favour the universe with “the new science” which will make Vico hang his diminished head, or feel his fame dead and gone? To argue as he does from the existence of a science of biography to a science of history, is to argue from the less possible to the more possible, so that he has the credit of inventing a fresh fallacy, viz., that the truth follows the weaker premises. Well done, R. S.! “Once in possession of the necessary data, the science would be accurately and rapidly developed” (p. 183); but whence come “the necessary data”? Is it not a preliminary, according to the venerable Mrs. Glasse, of making hare soup that you should first catch (or get) your hare? Is it not equally requisite before you have a science of history to have previously secured “the necessary data”? The *data* which science requires is similar and constantly recurring observation or experience. Where is that to be had? Observation and experience show man in a state of incessant changeableness, and hence all inductions framed upon the hypothesis

that "man is the same in all ages, and in all nations" (p. 183), are found to be misleading and disappointing.

Let us try this same instance of induction, "Man is the same in all ages"! Good: where then is man's fancied progress, and how are we to reconcile this postulate with the demonstration which history supplies that humanity is progressive? Can he be the same and progressive, or has he acquired the grand Satanic characteristic of being, as Milton avers, "Alike, but oh how different?" If this is the early teaching of the science of history it is highly deceptive, and we must advocate the same course of action with this philosophy as Macbeth believed was best in the case of physic—"throw it to the dogs." That seems to be about all its use.

No "science," R. S. asserts, "is absolutely predictive." Perhaps R. S. will beg pardon of the goddess Urania for his most absolute and presumptuous denial of her highest glory. Is not astronomy all in all predictive? Does not the renown of astronomers depend on their certain predictions, predictions calculated to a moment? When will the sublime era in the science of history arise that will match with the night in which the planet Neptune was first of all revealed to human observation by calculations of the most definite and irrefragable description? That is to say, if a science of history is possible, when will it be able by strict and indefeasible precalculation to tell in what particular cradle in the globe will the prime minister, say, of the Holy Land, be born? under whose dominion the battle of Armageddon will be fought? or by what household will the President of the United States, a century hence, be added to the number of the powers that are to be? or where is the town in which shall be produced the inventor of the means of aerial navigation? or any other prophetic character whose advent is foretold, and known as certainly as the eclipses of the sun, or the return of comets from their far journeys into the blank night of space.

We do not read of any grand prevision of Julius Cæsar, of Constantine, of Charlemagne, of Peter the Hermit, of Columbus, of Luther, of Joan of Arc, of Cromwell, of Clive, of Washington, of Napoleon, of Watt, of Stephenson, of Wheatstone, of Lincoln, or of Bismark—all historic names of greater or less fame or notoriety. This seems to show that a science of history is not possible.

But if we turn to philosophies of history, we shall find the greatest possible differences prevail. Macaulay proves that Providence was constantly on the side of the Whigs; Sheriff Alison, that He was never absent from the active efforts of the Tories. Miller shows that history has been so arranged that Britain should be the chief of nations; Guizot asserts that France has been placed in the first rank by the spirit of civilization; Vico bestowed the chief place in history upon Italy, and Mazzini does so now; while Hegel finds the inner movements of human progress governed by a spring in Germany, whence issue the influences of world-changes; and Fichte discovers that the destination of man is due to the fine spirit of



truth which emanates from philosophy; while Napoleon III. sees in the great stir of fell warfare the means of winding up the great machine of human existence to new effort and developments.

Is the millennial period to be when the science of history is so fully developed that we can pick out all the (possible) criminal population at their birth, and apply a law to them similar to that given to the Jews by the Pharaoh "who knew not Joseph"? Or is it to be when men's wills shall be so suffused by the doctrines of the Holy One?—

"The first true Gentleman that ever breathed."

This is a test question for the advocates of the science of history; for a science of history should be like other sciences,—

1. Founded on a true induction of similar experiences, &c.
2. Fairly explicable in a series of laws which can be submitted to due tests.
3. Predictive of the occurrences which depend upon the observed phenomena.
4. Consistent with, nay, fully explanatory of, all experience.

Is there any history which fulfils such conditions? can there be any? Are not records doubtful, motives hidden, actions misrepresentable, and the effects of circumstances variable on different individuals? If the foundations are uncertain, can the superstructure be stable? If not, a science of history is impossible; and the negative is in the right.

A. C. W.

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## Social Economy.

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### UGHT CORPORAL PUNISHMENT TO BE EMPLOYED IN EDUCATION?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

SOLOMON, who was aforetime asserted to have spoken by the inspiration of the Almighty, has been discovered to be a driveller; who, while he composed maxims on how to manage a family, could not guide his own children into the ways of righteousness, and spoiled his children, even although (perhaps because!) he used the rod. St. Paul, who submitted to his father after the flesh, who chastised him, and his master who used the rod, was quite mistaken when he justified those by whom he was stricken, smitten, and afflicted; and had he lived in modern days he would never have admitted that this chastisement was to his profit. He would have learned from daily leaders and from the negative writers in this serial that the lash was brutal and the birch a nuisance, the rod a snare and the strap a delusion, and that corporal punishment

ought not to be employed in education. The corrective power of pain, which has been inwoven with the divine plan of the world, is entirely a mistake, and it has no educational advantage. It neither restrains nor constrains; and the moral effect of sparing the rod is exactly the reverse of that which Solomon predicated. Practice is wrong, and theory is vain; sentiment alone is right, and good, and true.

Since this debate was begun in these pages, the topic of school discipline has become quite a subject for newspaper debates. The chief journals have taken up the question, and have attempted to give it a peremptory settlement. We do not think they have been quite successful in their difficult task of proving a negative. It is undoubted that some form or other of punishment is indispensable in human life. Men's minds and consciences are quite at one on that point, and the only "apple of discord" is what form shall our punishments assume, and to what part of human nature shall they appeal. The experience of ages has declared that corporal punishment has been, in the main, the most effective and the least injurious. But we are changing everything, and we must change that too. We are becoming so wise that the rod is no longer to be tolerated, and birch trees may cease to yield branches. Whiplash need no longer be manufactured, and hemp-seed need no longer be sowed, for boys are manageable without the raw material as well as the manufactured article. Leathern straps and canes are no longer requisite as productions of the artificer's art, for flogging is doomed, and its abolition is as certain as that of the Test Act.

But can we excise from the mind the ideas of merit and demerit, praise and blame, reward and punishment? or can society be benefited by training schoolboys to become regardless of these forms of human thought? We think not. If the inefficacy of punishment is to be used, as "Hopstock" does, as an argument for its abolition, then may we denude our towns of their police, sell off our gaols, and let out our penitentiaries for the accommodation of private parties; for these too have been inefficacious in exterminating crime. The fallacy of "Hopstock's" argument may be answered thus, as it is illustrated in a work of great merit:—"Please, sir, I could not help it," says a schoolboy, very truly, to his master, with reference to some offence he has committed. "I know you could not, my dear boy," says the master; "you left out of consideration the flogging you were to have if you did it; when I have given it to you, you will think of it another time, and it will enable you to help it for the future."

The quotation of examples in which "Hopstock" indulges, and in which several other controversialists delight, is of no weight unless it were complete. It is a most injudicious way of reasoning, unless we can get at an exhaustion of instances, which, in the case of this debate, is clearly impossible. We can adopt this "instance" style of argument quite as well and effectually I think as our opponents, as the following paragraph may exemplify.

Dr. Keate was perhaps the most notable flogger who ever wielded the schoolmaster's birch; yet "he was a great scholar, an elegant poet, a capital teacher; and we must not hold lightly [says the author of "Etoniana"] the man who has flogged half the ministers, secretaries, bishops, generals, and dukes of the present century." Under him, plagose as he was, such gentlemen and scholars as the Earl of Derby, W. M. Praed, W. E. Gladstone, &c., were educated; and many a cut upon the cuticle he is reported to have given them in "the pre-scientific period of educational history, before the disciples of Bell, Lancaster, and Stow had begun to stow into men's minds that thrashing is pernicious."

Dr. Arnold of Rugby was a schoolmaster of no mean mark, whose pupils have carved out eminence in many walks. He did not hesitate to employ the rod on not a few of those boys who, as men, have maintained the glory of their country as well as the fame of their master. We have Arnolds and Stanleys, Cloughs and Palgraves, Longleys and Ellicots, Browns and Trollopes, out of schools where the rod was wielded; and though there are cases of Do-the-boys-Hall inflictions of punishment, they are not in reality more common than the abuses of any other form of discretionary power placed in the hands of men of mere human passions and tempers. Were we to abolish everything thus liable to abuse, what could stand amongst human institutions? Banks, magistracies, bishoprics, and even premierships have had their delinquencies quite as numerously, considering their numbers, as "schools and schoolmasters."

That flogging has to a certain extent been superseded by other punishments among criminals, and in the great corporations of the army and navy, can be employed as no argument for the abandonment of corporal punishment in school. The objects of these experiments—which have, however, not given great evidence of their good effects—are entirely under the control of those who have them in charge, and are in most instances come to years of comprehension. They have had a certain discipline in obedience. But children enter school often without any training in obedience; often after a long and serious attack of home favouritism and petting. The restraints necessary in school appear not only new and vexatious, but unrequired; and fretting with stubbornness often ensues. Reasoning is vain, in many such instances; other punishments may lead to evil results, and their efficacy depends upon the amount of stubbornness with which the boy can bear the form of punishment assigned, and the experiment may fail; but there are few boys who do not readily quail before the rod, and upon whose stubbornness it does not act as a refrigerant.

We think this whole question a concession to the easy-going effeminacy of this era—to the hyper-sentimentality of an age which groans at bodily suffering, while it ignores the far less endurable gall and wormwood of the spirit which mental punishments involve. The keen agony of hunger, while far more injurious to health, is not nearly so effective as the twitching pain of a cane, while it takes far

longer to effect its conquests. Imprisonment, while it may wipe health from the face, may be borne by the stolid and stupid without any moral or mental effect, by the vicious even with enjoyment, as R. S. has shown. Impositions may be given and may be insisted upon, but if they are not done what is to be done? They only afford an opportunity for double resistance, or a fresh temptation to deception. Public gallery exposure nourishes and cherishes hypocrisy and petty malignity in the children, and is entirely useless, except in children of fine nature, which is just the sort to be spoiled by such tricks. We think that more importance ought to be attached to training than to disciplining; that teachers ought to be well informed regarding the nature of mind and passion, and should be guided by common sense and religious feeling; but we also think that corporal punishment might be employed moderately, judiciously, and not too frequently, or in regard to trifles in modern education, as a short, easy, and effective way of bringing children to a sense of their chief duty—obedience. MALVERN.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

In affirming that "corporal punishment ought not to be used in education," and in putting forward some proof to that effect, I wish it to be understood that this principle may not apply to every case. Isolated and uncommon idiosyncrasies may require uncommon and exceptional treatment to meet their exigencies. This, however, as I maintain, does not damage our position; rather, as is often said, "the exception proves the rule." I argue that an enlightened and intellectual age should seek rather by kindness and encouragement than by harshness and severity to "teach the young idea how to shoot." That is, that in all seminaries for the education of the young, the pupils should be stimulated to exertion in their studies by a judicious appeal to their reason rather than by an injudicious and demoralizing appeal to their fear of punishment and horror of the rod. That, in short, corporal punishment should be avoided in education. Articles affirming that corporal punishment ought to be used have been written by "Malvern," "Scholasticos," R. S., and J. M. G. "Scholasticos" and "Malvern" doubtless are sincere. They have done little to establish their position. However, let us give that little credit for being their best. Assuming that they are two examples of what corporal punishment can do, and that their relative articles are examples of what they can do, all I say is, that it does not argue substantially in favour of such punishment. The article of R. S. (as articles by that contributor generally are) is thoughtful and worthy of attention, but leaves, in this instance, little to reply to. Amidst this dulness and lack of argument, the paper of J. M. G. rises an oasis in the desert, and however slight the value of his remarks, he cannot be accused of spoiling a tale for want of telling it, as the exaggerated tone of his article will enable us to show.

To begin at the beginning, however, there are two or three

remarks of "Scholasticos" to be dealt with. "The rod," says he, "is the *legitimate exponent* of offended authority." To some minds it may be, and the only one. Not so with us. As a principle in the administration of the criminal law in every well governed country, and arguing from the greater to the less, in every well governed school punishment is awarded, not in a spirit of vengeance, or of vindictive or atoning retribution, but rather as a means of deterring the culprit from the commission of a like crime. And also by the example of his punishment to restrain others from crime.

Now, nationally, the whip has fallen into disuse in our gaols and our reformatories. People say it *degrades* the *criminal*, and, as "Scholasticos" must know, this punishment is comparatively rarely used, and imprisonment for a longer term substituted. Should we then, I ask him, do that to our children (I trust of highly susceptible feelings) which as a nation we shrink from doing to our criminals? Can we do to our children, who are as yet free from crime, without degrading them, what we cannot administer to those sunk in crime, because of its degrading influence? Then, is the rod the *legitimate exponent* of offended authority? Again, "children are not reasonable creatures; for some years they are animal, not intelligent. At what period of life do they cease to be animal? And with the alternative of becoming which, vegetable or mineral? This is simply silly and defeats itself, for how wrong morally it must be, in addition to its opposition to all reason and all religion, to chastise that which is *non-intelligent*, that which does not clearly know *right* from *wrong*. "Scholasticos" would have us then whip a child when "*animal* and *non-intelligent*," and I must, reasoning from his sentence, infer that when it ceased to be "*animal*" (whenever that may be) and became "*intelligent*" he would leave off whipping it. That is directly it arrived at such years as to know *duty* from *misconduct*, and *truth* from *error*, he would cease to whip it for offences of intelligence or of morals, constantly applied to its corrective education and training—mark, up to the time of its becoming "*intelligent* and not *animal*."

If this be the foundation of a system of education pursued by "Scholasticos" in such matters, in his own words "a namby-pamby spirit has got into our nation indeed!" "Malvern," the next writer on the affirmative side of this question, goes geographically a long distance, and likewise a long distance chronologically, for an argument; and like products of foreign and distant lands, brought here at great expense and trouble for the gratification of man's hyper-civilization, we often find that the productions of our own climate, or the creations of our own industry, are of quite an equal value at a less cost; so he might have perhaps found a stronger argument to patch up a bad cause nearer home. "Both at Athens and Sparta," says "Malvern," "not only the boys, but the youth in the gymnasia had their irregularities punished with stripes; undoubtedly without their spirits being broken, or any aversion

created for those studies by which they were afterwards to distinguish themselves in the Republic." It may be well, perhaps necessary, to remind "Malvern" that Greece was Pagan, that England is Christian, that the world has advanced in thought and in feeling since those good old times, that what might then be applied to social economics, as true in principle and unimpeachable in practice, is directly opposed to the spirit of enlightened civilization, and is not consonant with the temper of the nineteenth century. More, the Spartans had slaves. The Spartans made them drunk to exhibit the horrors of inebriety to the "boys and youth" of the State. Shall England do so? The Spartans destroyed, as soon as born, the children who were the issue of their parents at such periods of life as the father and mother were not in full vigour, at some times in her history! Shall England do so because they did? The Athenians destroyed many of their female children! Shall England sanction infanticide?

Further, it will be well for this writer to bear in mind that *this is not Sparta*, and that *he is not Lycurgus*, and that arguments culled from the dusty tomes of Grecian or Roman history, though all very fine in theory, though exhibiting an apparently encyclopædic scholarship, though showing us things very advisable and right in Sparta or in Athens, are not exactly in accordance with what is generally, and ought to be universally, "the spirit and the genius of the nineteenth century."

R. S., in an article sensible and moderate in tone, advocates the affirmative. I give him credit for all sincerity in his maintenance and expression of such views, and for making the most of a bad case. Still his article leaves little for reply. One question deserves, however, a word or two of consideration. After enumerating the pleasures and advantages of thrashing a boy, he asks, if you do not do this, how will you punish him? At the school at which I was educated (a large school) we were never thrashed; other punishments were substituted—impositions, confinement, not being allowed to walk out with the other pupils, and so on. But we had a master for whom the boys, not only the higher forms, but all the school, had a great regard, and of whose displeasure we all had a wholesome dread. He was a man of great power of character, and ruled his little kingdom with judgment and discretion. We probably left school as intelligent and, on an average, as well educated as most boys who attended schools where flogging was the order of the day. We were punished in the various ways mentioned above. But it has often occurred to me that if a system of small fines were to be introduced, and the pence of which the boys were so mulcted paid to the account of some charity, it would be an excellent mode of punishment, if parents would acquiesce in it, and further it by letting the schoolmaster give or withhold the boys' pocket-money. Thrashing is objected to, and most justly so, as barbarous and demoralizing. Confinement and impositions, which are the same in effect, as unhealthy in their tendency, to deprive lazy or mischievous

boys of proper exercise. Whereas the fines I suggest would only deprive them of their halfpence, which are very dear to them, and which are usually spent in edibles of a kind not calculated to promote health or digestion. So dear are the few halfpence a week (say a shilling at most) that as a rule boys have allowed them as pocket-money, that I believe the certainty of being deprived of them, if ill-behaved or wanting in diligence, would prove a constant spur to exertion and a constant check to schoolboy wickedness.

Let a kind schoolmaster likewise offer suitable rewards to merit and diligence. I now offer a few comments on the article of J. M. S. "This age," says he, "has grown peevish, whining, and puerile." When people discover such things they are rather under the delusion that the age is a reflex of their own disordered and unhealthy minds. Away with such twaddle! What age was more healthy in its morals? In which was a manly spirit more general or more admired? This gentleman's acquaintance with "soft-sawder patriots and apple-tart preachers" has not tended to improve his own *amor patriæ*, or to elevate his own style of preaching. To wit:—"We have reached a terrible depth of demoralization"—(does not J. M. S. know the depth well, down to the very bottom?),—"when such things are possible as dog hospitals and cat asylums, anti-cruelty to criminals' associations and garroters' friend associations." Well but, good sir, they are not possible, and don't exist; and—excuse me—you know it. What, when we sift it and dry it in the sun's rays, is left in weight of the enormous jelly-fish weighing a hundredweight? At most a few grains. So with J. M. S.'s sentence. Let us dry it. Some kind persons in London solicit subscriptions for the purpose of taking stray dogs from our streets and *destroying them* if valueless, or keeping them and finding owners and masters for them if worth keeping. Go there, and you will have the choice of fifty. If this be "maudlin sentiment and meddling philanthropy" grown "rampant," I say let it continue and flourish.

We will place this carefully dried specimen on our shelf. We have read J. M. S. through all his phases. We need dry no more—all is jelly-fish. Where morality points, where Christian spirit leads, where humanity and mercy with justice are, British reader, you will choose to be too. You will be found in a vast majority on the side of the question humbly but earnestly advocated by

S. I. R. E.

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## The Essayist.

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### CHRISTOPHER NORTH.

LET the reader fancy himself standing, about seven or eight o'clock, on a fine morning in summer, at the foot of the Scott monument. The sun is shining brightly, and the sky is blue; the birds are twittering joyously, and with the exception of a stray bugle note from the Castle beyond, comparative silence reigns over the Northern capital. A few early shopmen have removed their shutters, but Prince's Street wants a good four hours yet of its meridian splendour. You have gone all over the Calton Hill, and surveyed the National Monument till you were fairly tired; you have been down at Holyrood to see the pictures and Lord Darnley's boots; you have seen Mons Meg and the Scotch regalia, besides a host of other lions both great and small, too numerous to recapitulate. You have planned a trip to Melrose by the twelve o'clock train, or perhaps a run by the Edinburgh and Glasgow railway for a sail up Loch Lomond. Three or four spare hours are now upon your hands, and you are naturally desirous to apply them to the best advantage. How this can be done, then, is the question which presents itself. Craigmillar Castle would be a capital place, but a little too distant to reach on foot, and no sensible man would think of cooping himself up in a conveyance on such a magnificent morning. In the midst of your cogitations something suggests the Dean Cemetery, and ere the resolution has been half formed in your mind, you find yourself passing down Queensferry Street, across the Dean Bridge, and within a hundred yards of the gate.

A rather uninviting-looking place seems the Dean Cemetery from the outside; but once past the gate and the aspect is different. Pleasant to the eye are the many-coloured flowers that bloom upon the graves, pleasanter still is it to contemplate names around you which have done honour to Scotland. After life's fitful fever there sleeps Francis Jeffrey, and side by side with him his friend and biographer Cockburn. Nor are these the only illustrious names that meet the eye of the visitor. A small pillar of red granite stands near one of the side walks, lifting its head so unobtrusively as perhaps to escape observation. The inscription it bears is brief, being little more than the name of him who sleeps beneath it; a few flowers are planted on the grave, and these are all that mark the resting-place of WILSON.

Many people who visit the Dean Cemetery pass that modest headstone without heeding the name engraved upon it, not from any



want of attention, but because they are not familiar with it as belonging to one who ranked amongst the foremost writers of his time. But if the name of Christopher North stood there instead of John Wilson, what a host of ideas would be conjured up by the sight of it! what memories of those pleasant noctes, those brilliant reviews on men and books in the pages of *Blackwood*, those charming, never wearisome papers relating to Christopher himself would rush into the mind! The minutest particulars concerning the man to whom these memories belong are pregnant with interest, and those who can supply those particulars cannot but be regarded with gratitude. With what pleasure, then, have the admirers of Wilson hailed the appearance of the long wished-for record of his life,\* and that, too, from the hand of one who was, perhaps, of all others, best fitted to have undertaken the task—the hand of his daughter.

In the hasty glimpse which the traveller now obtains of the town of Paisley in whirling along the Caledonian Railway, he sees little to associate it with the birthplace of a poet. Tall chimneys, whose tops are hidden amid clouds of circumambient smoke, are a prominent feature in the view; the streets appear narrow and ill kept, and an aspect of gloom hangs over the entire place which is certainly the reverse of pleasant; yet here was born, exactly eighty years ago, the man whose name illumines every page of these volumes, and in this unpromising spot were the days of his childhood spent. His father, who was a gauze manufacturer, had realized a considerable fortune—so considerable that after his death the portion of his eldest son John amounted to something like fifty thousand pounds. Being thus placed in affluent circumstances, he was precluded by his position from serving what is called an apprenticeship to life, or from forming that practical acquaintance with it which is obtained by men who are less favoured by fortune. But what his position denied him was amply made up for by his love of adventure and of observation. Many stories of this trait in the future professor are still current in the town of Paisley; and according to one of them, which Mrs. Gordon relates, we find him starting from the parental roof one day, at the age of three years, on a fishing excursion, his tackle consisting of a willow wand, a thread line, and crooked pin. Little dreaming of the consternation his absence doubtless caused at home, the youthful disciple of Walton pursued his sport until the capture of the tiniest of minnows sent him back in triumph to his friends. Many years afterwards, when that childish form had attained the full pride of manhood, that memorable adventure was recorded in the most delightful of papers; nothing seemed to give the genial Christopher such unfeigned pleasure as to dig those youthful reminiscences from out the depths of his memory.

After this juvenile adventure nine happy years rolled past: how pleasant those early days seem when a man looks back upon them in

\* "Memoirs of Christopher North," by Mrs. Gordon. Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas. 2 vols.

after life ! Ever verdant, ever delightful, the recollection of them fades away but with memory itself. The heaviest cloud which had as yet darkened the brightness of his youth was doomed at this time to throw its shadow across his path. In 1797, just previous to his entry into Glasgow University, the death of his father took place. The mind of the future poet appears to have been affected by the event to a more than ordinary degree, for he is said to have swooned away in the graveyard on hearing the sound of the clay falling on the coffin. Rarely, however, does grief keep possession of the mind at such an early age, more particularly when circumstances are such as to render the loss of a relative unfelt in a worldly point of view. Added to which, in Wilson's case, in the career on which he was about entering he found much to divert his mind from brooding on the loss he had sustained. Having entered Glasgow College, he remained there for six years, that is to say, down to the year 1803. We may presume the events of his life during this period were not very marked, as we find little of any interest recorded of him ; and it is therefore unnecessary to dwell longer upon it, after remarking that during his stay at this institution he resided with Professor Jardine, a man who, independently of the respect inspired by his acquirements, gained the love of the students placed under his charge, by the amiability of his manners and the unblemished rectitude of his life. It was with no shortlived feelings of regret that he contemplated leaving the roof which for so many years he had regarded almost as parental ; but he soon found a pleasure amid the shades of Magdalen College, which was fondly dwelt upon scores of years after. Oxford, with her many classic associations, was ever fresh in the mind of Wilson. The extended course of studies prescribed for a youth on entering a great academical institution, and the many varieties of character he meets there, tend to strengthen his mind and to bring his ideas to maturity. But although young Wilson devoted himself with no ordinary assiduity to the studies laid down in the course, he was by no means averse to social enjoyments. He was occasionally subject to fits of deep melancholy, but when his gloom wore off his spirits became elastic in the opposite extreme. He was fond of the society of youths of his own age, and his genial disposition rendered him beloved in return by all who came in contact with him. In addition to the more abstruse matters to which he gave his attention while at Oxford, we find he devoted a good deal of time to literature ; and although much profundity of reasoning or polish of style could not be expected from a youth of eighteen, the varied nature of the subjects on which he wrote, as given by Mrs. Gordon, speaks well for his versatility, to say nothing of the amount of reading necessary to deal with them in even a passable manner.

A predilection for letters was not the only taste that Wilson indulged. Athletic sports always occupied a high place in his estimation. He had a decided taste for pugilism, which he practised with considerable success. Added to his scientific knowledge, his

powerful frame rendered him a formidable antagonist, even to those who were professors of the noble art. As a pedestrian, too, he won for himself a high degree of notoriety. It was no uncommon thing to find him, particularly after one of his fits of depression, starting off for a pleasant walk of fifty or sixty miles, and returning apparently both physically and mentally the better of the exercise. Another amusement, which has now, happily for the character of the age, lost much of its former attractions, received no little share of his attention, namely, that of cockfighting. It is somewhat difficult to conceive the professor of moral philosophy of after years giving countenance in his youth to what would now be considered a cruel and degrading sport; but in those days most young men with any pretensions to position and fortune not only patronized it, but expended considerable sums in the maintenance and training of those bellicose bipeds. Wilson seems to have enjoyed the thing uncommonly, but not altogether, perhaps, from the mere excitement attendant on such exhibitions. Himself endowed with a large share of physical courage, he took a keen pleasure in seeing that admirable quality displayed in others, even in the brute creation; and this, no doubt, might have contributed to foster a taste which ripper judgment might afterwards have condemned. But notwithstanding the time given to these amusements, it by no means encroached upon the hours prescribed for his studies. He became, in course of time, an admirable Greek scholar, and according as years increased his observation and reading on general subjects became proportionately extended. Towards the close of his fourth year he took his degree, besides having borne off in triumph, some time previously, the Newdigate prize for a poem on Sculpture, Architecture, and Painting. The highest opinions of his talents were entertained at this time by his tutors and college acquaintances; and unlike very many young men of whom high expectations are formed, the success he achieved in after life not only equalled, but surpassed the promise of his youth.

With the triumphs he had achieved in 1807 came the close of his collegiate career, and being then in possession of ample means, a life of leisure lay before him. Amongst the writers to whose works he had given his attention while at Oxford, Mr. Wordsworth occupied a prominent place, and, as a natural consequence, Wilson, whose own ideas led him to revel amidst the beauties of nature, became an enthusiastic disciple in the new school of philosophy to which that great genius had given birth. To the latest period of his life his admiration for Wordsworth and his teachings remained unchanged; and if Wilson never laid the foundation of any peculiar school of his own, it was compensated for by the fervour with which he ever continued to uphold the principles of the master under whom he studied, notwithstanding the amount of coldness, and even contempt, they were long destined to endure. It was not wonderful, therefore, that he should have fixed his abode amid the scenes which the genius of Wordsworth had rendered hallowed. On the

shores of Windermere stands the little estate of Elleray, a spot which seems to combine all the beauties most attractive to the poet's mind. While enjoying to the fullest extent the advantages which the place afforded, not the least of which was the society of Wordsworth and of De Quincey, he did not allow his mental powers to rust for want of use; in his hours of solitude he prepared for the press a number of short poems, chiefly descriptive of the scenery by which he was surrounded. After a day of pleasure, whether spent in boating on the lake, or in rambling through the adjacent mountains, he was wont to wander forth at night and contemplate—

“The full-orbed moon that bathed in light  
The mellow'd verdure of Helvellyn's steep.”

And at such times, no doubt, numbers of his minor pieces were composed. During the first year of his residence at Elleray, he conceived the execution of a poem of more important dimensions, which he laboured at assiduously till its completion about the middle of the year 1810. With this work Wilson made his first bow before the reading public, under the auspices of a Mr. Smith, a Glasgow publisher of some repute. Wilson, with the self-consciousness of genius, had formed, and with justice, a high estimate of the poem, and being then in his twenty-sixth year, was naturally buoyant with hopes of success. He pictured to himself a brilliant reputation on the publication of his poem, but like many another instance of the unsubstantial nature of such visions, the work on which so large an amount of genius was expended proved commercially a failure. Yet in the estimation of those who knew what good poetry was, and were therefore competent to judge of it, “The Isle of Palms” occupied a distinguished place. Jeffrey, the great ruling spirit of the North, whose breath could make or mar the bubble reputation, looked upon the work with a favourable eye. To discerning critics the work was one of great beauty. In metrical construction and harmonious arrangement of the lines there was nothing more to be desired by the most fastidious critic. In the descriptive passages, too, there was a manifest skill exercised which could scarcely have been excelled even by the magic pen of Coleridge. But it was in this very excellence that fault was found with the poem. The pictures brought before the eye were by many readers considered to be too highly coloured; the real seemed to have given place almost entirely to the ideal. It was one of those works which are pre-eminently the productions of youth,—works which are conceived and executed ere the influence of experience and riper judgment is at hand to rein in the exuberance of the imagination. It is questionable, had the poem remained unpublished for half a dozen years longer, whether Wilson, with the good sense for which he was ever distinguished, would not have hesitated before giving it to the world, or at least without making considerable alterations in it. Were space at our disposal, numerous passages might be adduced which would seem fitter adjuncts to an

Arabian tale than to a story confessedly simple in construction like the "Isle of Palms." The following lines, though not the most remarkable instances, may serve to illustrate this in some degree. Describing the beauties of the lonely isle, the poet says:—

"Fantastic bands of fearless flowers  
Sport o'er the rocky wall;  
And ever through the shrouding spray,  
Whose diamonds glance as bright as they,  
Float birds of graceful form and gorgeous plumes,  
Or dazzling white as snow.  
While as the passing sun illumines  
The river bed in silent pride,  
Spanning the cataract, roaring wide,  
Unnumbered rainbows glow."

In meeting successive passages of this kind the experienced reader cannot avoid feeling that he is contemplating the unreal; and even those whose imaginations would be charmed at first by descriptions of scenery like this, would ere long experience a surfeit from its cloying beauty. But, on the other hand, amid the glittering display brought before the reader, he occasionally finds a passage which, though less ornate than the others, is still radiant with a beauty of its own, and above all, more appreciable by those who love Nature best in her own grand simplicity. Though the picture presented in the following lines is less highly coloured than that which has been given, few readers whose ideas are correct will not acknowledge the superior charm they possess in bringing before the mind a scene of whose beauties all may be equally sensible. Fitzowen's bower on the island is thus described:—

"Beyond a green and level lawn,  
Its porch and roof of roses dawn  
Through arching trees that lend a mellow shade.  
How gleams the bower with countless dyes,  
Still brightening where they fade!  
Two noble palms, the forest's pride,  
Their straight majestic stems to heaven uprear;  
There beauty sleeps in grandeur's arms,  
And, sheltered there from all alarms,  
Hath nought on earth to fear."

Again, what exquisite beauty is revealed in these lines:—

"And towering o'er those beauteous woods,  
Gigantic rocks were ever dimly seen,  
Breaking with solemn grey the tremulous green,  
And frowning far in castellated pride.  
While hastening to the ocean, hoary floods  
Sent up a thin and radiant mist between,  
Softening the beauties that it could not hide.  
Lo! higher still the stately palm trees rise,  
Chequering the clouds with their unbending stems;  
And o'er the clouds, amid the dark blue skies,  
Lifting their rich, unfading diadems."

But whatever blame the critic may bestow upon the "Isle of Palms" in detail, he is bound to acknowledge that it could not have been written save by a man of rare and original genius. Though character painting can hardly be considered as one of Wilson's great points, his delineations of it seldom fail to please. Formed as he was by nature to look upon the brighter side of humanity, his was not the brain to mould a Lara. In Fitzowen seem centred all the simple virtues which Wilson so loved to study amongst the peasantry of his own Scotland; the reader finds in him none of those bolder points which serve to render a character, if not unique, at least interesting. To many there seemed a strong resemblance traceable in the character of Fitzowen to some of those which Wilson afterwards portrayed in the "Lights and Shadows of Scottish Life;" the two figures which sustained the interest of the "Isle of Palms" seemed but selections from the numerous studies of peasant life which Wilson had always at hand, placed in an ideal sphere, and around whom a veil of poesy was woven.

In 1816 appeared his next important work, a dramatic poem entitled the "City of the Plague." This undertaking was rather a perilous one for a young poet whose reputation had hardly been established. The subject he proposed to deal with was not one on which his fine imagination could be exercised to advantage, but it required a powerful pen to do it justice, and to depict with any semblance of success the horrors which devastated London during that memorable period. Like its predecessor, the poem does not appear to have met with any great sale at the time of its publication, but it served to increase the reputation of its author. Of the two poems the "Isle of Palms" was undoubtedly the more pleasing, although by many competent judges the new work was pronounced the more artistic. Wilson evidently bestowed more care on the study of character in the latter poem; his observation of mankind in general had considerably increased, and consequently he was enabled to infuse a broader system of philosophy into what he wrote than when the "Isle of Palms" was conceived and executed, although a very few years only had intervened between the appearance of the two poems. If we are to rate observation of character, and philosophical ideas drawn from that observation, above all other merits, then, indeed, may we consider the "City of the Plague," to be the most finished of his poetical works; but so long as poems in which imagination predominates retain their popularity, the "Isle of Palms" will be the favourite one. To present before the reader isolated passages from a poem like the "City of the Plague" exhibiting different phases of merit, could not be otherwise than a thankless task, however judicious might be the selection. A separate paper might be devoted with advantage to the examination of the two poems. All, however, that can be done within the limits of a brief notice like the present is to direct attention to their beauties in a general way; and to attempt to analyse them with any degree of satisfaction would be a task of extreme difficulty, and be productive of but little benefit to the reader.

Having glanced in this cursory manner at what may be said to have been the productions of his youth, we now approach the period at which his real reputation may be considered to commence. The years 1817-8 were destined to begin a new epoch in the history of periodical literature. In criticism the *Edinburgh Review* had for a considerable time previously held sole and undisputed sway, until the *Quarterly Review* came into existence. Holding a position almost unique, as it were, its influence was then much more powerful than perhaps at present, added to which it was the principal exponent of the political views of its own party. Half a century ago society was affected by politics far more decidedly than now, so much so that their influence extended in no small degree to the weaker sex; the most rancorous abuse was poured forth by each party upon its opponents, and the warmest friendships were frequently changed to the deadliest enmities. Amid such a state of things it may be easily conceived the part which the great representative of Whiggery played in the political arena: woe betide the luckless Tory whose new-born volume fell within the clutches of the *Edinburgh Review*. Wilson was a firm Tory, yet notwithstanding the difference of their opinions a kindly feeling existed between him and Jeffrey. It is believed that Wilson did figure more than once as a contributor to the pages of the *Review*, but that was before his political views had assumed a decided form. As soon, therefore, as he became fully identified with his party, he withdrew himself from all connection with the Whigs. A project was at length formed by Mr. Blackwood the publisher, of starting a periodical which, while it adhered strictly to its character of a political review, would not refuse admission to its pages of a lighter description of literature. To the magazine whose reputation is now world-wide Wilson was one of the earliest contributors, and his connection with it continued almost uninterrupted till within a short period of his death. In its pages he built for himself the reputation of being one of the most brilliant reviewers and essayists of his time. From the period at which he commenced to write in *Blackwood's Magazine* his poetical efforts were in effect entirely abandoned: he discovered the new and stronger faculty that lay within him, by which he was enabled to secure a brighter and more enduring fame than he could ever have attained by the efforts of his poetic muse. The contributors to the new undertaking included many of the most distinguished writers of the day, and amongst them was one, then a young man, comparatively speaking, whose exertions, combined with those of Wilson, were undoubtedly more instrumental in raising the periodical to the eminence it afterwards occupied than perhaps the rest of the contributors put together. This writer was John Gibson Lockhart. The vigour of his style and the pungency of his sarcasm made him a formidable antagonist to any who attempted to cope with him. The number and variety of his contributions to the magazine during his connection with it were so great as to appear incredible to those who

were not aware of his manifold gifts. In addition to his accomplishments as a writer, he was not less skilful in wielding his pencil as a caricaturist. Satire was decidedly the most prominent element in his composition, and this faculty he developed with the pencil till he reached a point of perfection wonderful in a mere amateur. An advocate by profession, he was not sufficiently patronized to prevent an abundance of time lying occasionally on his hands. The study of faces, and transferring them to paper according as his fancy viewed them, frequently formed a pleasing variety to the dreary work of marching about the law courts with a briefless bag dangling idly from his hands. Not only were the odd or curious faces he met with every day traced by his pencil, but even his own best friends were not exempt from the vagaries of his satiric vein. In Mrs. Gordon's book are given numerous examples of his artistic skill, in one of which is recognized the subject of this paper; another represents the well-known face of Sir William Hamilton; while a third depicts the decidedly handsome features of the caricaturist himself.

To Lockhart and Wilson the chief credit was due of placing the magazine in the high position which it continues to occupy. But to attribute its success entirely to the exertions of those two men would be unfair to the number of able writers who lent their assistance in establishing the magazine; added to which there was another circumstance on which the success of such an undertaking depends in no small degree—that of its guidance by an able and judicious editor, no other than the proprietor of the magazine, Mr. Blackwood himself. The labour which Wilson underwent in providing papers month after month was enormous, and such as only a man of iron constitution could long withstand. The average number of articles contributed every month was two, and sometimes this number was far exceeded: in one issue it is stated that no less than seven of the articles proceeded from his pen, many of them requiring deep thought; added to which must be estimated the labour of preparing lectures after he obtained the chair of moral philosophy on the death of Dr. Brown in 1820; and those lectures, not merely ones which dealt with the subject in a general way, not intended to be remembered forty-eight hours after their delivery, but lectures which showed deep and careful meditation, which amazed all who heard them by the felicity of the language in which they were expressed, and the searching scrutiny of human nature which they evinced. One of the pleasantest chapters in Mrs. Gordon's book is devoted to the professor and his class: the practised pen of Mr. John Hill Burton, as one of the students and friends of Wilson, is called in to relate his recollections of the great professor. Those recollections are extremely graphic, and like all that proceeds from the pen of that talented writer, interesting in the highest degree. He describes the professor in his house in Gloucester Place, surrounded by a number of the students of his class, most of them then young, but who have since won their



way to honourable reputation. Many a pleasant evening his closing spend together, listening to his rare conversation, and enjoying most a hospitality which was exercised with no sparing hand. As the teacher none ever exercised a more complete influence over those who studied beneath him, and that, too, without making use of the dignity of his position. He took a keen interest in the discussions which took place amongst the members of his class; and whilst giving the benefit of his learning and experience to guide the disputations of his youthful friends, they were yet the while perfectly at home with him. Without a spark of real egotism in his character, he was yet conscious of his own powers. Powerful in intellect as he was in body, this self-consciousness enabled him to overthrow his antagonist playfully, and yet so effectually that all who had once grappled with Professor Wilson cared little to try their strength with his again. Though not naturally gifted with great reasoning powers, his style of argument seldom failed to gain him the victory over his opponent. Yet even those who acknowledged themselves vanquished before him, never bore him enmity on account of his victory. His enemies consequently were few; in fact, to know him and entertain the smallest feeling of enmity towards him was impossible. Those who possessed even the slightest personal acquaintance with him could not regard him otherwise than with love and respect.

In 1822 appeared the collection of delightful tales and sketches from his pen, known as "*Lights and Shadows of Scottish Life*," and which soon obtained a wide popularity within the succeeding three years. Two other works of fiction from his pen were published, namely, "*The Trials of Margaret Lyndsay*," and "*The Foresters*." Successful as these works were their popularity was far beneath that of the "*Noctes Ambrosianæ*," a series of papers which appeared from month to month in *Blackwood's Magazine*. Of the many varied productions which came from the pen of the versatile Christopher, none seemed to stamp him so effectually with a character of his own as the *Noctes*. Those papers dealt with a variety of subjects, chiefly those of social and political importance, which occupied the public mind at the time. Nothing could exceed the delight with which they were welcomed by the readers of *Blackwood*; and when a new number appeared its pages were instinctively turned over in search of a *Noctes* by the well-known hand. The shrewdness of the observations on men and things, expressed in all the broadness of the Scotch vernacular, rendered them extremely readable. Many of his most successful papers were dashed off within a few hours of their reaching the compositor; page after page was covered with incredible speed, even while that eternal torment of an author's life—the printer's devil—was clamouring inexorably for "copy" in the hall below. A few lines from Mrs. Gordon's book, descriptive of Wilson's mode of writing, may not be improperly introduced here:—"His habit of composition, or rather, I should say, the execution of it, was not always ordered best for his

were not the amazing rapidity with which he wrote caused plish, often to delay his work to the very last moment, so that he almost always wrote under compulsion, and every second of time was of consequence. Under such a mode of labour there was no hour left for relaxation. When regularly in for an article in *Blackwood*, his whole strength was put forth, and it may be said he struck into life what he had to do at a blow. He at these times began to write immediately after breakfast, that meal being despatched with a swiftness commensurate with the necessity of the case before him. He then shut himself into his study, with an express command that no one was to disturb him; and he never stirred from his table until the greater part of a *Noctes* was written, or some paper of equal brilliancy and interest was completed. The idea of breaking his labour by a constitutional walk never entered his thoughts for a moment. Whatever he had to write, even though a day or two were to keep him close at work, he never interrupted his pen, saving to take his night's rest, and a late dinner served to him in his study. The hour for that meal was on these occasions nine o'clock; his dinner then consisted invariably of a boiled fowl, potatoes, and a glass of water—he allowed himself no wine. After dinner he resumed his pen till midnight."

More than twenty years of labour of this kind began at length to tell upon even Wilson's strength. It was impossible that any frame however powerful could long undergo such a continued strain without feeling at length the symptoms of decline. The first of these was manifested in 1840, when a paralytic affection attacked him in his right hand, which caused him to lay aside his pen for nearly a year. From 1840 to 1845, we are told there were but two articles contributed by him to the magazine; but during the interval he employed himself in collecting a number of his papers, which he afterwards published in three volumes, under the title of "*Recreations of Christopher North*." The effects of the paralysis in his right hand continued to trouble him at intervals to such an extent that his handwriting became almost illegible, and this no doubt may in some degree account for the absence of matter from his pen. By the death of his wife too, a woman whose natural refinement well fitted her to be the partner of such a man, he sustained a severe shock; from thenceforth writing became irksome to him, and those who came most in contact with him began to perceive a gradual change coming over him. His spirits were still cheerful, it is true, and his form had not begun to lose its manly symmetry, but yet a change had taken place in him perceptible only to those who knew him best. He was not the Wilson of former days; fits of sadness came over him frequently which told how deeply he had been affected by his loss. Gradually the excitement and bustle of public life began to lose its charm for him. According as years increased and his health declined, he withdrew himself by degrees from the scenes in which he had figured so long and honourably, to spend his remaining days in the society of friends who were dear to him.

It is unnecessary to record here the events which marked his closing years. They are few and of but little special interest; the most prominent perhaps was the recognition of his services by the Government, who in 1852 conferred a pension of £300 a year upon him, through the nobleman who is now at the head of British affairs. Graceful as was the act, it came a little late. His death took place on the 3rd of April, 1854, being a little more than a year from the date at which the pension was granted.

Brief and incomplete as such a notice as the present must necessarily be, enough, it is believed, has been said to convey an idea of the value of the memoir of whose contents we have endeavoured to convey a summary. The story of Wilson's life and genius is related there simply and unaffectedly, with grace and tenderness, and yet not in such a manner as to make the reader feel that the biographer is lost in the daughter. It was truly a labour of love to dwell upon each incident in such a career; and were the lives of all great men written as well and faithfully as that of John Wilson has been, biography would be a splendid study indeed.

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THE CHARACTER AND PERSONAL APPEARANCE OF PROFESSOR WILSON.  
 —Few men have ever left a memory at all comparable to that of Professor Wilson. His splendid physique, his amazing animal spirits, his brilliant powers of conversation and eloquence, captivated all who came in contact with him. How far the noble person, the fluent and fervid oratory, and the general dash of manner of Professor Wilson contributed to make up the sum of his fame, may now be a fair subject of debate. That he was altogether a magnificent sample of humanity is beyond question. For years he was the most conspicuous figure in the Edinburgh streets. We have come in contact with a good many great authors in our time, from Sir Walter Scott downwards, and we doubt whether we have ever encountered any man so complete at all points as this same stately and stalwart Professor. In body and mind—in physical and mental training—in personal accomplishments, and in wit, poetry, eloquence, and learning, Professor Wilson was marvellously developed and equipped. He was one of nature's aristocrats, with the advantage of the highest culture. Besides, was he not a glorious son of Scotland—one who could ford her streams, stalk her deer, climb her mountains, defend her with a chieftain's strength, and proclaim her grandeur to the world in language worthy of a Runic bard? What wonder that his name on our northern side of the Tweed was so long a name to conjure with! Everything about him was on a large scale. His very egotism was not of the petty and offensive, but of the gigantic sort. The boldness of his self-assertion was sublime. Wherever he sat, it was the head of the table. He was stared at in public places as a Titan in all noble attributes. As a great Scotchman and writer his countrymen at large admired him; as a merciless critic the smaller class of poetasters dreaded him; as a man his friends, and they were many, loved him; and when he died a hundred pens and ten thousand tongues broke into lament and panegyric.—*James Hedderwick.*

## The Eloquence of the Month.

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### "MEDICINE, AND THE MEDICAL PROFESSION."

[The month of October has been prolific in eloquence. The Church Congress at Norwich, the Social Science Congress at Sheffield, the meetings of old and new members of Parliament with their constituents, the opening addresses at various institutions, &c., have supplied us with more than ample choice for our selection. We have chosen this month, however, an eloquent and instructive specimen of public speaking by a member of a class who are not usually credited with the repute of eloquence, even when their skill otherwise is undoubted—the medical profession. From the inaugural lectures with which the various metropolitan medical schools were opened in the early part of October, we choose select portions from that delivered, 2nd October, at King's College, London, by PROFESSOR PRIESTLEY. M.D., because of its judicious good sense, honest outspokenness, interest, and moral excellence.]

PROFESSOR PRIESTLEY prefaced his lecture with a *vidimus* of the general history of medicine—clear, succinct, and informing,—and then proceeded to say:—"I have taken this cursory glimpse of the history of medicine mainly to point out that the science of medicine has been of slow and difficult development. Science comes not by intuition—it is the accumulated experience of whole generations of thinking men who have devoted themselves to its study, generalized into law; and an intimate acquaintance with it is absolutely indispensable to him who would be a sound practitioner. One of the most important medical truths which has been evoked from the confusion of clashing hypotheses and endless variety of opinion is, that a power resides in the human body which not only sustains and preserves it in health, and enables it to oppose resistance to adverse influences, but more than this, recovers it, if suitable conditions can be procured, when stricken with injury or disease. This great truth was long ago pointed out by Hippocrates, and, though often lost sight of for a time, now stands out as a guiding star, clear and bright, to influence every proceeding of the scientific physician and surgeon. What the laws of attraction are to astronomy and those of affinity to chemistry, such are those of what are termed vital force to medicine. Without a due recognition and appreciation of these, the medical practitioner would be constantly at fault—on the one hand over-estimating the power he possesses to control diseased action, or on the other going hopelessly wrong in his efforts at cure. All attempts at healing on the part of the philosophical physician are based on an acquaintance with that *vis vitæ*, that *vis medicatrix naturæ*, which pervades the

living organism and preserves it in its integrity. As he knows that Nature has ways and means peculiar to herself of throwing off the burdens imposed upon her by disease, that she is prepared for the storms as well as for the calms of life, instead of prescribing remedies which may be in theory supposed to act specifically, homœopathically, or even allopathically, in uprooting illnesses he endeavours to trace the sources of the mischief, watches the indications which point towards restoration and cure, and by all means at his disposal assists nature to adjust the balance of health. How different this method is from the way in which diseases are generally supposed to be combated and cured! True, the intelligent classes in our day are no longer deluded by the expectation of miraculous interpositions for the cure of disease. Neither do they rely on charms, amulets, or astrological symbols; but educated and ignorant people in common entertain ideas of the art of healing which are entirely at variance with its actual state and progress, and which are far too mechanical in their tendencies. The common impression seems to be that all diseases are entities, which, like parasites, attack the human body, or like poisons corrupt the fountains of life; and that the physician has, or ought to have, or will have when the science is more perfected, a specific remedy for each—a panacea for every physical ill. We see indications of this bias at every turn, in common conversations, in our intercourse with patients; even in our daily and weekly newspapers we find copied and recopied details of cures by newly-discovered specific remedies. Nay, further, certain medical writers, possessed by the same notion, assert that rational practitioners, whom they name ‘allopaths,’ cannot cure diseases by antagonistic medicines, and propose another method even more unsound, viz., to cure diseases specifically by medicines selected on the principle of ‘*similia similibus curantur*.’ Nothing can be more erroneous or more fallacious than this. The number of diseases traceable to morbid poisons is comparatively small, and the number of specifics we possess, or are likely to possess, is still smaller. And if we look closely into the *modus operandi* of a so-called specific—take quinine, for example, as a remedy for ague,—it is very doubtful if it acts in any other way than as a powerful tonic, strengthening vital force, and enabling it to oppose greater resistance to the invasion of disease. In the larger proportion of ailments which affect the human frame there is no engrafting of a *materies morbi*, which can be attacked and destroyed like a parasite, or neutralized as an acid by an alkali. Disease is rather the result of unnatural conditions of life, which have altered or impaired nutrition, and have ended in degeneration or destruction of the part affected,—the healthy performance of function is prevented, and inconvenience, pain, and death are the consequences. From this point of view the practice of medicine becomes a much more difficult and complicated process than is ordinarily supposed; for instead of being comprised in a number of recipes, or learning empirically what drug is best in this complaint or for that symptom,

normal anatomy and physiology must be studied, the natural history of morbid changes must be mastered, the causes of disease understood, and the treatment in most cases must consist not so much in prescribing medicines as in ensuring those healthy conditions which give Nature a chance of resuming her sway, and performing a cure by her own method. I would not lead the student to trust so implicitly to the restorative powers of nature as to despise the resources of art, or undervalue the service that medicine, judiciously administered, may render in the treatment of disease.

"A wise physician has truly said, 'There is no curing diseases by art without first knowing how they are cured by nature; but the parody is not true, that the art of medicine consists in amusing the patient while nature cures the disease.' Unfortunately we have only to make acquaintance with this vital force, which possesses such wonderful attributes, speedily to learn that, unaided, it is in many cases unable to oppose sufficient resistance to adverse influences, and is borne down and extinguished whenever the intensity of diseased action predominates. Nay, it is well established that this force, however salutary in its general operations, may be so perverted as to lead to infinite mischief. 'Though Nature knits up wounds with her adhesive inflammation, by the very same method she glues the intestines into fatal entanglements, shackles the heart, and chokes up the windpipe. In this man, she soothes the grief of a wound by pouring out serum; in that, she makes the same effusion effectually close the *rima glottidis*. She spirts blood from the hæmorrhoidal vessels of Paul, who blesses her for saving him from apoplexy; of which very disease poor Peter dies, because she pours the very same fluid into his lateral ventricles: and so on; for man's body is a microcosm, in which one sees the play of Zoroaster's antagonist principles. Nature is ever the same—blessings are mixed with curses: the poisonous berry and the nutritious root are found on the same plant; there are balmy dews and pestilent fogs, fertilizing streams and destroying deluges, and the lair of the murderous lightning is in the cloud that floats across the blessed sunshine.' Such, gentlemen, are the incongruities we have to understand and contend with.

"In reference to the administration of medicines, and the use of the other resources of art, do not discard them or disbelieve in their efficiency, when you learn that they cannot act specifically as you previously believed, or that in numberless cases Nature will work her own cure. In the operations of the surgeon and obstetrician, benefits are at once apparent in the removal of some cause of suffering, or in deliverance from some imminent peril; and although, in the management of medical cases by the physician, the relation between cause and effect may not be so readily observable, the advantage is not the less real. Though he have no specific for the poison of fever, he can assist its elimination by medicines which act on the excretory organs, he can palliate the distressing symptoms,

and support strength until the crisis is past; and in pulmonary consumption, when no medicine can have the power of replacing the injured and lost lung-tissue, he may sustain vital power, temper morbid action, and give nature time to cicatrise and heal the yawning caverns he detects with such sad forebodings by the aid of his stethoscope. In treating diseases the physician interprets Nature's wants; removes hindrances out of her way; sometimes, it may be, restrains and controls her. As Lord Bacon expresses it, 'he is the servant and interpreter of nature, and feels that he can only understand and act in proportion as he observes and contemplates the order of nature. More he can neither know nor do.'

"The function of the medical practitioner is not, however, confined to the treatment of diseases and injuries *in presentia*. A new department of science, little known to the ancients, and which has been almost created in our times, called 'preventative medicine,' has sprung up. In this, the medical practitioner has an almost illimitable field for the use of talents, for the exercise of benevolence and philanthropy. On him devolves the duty of tracing to their well-springs those death-streams which, small and imperceptible at first, converge to swell the flood of preventible mortality, and to stem them, it may be before, by widening, deepening, and strengthening, they overwhelm whole communities of our fellow-men. The physician, surgeon, and general practitioner have, as they move about among their patients, incessant opportunities of diffusing a better knowledge of the laws of health, and inculcating more intelligent views as to the way in which derangements in the animal economy are properly re-adjusted. In these days of intelligence it is marvellous to contemplate the dearth of sanitary knowledge which prevails among rich and poor, and the carelessness or wilfulness evinced in matters of vital importance to health. One-half of the duty of a medical man consists in teaching and preaching how people may, in a physical sense, lead better lives; and if his heart be in his work, as he sees young and old stricken down by diseases which might have been prevented, 'he burns with a passionate earnestness to bring back the bodily economy to its allegiance to the Supreme Guide,' just as the conscientious clergyman of the gospel yearns to bring back the erring soul to its Maker. And, rely upon it, the healing art is in more than one sense, as it has been designated, 'the right arm of the church;' for if it makes men stronger, longer-lived, and healthier, it will make them also wiser and happier, and better Christians. It will be within your province, putting aside your own selfish interests, to instruct the mother how she should feed and clothe and nurse her tender infant, so that that terrible mortality bill may be lessened which tells us that one child in every three dies before the completion of its fifth year; to counsel the young how they may best attain a vigorous and healthy adult life; to persuade the wealthy to enjoy their riches moderately, and thus avoid the ailments incident to too luxurious living; to teach the poor that with scanty means, good ventilation,

cleanliness, and sobriety are the more necessary; and that open sewers and dust heaps at his very door are hotbeds for pests and fevers; to shame the landlord who, for greed of gain, lets tenements to the ignorant poor so unwholesome that he would scarcely keep his own dogs in them; to stand between the utterly destitute, who have sickness added to poverty, and the overseers or guardians who, it may be, are more careful about the increase of rates than the relief of distress; to warn employers who crowd their workmen and women in close rooms that they are wholesale demoralizers of their species, and that the employed, under such circumstances, must break down in health, or go to the gin-shop to palliate the effects of foul air; to intercede with an over-parsimonious Government for an improvement in the diet and lodging of soldiers and sailors; in a word, to 'carry hygiene into the army, the factory, and the nursery, down rivers, and across fields.' And how, gentlemen, are you to qualify yourselves for these great duties, these great responsibilities? Long ago Hippocrates wrote that there were four qualities indispensable to every good physician; and in using the appellation physician, he used it generically, as I do to-day, and included all medical men. These qualities were learning, sagacity, humanity, and probity; and though this aphorism was put on record before the commencement of the Christian era, it is just as true now in the middle of the nineteenth century."

Prof. Priestly then dwelt at some length upon these necessary points, and notably upon the great advantage which a medical man derives from education.

He then observed:—"The medical man must ever be acting on probabilities, often seeing 'as through a glass darkly;' and yet he must act promptly and decisively, as though dealing with certainties. Can it be wondered at that medical opinions should sometimes be erroneous—that mistakes should ever and anon be committed even by the most skilful? It is, I suspect, only those physicians and surgeons who have no practice who never make mistakes; those of large experience often find themselves at fault. Medicine shares uncertainties with many other professions however, with politics, with ethics, with law, and navigation; and although our brethren of the bar may rail because doctors differ, we may instance with equal force the glorious uncertainties of the law. 'Medicine,' as Dr. John Brown says, 'is a tentative art, to succeed in which demands a quickness of eye, thought, tact, and invention, exercised by patient observation;' and the medical man must have that fertility of resource which is not baffled whenever a case arises which seems not defined by the rules of art. There is no better training for the emergencies of future practice than that afforded by the out and in-door departments of a general hospital; and the student, however industrious, who does not constantly test his medical knowledge at the hospital, and, as gold in the refiner's fire, try it at the bedside of the patient, is very apt, in after years of practice on his own responsibility, to find every case an exception to



the ordinary definition of the disease laid down in the class-room or in class-books, and to be constantly at a loss how to proceed. He is, as Montaigne says, 'like him who paints the sea, rocks, and heavens, and draws the model of a ship as he sits safe at his table; but send him to sea, and he knows not how or where to steer.'

"The practice of medicine, both in the prevention and cure of disease, consists much more in the exercise of common sense than is usually supposed; and sagacity in medicine often becomes more conspicuous in the exercise of common sense than of any of the so-called special senses. The medical man must have a genuine sympathy for those who are sick and suffering. The exercise of pure science and art will often have a very partial influence for good, unless you can pour balm upon the wounded spirit, and give that hope and encouragement which is so important a help to cure; and if it be true, as I believe it is, that a remedy may be useful when prescribed by one physician and inert or powerless when prescribed by another, simply because the one exerts a more powerful moral influence over the mind of his patient, it is of the greatest importance to study carefully the minds of men, to dip down into the depths of our common nature, and thus be able to strike with a strong and yet gentle touch the chords of sympathy which make us all akin; and in our conversation with patients thoughtfully to consider before speaking, lest perchance our way of saying a thing may do more harm than our prescription can do good. True it is that, in deciding what is best for a patient, we must allow our judgment to be biassed by nothing which would militate against his chief good; the pure white light of science must be tintured by no coloured rays which may disturb mental vision; but the physician may permit the admission of those warming rays of sympathy and kindness which so often gladden the hearts of patients, and may cheer and console even those he cannot cure. The sick bed levels all distinctions; and you may evince as much chivalry, and reap as large a reward of satisfaction in easing the pain and smoothing the pillow of the poor, in conscientiously taking charge of the destitute, as in attending a richer patient, who thinks he has discharged all his obligation to you when he has paid his fee. I would fain impress on all hospital pupils how great is their responsibility, and at the same time their privilege, when they are entrusted with the care of the sick poor. Their steady and punctual work, their cheerful readiness to act in emergencies, are almost as essential to the well working of an hospital as efficient services from the medical officers. And in justice to medical students, I can testify that they are seldom found wanting. And what can I say of probity that you do not all know? Is not truthfulness always desirable? Is not honesty the best policy in all professions and occupations? The medical man is exposed to unusual temptations, and the very nature of his pursuits makes even self-deception easy. The defective knowledge of physiology, and of the scope and power of the medical art, which prevails in the community—the whims and caprices of

patients—the demand for specific methods of cure—render it extremely difficult for the medical man, conscientious though he be, to steer a straightforward course. He perhaps very soon discovers that it is far simpler, less laborious, and more remunerative to pander to popular prejudices, and that in the end he gets little credit for the various attempts he makes to treat patients on rational principles.

“Under another form, the spirit of Naaman the Syrian most extensively prevails, ‘Did not I think he would give me some specific remedy for my ailment, instead of indicating so homely a way of cure?’ It is too true that any designing charlatan who will proclaim an infallible and newly-discovered cure finds numberless votaries; and if he is shrewd enough to make no gross mistakes, nature will help him to a certain number of recoveries, notwithstanding the worthlessness of his method. ‘The spontaneous curability of most diseases is to the medical charlatan what the regular and calculable, but generally unlooked-for, recurrence of certain natural phenomena is to the juggler and mountebank.’ It has been well said, ‘If physic be a trade, it is a trade of all others the most cut out for a rogue.’ To some people a new sensation in medicine is as necessary as a new hat or a new bonnet; and sooner than not be gratified in their desires, they will accept the most exaggerated theory as eagerly as they will don the most extravagant costume. The medical man, particularly the struggling one, has need to pray that he may not be led into temptation; but if he has none other than sordid motives, his prayer is an useless mockery. Better the little produced by honest and unpretending industry, with conscience preserved bright as a polished shield, than to rise out of a slough dishonoured, clutching, it may be, the coveted prize, but covered with filth and degradation. The medical man has no right to sacrifice the patient’s true interest to trifling punctillios, but he has equally no right to deprive another practitioner of his patients by wily arts and mean insinuations. The relation of doctors to their patients, and of doctors to each other, cannot but be complicated, seeing that there are often many contending interests; and whole volumes have been written on what are called ‘medical ethics.’ All the rules of medical etiquette are, however, intended merely to be the application to particular circumstances of that great precept, ‘Do unto others as you would that they should do unto you.’ Be ye obedient unto that, and all shall be well.

The lecturer then dwelt upon the necessity for diligent study, and a just estimate of its importance. He assured the students that if they persevered in well-doing they would ultimately reap their due reward—the love of man and the approval of Heaven.

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## Toiling Upward.

### RICHARD COBDEN.

"For these are the men that, when they have played their parts and had their exits, must step out and give the moral of their scenes, and deliver unto posterity an inventory of their virtues and vices."—*Sir Thomas Browne.*

"Richard Cobden, the world-wide known, the leader of the greatest mercantile confederacy man has ever seen, the wielder of a power the most pacific, the most pliable, but the most overwhelming probably ever guided by one governing spirit; Richard Cobden, who revolutionized an empire, who will revolutionize the world, and who did it without the glitter of a bayonet or the crack of a musket; Richard Cobden, who prostrated the proudest oligarchy of Europe, who ruled the man who ruled the legislature, who ruled the empire; Richard Cobden, at once the missionary, the champion, the advocate, the embodiment of Free Trade."—*Angus B. Reach.*

PROMINENT in the retrospect of 1865 will stand the mournful record of April's second day, for on that morning a man who had fought in his day a manly fight, whose life was one unvarying protest against oppressions, wrongs, and wars, passed to his rest, and Richard Cobden, the tribune of the people, the apostle of free trade, died as he had lived, in armour for the right, answering his "*adsum*" to Duty's plain though painful call. Five days later, and a weeping band of companions, whose hearts had knit together in sympathy for the same noble cause, and who had struggled together in many a bloodless fight—Bright, Gibson, Villiers, Wilson, Smith, and others,—followed his body to its home in Lavington, henceforth a shrine for the patriotic heart's purest devotion; while the nation, sensible of his great and blessed labours, awarded the story of his life a place on the choicest tablets of her history.

It is common to speak of the days of the prophets as days long cast back in the history of the world, and yet God has never left this world without its prophets. Certainly He has not sent amongst us men who come heralding their utterances with a "thus saith the Lord," and yet he gives us from time to time men upon whose life-labour, we cannot doubt, He has set his *imprimatur*, and whose death well merits the victors' "Well done!" These are the men who dare to swim against the tide of custom, who lift their voices against the wrongs and evils of artificial society, who bear the buffetings and hardships imposed by their fellow-men, that they may lead them nearer to the sunlight of truth, and—

"Through soft degrees  
Subdue them to the useful and the good."

Yet these are the men whose blood has drenched the altar of truth, for from the time of the sublime tragedy of mount Calvary to our own day the cry against all who have denounced cherished error has been, "Away with him! crucify him!" Men do not see high motives through the scales of self-interest; and the lesson of the past to the present, voiceful from the story of a thousand lives of prophets and martyrs, is to take heart and go forward.

A prophet was Richard Cobden, and his life story speaks of the noblest inspiration,—the inspiration of that fine chord of sympathy that bound him to his poorer fellows, and was ever urging him on to claim kinship with the wronged and the oppressed, and to stand by their side, asserting and claiming their rights against their oppressors. We all know the story of his "*toiling upward*" from the day of his birth, on the 3rd of June, 1804, till the day when he lay a "dead untitled monarch." We cherish his words, and interweave our daily talk with anecdotes of his career; we have become familiarized with his features through a host of portraits to be found in almost every cot; we mention his name as one of our nearest friends,—Richard Cobden. No poor man ever talks of him other than thus, and he would feel it a personal insult to hear any affix or prefix put to it. Living, men flocked in thousands to hear his manly utterances; dead, they raise pillars to his name, and sitting around their cot fires at night, they tell their children how this man "gave the people bread," and raise in their breast the noble ambition to make the future worthy of the past. But though thus familiar, we cannot be too familiar, and we would take up the instructive story and briefly recount his *toiling upwards*.

The three great lessons which his life illustrates, and which it will be well for the reader of these papers to bear in mind, are—(1) The power of a man to whom Conviction is a stern guiding monitor. (2) The duties and treasures of our individual stations, teaching us that though we are thrown into a situation of life that opens no prospect of poetic incident, yet it is expected, by virtue of our common humanity, that we shall accept cheerfully our situation, and endeavour to ransack the materials amidst which we are thrown of all their capabilities of usefulness. (3) The fallacy of accepting, as arguments against any truth, the strength in number of its opponents, or the sneers and reproaches of the thoughtless.

Richard Cobden was born, as we have before said, June 3, 1804, in his father's farmhouse at Dunford, in Sussex. Of his known pedigree we may almost say that it is comprised in the sentence that he was the honest son of an honest but not over-wealthy Sussex yeoman. Nor are we very anxious in our researches in this matter, for he has left a name that needs not to be garnished by heraldic fable or stories of ancestral deeds of prowess. Did we wish to trace back his lineage, no doubt it would lead us through the lives of men jealous of the honour of their country; and it is upon record that for very many years Cobden's grandfather—who is familiarly and favourably remembered as "Maltster Cobden"

—was head bailiff (or mayor) of Midhurst, a town situated about five miles from Dunford. Richard, when old enough, assisted in farmwork, and doubtless spent his time much the same as other farmers' boys, relieved probably by that spirit of inquiry and love of information which characterized him even to his latest days. When still a mere child his father died, and he was taken charge of by either his uncle or a friend of the family residing at the cathedral town of Chichester, where he spent the next two or three years of his life acquiring the scanty store of information deemed sufficient for the youth of that day. At the age of about fifteen he left Chichester for London, to occupy a situation as junior clerk in his uncle's warehouse in the "great city." Here he cultivated an earnestness in the pursuit of knowledge which was fanned and developed by none of those educational institutions, with their incentives to competition and prizes for the industrious, which prompt and develop the ambition of the artisan classes of our own day; nay, he cultivated his love of learning against the bigotry of the time, which regarded the union of the student and the successful man of business as incompatible. He thus refers to those days in a speech in the Manchester Athenæum in 1847:—"When I was a youth in London, starting in business, the whole metropolis did not furnish such an institution as that which the Athenæum gives to you in Manchester. We had no means of meeting men of kindred tastes, no means of pursuing studies or of hearing lectures; we were confined to our own firesides; we had no stimulus, no competition among young men of our own rank and standing such as you have in Manchester. Oh, if I had my time over again, and was placed in the situation in which many of the young men here present are placed, I would not arrive at the age of five-and-twenty without being a perfect master of the French, German, and Italian languages!" We need not follow him through the various steps of his plodding upwards; honesty, fidelity, and good business ability had their reward, and won him the confidence and respect of his employers, and when the firm (not the firm under which he was first employed, but one under which he had held a situation as commercial traveller) wished to dispose of their business, he became, in conjunction with other fellow-servants, a proprietor, and started a branch of the firm at Manchester, under the title of Richard Cobden and Co., calico printers. He was in every sense of the word successful, and at one period—at the time when he began to devote himself almost entirely to politics—his income was about £9,000 per annum.

There is a tendency in commerce to blunt the finer feelings, the weight of wealth keeps the soul constantly on the earth. The tricks of trade, the grinding and screwing of commercial men, destroy their sympathy for fellow-men, but it was not so with Cobden. Of his commercial life we may say, in the words of a contemporary satirist, who knows well how to throw a chaplet on a noble bier,—

"On that path this man advancing, felt  
The impulse of a great good far away:  
Looked up, saw angels, and where others knelt  
To grope for gold, he knelt to dream and pray."

His early studies, his large-hearted sympathy with his fellows, and perhaps his natural love of politics, drew him into the controversies of his day; and in 1835 the Manchester reformers became aware that their ranks had received an accession in the person of one who could deal with political questions with a clearness and a freshness, and could support his position by such a fertility of illustration and cogency of argument as had not been since the days of Adam Smith. Under the signature of "A Manchester Manufacturer," he joined battle with the follies of political economists of the day in a pamphlet entitled, "England, Ireland, and America" (1835), soon following with another on "Russia," in both of which he enunciated those doctrines of peace, non-intervention, free trade, and repeal of the Corn Laws, which he has since been instrumental in carrying to a successful issue. In order to prepare himself for dealing with the subject of the latter pamphlet, he had undertaken in the previous year (1834) a tour to the East. The pamphlets produced a warm controversy, their sale was rapid and extensive, and established in Manchester Mr. Cobden's reputation as a leading man in the community, and his co-operation was courted in all public movements in the neighbourhood. He aided, in 1837, in the establishment of the Manchester Athenæum, advocated in a pamphlet, entitled, "Incorporate your Borough," the elevation of Manchester to municipal dignity. The endeavour being successful, he was elected a member of the Town Council, and in the same year a member of the Chamber of Commerce. He contested, in 1837, the borough of Stockport, but was defeated by a majority of fifty-five votes. Besides the tour in the East in 1834, he had visited, in 1835, the United States; and after the defeat at Stockport he spent some time in France, Belgium, and Switzerland; and in 1838 he travelled through Germany. He was thus preparing himself, by observations on men, manners, and governments, and the effects of the different codes of laws, &c., upon social life to deal with the great work before him.

And now we have followed his career to that point whence to trace it further we must turn to some of the brightest pages of England's history. In 1838 Mr. Cobden joined—and was soon brought to the front as the leader of—that association which is unexampled in the history of voluntary associations for the mighty revolution it effected in the English mind, the Anti-Corn Law League. The object of the Corn Laws was to afford the home agriculturists a monopoly in grain, and yet to allow of the introduction of foreign grain whenever a bad harvest produced a scarcity of food. The system had received the impress of the wisdom of successive generations of statesmen through two or three centuries, and had

been frequently revised or remodelled. In 1774 it assumed the definite shape retained till its repeal in 1846, subject in the meantime to several revisions—as in 1791, in 1804, in 1815, and in 1828,—by each of which it was made still more protective, and “the price to which wheat (for instance) must rise ere it could come in from abroad, at a nominal duty, was fixed in 1774 at 48s. per quarter; in 1797 at 54s. per quarter; in 1804 at 66s., and in 1815 at 80s.—the quarter being eight bushels. The liberal policy of Mr. Huskisson slightly prevailed in 1828, and the maximum price was fixed at 73s.” As grain rose duty fell, and as grain fell duty rose; and thus it was continually fluctuating, and when the price of home-grown wheat was 52s. per quarter, duty on foreign wheat was 34s. 8d; when the price rose to 70s. duty fell to 10s. 8d., and when 73s. duty fell to 1s. Adam Smith first, and a host of brilliant thinkers after him, had contended that this protective system was an economic fallacy, and that the true secret of commercial greatness and prosperity was free trade. Though in our own day every schoolboy and every artisan can recount the arguments in favour of such opinions, they were very long in gaining general acceptance, and it was not till the old protective system, carried to its legitimate issue, had plunged the country into dire distress consequent upon deficient harvests, that the disciples of these opinions could find an argument strong enough to appeal to the reason of the great mass of the people and the Government. Men were loth to give up the idea that it was expedient to encourage, protect, and develop our agricultural resources by giving the British farmer a monopoly of the market, and entertain the new idea of throwing off the restrictions and opening the market to all competitors. But arguments for and incentives to the holders of these opinions were fast ripening in the starved and bankrupt state of the country. A deficient harvest in 1837 was followed by another in 1838, and the disciple of Adam Smith did not scruple to attribute the disastrous state of the country to the Corn Laws.

In September, 1838, Dr. Bowring and Colonel Thompson held a small meeting in Manchester and resolved to form an Anti-Corn Law Association (one had been established two years previously in London by the supporters of Mr. Villiers), and shortly afterwards they held a larger meeting of merchants and manufacturers. In this meeting Mr. Cobden occupied a prominent position, as also in the meeting on the 16th of January, 1839, at which £1,800 was subscribed to the funds of the League, Mr. Cobden subscribing £100. This assembly decided that a meeting of delegates should be held in London on the opening of Parliament—Mr. Cobden was one of the delegates. They drew up a petition, signed by 40,000 people, against commercial restrictions, and requested permission to present evidence at the bar of the House of Commons on the injurious effects of the Corn Laws. Mr. Villiers brought forward the motion, which was contemptuously negatived by 361 to 172. The members who rushed so derisively into the lobby against the

motion had yet to learn the character of the men with whom they were dealing. The delegates met the next morning, indignant but determined, disappointed but resolved as to the future. Miss Martineau writes :—"Among the hopeful speakers was Richard Cobden. There was no cause for despondency, he said, because the House over the way refused to hear them. They were the representatives of three millions of people—they were the evidence that the great towns had banded themselves together, and that their Alliance would be an Hanseatic League against the feudal corn law plunderers." But neither the people nor the Parliament were yet prepared for the abolition of the Corn Laws. Before the advocates there were seven years of hard and unrelenting toil. They had yet to teach and to convince self-interest, and they had to wait for illustrations of their doctrines in the constant calamities of the nation.

The delegates now adjourned to Manchester, and Mr. Cobden moved that the Association should assume the name of the Anti-Corn Law League, with a central committee in Manchester, and having branch societies throughout the country. The League enunciated as its leading principles that "The Corn Laws were not beneficial to the whole body of agriculturists, but only to a privileged few ; that they depressed other branches of industry ; caused frequent and ruinous fluctuations in the market value of bread-stuffs, and greatly enhanced the price at all times, and therefore were injurious to the community generally, and especially to the labouring poor." The landlords laughed at the idea of a few Manchester manufacturers banding themselves together against the vast numbers, the immense wealth and influence, of the protectionists. But strength is not in numbers ; and against this giant monopoly Cobden stood forth, and in the name of free trade and the interests of the poor, he threw the gauntlet to the 40,000 land-owners of England, boldly but modestly ; with the principles of the League in his hand, appealing only to the reason and sense of justice of the people, he went through the length and breadth of the land. The nation seemed against him, and the task of converting such a vast number was one that might have made a giant quail ; but Cobden was equal to the task. He thus refers to this period after the object of their struggle had been gained :—

"There are a number of gentlemen who, during the last seven years and a half, have been almost daily in attendance at the League Rooms in Newall's Buildings ; and, bear in mind, for the first two or three years of our agitation it was a very hopeless matter ; there was no *eclat*, no applause, the result of the powers we now enjoy. We sat in a small room, the same we now have, and we had a dingy red curtain drawn across the room, that we might not be chilled by the paucity of our numbers. Two or three were all that were here on one occasion ; and I recollect saying to my friend Prentice, 'What a lucky thing it is the monopolists cannot draw aside that curtain, and see how many of us there are, for if they could they would not be much frightened !'"

The League laboured assiduously, and at the close of 1839 more



than 100 towns had formed similar associations. In 1840 Mr. Cobden declined the request that he should allow himself to be put forward as a candidate for Manchester. In the following year Parliament was dissolved, and he was returned for Stockport. Everywhere else almost the elections were against the League—Tories and Protectionists had taken the place of free traders. Aristocratic landlords sneered at the plain, unassuming member for Stockport took his oaths; the “*demagogue*,” the “*barker*,” would soon sink into insignificance amongst the high-born, university-educated men who thronged Westminster. So they said. But with Mr. Cobden truth was the same in Westminster as in Manchester; and though they laughed at the style of his first speech, instead of the contemned and ignorant demagogue who emptied the benches when he rose, he became the man whose “unadorned eloquence” the highest in the land flocked to hear, and whose very mention, “Cobden is up!” filled the House with straggling members. However congenial the theme, space forbids that we should linger over the parliamentary life of Mr. Cobden. In 1842 a slight concession was made to the free traders in the *reduction* of the duties on corn. Towards the close of the year Mr. Cobden, Mr. Bright (a name which, but for the fact that we are writing a short sketch of Mr. Cobden alone, should be joined with his throughout, not only this struggle, but the rest of his life—these two noble hearts had knit together in love for a common cause), and Colonel Thompson, were deputed by the League to travel through the country and address the people. Here we see the heart and soul earnestness of the man. He had allowed his business concerns to become neglected, and, indeed, almost embarrassed, that he might devote his whole time to the cause of free trade, and now he cheerfully gave his strength and his best years and his mental powers to make this question plain to the people. He went into the heart of the agriculturists; he attended their meetings, spoke, and defeated them in almost every case by a show of hands. And thus he continued to work and speak till 1846; now addressing densely packed meetings in Drury Lane Theatre, amidst the plaudits of peers and commoners; now speaking to the farmers, announcing himself as the son of a farmer, and making agricultural facts the basis of his arguments; convincing and winning them over, and hushing angry discussion from his views by the plainness of his statements and his unassuming demeanour; again pouring his broadsides into the Parliamentary Protectionists by moving in the Commons for a committee to inquire into the effects of protective duties upon tenant farmers and agricultural labourers; or aiding in the return of some one favourable to the views of the League. The battle was severe and long, but the day of victory drew nigh. On the 16th of May, 1846, the third reading of Sir Robert Peel’s Bill for the Repeal of the Corn Laws was passed by an overwhelming majority in the Commons; passed the Lords; and received the Royal

assent on the 2nd July, 1846. Sir Robert Peel thus referred to the services of Mr. Cobden in the struggle :—

“ I must say, with reference to the honourable gentleman opposite, as I say with reference to ourselves, neither of us is the party which is justly entitled to the credit of those measures. There has been a combination of parties, and that combination, and the influence of Government, have led to their ultimate success; but the name which ought to be, and will be associated with the success of those measures, is the name of the man who, acting, I believe, from pure and disinterested motives, has with untiring energy, by appeals to reason, enforced this necessity with an eloquence the more to be admired because it was unaffected and unadorned. The name which ought to be associated with the success of those measures is the name of RICHARD COBDEN.”

Bold in the day of battle and ever in the front as long as a single protectionist foe remained in the field, he shrunk from the plaudits and honours of the hour of victory, and when the final meeting of the League was held in Manchester—Mr. George Wilson presiding,—the name of Mr. Cobden was announced, the whole audience rose and gave such a series of ringing cheers as might have sent the last ghost of protection creeping back to its *Inferno*; but coming forward, Mr. Cobden declared that far too much honour had been conferred upon him, praised the friends around him, Sir Robert Peel, and others concerned in the movement. To all these, no doubt, great credit was due; but the people then knew, as well as we do now, who had led them in this struggle, who had instructed in the council as well as fought in the field—him to whom throughout they had looked up,—to temper by his foresight and to cheer by his belief in the justice of their cause; and they insisted, by thundering “ *Noes*,” that they had done him less even than justice.

Worn down with the labour that for seven years had kept his faculties ever on the stretch, and given him, either day or night, little chance for relaxation, he had thus early laid the basis of the disease which at last caused his death, and he announced his intention of resigning his seat for Stockport, in order that he might enjoy a temporary absence from active life, to recruit his health on the continent.

There was another circumstance in connection with his condition at this time to cause him some anxiety. As we have before stated, his devotion to the cause of free trade had induced him to neglect his business, which had become embarrassed in consequence, and he was now comparatively a poor man. But the nation was not unmindful of his great services, and it was proposed to present him with a national testimonial, which soon swelled to the munificent sum of £70,000, and Mr. Cobden himself was feasted and fêted throughout the country. And when he went to the continent, every city in which a few friends of free trade had sprung up vied in their attempts to do honour to him, and men of all nations forgot their sectional feelings, and rallied together to do homage to this man, henceforth a citizen of all nations—a friend of all classes. While on the continent he was elected a member for

the West Riding of Yorkshire, and on his return he accordingly took his seat for that constituency. The next few years of his life present little of interest, except that we find him trying to further his views in regard to a bond of union amongst all nations by attending the peace congresses held at Brussels, London, Paris, &c., and promoting the International Exhibition of 1851 in the capacity of commissioner. He longed for the day when war, with all its miseries and vices, should cease, and—

“The battle flag be furld

In the parliament of men, in the federation of the world.”

He laboured to promote the idea of the unity of interest of all nations, and to teach people how that peace and a free intercourse and interchange of the various productions of countries was not only beneficial to themselves, but obedience to the ordinations of God.

But his peace principles brought him into disfavour with a part of his countrymen. So high ran the war feeling in England in 1853, in regard to the Russian war, that Mr. Cobden's voice was almost drowned in the reckless cry for more supplies and men for the Crimea, and he earned what he never merited, the title of a “peace-at-any-price man.” This unpopularity was further increased by his speeches with regard to the bombardment of Canton (1857), when he moved in the Commons, that “this House considers that the papers laid upon the table fail to establish satisfactory grounds for the violent measures resorted to at Canton.” The motion was carried, and Lord Palmerston appealed to the country. In the election Mr. Cobden lost his seat, and was once more a private citizen. Thus it is that one who would obey the dictates of his conscience in his dealings with the public will often find himself like a log of wood on the ocean, now aloft on the peaked crest of some wave of good-will, and now engulfed by a sweeping wave of odium. In 1858 he paid a second visit to the United States, where he received very flattering attention, and established a reputation and feeling of good will between that country and himself which remained unbroken till his death. Again during his absence (in 1859) he was elected to Parliament—this time for Rochdale,—and he turned his steps homeward. On his arrival in Liverpool a very flattering letter from Lord Palmerston awaited him, offering him a seat in the Cabinet, with the Presidency of the Board of Trade. Mr. Cobden knew that it was not a congenial sphere; besides differing with Lord Palmerston on many points, especially with regard to his foreign policy, his open nature, which abhorred concealment, unfitted him for the strategy necessary for a minister, and he declined the post.

It was about this time that the idea of the commercial treaty between England and France occurred to him. He unfolded his idea to Mr. Gladstone, and afterwards to Lord Palmerston, both of whom heartily concurred in his project, and he was duly authorized by the Palmerstonian government to go to France with full powers

to effect a commercial treaty. The country wondered to see this plain Manchester gentleman, unused to the ways and intrigues of courts, unaccompanied by the pomp of plenipotentiaries, ignoring the usual routine of diplomacy, seeking an audience with the French emperor, to lay before him his grand idea of a treaty which should unite the two countries with a bond of enduring peace. The task was difficult ; but he accomplished it, winning over the great potentate, and silencing by success those of his countrymen who had thrown all possible opposition in his way. The advantages of this treaty were inestimable. It "altered the whole policy of England and France," and changed open jealousy to friendly rivalry. The words of Mr. Gladstone on Mr. Cobden's services are so truthful that we must quote them. He said :—

"With regard to Mr. Cobden, speaking, as I do, when every angry passion has passed away, I cannot help expressing our obligations to him for the labour he has, at no small personal sacrifice, bestowed upon a measure which he, not the least among the apostles of free trade, believes to be one of the most memorable triumphs free trade has ever achieved. Rare is the privilege of any man who, having fourteen years ago rendered to his country some signal and splendid service, now again, within the same brief span of life, decorated neither by rank nor title, bearing no mark to distinguish him from the people whom he loves, has been permitted to perform a great and memorable service to his sovereign and to his country."

France, as well as England, was sensible of his merits, and not only did the Emperor offer Mr. Cobden knighthood, but he, as well as the French nation, felt and expressed a poignant grief on his decease.

Having concluded the treaty he again sought rest, and visited the shores of the Mediterranean. Returning thence in June, 1861, he was presented with the freedom of the city of London. During the negotiation of the treaty his friends had presented him with the sum of £40,000. Lord Palmerston had also offered him at the conclusion of the treaty a baronetcy ; but this, like all other honours, he steadily refused. The remainder of his days were spent in helping on reform and free trade in their various stages. He discountenanced that English sympathy with the Southern states of America in the happily now past struggle, which he saw was favouring an armed intervention as bad as the struggle itself. His parliamentary life was diversified by those annual visits to his Rochdale constituents, in company with his friend Mr. Bright, to which thousands throughout Lancashire and the neighbouring counties flocked, while thousands more were unable to gain admission, and for which rooms anything near large enough were with difficulty obtained. It was at one of these (the last), in November, 1864, that he overtaxed his strength by speaking for upwards of two hours and a half to some 6,000 people. In feeble health at the time, the excitement and exertion prostrated him, and it was his last public appearance. He was laid up for the rest of the winter ; but wishing to take part in a debate on Canadian defences, he went up to London on the 21st March. He

arrived in London to be again seized by an attack of his disease, which resulted, as we all know, in his universally mourned death. Thus it is ever with our benefactors, "They have no sooner gained the summit of one elevation than another more lofty rises before them, and if they have the proper spirit in them, and man themselves for the toil, the view extends on and on, and they never gain the highest summit, for death comes in, and in tender mercy to a body which is worn out with the toil, lays it down to its repose in the dust."

Before closing this imperfect sketch, let us glance for a moment into the House of Commons on the evening following the death of Mr. Cobden, on the scene which has formed a subject for a far more eloquent pen than that of the present writer.\* He must be a bad or a worthless man indeed, over whose grave no one can mention a virtue or remember a bright spot; but few are the instances of such universal regret as that over Mr. Cobden; and when one by one Lord Palmerston, Mr. Disraeli, and Mr. Bright rose and testified to the sterling worth of this man, and dropped their epitaph upon his life, the subdued cheer, the silent, quivering lips, and marks of approbation, or the sympathetic tear, showed how the feelings of the House were embodied in their remarks. It had fallen to the lot of Lord Palmerston to offer to Mr. Cobden those rewards which few men would have refused, and which the most disinterested could accept without any taint on a former career, and he testified of him that "he was a man of great ambition. His ambition was to be useful to his country, and that ambition was amply gratified." \* \* \* "Sir, Mr. Cobden's name will be for ever associated with and engraved on the most interesting pages of the history of this country."

Mr. Disraeli, who had often measured swords with Mr. Cobden in the House of Commons, thus speaks:—"I think I may say that as a debater he had few equals; as a logician he was close and compact, and I would say adroit, acute, and perhaps even subtle; yet, at the same time, he was gifted with that degree of imagination that he never lost sight of the sympathies of those whom he addressed; and so, generally avoiding to drive his arguments to an extremity, he became as a speaker both practical and persuasive." \* \* \* "There are indeed, I may say, some members of Parliament who, though they may not be present, are still members of this House, are independent of dissolutions, of the caprices of constituents, and even of the course of time. I think that Mr. Cobden was one of those men. I believe that when the verdict of posterity shall be recorded upon his life and conduct, it will be said of him that, looking to his expressions and deeds, he was without doubt the greatest political character that the pure middle class of this country has as yet produced; that he was an ornament to the House of Commons, and an honour to England."

\* M. D. Conway, in the *Atlantic Monthly*.

Then followed the words, beautifully simple, and beyond the harsh touch of criticism, of the friend tried and trusty, the companion in numberless scenes of triumph and disappointment, the sharer of his hopes and aspirations, the friend still nigh as he closed his eyes on this life, and thus he spoke:—"I feel that I cannot address the House on this occasion; but every expression of sympathy which I have witnessed has been most grateful to my heart. But the time which has elapsed since I was present, when the manliest and gentlest spirit that ever tenanted or quitted a human form departed this life, is so short, that I dare not even attempt to give utterance to the feelings by which I am oppressed. \* \* \*

\* \* \* "I have only to say that after twenty years of most intimate and almost brotherly friendship with him, I little knew how much I loved him until I found that I had lost him."

What a grand *dénouement* to a noble story,—a life disinterestedly pure, unselfishly ambitious, active, and philanthropic, and a grave heaped with the regrets and mournful tributes of his sorrowing fellows,—a requiem chanted with equal eagerness by political rivals, and toiling and sorrowing men for whom he had helped to make juster laws.

We need not praise Mr. Cobden. The highest praise that can be given to any man is to follow in his footsteps. If we admire his career, let us step into the ranks and march with the noble host to do battle with antiquated folly and traditionary error. But though we would not praise him, the following chaplet, intended for another more illustrious but not nobler bier, is so truthful that we offer no apology for quoting it:—

"We have lost him! He is gone:

We know him now: all narrow jealousies  
Are silent; and we see him as he moved,  
How modest, kindly, all-accomplished, wise,  
With what sublime repression of himself,  
And in what limits, and how tenderly;  
Not swaying to this faction or to that;  
Not making his high place the lawless perch  
Of winged ambitions, nor a vantage-ground  
For pleasure; but through all this tract of years  
Wearing the white flower of a blameless life  
Before a thousand peering littlenesses.  
Laborious for our people and our poor;  
Voice in the rich dawn of an ampler day;  
Far-sighted summoner of war and waste  
To fruitful strifes and rivalries of peace."

NAM DEB.

## The Reviewer.

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*Recent British Philosophy; a Review, with Criticisms, including some Comments on Mr. Mill's Answer to Sir W. Hamilton.* By DAVID MASSON. London and Cambridge: Macmillan and Co.

As a critic of great depth and power, as a historian competently furnished with copious knowledge of facts and a fine expository tact, as a biographer of singular industry and enormous patience, as an editor at once judicious and independent, and as a professor of much energy, ardour, and thoroughness, David Masson has made himself well known; and even in the wider fields of politics it is consistent with our information to assert that he is a man of mark. In this volume he appears as a philosopher,—not as an expounder of original views, but as a recorder and a reviewer of the thoughts and opinions held by the most notable of the contributors to the advancement of “recent British philosophy.” The substance of this book was delivered as lectures at the Royal Institution of Great Britain, but it is throughout largely increased in bulk and in accuracy of reference, and contains a very good supplementary review of the progress of speculative thought in Britain from the days of Coleridge and Bentham to the present time.

The first chapter contains “A survey of thirty years,” in about as many pages, including a “conspectus of recent writers and writings.” Little of importance is said in the introduction, and the conspectus is by no means so complete as it might (perhaps we should say, ought to) have been. If Lowndes, McCosh, and Wilkinson be deemed worthy of note and comment, Professor G. Boole, Professor W. A. Butler, and Dr. J. G. MacVicar ought not to have been omitted. If it was found advisable to introduce the names of Professors Veitch, Baynes, and Arnold, those of Professors Cairns, Spalding, and Hoppus might have been added. If B. H. Smart, P. C. MacDougall, and Henry Calderwood require record, Richard Congreve, Charles Bray, and Peter Baynes deserved it equally. We might add too, as not unworthy of note, Thomas Hope, Thomas Doubleday, J. R. Morell, F. Heywood, and J. M. D. Meiklejohn, translator of Kant; J. W. Blakesley, biographer of Aristotle; P. E. Dove, author of the “Theory of Human Progression;” F. Espinasse, biographer of Voltaire; Sir A. Grant, George Moore, Wm. Maccall, Wm. Smith (*Gravenhurst*), J. R. Beard, Wm. Fleming, &c. Such names ought not to be absent from a “conspectus” which includes Combe, Bailey, Rogers, Taylor, and Buckle. Even the conspectus itself is incomplete in its references, *e. g.*, Lewes’ “Aristotle,” Veitch’s “Translations of Descartes,” Morell’s “Logic,”

&c., are not mentioned. All the more is this a relevant matter, because the conspectus professes to be "statistical and not critical," for incomplete statistics is worse than incomplete criticism.

The second chapter treats of "The Traditional Differences: how repeated in Carlyle, Hamilton, and Mill." "The differences among philosophers hitherto may be resolved ultimately into (1), a difference of *psychological theory*, accompanied by (2), certain differences of *cosmological conception*, all subject to or ending in (3), a difference in respect of *ontological faith*," p. 30. There are, in the first, experimentalists and transcendentalists; in the second, nihilists, materialists, natural realists, constructive idealists, pure idealists, and advocates of absolute identity; in the third there are noumenalists and phenomenologists. These various forms of the outcome of thought are sketched and differenced with some accuracy and great boldness of touch. In relation to these three differences Professor Masson reviews Hamilton, Carlyle, and Mill, placing the two former in the ranks of the transcendentalists, and naming the latter an experimentalist. He refuses to allocate the cosmological conception of Carlyle, but he gives Hamilton to natural realism and Mill to constructive idealism. They both negative ontology, but Hamilton has ontological beliefs, while in Mill these are repressed, or rather unexpressed. "The result historically is that, during the greater portion of the last thirty years, the most prominent rival leaders in formal or systematic British speculation have been two philosophers, one of whom may be described as a transcendental natural realist, forswearing ontology, but with much of the ontological passion in his temper; and the other as an empirical idealist, also repudiating ontology, but doing so with the ease of one in whom the ontological feeling was at any rate suppressed or languid," p. 166.

The third chapter considers "the effects of recent scientific conceptions on philosophy."

"Not a new scientific discovery can be made, not a new scientific conception can get abroad, but it exercises a disturbing influence on the previous system of thought, antiquating something, disintegrating something, compelling some readjustment of the parts to each other, some trepidation of the axis of the whole. Sometimes the action is almost revolutionary," p. 168. This thesis is fully illustrated, and the tendency noted of science to lead to materialism or idealism; at the same time he thinks he perceives a "blind struggling towards a logic that should profess to unite the two extremes, and intervolve the thought of nothing, inextricably, by a law of the intellect, with the thought of absolute being," p. 232.

Chapter fourth shows us the "latest drifts and groupings." The parties grouped are (1), Thomas Carlyle, Isaac Taylor, Dr. Whewell, Dr. Newman, Mr. Maurice, and Professor Newman, who "have inwound their speculations with theological questions and controversies," at whom, therefore, Mr. Masson considers it inexpedient to glance as their merits demand; (2), the British Comtists—Lewes, Miss Martineau, and Mr. Buckle; (3), Professor Bain and Mr.



Herbert Spencer: (4), Hamiltonians—Mansel, McCosh, Lowndes, Cairns, Fraser, Veitch, Baynes; (5). Professor Ferrier and J. H. Stirling; (6), Swedenborgianists and Spiritualists; and a section is devoted to a consideration of Mill and Hamilton, founded on the recently published examination of the philosophy of the latter by the former. In this he says, "Mr. Mill's estimate of Sir William Hamilton's intellect and of the worth of his services to British thought seems to me lower than was to be expected from so fit a judge," p. 302. One of Sir Wm. Hamilton's peculiar points he touches off finely, viz., "his preference for philosophy, considered as a gymnastic for the soul, over philosophy considered as a purveyor of available truths. The toil, the labour, the pain of philosophizing seemed to him valuable, apart from any teachable results," p. 308. Professor Masson thus explains Mr. Mill's philosophical place and stand-point: "Mr. Mill cosmologically is now a *cogitationist*. The ultimate fact of the phenomenal world, as recognized by him, is neither matter nor mind, in any present sense of these terms, but a cogitation or coagulation of phenomena which may be called feelings, out of which cogitation or coagulation it has happened, in virtue of the laws regulating it, that there is now that stupendous fact of all present—or at least of all human—sentiency, the instinctive furling off, in every conscious or perceptive act, of a conceived external world of possibilities from a conscious and persisting personality. If we stop at this fact—which we may do for most practical purposes—our cosmological system may be that of the new Constructive Idealism; but if we persevere in the analysis, we end in *cogitationism*," p. 345. Prof. Masson advances the following objection to Mr. Mill's philosophy: "He provides no room or function whatever for belief as distinct from knowledge." If we assert a deity it must be as a legitimate inference from the phenomena of our experience; if we predicate certain attributes or actions of this deity, these also must be rational inferences from the facts that come within our observation, investigated according to the ordinary principles of reasoning. In other words, if theism and theology are to sustain themselves at all, it can only be by the *à posteriori* argument, and not by any form or forms of the *à priori* one," p. 394.

Many other ideas of worth and moment are given in the course of his critique. Is this *excursus* in philosophy, then, such as to warrant us in awarding to Professor Masson an equal place as a philosopher to that which he has already acquired as an historian, biographer, politician, critic, &c. We hesitate to affirm so. He possesses and manifests *insight*, but we do not think it is *philosophic* insight. The argumentation of philosophy he can use and represent, but he does not seem to have wrought out within his own soul a scheme of thought—a system of philosophy. As the work of a spectator of the philosophic strife, however, it forms a good and trustworthy report and criticism.

## The Topic.

### IS THE OUT-DOOR EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN REPREHENSIBLE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE.

THE out-door employment of women is reprehensible. 1. It withdraws them from their domestic duties, on the proper fulfilment of which so much is dependent, and which cannot be neglected without family suffering ensuing, both physically, mentally, morally, and pecuniarily. The youngest children are left in the care of one not much older than themselves. In addition to suffering from bad nursing, they are often drugged with narcotics, and are thus in various ways injured for life. The good old adage, "A stitch in time saves nine," is disregarded. Clothes mending is neglected, and poverty, rags, and distress are the consequences, to an extent which is not counterbalanced by the wages of out-door employment. Proper food is not provided for the family, who suffer physically in consequence. By the absence of the mother proper restraints are removed from the children, and moral deterioration is the result. Sufficient time is not afforded for keeping the home clean, and physical injury and mental debasement follow. The home is not made so comfortable for the husband as it should be, and he is driven to the alehouse or some other hurtful place of resort for comfort. 2. It operates against the employment of men, who are necessarily displaced by the employment of women. This is one cause of so many men being unoccupied. Thus the right condition of things is turned upside down. Men are set at liberty that their place may be occupied by women, who are taken from their proper sphere, which men cannot fill. In a right arrangement of things both men and women would have their appropriate

employment,—men out of doors and women within doors. 3. The daily mingling of large numbers of men and women together is attended with demoralizing effects. In these large numbers there are some who are greatly depraved, and whose influence depraves others.—S. S.

Out-door labour performed by women ought most certainly to be kept as much as possible out of the usages of society. Home is woman's sphere. The rough and toilsome labours of agriculture or of the fictile manufactures are not fitted for their frames, still less for their moral nature is the rude conduct often indulged in among out-door labourers. The poetry of the hayfield reads very nicely; but those who have witnessed the reality, and those who know the pernicious influences floating like a moral miasma over the new-mown hay, will hesitate before they assert that anything can be more reprehensible than field labour for women, except those forms of out-door work which are practised in the pottery, at the coalpit head, and in the brickfield. Any wage labour engaged in by women lessens the entire wages of the whole of the labourers engaged in that particular line of industry; as the tendency is always to draw down wages to the lowest point while women, lured on by the hope of higher wages, are led to engage in unfeminine labour. The distinctions of sex thus get obliterated in the association of those labourers, and the unsexed workers vie with each other in profligacy and vice. The home is injured in every way, and society has thrown upon it continually a spawn of illegitimacy, pauperism, and the heathenism of our complex social system continues to increase, so that wo-

men's labour reacts in producing women's sorest woes—marriagelessness and livelihood by immorality.—DERWENT.

The out-door employment of women is reprehensible. 1. Because it, to a great extent, prevents them from forming those domestic habits which are so essential to their future happiness and well-being; for how can a woman be expected to conduct her household affairs in a proper manner when she has been taught to work in the field or factory instead of the house? 2. Because it removes them from their proper sphere of labour, and thereby prevents them from working out the great effects on society which they, by their nature, are intended to do. The mother's influence is most felt by the child, who in its turn develops those influences into actions, and by those actions affects society according to the good or bad influences by which it has been governed. The mother's influence is not only felt in childhood, but extends through life, urging us on to high and noble deeds, or leading us into acts of a debasing nature; therefore we should do all we can to get women properly trained for the high position which they ought to and will yet occupy in society, so that their influence may at all times be exerted for good. 3. Because it prevents mothers from attending to the wants of their own children, and thereby gives encouragement to the system of drugging children. We think that the out-door employment of women cannot but be reprehensible.—T. W.

#### NEGATIVE.

The woman's question is an intricate one. The out-door employment of women is not reprehensible in itself, however much so it may be in the modes in which it is carried on. Of old time the pursuits of gardening, reaping, glean- ing, fruit-gathering, &c., fell to the lot of women, as well as the management of steers and domestic animals. The state of modern life has introduced manufactures, and the labour of women has been transferred from the semi-

pastoral occupations of the field to the semi-manufacturing processes of the bleaching-ground, the dye-work, the calico-printing work, the tile-field, &c. In these, taken by themselves, there is nothing reprehensible, though modern sensuality, ignorance, greed, and folly have introduced evils into them. These evils are always reprehensible, but the labour is not. Labour, like marriage, is honourable to all, and the labour of women is not to be scoffed out of the market because besotted men have dragged many female outworkers into the mire of sin. Much as sin prevails among women employed in out-door labour, we question if it would not much more abound if women were to be wholly dependent on men for their living. Then a life of sin would often be inevitable, whereas now even out-door labour affords a means of independence, and makes the enticement of vice at once less powerful and less excusable.—M. A. R.

Women must work. There is no shirking that fact. What sort of work suits them best? Close confinement at fretful needlework, in stews of factories, in millinery pest-houses, or among the fields, with the sky overhead and nature around them? Hard may be the toil demanded, but it is full of lusty life, and does not shrivel their nature like the hive system of in-door industry. There is nothing reprehensible in woman making her own life sweet by labour. If sin arise in such states there is more blame, we think, to be cast on human nature than on out-door employment.—D. W. T.

Shocking revelations have certainly appeared in the daily prints concerning out-door labour, agricultural and manufacturing, and it would be difficult to say whether the latter or the former afforded the most sensational reports. But the revelations of factory life, and of all those forms of female industry which are carried on in-doors, are quite as offensive and as vile. In fact, the sins and sorrows of life are felt in both. We do not think, however, that the

destruction of the home feelings can be so wholly accomplished among out-door workers as among in-door ones, while vice can scarcely be so openly indulged in. Houses afford a sense of privacy, which out-doors do not, and unless the work is entirely unsuitable for females, on account of its requirements, we consider out-doors more favourable than in-doors, and would not regard labour of the former sort reprehensible.—A. C. H. E.

Women far outnumber men. There is a surplus of female population, and the question comes to be—either shall these women exist in a mere state of dependence, often leading to vicious connections, or shall they have the means of independence in their own hands, by being able to engage in out-door labour? Many of the out-door labours in which women bear a share are strictly feminine and suitable to their nature and circumstances. Some

unfeminine pursuits have, it is true, been intruded into by women, as some unmasculine employments have been invaded by men. The need for women working out of doors is not likely soon to diminish, unless their numbers greatly decrease. So long as they must work they must accept the kind of labour they can get and do.—T. P. C.

Political economy has been called "the dismal science," and so it is to all those who cannot or will not conform to the requirements of life. A poet has given even a more dismal picture of human existence when he sings,—

"Ah! man must work, and woman must weep."

It is surely better that they should labour than weep; and if they are to labour at all they are far better in the fields than immured in factories and shut up in mills.—JACOB CLEAR.

## The Inquirer.

### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

569. Be so kind as to inform me of the price and author of the best "Modern Geography," also the price and publisher of the *Fortnightly Review*?—A SUBSCRIBER.

570. Would any reader oblige with a brief account of the life and works of Mr. G. H. Lewes, editor of the *Fortnightly Review*?—WENTWORTH.

571. Many works have been issued, containing the beauties of authors, e. g., the "Beauties of Shakspeare," of "Burke," &c. Has any similar book been issued containing the beauties of ancient authors, e. g., the beauties of Homer, of Virgil, of Horace, &c. ? If not, would any one supply me with a list of the generally recognized beauties of Homer, i. e., choice specimens.—A. R. C. H.

### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

547. "Offices of Prayer; embracing

all the Devotional Parts of Scripture, applied to the Leading Necessities of Life and Religion." By Thos. Waddell. London: Longmans and Co.—W. B. L.

559. The present Earl de Grey and Ripon is the eldest son of Viscount Goderich, prime minister in 1827.—BUDDY.

569. See *British Controversialist*, Vol. I., 1865, pp. 230, 385, and add to that list "A Manual of Modern Geography," by Rev. A. Mackay (Blackwood and Son), 7s. 6d. The *Fortnightly Review* is published by Chapman and Hall, price 2s.—G. W. D.

571. Two selections of the nature mentioned we have seen. They were edited by Dr. Ramage, a Scottish schoolmaster, and published in Liverpool, but we do not remember more than this of the works, at which we merely glanced.—JAMES VINCE.

## The Societies' Section.

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### LORD STANLEY AND THE *TIMES*.

[Lord Stanley, in replying to the toast of "The House of Commons," at the luncheon given by the Mayor of Birmingham to the President and a select number of the members of The British Association, on 11th September, gave expression to certain opinions regarding Parliamentary Eloquence, which the *Times* has thought proper to controvert. We think it advisable, as containing the elements of a good debate, to place the *pro* and *con.* of this question before the readers of the Societies' Section.]

Lord Stanley said:—

"I have sat in the House for nearly seventeen years, and I can say with pride that the longer I have known it the higher has risen my respect for its ability and for its common sense. I believe, both as regards men and influence, the opinion of the House of Commons collectively is generally better than that of any individual member of it. I say this for the benefit of young members. The House, as long as I have known it, has always shown a marvellous tact, almost approaching to instinct, in discerning who are likely to contribute anything to its debates, and those who merely get up to waste time and to air their vocabulary. I have heard men who have spoken with real fluency and eloquence, in a word, men who are described as having great command of language, when probably it would be truer were you to say that language has great command of them. Men of that class I have heard described as not knowing what they were going to say when they got up, not knowing what they were saying when on their legs, and not knowing what they had said when they had sat down. Many a man of that sort is left to declaim to empty benches, whilst you have the ear of 400 or 500 members listening in silent respect to some one else, who certainly had not the gift of oratory, and brought his sentences out head foremost, or tail foremost, until you almost wondered how it was possible a man could speak such bad grammar. The House of Commons soon found out when a man spoke common-

The *Times* replied:—

"A clear thinker, an accurate reasoner, and an impartial judge, who has sat for seventeen years in the House of Commons, Lord Stanley has every claim to the attention of those whom he undertakes to instruct in the art of rising in its good graces. Lord Stanley professes the highest respect for the House, and advocates the opinion, sanctioned by the authority of Aristotle, and entertained, we believe, by many of its most distinguished members, that the collective taste and judgment of the House is better than the taste and judgment of any one of the individuals composing it. For our own part, we should have inclined to the belief that there must be persons in the House whose judgment would as far transcend the aggregate judgment of the whole assembly as their attainments and abilities transcend its average attainments and abilities. His Lordship's observations would seem to imply—what they certainly were not meant to convey—that there is no such thing as oratory, and that so long as a man has clear and sensible views of things it is immaterial for his success in the House of Commons in what language he may give them to his audience. The error is similar to that of the ancient critic who believed that as a good man is, after all, the person

places and nothing more, and favoured the man who, though awkwardly and uncouthly, really intended to contribute some new idea to the discussion that was going on. I recollect, about a dozen years ago, when the discussions about competitive examination for the public services first came on, somebody said, by way of a sneer, "Oh, if competitive examination is such a good thing, why do you confine it to the clerks? why not have it also for the secretaries of state and chancellors of the exchequer?" Well my answer was and is, this is exactly what we do: no man could obtain a leading position in the House of Commons without passing through a competitive examination. It is a trial of physical strength and endurance; a trial of patience and of temper; it is a trial of readiness, of thorough and accurate knowledge, and, last and chief of all, it is a trial of common sense and knowledge of the world. If a man fails entirely in any one of these particulars, but more especially if he fails in the last, he may do very well elsewhere, but he is not the man who will take a leading part in the House of Commons. I suppose there is no popular assembly that has ever existed that has commanded so much respect and exercised so much power as the English House of Commons. Now why is that? It is because there never has existed a legislative body whose component members were so thoroughly independent in social position and in feeling. Take the whole House through, count up—you may easily do it—the number of those who are known to be aspiring to high political office; deduct again—and I am happy to say they are very few—those who are supposed to come in on the speculation that they may drop in for a comfortable place somewhere; deduct both these classes, and they still leave behind a great majority in the House. I say again the great majority of the House on both sides is composed of men who have nothing to fear and nothing to gain from any minister, and who can, therefore, follow a minister without servility, and oppose him without asperity. As regards the character of the House of Commons, I am not afraid it will ever lose the position it now holds in public opinion."

most likely to persuade his audience, every good orator must of necessity be a good man. There never did exist yet a popular assembly, and there probably never will exist one, on which the graces of manner, of diction, and of language will be lost, and which will be able so completely to distinguish between the husk and the kernel as to fix its attention wholly on the thing to be proved, and to disregard entirely the manner in which the proof is brought forward. We are not aware of any person who has attracted to himself a considerable share of the attention of the House of Commons who has not been endowed with more than ordinary powers of language. Lord Palmerston, though never a very fluent, has always been a correct and grammatical speaker, and careful even to fastidiousness in the use of words. Mr. Disraeli, with higher oratorical pretensions, has often been able to conceal unformed views or defective information by a dexterous employment of words; and it is quite notorious that it is not alone to his mastery over the subject on which he speaks that Mr. Gladstone owes the influence which he exercises over the House of Commons. We are unable to call to mind a person able to command the attention of 400 or 500 members 'by sentences utterly ungrammatical, and pushed out sometimes head and sometimes tail foremost.' The first point, doubtless, is a full and clear understanding of the subject; the second, the preparing it in such a manner as to enlist the attention and sympathy of a highly critical assembly. The successful orator is the man who unites the two. The House of Commons at the present time would not suffer itself to be dictated to in the language of Mrs. Malaprop, and we should not think any better of its common sense if it would."

## SUBJECTS SUITABLE FOR DEBATE.

Is the Character of William Penn worthy of admiration?  
 Was Charles the Second's Declaration of Indulgence rightly rejected by the Nonconformists?  
 Was the American Revolution founded on Just Causes?  
 What causes Over-population—Plenty or Poverty?  
 Are Protective Duties always disadvantageous?  
 Is the Religious Theory of Civil Government Defensible?  
 Do Colenso's Bible Criticisms favour Infidelity?  
 Are the Triumphs of Power worth their Cost?  
 Is the Phalanstery or the Family the best form of Training Children?  
 Is Mnemotechny practically useful?  
 Was the Conquest of Peru justifiable?  
 Is Competition advantageous?  
 Is the enforced Depopulation of a Country right?  
 Is Clanship a beneficial form of Civilization?  
 Are Christian Missions a failure?  
 Is Lay Preaching Scriptural?  
 Is Denominationalism Christian?  
 Is Ceremonialism disadvantageous and injudicious?  
 Is Auricular Confession consistent with Independence?  
 Should an Atheist fear to die?  
 Can a pre-Adamite Antiquity be proved regarding the Human Race?  
 Are the early books of the Old Testament Symbolical or Historical?  
 Was the Human Race ever miraculously dispersed?  
 Ought Missions to be Religious or Commercial?  
 Ought Copyright to be International?  
 Is the Church or the Bible the pillar and ground of the Faith?  
 Is "The License Law" just and expedient?  
 Should Public Traffic in Spirituous Liquors be declared Illegal?  
 Ought Education to be regulated by a person's intended profession?  
 Is Modern equal to Ancient Piety?

Is the Study of Modern preferable to that of Ancient Languages?  
 Does Christianity forbid Social Amusements?  
 Is the Maine Law applicable to England?  
 Is Emulation a just principle in Education?  
 Are Peace Principles practical in the world?  
 Can the Efficacy of Prayer be proved?  
 Is Moral Education more important than Intellectual?  
 Would Papal Supremacy benefit Mankind?  
 Has the Influence of the Aristocracy on Literature been beneficial?  
 Have Mechanics' Institutes been beneficial to the People?  
 Are the Masses more selfish than the Aristocracy?  
 Was the Government of Louis Phillippe worse than that of Louis Napoleon?  
 Is the Distribution of Property in England such as it should be?  
 Ought Statements of Experience to form tests for admission to Christian Churches?  
 Is Goethe worthy of his reputation as a Man and an Author?  
 Are the Teachings of Carlyle favourable to Freedom and Progress?  
 Is the use of Tobacco commendable?  
 Is the Resurrection of the Body Scriptural and Reasonable?  
 Was Le Sage the author of Gil Blas?  
 Republic or Monarchy—which is preferable?  
 Is a Country Life preferable to one in Town?  
 Are popular Lectures useful as means of Instruction?  
 Ought Working Men's Clubs to be encouraged?  
 Is "thus saith the Scriptures" a Religious *ultimatum*?  
 Was the Fall of Lord Clarendon deserved?  
 Was Lord Bacon justly Condemned?  
 Ought Insanity to annul Legal Responsibility?  
 Should Weekly Wages be Taxable as Income?

## Our Collegiate Course; OR, AIDS TO SELF-CULTURE.

### STUDIES IN ENGLISH LITERATURE.

#### POPE'S "ESSAY ON CRITICISM."—PART II.

[Fame is transient, and the critic who gives it should give it quickly.]

<p>Be thou the <i>first true</i> merit to <i>befriend</i>;          His praise is lost who stays till all commend. (56)  <i>Short</i> is the <i>date</i>, alas! of modern <i>rhymes</i>,          And 'tis but just to let them live betimes.          No longer now that golden age appears,          When Patriarch wits survived a thousand years:          Now length of Fame (our second life) is lost, (57)          And bare three score is all that we can boast;          Our sons their father's failing language see,          And such as Chaucer is shall Dryden be.</p>	<p>275</p> <p>280</p>
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#### MEANINGS OF WORDS IN ITALICS, AS SUGGESTIONS FOR PARAPHRASING.

<p>Line 274. Earliest; genuine; to appreciate.</p>	<p>276. Brief; popularity; poems.</p>
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(56) "*Bis dat qui cito dat.*" He gives twice who gives quickly.—*A. Alcibiades*.

(57) "Why then doth *Fleah*, a bubble-glass of breath,  
 Hunt after honour and advancement vain,  
 And rear a trophy for devouring *Death*,  
 With so great labour and long-lasting pain,  
 As if his days for ever should remain?  
 Sith all that in this world is great and gay  
 Doth as a vapour vanish and decay.

"Look back who list upon the former ages,  
 And call to count what is of them become;  
 Where be those learned wits and antique sages  
 Which of all wisdom knew the perfect sum?  
 Where those great warriors which did overcome  
 The world with conquest of their might and main,  
 And made one meer of the earth and of their reign?"

*Edmund Spenser's "Ruins of Time."*

"The fame of a poet is popular, or nothing. He does not address himself, like the man of science, to the learned, or those who desire to learn; but to all mankind: and his purpose being to delight and to be praised, necessarily extends to all who can receive pleasure or join in applause. It is strange and somewhat humiliating to see how great a proportion of those who had once fought their way successfully to distinction, and surmounted the rivalry of contemporary envy, have again sunk into neglect. We have great deference for public opinion, and readily admit that nothing but what is good can be permanently popular. But though its *vivat* may be generally oracular, its *pereat* appears to us to be often sufficiently capricious; and while we would willingly foster all that it bids to live, we would willingly revive much that it leaves to die. . . . While our tasks



So when the *faithful* pencil has *designed*  
 Some *bright idea* of the *master's* mind, 285  
 When a new world leaps out at his command,  
 And ready nature waits upon his hand;  
 When the *ripe* colours *soften* and *unite*, (58)  
 And sweetly melt into just shade and light;  
 When mellowing years their full perfection give 290  
 And each *bold* figure *just begins* to live,  
 The treacherous colours the fair art betray,  
 And all the bright creation fades away!

[As Fame is exposed to envy, critics should be generous.]

Unhappy wit, like most mistaken things,  
*Atones* not for that *envy* which it *brings* ; 295  
 In youth alone its empty praise we boast,  
 But soon the short-lived vanity is lost;  
 Like some fair flower the early Spring supplies,  
 That gaily blooms, but e'en in blooming dies.  
 What is the wit which must our cares employ ? 300  
 The owner's wife, that other men enjoy:

284. Trustworthy; planned.

285. Original outgrowth; draughts-  
 man's.

288. Glowing; blend; mingle.

291. Well-drawn; perceptibly; seems.

295. Compensates; ill-feeling; ex-  
 cites.

lengthen, our lives remain as short as ever; and the calls on our time multiply, while our time itself is flying swiftly away. . . . And many poets worthy of eternal remembrance have been forgotten, merely because there was not room in our memories for all."—Lord Jeffrey's "*Essays*," "*Review of Campbell's Specimens of the British Poets*," 1819.

(58) "Words are, in fact, the colours by which an author paints his pictures; and the colour which he uses betrays the man. In our day the exigencies of science, of commerce, the requirements of modern life, the new thoughts, the new feelings to which progress gives birth, are, in one sense, expanding, and, in another, restricting the meaning of words. Our language requires both enriching and purifying. . . . And never had we more need of fresh life and vigour in our poetry than at the present moment. Our Muses have emigrated from the woody heights of Parnassus and the springs of Hippocrene to Mayfair. Poetry, instead of being an oak of the forest, nurtured by the wind and rain, is now a plant forced in the hot air of drawing-rooms. The manliness of tones which so stamped itself upon our Elizabethan dramatists seems in danger of dying. Those great poets mixed with the crowd, wrestled with a thousand ills, and throve upon misfortunes which would overwhelm the modern minstrel. One was a brick-mason, one a parish clerk, and the greatest the son of a butcher. Their plays are full of life, of its stern trials—such as the poor only know,—reflects man's passions, and joys, and aspirations; and, above all, are written in strong, homely English. And yet upon mere words, of course, poetry does not depend. You may use the most beautiful words as a limner does the most beautiful colours, and still produce only a daub. For poetry comes only out of a high, earnest life, purified by discipline, and fortified by reason, in the essential goodness of things, and then comes only at those rare intervals when—

"Our great good parts put wings into our souls."

Cornhill Magazine, July, "*The Poetry of Provincialisms*," pp. 40—42.

Then most our trouble still when most admired,  
 And still the more we give, the more required;  
 Whose fame with pains we guard but lose with ease,  
 Sure some to vex, but never all to please;  
 'Tis what the vicious fear, the virtuous shun.  
 By fools 'tis hated and by knaves undone!  
 If wit so much from *ignorance undergo*,  
 Ah, let not learning too commence its foe!  
*Of old*, those *met* rewards who could *excel*,  
 And such were praised who but endeavoured well.  
 Though triumphs were to generals only due,  
 Crowns were reserved to grace the soldiers too.  
 Now they who reach Parnassus' lofty crown,  
 Employ their *pains* to *spurn* some others down;  
 And while self-love each jealous writer rules,  
*Contending wits* become the *sport* of *fools*;  
 But still the *worst* with most *regret commend*  
 For each ill author is as bad a friend.  
 To what base ends and by what abject ways  
 Are *mortals urged* through *sacred lust* (59) of *praise*!  
 Ah, ne'er so dire a thirst of glory boast,  
 Nor in the critic let the man be lost.  
 Good nature and good name must ever join;  
 To err is human—to forgive divine.

305

310

315

320

325

308. Genius; stupidity; endure.  
 310. In former ages; received; out-  
 shine.  
 315. Use; great exertions; kick de-  
 risively.

317. Quarrelsome authors; plaything;  
 the ignorant.  
 318. Lowest; vexation; bestow praise.  
 321. Mankind driven; graceless  
 greed; fame.

(59) "Auri sacra fames." Cursed greed of gold.—*Virgil*.

"How vain that second life in other's breath,  
 The estate which wits inherit after death!  
 Ease, health, and life, for this they must resign  
 (Unsure the tenure, but how vast the fine!)  
 The great man's curse, without the gains endure;  
 Be envied, wretched, and be flattered, poor;  
 All luckless wits their enemies profess'd,  
 And all successful, jealous friends at best.  
 Nor Fame I slight; nor for her favours call:  
 She comes unlooked for, if she comes at all.  
 But if the purchase cost so dear a price  
 As soothing folly, or exalting vice;  
 Ah, if the muse must flatter lawless sway,  
 And follow still where fortune leads the way.  
 Or, if no basis bear my rising name,  
 But the fallen ruins of another's fame,  
 Then teach me, Heaven, to scorn the guilty bays,  
 Drive from my breast that *wretched lust of praise*;  
 Unblemish'd let me live, or die unknown;  
 Ah, grant an honest fame, or grant me none!"

*Pope's "Temple of Fame" (closing lines).*

## Literary Notes.

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The Religious Tract Society is about to issue, in 12 vols., for 17s., "A Collection of the Writings of the British Reformers," with biographies, sketches, portraits, &c.

Longfellow's translation of Dante is reported as *in the press*.

A uniform edition of the old English poets is projected in America.

A library of old English divines, carefully edited, is among the favourite designs of two American publishers.

Miss H. F. Gould, American poetess, died September 5th.

Richard Hildreth, historian of the United States, translator of Bentham's "Legislation," author of the "White Slave," &c., died at Trieste, where he was U.S. Consul, July 10th, aged 58.

"A History of the American Civil War," by Dr. J. W. Draper, whose "History of the Intellectual Development of Europe" attracted much notice, is promised early. He has just issued "Thoughts on the Future Civil Policy of America."

Jonquin Navarre has translated Prescott's "Conquest of Mexico" into Spanish.

Mr. Griffiths, president of the Benares College, has in the press "Idylls from the Sanscrit," chiefly translations from Kāladāsa.

Buckle's work, "The History of Civilization," is not to be left uncontinued; Judge Dean of Albany, U.S., has undertaken this task, for which he is said to be eminently qualified.

Rev. Franke Parker, M.A., is about to make Daniel and Thucydides illustrate each other in regard to the coming of the Messiah in a critique of Dr. Pusey's "Daniel the Prophet."

The *Church and State Review* is to be changed from a monthly to a weekly

serial, and the editorship goes out of the hands of Archdeacon Denison.

Rev. C. E. Oakley, author of an account of the translation of the English Bible (1855), died Sept. 15th, aged 33.

Traugott Bromme, author of "Travels in North America and Upper Canada" (1834), and draughtsman of the atlas to Humboldt's "Cosmos," died at Stuttgart, Sept. 4th, aged 64.

Mr. J. H. Purkiss, who has left behind him a treatise on dynamics, was drowned in the Cam, while bathing, in August, aged 23.

Count Waldarsee is engaged on "The War in Denmark in 1864."

M. Berryer is about to issue, with annotations, his "Orations" at the bar and in the Chambers.

The municipality of Florence has put up a monumental marble tablet on the house where Mrs. T. Trollope died.

Professor Fétis, of Brussels, has issued a "Musical Dictionary."

Lamartine's "Life of Byron" is publishing as a *feuilleton*.

Francis II., late King of Naples, intends, it is said, to publish his memoirs.

M. Jules Vallés is writing a series of papers in the *Courier du Dimanche* on English literature.

The *Anthologia Italiana*, a sort of fortnightly review, is to be begun in Florence in November.

Cassell, Petter, and Galpin, are to issue Gustave Doré's "Illustrations of the Bible."

Dudley Costello, author of "Faint Heart never won Fair Lady," "Italy from the Alps to the Tiber," &c., died September 30th, aged 63.

Messrs. Clark, of Edinburgh, are about to issue, in about 16 vols., a "Library of the Ante-Nicene Fathers,"

faithfully translated, with biographical, critical, and bibliographical introductions and notes.

An authorized Life of Cobden is in good hands.

F. Réthore has written a defence of French Sensationalism, under the title of "Condillac, or Empiricism and Rationalism."

M. Jules Barni (b. 1818), the Kantist, has published the lectures on the Encyclopedists and their Times which he delivered in Geneva, 1861-2.

Rev. Canon H. Stowell (b. 1799), author of "The Bible Self-evidential," "Tractarianism Tested," died Oct. 8th.

Arrangements have been made with the widow of Pierre Joseph Proudhon, the French publicist and statesman, author of "The Contradictions of Political Economy," &c. (1809—1865), for the publication of his "Works," in 40 monthly volumes. This does not include an annotated Bible, which has been valued at £1,400.

Barry Cornwall (B. W. Proctor) has nearly ready a biography of Charles Lamb (Elia).

George Linley, song writer, author of "The Modern Hudibras," &c., died September 26th.

Sir A. Grant, Bart., author of "The Ethics of Aristotle," and Prof. E. L. Lushington, are to edit "The Philosophical Remains" of the late J. F. Ferrier, LL.D.

Messrs. Sampson Low and Co. are to set a monthly "Argosy" afloat.

Coleridge's "Friend" is to be re-issued in Bohn's Standard Library, now the property of Bell and Daldy.

W. A. Wheeler has in the press a "Dictionary of Persons and Places of Note in Novels," &c.

The Commentary on the authorized version of the Holy Scriptures, projected by the Speaker of the House of Commons, and to be edited by the Archbishop of York, aided by some of the best Biblical scholars in the country, is in progress, some of it even in type.

Prof. D. Masson, who has been transferred to Edinburgh as successor to Aytoun, yielding to the impatience of the public for the conclusion of his "Life of Milton," and his own desire to work out his idea, is about to resign the management of *Macmillan's Magazine*, over which he has presided since the commencement.

The Talbot Inn, High Street, Borough, London, being, by tradition, though newly repaired, in 1676 the scene of which Chaucer says,—

"In Southwark, at the Tabard as I lay,  
Ready to wenden on my pilgrimage  
To Canterbury,"—

it has been proposed to purchase it, and preserve it as a memorial of England's earliest poet.

"The Collected Writings of Edward Irving, edited by his nephew, Rev. G. Carlyle, has been so far completed in five volumes; but it is proposed to add a sixth, consisting of selections from his writings on the Interpretation of the Prophetic Scriptures.

Gerald Massey has in the press a work of much interest on "Shakspeare's Sonnets." This work will give, it is said, a new explanation of those mysteries of literature, the difficulties of which have been, in part, expounded in a paper on "Shakspeare Controversies," in this serial in April, 1864. Mr. G. Massey was the author of the *Quarterly Review* article in the Tercentenary year.

Victor Hugo's "Chansons de la rue et des bois" are ready, and are issued simultaneously in Brussels and Paris.

Charles Richardson, LL.D., author of "A New Dictionary of the English Language," &c., died 6th Oct. aged 90.

C. A. Rassam, Vice-consul at Mosul, has nearly completed a new translation of Isaiah.

An "Annual," on Dante Literature, was determined on at the Dresden Literary Society, of which King John of Saxony, the German translator of "The Divine Comedy," is the president.

## Epoch Men.

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### PETER BAYLE.—FREE DISCUSSION.

"The influence of Bayle's writings on the taste and views of speculative men of all persuasions, has been so great as to mark him out as one of the most conspicuous men of his age."—*Dugald Stewart*.

"Bayle was a firm and sincere friend of truth, and succeeded in combating the prejudices, the errors, the follies, but especially the superstitions of intolerance, with the weapons of reasoning, learning, and an astute wit."—*G. T. Tennemann*.

WHILE strolling alone, on a fine autumn day, along that pleasant elm-shaded walk which margins the south bank of the Seine,—the grand course of Rouen,—we endeavoured to recal to our thoughts the literary memories of that city, the birthplace of the brother dramatists, P. and T. Corneille, Fontenelle, their nephew, the rhetorician Sanadon, the erudite Bochart, Basnage, the early, and Armand Carrel, the later and greater journalist, &c.; and we recollected that in his young years Peter Bayle, "the pioneer of free discussion in modern times," and the most subtle controversialist of the seventeenth century, had for a brief space striven to earn, as a teacher there, the scanty bread his moderate necessities required. On returning to the city we inquired if the house where he had resided was known, but failed to elicit any information. At the Library of the Hotel de Ville, by the courtesy of the curator we were permitted to turn over the pages of those volumes in which such a singular mass of rare and varied erudition is so lavishly, but indigestedly submitted to the reader; and in which he has so sedulously advocated free thought and the right of expressing it. That evening we noted the life of Peter Bayle as that of one which ought at an early date to find a place among those Epoch Men, a record of whose thoughts or doings have from time to time found space allotted to them in the pages of *The British Controversialist*.

Henry Rogers calls Bayle a "subtle and acute critic," and Edward Gibbon does not hesitate to speak of him as "the accurate and enlightened dialectician." Such authorities sufficiently assert his power as a thinker to entitle him to consideration. It will be our duty hereafter to estimate the worth of the efforts he made, the value of the influence he brought into living effect upon human thought, and the character of the tendency his labours imparted to critical literature. But we shall briefly sketch the events of his life, and describe the nature and contents of his works, before we attempt to appraise his merits, or pronounce on his defects.

Peter Bayle was the son of a Calvinistic clergyman of Carlat, a village in the old earldom of Foix, under the shadow of the Pyrenees. He was born 18th Nov., 1647, and received his early education under the care of his father, who taught him Latin and Greek, and encouraged a passionate love of reading, which he displayed in his youth. His extraordinary ingenuity of mind and vivacity of memory induced in his parents the hope that he might attain a fair eminence in life. It was not, however, till he had reached his nineteenth year that he was sent to the Protestant College at Puylaurens, where he studied literature from February, 1666, to February, 1669, working with such earnestness as to injure his constitution. That he might acquire a superior course of philosophy he was transferred to the College of Toulouse, a seminary of repute, under the care of the Jesuits. Here the talent of the members of that great Order

"By winning words to conquer willing hearts,  
And make persuasion do the work of fear,"

was exercised; and through the arguments of its professors, and the skilfully conducted discussions of the priest in whose district he dwelt, he was led to renounce Protestantism and to embrace Catholicism. His conversion, while it gratified the Fathers extremely, annoyed and grieved his relatives, and on his return from Toulouse they exerted every effort to restore him to orthodox Protestantism. In this they succeeded, and after a seventeen months' profession of Catholicism he retraced his hastily-taken step as hastily, and made his peace with his father's church.

At this time apostates from the Holy Mother Church were visited by sore pains and penalties, and to escape these Bayle took refuge in the queen city of Protestantism—Geneva, where he supported himself by giving private tuition in different families. Hence he acquired the lasting friendship of Basnage, and lived on terms of intimacy with the celebrated Professors Benedict Pictet, the theologian and historian, and John Leger, the linguist and philosopher. The doctrines of Descartes were at this time in the ascendant in Geneva, and Bayle eagerly studied the reformed philosophy; and threw aside the scholasticism he had imbibed from his Jesuit teachers. Through the friendship of Basnage, Bayle was appointed tutor to the sons of Count Dohna, and dwelt with them at Copet, in the Pays de Vaud. In 1674, he removed to Rouen, where he became a teacher; but anxious to acquire the society of learned men, access to books, and a wider sphere of effort, he started for Paris, and began the fatiguing duties of an instructor there,—feeling himself fully indemnified by the libraries and associations available in that great centre of intellectual activity. From this great city he corresponded with Basnage, and gave him the news of the times, with sketches of the ideas which occupied his own mind. These Basnage, with the zeal of friendship, showed to Peter Jurieu, the famous Protestant theologian and controver-

sialist, then a Professor in Sedan, a town ceded to France in 1624, by the Duke of Bouillon. Jurieu was charmed with the rich, fresh thought these letters indicated, and when the chair of philosophy became vacant Jurieu nominated Bayle as a candidate; and this appointment he gained after, as was then the fashion, a public disputation and trial of skill, 2nd November, 1675. Philosophy was at this time in a transition state. Scholasticism had been opposed by the experientialism of Lord Bacon, the rationalism of Descartes, the idealism of Spinoza, the materialism of Hobbes, the intellectualism of Cudworth, and the mysticism of Malebranche. Bayle, though trained in the driest school of formal Aristotileism, had renounced the olden, and accepted the modern, philosophy, becoming, for the time, a professed Cartisian. But it was now his duty to examine and appraise, as well as expound systems,—to study them critically, in fact. But the critical faculty of Bayle had been chiefly excited, and operated on, by Montaigne, whose works formed the favourite reading of the Professor of Philosophy in the College of Sedan. The influence of the *Essayist* on a subtle mind, set in the midst of a wild fermentation of thought, was such as to incline him to balance the pretensions of experience and reason against the suggestions of intuition and the assertions of religion, as the prerequisite to a determinate acceptance of the doctrines taught by the rival claimants of the possession of authoritative truth. During five years he managed to advocate a free and progressive spirit of inquiry without exciting doubt or jealousy in influential quarters. His lectures were listened to with attentive deference; his publications, striking even in their titles, but still more in their contents, excited interest; his relations with the learned rapidly extended, and the greater part of the thoughtful men of the age entered into correspondence with him. He became one of the arbiters of fame. An occasion, however, arose by which he was led to commit himself to distinct opinions. In 1680, the appearance of a comet, the most remarkable for brilliancy of which we have any authentic account, and one which approached nearer the sun than any other whose distance has been accurately calculated, had spread consternation and despair, and started the questions,—

“ Art thou the flag of woe and death  
From angel's ensign-staff unfurled?  
Art thou the standard of God's wrath  
Waved o'er a sordid sinful world? ”

This comet is one of much interest. Flamsteed wrote down careful observations of its course, and from these Newton was able to calculate the kind of curve it marked out in the celestial spaces, and to prove that the very force which rules the planets also governs the apparently wayward career of comets, and Doerfel was led by it to suggest the parabolic hypothesis which Newton in part adopted. Whiston calculated its period of revolution as one of 575

years, and it is said to have been seen shortly before Julius Cæsar's death, in the reign of Justinian, and again in Henry I.'s reign, 1106, the year of the settlement of the Investiture dispute. Bayle, with the intention of allaying the superstitious alarm it had excited, wrote his celebrated "Letter on Comets," in which it is proved by many arguments derived from philosophy and theology, that comets are not the prophets of mischance; with many moral and political reflections, and many historical remarks in refutation of several popular errors. A license for the publication of the work was refused; and in July, 1681, the University of Sedan was, contrary to the express stipulations of the treaty of transfer, arbitrarily suppressed by a decree of Louis XIV. Jurieu and Bayle took refuge in Holland. By the earnest efforts of one of his former pupils, M. de Paets, a pension was obtained from the magistracy of Rotterdam, for Bayle; and subsequently they authorized the opening of a new seminary, in which Jurieu obtained the professorship of Theology, and Bayle that of History and Philosophy. The relations of these old friends now change. Jurieu's position was, it would seem, now reversed, he was the patronized, and not the patron. He and Bayle were colleagues, but enemies. Bayle's lectures began in December, 1681, and in the spring of 1682,—it is said in a fortnight of the Easter vacation,—he wrote a reply to the verbose History of Calvinism issued by Louis Maimbourg, which contained, in Bayle's opinion, a libellous misrepresentation of the conduct of the French Protestant church. "The General Criticism of Maimbourg's History of Calvinism" was condemned to be publicly burned in Paris, by Louis XIV.—a method of reply intended to save the monarch's pensioned scribbler trouble, but which greatly increased the sale and efficiency of Bayle's trenchant exposure of his slips, errors, and falsehoods.

As "a calm and a lofty spectator of the religious tempest, the philosopher of Rotterdam condemned with equal fairness, the persecution of Louis XIV., and the Republican maxims of the Calvinists, their vain prophecies, and the intolerant bigotry, which sometimes vexed his solitary retreat."

At Amsterdam, in 1684, there was published a collection of some curious pieces concerning the philosophy of Descartes, which have often been attributed to Bayle, and most probably are his, as they are marked by similar felicities of phrase, and are characterized by much of the same questioning and dubious spirit as he displayed in other works known to be his. In March of that same year he took a new step in starting *The News of the Republic of Letters*, a monthly literary journal (perhaps suggested by the *Journal des Savans*, begun in 1665), whose contents consisted of reviews of works of importance, a list of new books, with brief remarks on them. The new adventure excited great interest. In May, Bayle received an invitation from the Council of the University of Francker, in Friesland, in the north of Holland; but this, although it offered an increased salary, he refused, because it



would be ungrateful to Rotterdam and injurious to his fresh literary enterprise, in which his interest was deep, and on which he laboured with much intensity. Indeed he was always so industrious as to seem inspired by a perfect hunger for labour. He told Des Mai-zeaux, his biographer, that from twenty to forty he worked fourteen hours a day, and never, in fact, knew what leisure was. His mode of living at this time is—in the preface to the second volume of his "Dictionary," thus described by himself,—“Amusements, pleasure-parties, games, collations, trips to the country, visiting, and other recreations, necessary, as they say, to many literary men, have no place in my manner of life; I lose no time in them, neither do I spend any on domestic cares, or in interfering with anything or meddling at all with business. In this way a man may accomplish much.”

To a man of such indomitable ardour in labour, the charm of periodical writing must have been immense,—affording as it did a constantly-recurring publicity, an opportunity of placing every thought, fresh with the interest of its new life, before the public at once, a facility for the certain gratification of friends, and for ready retaliation against those who held opinions of an opposite tendency and for acquiring a profitable celebrity. Such a man, too, was specially fitted for such a task. With varied talents and some learning, with an almost unsurpassed richness of reading, an acute mind, fertile wit, ingenious felicity of composition, and a splendidly incisive critical power, he combined almost every requisite in versatility and judiciousness, taste, culture, and readiness which editorial functions seem to require. He had besides a wide agency of literary friends willing and able to assist him, and by the suggestiveness of whose correspondence his labour was much advantaged. Even with all these qualifications and recommendations, however, his labours were not all undertaken in sunshine and finished in the light of love. The conducting of a critical journal in an uncritical age, and at a time when the rights of critics were not recognized, could not but be a difficult task. The jealousies, envies, and “quarrels of authors,” are proverbial. The waters of bitterness too frequently flow through the fields of criticism,—for the assumption upon which criticism proceeds, that the reviewer possesses the capacity to adjudicate upon the worth of another's effort, itself involves an element of discord especially likely to burst into ill-feeling, and result in enmity. Of the literary hostility he encountered we shall hear again. We have to notice now that the eccentric ex-queen, Christina of Sweden, fancying that in a letter from Rome, published in the *Nouvelles*, an offensive allusion was made to her, commissioned one of her ladies to demand an apology. This incident he managed so adroitly as not only to withdraw the royal enmity but to elicit from her an autograph request that she might have the favour of numbering him among the men of mark in the world with whom she loved to correspond, and he became one of that singular heroine's intimates; the more so as she, like him,

censured the persecuting violence of Louis XIV. Much of her correspondence with Bayle has been preserved.

He was in the midst of his active editorial career when, in 1685, the Edict of Nantes—the Bill of Rights of the Protestants of France—was revoked. By this Act, worship, according to the reformed church was forbidden, Protestant clergymen were proscribed, and parents were enjoined to bring up their children as Catholics; confiscation of property, and condemnation to the galleys, was declared against all who should attempt to leave the country; and troops of dragoons were sent into Protestant localities to stimulate conversions. This disastrous resolution, which gave rise to frightful atrocities, occasioned terrible sufferings, and caused a hundred thousand families to transfer their industry to Germany, England, and Holland, excited in Bayle a very bitter feeling, to which, though he repressed it in his magazine, he gave full vent in an anonymous pamphlet on “Catholic France under Louis XIV.” In this work he not only expressed his indignation at the persecutions favoured by the dominant church, but also his earnest sympathy with those who were compelled to suffer for conscience’ sake. Though grief strove hard to overwhelm him by the death, within very short intervals, of his father and two brothers, his intense love for freedom of thought roused him up from the indulgence of personal sorrow to a vigorous protest against the spirit of persecution which appeared to be gaining the mastery in his time. The means which he took to accomplish this object was to compose, under the form of a translation from the English, though widely known to be an original work, a sort of lay-sermon against the constraint of human belief, from the text (Luke. xiv. 23), “Compel them to come in, that My house may be filled;”—a text on which some of the advocates of persecution used to found their justification. This caustic, and, let us confess it, somewhat coarse production, exerted a powerful influence on thinking minds. Bayle does not seem to have been acquainted with Jeremy Taylor’s magnificent polemic on “The Liberty of Prophesying,” published in 1647; but it is said that Bayle’s tract led Locke, who was then residing in Holland, to reconsider the thoughts the perusal of Taylor’s work had suggested, and to write his “Letters on Toleration.” It also influenced the minds of Leibnitz and Limborch. Hallam gives the following account of the book. “He gives, in the first part, nine reasons against this literal meaning” [which the persecutors sought to attach to the text], “among which none are philological. This work of Bayle does not seem to me as subtle and logical as he was wont to be, notwithstanding the formal syllogisms with which he commences each of his chapters. His argument against compulsory conversions, which the absurd interpretation of the text by his adversaries required, is indeed irresistible; but this is far from establishing the right of toleration itself. It appears not very difficult for a skilful sophist—and none was more so than Bayle himself—to have met some of his reasoning with a specious reply.

The sceptical argument of Taylor, that we can rarely be sure of knowing the truth ourselves, and consequently of condemning in others what is error, he touches but slightly; nor does he dwell on the political advantages which experience has shown a full toleration to possess. In the third part of the 'Philosophic Commentary' he refutes the Apology of Augustine for Persecution."

The labour expended on this book, and in preparing for the regular issue of his serial, and the reaction of restrained grief, brought upon him a severe attack of illness in the early part of the succeeding year. In February he was compelled to resign his editorship, which was handed over by the booksellers to De la Roque and Barrin, who conducted it for ten years, with very inferior skill; after that it passed into the hands of I. Bernard and J. le Clerc. This was, however, a mere publisher's arrangement. Bayle, the projector, passed his right and conveyed the working out of his idea to Henry Basnage, the brother of his friend, a Rouenese, who continued the work successfully under the title of the "History of the Works of Learned Men," for twenty-two years.

We quote from Disraeli, the elder, the following sketch of Bayle, the editor:—"He possessed the art, acquired by habit, of reading a book by his fingers, as it has been well expressed; and of comprising in concise extracts, a just notion of a book without the addition of irrelevant matter. He had (for his day) sufficient playfulness to wreath the rod of criticism with roses; and for the first time the ladies and all the *beau-monde* took an interest in the arid labours of criticism. Yet even Bayle, who declared himself to be a reporter and not a judge,—Bayle, the discreet sceptic, could not long satisfy his readers. His panegyric was thought somewhat prodigal; his fluency of style somewhat too familiar; and others affected not to relish the poignancy of his gaiety. In his latter volumes, to still the clamour, he assumed the cold sobriety of an historian; he has bequeathed no mean legacy to the literary world, in thirty-six small volumes of criticism, closed in 1687."\*

All the year 1687 he was incapacitated from literary labour, although he continued to teach. He was suffering from a disease of the chest, which, as being hereditary, he believed to be incurable, and refused to take medical advice upon, though he watched with imperturbable calm the ravages it made, and observed the speed with which it was hurrying him to his grave. He grudged every moment lost to labour; and perhaps his greed of work was stimulated by his sense of the shortness of his time. He would work out, not rust away, and by a life of earnest industry prepare for the grand transmutation of death.

It is probable that about this time, while incapable of following his usual course of active literary effort, he indulged himself in reading and annotating the "Historical Dictionary," issued in 1674

\* "Curiosities of Literature,"—*Literary Journal*, vol. i., p. 16.

by Louis Moreri, who, after composing another volume of corrections and additions, had died from overwork at the early age of thirty-seven in 1680. While perusing this substantial labour of a brief life, and comparing it with others, he formed a project for writing a book supplementary to, and corrective of, previous dictionaries. But the blast of war rung in his ears, and he required to buckle on his controversial armour somewhat unexpectedly.

Bayle was in the habit of publishing his books anonymously, and of employing a great many shifty artifices to divert the hand of persecution from seizing him with clear evidence of authorship quotable against him; and in the state of literature at that time there was perhaps excuse enough for such devices. Most works of note, however, soon became sufficiently fixed in public opinion for good or evil as to indicate whether danger or safety awaited the acknowledgment of authorship, and most of Bayle's works were known as forthcoming by his friends, even while he was carefully preparing the hoax regarded as advisable to secure him from the uselessness of martyrdom—of being doomed to silence. Jurieu envied and hated Bayle with the fierce enmity of an old friend,—and jealousy of his colleague's popularity or dislike of the opinions of the man he had lifted into eminence, burned in his soul. On the appearance in 1690 of a tract entitled, "Important Counsel to Refugees," which contained an attack on the doctrines and conduct of the French Protestants, Jurieu, without proof, chose to attribute the pamphlet to Bayle, and wrote an "Examination" of the work, in which he charged Bayle with the authorship, and accused him of being in league with the French party. To this Bayle replied, in 1691, with the "Chimerical Cabal," in which he denied the charges, and he followed this up with "The Chimera of the Cabal Demonstrated," in further defence of himself. Bayle never admitted the authorship. It has been ascribed to Pelison. Basnage thinks it was composed by Daniel de la Roque, and that Bayle wrote the preface. De la Roque was a reconvert to Romanism, and Pelison shortly afterwards followed his example. The style very much resembles Bayle's, and though Des Maizeaux, his friend and biographer, by apologizing for the book, impliedly admits a suspicion that it is his, we are inclined to regard Basnage's idea as the right one, more especially as the subsequent conduct of Jurieu drew upon him a good deal of odium at Geneva;—an unlikely result had the heads of the party there, believed in the treachery of Bayle. However this may be, and we cannot profess to be able to settle the question definitively, Jurieu, who possessed great influence in Holland, denounced Bayle to the Consistory of Rotterdam as an atheist and a conspirator against the Commonwealth, basing his accusation for the first count on his "Letter on Comets," published twelve years before, and for the second, on the "Counsels." The Consistory found that the "Letter" contained dangerous and heretical doctrines; and that the "Counsels" proved that Bayle was treasonably advocating the views and wishes of France,—a power with

which the State was then waging a fierce war. With the consent, if not indeed at the express command of William III., the magistracy of Rotterdam hereupon, in 1693, revoked his licence to teach either in public or in private, and withdrew his pension. "Singular," says Cousin, "was the destiny of this man of the south of France, who, to escape the superstitions of his own country, fell into the hands of the Synod of Dordrecht."

Thus debarred from teaching, Bayle's mind turned all the more intensely and fondly to the work suggested to his mind during his illness,—the preparation of a "Critical and Historical Dictionary." Indeed, he congratulated himself sincerely on his freedom from the mutually destructive professional jealousy to which academical life is subject; and deliberately settled himself down, amid fruit and cabbage stalls,—with barges gliding slowly along the semi-stagnant canals,—in his house in the great market-place of Rotterdam (right opposite to which the great bronze statue of a kindred spirit—Erasmus—stands), to labour, with all the earnestness of a determinate resolve, at this notable and characteristic literary effort. M. A. A. Barbier, private librarian to Napoleon I., informs us that "the celebrated Bayle had no other intention when he commenced his "Dictionary" than to correct the numerous mistakes of Moreri: but the work thus begun soon became one of the greatest importance." Moreri's book was "a kind of encyclopædic dictionary,—biographical, historical, and geographical. Bayle professed to fill up the numerous deficiencies, and to rectify the errors of this compiler. . . The learning of Bayle was copious, especially in what was peculiarly required, the controversies, the anecdotes, the miscellaneous facts and sentences scattered over the vast surface of literature for two preceding centuries. In that of antiquity he was less profoundly versed, yet so quick in application of his classical store, that he passes for a better scholar than he was. His original design may have been only to fill up the deficiencies of Moreri, but a mind so fertile and excursive could not be restrained in such limits. We may find in this an apology for the numerous omissions of Bayle, which would in a writer absolutely original seem both capricious and unaccountable. We never can anticipate with confidence that we shall find any name in his dictionary. The notes are most frequently unconnected with the life to which they are appended; so that under a name uninteresting to us, or inapposite to our purpose we may be led into the richest vein of the author's fine reasoning or lively wit. Bayle is admirable in exposing the fallacies of dogmatism, the perplexities of philosophy, the weaknesses of those who affect to guide mankind. But wanting the necessary condition of good reasoning,—an earnest desire to reason well, a moral rectitude from which the truth must spring, he often avails himself of petty cavils, and becomes dogmatical in his very doubts. The sophistry of Bayle, however, bears no proportion to his acute and just observations."\*

\* "Hallam's "Literature of Europe," vol. iii., part 4., chap. 7, p. 549.

"The mind of Bayle was formed by nature to move in an orbit of its own, imbued, as he seemed, with an irrepressible desire of doing what no man else would do, of thinking what no man else would think, and of finding out by the most profound research and unwearied diligence, every paradox that was discoverable in the opinions of others. . . . So completely did he seem moulded to the work of criticism and controversy, that after having at one time pointed out the inconsistency of reason with revelation, and at another the inconsistency of revelation with reason, he seemed to rest at last in the assurance that absolute truth is altogether indiscoverable, and that we must get as near to it as we can by criticising and correcting the aberrations of those who have sought it."\*

The first volume of Bayle's *Magnum Opus*, "The Historical and Critical Dictionary" was issued in August, 1695; and the second, though printed in 1696, bears the date of 1697. This is known as the *first* edition. It instantly acquired great popularity. Jurieu, Saurin, and Le Clerc criticised it severely; and the implacable Jurieu laid it before the Consistory, where five charges were brought against it. 1. Indecency. 2. The tenor of the article on David—which draws an unfavourable contrast between holiness and morality. 3. Its advocacy of Manicheanism. 4. Its defence of Scepticism. 5. Its elaborate statements of Epicurean doctrines, and the studious zeal shown in defending or commending atheists, &c. Bayle promised submission to the Consistory so far as to rewrite the paper on David, which was published in the second edition, 1702; but the public objected to this interference with the work, and demanded the book in its integrity as it came from the author, but accepted the original article in a separate form. Bayle defended himself against the accusations in some Explanations attached to the second edition, which was considerably enlarged.†

This book is not only a great, but a singular one. It is indeed most perverse in its *derangement*. Its text is meagre where it should be ample, and its notes, criticisms, quotations, digressions, doubts, sarcasms, and multifarious knowledge come into view in the most unexpected time, place, manner, and circumstance. It is not a book that can be systematically read, but it can scarcely ever be opened without amusement, information, odd turns of thought, or subtle distinction, giving gratification to the reader. The diction is clear, vivid, polished, passionless, often terse, sometimes coarse, never dim or dull; the style is gay, easy, copious, pungent, argumentative, and ingenious; the thoughts are discursive, paradoxical,

\* Morell's "Speculative Philosophy of the XIXth Cent., vol. i., chap. 3, p. 311.

† We may as well note here that other editions have been issued, of which the 3rd and 5th, 1730 and 1740, containing life of the author and additions, were edited by Des Maizeaux; the 4th, 1734, by Le Clerc; the 11th, by Beauchot, is neat, handy, and much augmented, and contains a bibliographical account of former editions. An English translation, of no great merit, appeared in 1710; and another, considerably improved, in 1734—41, in ten vols.

temperate, acute, and critical; the method is desultory, wanton, and unsettled; the matter is culled from all sources, given in all forms, put to diverse uses, and compacted round the most irrelevant topics. "If," says Gibbon, "Bayle wrote his 'Dictionary' to empty the various collections he had made, without any particular design, he could not have chosen a better plan. It permitted him everything, and obliged him to nothing. By the double freedom of a 'Dictionary' and Notes, he could pitch on what articles he pleased, and say what he pleased on those articles." Hence it is a strange conglomerate of compilation and dialectics, of curious reading and singular reflection, of patient industry and impatient petulance of thought, of opinionativeness and of hesitancy, of perverse ingenuity and persistent logical audacity. But it is a Dictionary of criticism, not scepticism; a long protest against the right of man to dogmatise and persecute, not an appeal in favour of doubt and self-indulgence. It has been misunderstood by religious men and misrepresented by infidels; by the former, because he examined keenly and controverted freely the tenets of the common faith; and by the latter, because they could make use of the doubts he suggested, for a different purpose, against revelation—while they ignored the equally trenchant objections he brought against trusting in reason. By forgetting or overlooking the design of Bayle, religion has been deprived of the good faith of the author; and infidelity has taken advantage of his mobility. He wrote, he says himself, "not to inculcate scepticism, but to suggest doubts;" "my talent consists in raising doubts, but they are doubts only." And wherefore had he this anxiety to excite doubt—to show the possibility of double thought? To prove convincingly to Catholics that the enforced faith which they could succeed in inculcating by persecution and the civil arm is truly faithless; and to show to Protestants the pertinent truth that, if they claim the right to reason on such subjects, they ought to permit others to do the same; and that as neither of them can reach the same conclusions when they reason, so neither of them ought to regard conformity of creed essential to civil co-existence. In this, as in all his other works, he endeavours to establish the general principle of toleration, by arguing that justifiable doubts are competent hindrances to uniformity of faith, and that as they may exist they ought to be allowed. The fallacy of nomenclature has been here again at work. Men talk of Bayle the sceptic, when they mean Bayle the critical controversialist.

Bayle next began a miscellany, whose title, "Replies to the Inquiries of a Provincial," seems to have been suggested by Blaise Pascal's "Letters to a Provincial," 1657. It was intended "to occupy a middle place, between books for study and books for amusement." In 1704 he wrote a Defence of his "Letter on Comets," in consequence of Le Clerc's "Defence of Providence," against the alleged aspersions of Bayle, which is contained in the first volume of "Parrhasiana." Isaac Jacquelot, in his "Conformity of Faith with Reason," 1705, opposed the theological views of Bayle, who answered in the second

and third volumes of the "Replies." Jaquelot retorted by an "Examination of Bayle's Theology." But, feeling that in controversy Bayle possessed the mastery, Jurieu, Jaquelot, and the Reverend Consistory of Rotterdam thought that a taste of banishment would benefit him, and raised again the charges of atheism and treason. This portion of their programme they were unable to carry out; for Lord Shaftesbury, the moralist, who had enjoyed Bayle's friendship, and had even invited him to escape the rancour of his foes by taking up his residence with him, interfered in his behalf, and gained a little consideration for his consumption-tortured lungs. He issued thereafter another volume of his "Replies," and a tractate, entitled "Conversations between Maximus and Themistius," in answer to Le Clerc. These "Conversations" he was continuing in reply to Jaquelot when, "pen in hand," on 28th December, 1706 (Innocents' day!), inflammation came as the messenger of Death, and called him to go and take rest: and as Leibnitz said, "It is to be hoped that Bayle is now encompassed by those lights, of which he entertained doubts upon the earth;" as it may be believed that good desire was never defective in him.

"Candidatus, insuetum miratur limen Olympi  
Sub pedibus videt nubes et sidera, Daphnis."\*

The work, in the completion of which Death stayed the author's hand, was published by the wish of his niece and housekeeper, — to whom he had acted as guardian, and to whom he bequeathed ten thousand florins; and Jaquelot issued a reply in which he had the last word and the zealot's revenge. The hand of "the cloud-compelling Jove" of literature had grown rigid, and the writer knew that his answer must be answerless. But the might of Bayle's thought is even yet triumphant in the earth, while many of his traducers are remembered only for their calumny, their envy, and their rancorous persecution of one who was both bold and humble enough to be able to say (with Britain's Laureate),—

"I stretch lame hands of faith, and grope  
And gather dust and chaff, and call  
To what I feel is Lord of All,  
And faintly trust the larger Hope."

Our chief interest in the story of Bayle lies in the fact that he, like Sir William Hamilton, recognized the gymnastic value of controversy in making the mind prompt and all-sided; its intellectual importance in exciting thought; its moral worth, as calling for the exercise of charity; its religious excellence, as the enemy of dogmatism, and the safeguard of toleration, as well as its social indispensability for forming and keeping in constant working order a

\* "Daphnis, white-robed, the courts of a strange heaven admires,  
While 'neath his feet he sees earth's clouds and their star-fires."  
Virgil's *Eclogues*, v. 56.



wise, effective, and safe public opinion. In his scepticism there was no moral turpitude. It was employed as an argument for freedom of faith, not for freedom from faith. The moral odium now attached to the designation sceptic makes it inapplicable to him. Philosophically, "Bayle is not a systematic sceptic, like Sextus and Hume, avowing his principles, and pushing them intrepidly to their last consequences." Religiously he is not a sceptic, like scoffing Mirabeau or sneering Voltaire; socially, he is not a sceptic like Robert Owen. His scepticism is like that of Montaigne, of Hobbes, of Hamilton, and (may we not say) of Mansel and of J. S. Mill; a modest doubt that human thought can ever so curiously and certainly penetrate into the secrets of divine things as to dogmatize upon creeds and persecute for opinions. Bayle's scepticism is not disbelief, is not even unbelief,—it is a hesitancy to declare an implicit belief where the mind is conscious of explicit uncertainties; it is a balancing of beliefs in the judgment, not a casting aside of faith from its influence upon practice. He advocates free discussion as a plea for toleration and doubts in behalf of the holiest interests,—freedom of conscience and honesty of thought and life.

Bayle lived in an age and had suffered from its spirit, in which great efforts were made to control opinion. The dominant sects demanded persecution in their interests. Uniformity and conformity of faith were their dearest desires. He claims the Protestant's right,—“the right of private judgment”—but he claimed it for all. He called on the churches not to fix but to educate the faith of their members, on States to regulate the conduct, not to stereotype the creeds of men, and on individuals to use their minds as the gift of their Creator freely, honestly, well assured that the free use of His endowments constituted the best homage. The rancour of his enemies has branded his name with a double-meaning epithet; the cunning of the French worldlings and sensualists by basing their “Encyclopædia” upon the same (apparent) scheme, covertly led men to think of him as a pioneer for them. He, less than most men, required infidelity as an excuse for his life. An enemy testifies of him that he was “chaste and grave in his discourse, moderate in eating and drinking, austere in his mode of life.” The pruriency which admittedly sometimes stains his page never stained his life. Though he makes an open show of the contradiction of reasons with itself, of the doctrines of religion, one with another, and of revelation with reason, and reason with revelation, he never employs either as a justification of faithlessness or immorality. His scepticism is an appeal for toleration of opinion, not an extenuation for crime. He is the apostle of free discussion as the justifying condition of religious toleration and the true outgrowth and proof of the Protestant's “right of private judgment.”

S. N.

## Politics.

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### OUGHT PARLIAMENTS TO BE SEPTENNIAL?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

WHY should Parliaments change at all? And if there must be a death-stroke given to the existence of any Parliament, on what grounds should the mortal wound be inflicted? Let us look a little at the origin and object of Parliaments, in order to arrive at some conclusion on this matter.

Parliaments are called into existence by the sovereign and the people, for advice touching high matters of state, and for the furtherance of measures tending to the amelioration of the social condition of the people and their general well-being. The king is no part of the Parliament, neither are the people, except through their representatives. The Parliament exists for the mutual benefit and support of both. What checks, then, do these two parties possess on a body independent of them, in order that they each may be well and faithfully served? The king can dismiss his ministers, *i. e.*, his principal advisers, and choose others more subservient to his wishes; but the people, by means of public opinion, can render these ministers powerless if they are acting at variance with their wishes. They must either yield or compromise the matter, or a revolution would ensue. Any one studying the rise and fall of the various ministries during the last half century, will at once acknowledge the justice of this remark. That revolutions do not ensue is to be attributed to the common sense pervading both parties, in consequence of which, rather than endanger the constitution, one or other, or both, gives way to a greater or less degree.

It would seem, then, that as the Parliament exists for the benefit of both king and people, it ought not to be put an end to so long as it is faithfully performing its duties, and giving satisfaction to both sides. You do not discharge a good servant who is doing his work well, simply because he has lived with you seven, ten, or twenty years, and just give him the chance of scrambling into his place again amid the host of competitors for your patronage, and who, till the trial is made, may seem, even to you, paragons of excellence far superior to your late servant. And so the Parliament is a servant to the nation, and as such has no right to be discharged while it does its work properly. And by Parliament, here, is to be understood not only the Cabinet ministers, and those who

sit upon the Treasury benches as their supporters, but the whole body,—Government and Opposition, Conservative, Liberal, and Radical, who have seats in the House. The duties of all the members, though differing it may be in kind, are equally important, and require to be zealously and conscientiously performed.

What is the general result of a dissolution of Parliament,—either when, as seldom occurs, it is allowed to die a natural death, or when, as is more frequently the case, a forcible end is put to its existence? Does it produce such great benefits on the country as to induce us to desire a more frequent change. Few will answer this affirmatively; for, firstly, tried men able and willing to save their country, have to fight hard for the opportunity of doing so with inexperienced and often unscrupulous opponents. Bribery is generally prevalent, and very often the better men are forced to give way to inferior ones, solely because they do not choose to outvie their opponents in empty and violent declamation, and have some regard for their principles.

Secondly. Although the new blood infused into the House may be more energetic and life-giving than the old, yet it takes time before a position in the House can be secured and sufficient influence obtained to carry out successfully the plan laid down: and often before this is accomplished Parliament is violently or naturally dissolved, and the member finds himself unseated, and is often put *hors de combat*.

Lastly. The mere excitement so prevalent at a general election stamps it as a very unfitting way of obtaining a good Parliament. Party spirit generally runs high, and, as usually happens in such cases, is one-eyed or blind altogether, intent only on the gratification of its own selfish ends, and caring little about the general welfare of the nation.

Again, if we look to the circumstances under which the different acts for limiting the duration of Parliaments, additional reasons will be found for concluding that Parliaments should not extend thus far and no farther. Previous to the passing of the Triennial Act, the power of dissolving Parliament was vested in the sovereign alone. Party opposition, as at present existing, was then unknown. Public opinion was powerless; the sovereign in this respect was absolute. Then came one motion for Parliament to dissolve only by its own consent; and this was followed by the Triennial Act, which lasted till the invasion of the Pretender, when, as the Parliament would otherwise have expired in the midst of intestine disorder, it was resolved to continue its existence till seven years from the date of its birth.

The Act was passed in a moment of alarm, and the only regret is that better precautions have not been taken against similar occurrences for the future. Is there any virtue in the number seven? Have we any guarantee that every seventh year is to be a sabbath for us,—peace and rest at home and abroad? Look even at the recent dissolution. How black and ominous were the clouds

in the political horizon! especially when we looked across the Western Main. What if they had broken with all the thunders of war upon our heads, and the Parliament on the eve of dissolution, or in the excitement of reconstitution? Possibly the duration of Parliament would have been extended; but we ought not to be left to such contingencies as that. Parliament is supposed to represent the wishes of the king and people, and so long as it does that it ought not to be disturbed.

The means of testing this are at the present time amply sufficient. First, there is the now almost-omnipotent force of public opinion, which not only makes itself heard in tones of reproach, but also gives encouragement to a Government and positively indicates the course which is in accordance with its own wishes. No man understood it better, or was more carefully guided by its utterances than the late lamented Premier; and his long retention of office, and the duration of his Parliament to its full term, are due to the use he made of this beacon-light to avoid the rocks and quicksands of political navigation. No Government can now act in the face of public opinion, which has a hundred ways of making its will known and its power felt.

Next: there is always in the House a strong opposition anxious for power, and eager to find a flaw in the proceedings of the Government of the day, that they may rise by its fall. And it is always competent in them to propose a vote of "No Confidence" in Ministers, and test the feeling of the House, and so of the country; for talk as you will about violated pledges, &c., the chances are surely equal that the treachery on each side will be to much the same extent, so that the House as a whole still represents the country. And even if the vote go against Ministers, they can still appeal to the country as a final and decisive test.

Let us now examine a few of the stock arguments for short Parliaments, and see how far they are valid.

The grand arguments employed by all the advocates of short Parliaments even those who desire annual ones is the wholesome dread which such a state of things would exercise on members, and how much better they would fulfil their hustings' pledges if they knew that they would be called to account every two or three years for their conduct; whereas, with the chance of a seven years' lease of power, they are indifferent to the wishes of their constituents, but, by a few votes at the close of the session, manage to smooth matters over with them. This, I believe, is the substance of the argument usually put forward, but if wrongly stated, I am open to correction. Now for its worth. Is a man who only does his duty, or, rather, what you think his duty, solely in consequence of continually seeing the pains and penalties of disobedience full before his face, a very exalted specimen of humanity? Is fear the highest principle which should influence a man in the discharge of his duty? By making it so, do you elevate or degrade his moral nature? Let each answer for himself.

Again: Are the majority of our members such rogues that they give pledges only to break them, and is consistency a thing unknown in the British Senate? There may be a few such, but take the parliamentary career of the majority, the very large majority, and will it be found that it is the habit of members systematically to advocate on the hustings and at St. Stephen's principles diametrically opposite? Every one knows that it is not so: and even when a member does do so, however enraged his constituents may be at the time, he is generally able, supposing they grant him an opportunity of self-vindication, to show that he was right in the view he took of the matter, or at any rate that he has not voted against their inclinations for the mere love of so doing, and without good reasons of his own. And so he is invariably assured that the confidence of his constituents in him remains unshaken. Take the hon. members for Sheffield and Stroud as notable examples. Further, when they do disagree, the presumption is that the member will be in the right and the electors in the wrong. He has a wider and deeper knowledge of the subject at issue than they, and so looks further forward and in other directions than that on which the eyes and minds of the constituents are fixed. Members of the British Parliament are representatives, not delegates,—real men, not machines; and the argument that parliaments should have a settled period of duration, in order that members may be called to give an account of their stewardship, is wrong in principle and needless in practice; because, first, there are few who do not discharge their duty faithfully; and in a general election, the House seldom gets purged of these, often the reverse, as they and others like them, get elected for different constituencies; secondly,—

Very few members wait till a general election to meet their constituents; the majority visit them annually, and deliver an account of the way in which they have acted. Thirdly, the force of public opinion is now so powerful that it would be almost impossible for a member to retain his seat if his constituents were really totally against him; he would at once resign; when he, like the Government itself, can test its reality by a fresh appeal to his constituency. Men of honour, when they are led to embrace political opinions at variance with those professed to their constituents, generally resign, as Sir Robert Peel did for Oxford University.

To dissolve Parliament merely for a trial of party strength is a waste of money, and a mere counting of noses; it is not party which rules the nation, but principles. The acts of any Government are not dyed in pure Toryism, or washed in pure Whiggism, but relate to the good of all; and it is only as a man considers the principles, the carrying out of which he deems best for the national welfare, to be held by either party, that he will vote for Tory, Whig, or Radical. When any national question is at issue between these parties let the matter be referred to the country; then men know what they are voting for—for that time at least—and accord-

ing to the majority of the favourers or opposers of the measures returned may we judge the national feeling upon the subject.

The other arguments likely to be urged in favour of short parliaments need not be anticipated now; they will doubtless have full justice done to them by those who follow and reply on this side of the debate; only let us observe that the most candid and cautious thinkers on this topic do not consider parliaments should endure for a less time than five years, and generally conclude their arguments by saying that as things are at present it is not worth altering. And so say we; but if an alteration is to be made, let it be that parliaments are to last as long as they possess the confidence of the country,—leaving to members the same facilities for retiring when they see fit, as at present, and to the opposing parties in the house the same powers as now of threatening or terminating the existence of any parliament by a vote of “No confidence,” or rejection of a Government measure, to be afterwards ratified or nullified by an appeal to the country. Then, as before stated, men have an intelligible issue raised, and can act at the poll accordingly, and fairly compel candidates to pledge themselves one way or the other on the question. But as this is not likely to pass at present—and the Septennial Act is generally anticipated by appeals to the country—better let well alone.

R. S.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE perpetuity of parliaments is an idea so absurd that we shall not suppose any of our opponents likely to advocate membership for life. The whole spirit of our politics would be changed were we to adopt that form of creating a Commons' House peerage. There can be no doubt, however, that if this method were adopted it would “give stability to the constitution and power to the House of Commons”—qualities which “Septennis” (p. 334) much desiderates. But it would be the stability of Conservatism in its worst form, and it would be power in its most tyrannical shape. The experience of the Long Parliament is enough to prove that such a method of giving power and stability would not be found fraught with the many blessings “Septennis” assumes it would bring. We contend that such a scheme of polity is not in accordance with our mode of life, and would not be advantageous in action. To elevate a man from among his fellows and put him into our House of Representatives on the principle of “once in, in for ever,” would be the way to doom the country to unprogressiveness or revolution. The spirit of our institutions will not admit of such a mode of giving “stability to the constitution and power to the House of Commons;” and if the argument of “Septennis” is worth anything at all, it is worth as a proof that life-membership should be the rule in the House of Commons. An argument capable of such a fatal *reductio ad absurdum* cannot have much value, and must have less truth.

“Septennial parliaments” are asserted by “Septennis” to

secure the country from ruinous expense and agitation. We affirm the direct opposite. We say that the safe tenure of a place in Parliament makes it covetable on many grounds other than those of the public good; and that these are the very inducements which lead to the contests and expense which "Septennis" regrets. To give a clear seven years of self-seeking effort into the hands of a man is a great sacrifice of public good, and it is worth a great effort to keep such a one out of the house. The greatness of the stake occasions the viciousness of the play. Lessen these stakes sufficiently, and the feelings of the players will not be strung up to the hazardous pitch which they now generally attain. We entirely dissent from "Septennis" in this matter. "Expense and agitation" would cease if parliaments were reduced to such a term as would enable men to do the country service, but not long enough to make the sale of their votes the means of purchasing the sinecures of place.

If parties could look upon the success of the opposition as one of brief duration, and knew that the trial of their strength would be able to be renewed at an early opportunity, they would not fight to the uttermost, but would agree to moderate measures and moderate agitation.

We are as far from the conclusion arrived at by "Septennis" regarding the soothing power of time as an argument in favour of septennial parliaments. We do not think it advisable that politics should have an alternate ebb and flow, a lull and a tempest. We think that a judicious policy would teach us to keep men's minds constantly alive to their interests; and for this no measure would be so advantageous as that of shortening the duration of parliaments. Men would then have the currents of political thought regularly coursing through their minds as part and parcel of their being; an intelligent interest in public events would be aroused, and men would learn to regard their votes for members of the House of Commons as a right given to them to be exercised for the general good, and not to be disposed of as a private favour or as an exchangeable commodity.

The arguments of "Septennis" "o'erleap themselves and fall on the other side."

"Vigilance" must be woefully unvigilant if he does not know that bribery is largely practised. Let us take a patent proof. Each side accuses the other of impudent, shameless, and scandalous proceedings. Liberals heave hustings' mud upon Conservatives, and Conservatives, in their turn, do not return the compliment with conserves so frequently as with compost. Are both parties either liars or cheats? If there is no bribery, the one lies on the other; if there is bribery, and they know it, and knowing it do not evoke the agencies of the law for its prevention, then they are deceivers. If there is no bribery, and one party affirms that their hands are white, while they point to the defiled fingers of their antagonists—would these antagonists bear the imputation when they were innocent, and could the other insist on it without shame? We

commend a more vigilant employment of the Argus eyes of our friend before he denies the existence of bribery because prosecution is not fashionable ; such actions would spoil the trade of either party, and therefore they are in favour with neither. The house itself has often borne testimony against itself that bribery is a game played at by both parties—at the expense of the constituencies in the long run. If the electors “choose honest and intelligent men” (p. 339) there would be no need for short parliaments. Truly, no! But what infallible test is available for finding these out? What psychomaney has “Vigilance” got hold of with which he can inoculate the nation that it may always succeed in choosing honest and intelligent men? Is it phrenological, physiognomical, chiromantic, romantic, comical, or demagogical? What an invaluable help “Vigilance” would be! He surely has the prime secret! If not, why does he expect the mass of electors to “choose honest and intelligent men” without an art of member-finding not yet recorded in human books?

Political opinions change because political events do. Hence arise the fluctuations of men's thoughts. Just as men's minds are affected by the state of the money market, so are they moved by the state of affairs at home and abroad. Opinion, like the mind, is in the healthiest state when in activity ; when stagnant it is detrimental. This is the true reason for short parliaments. They are the representatives of a changing public opinion, not of a seven-years' stereotyped notion, which they should be to make “Vigilance” a just advocate of long parliaments.

The advent of a reform bill is imminent. Let each of us be fully persuaded in his own mind that a pronounced public opinion upon the duration of parliaments is necessary to secure the due and adequate representation of men in any House of Commons. If we would lessen temptations, increase sense of responsibility, secure ourselves against betrayal, provide for the progress of man with the age, we must advocate the shortening of parliaments. If we would rescue representation from the aristocracy, and gain it for the people ; if we would have the people free from temptations, and members free from inducements to violations of law and right ; if we would loosen the hold of the great lords upon the small boroughs, and hinder them from grasping at place in the Commons' House, we must manage to get parliaments shortened. In no case now-a-days should parliaments be septennial ; for septennial parliaments secure an oligarchy—the worst of all possible forms of government. “For a people to be free it is sufficient that she wills it.” Let us will, then, that parliaments shall not henceforth be septennial.

A MILLITE.

#### AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

THE greatest evil under which our country at present labours is that of hasty and minature legislation. In innumerable cases, of late, Acts of Parliament have required revision, amendment, and



interpretation clauses before they were three years old. This hurry-scurry style of writing down the mind of the country in law books is sadly disastrous; for it affords less security to the well-intended citizen than certainty of plentiful employment for the professional lawyer. The hasty impetuosity of nostrum-mongers, and the keenness of partizans to take advantage of any instant's unwatchfulness on the part of their opponents tend constantly to increase this plague-spot in popular legislation. The passing of Acts of Parliament with conflicting conditions and irreconcilable requirements, is a disgrace to the House of Commons; and we have the authority of numerous members of "The Law Amendment Association" for saying that the construction of modern Acts is singularly loose, often ambiguous, and not seldom contradictory. Now, if this be the case, as it assuredly is, in a Parliament which has a duration of seven years to mature its deliberations, would not the likelihoods of immature legislation be increased if we were to consent to a reduction of the tenure of a seat in the House of Commons to three years, and, therefore, much more were we to agree to annual parliaments?

This is a consideration which has great force in it, to my mind. I do not see how legislation could be otherwise than "forced" and hurried in a house whose members had so little time left to work the persuasive elements of thought into the minds of their compeers in the legislative halls of the country. The lessening of the possible time in which a given effect might be produced would lead to impatient, and, perhaps, unscrupulous, zeal to complete within the narrow allotted limit the labour on which a politician might have set his heart. The enthusiasm of men would be more constantly and impulsively kept in action, and that cool caution and calm collectedness of thought, which we call deliberation, would have little opportunity of being asked to take part in the oversight and preparation of Bills. Such racy legislation we think would be sure to be rash, and all rash legislation is injurious to the true interests of a commonwealth whose affairs are so intricate, and whose connections with outward nations are so manifold as ours. I would, therefore, humbly suggest that those who advocate the adoption of a term of parliament shorter than seven years, should lay their minds to the solution of this, as it appears to me, great difficulty, and should show that triennial or annual parliaments would not be likely to lead to rash, immature, and ill-considered legislation. We believe it would, and hence affirm that septennial parliaments are the best.

I certainly do not believe in the immaculate patriotism of every member of the House of Commons; but I shall certainly hesitate before affirming that any large number took, or held, their seats with any design of betraying the best interests of their country for any bribe whatever. I do not think that the path of danger in our country, in an age of newspapers, of criticism, and of outspoken political contention. I believe rather, that the danger lies in the

over zeal of men of one idea,—men who have brooded over one single political scheme, till that one nostrum had upset all the reflective power of his mind, and made him insensible to reasoning, indurated against argument, and immoveable even by the acquirement of wider experience. Such men as look upon all things in the light of a foregone conclusion, and have committed themselves to the advocacy of distinct opinions with the violence and virulence of an out-and-outer. These are the men whom no hope of place, and no inducement of pension can induce to give a vote; but then they are the very men who are most open to cajolement, and most likely to yield, if by yielding they are induced to believe they are about to gain a new ally, or clear away an obstruction, or induce another man to hold their standard up to public view as that round which he is willing to rally. Such men, I think, are more and more likely to get into Parliament; lifted there on the wave of popular agitation, and sent there as the chosen advocates of the cry of the hour. These men, with all their moral earnestness and all their ardour of conviction, are generally men of a narrow range of mind, of confined information, and of little critical sagacity, though often of fine instincts. Our opinion, then, is that if the shortening of the duration of parliaments would tend to increase the rashness already too evident in modern legislation, the evil would be aggravated by the nature of public opinion, and by the kind of men who are now most commonly accepted as its representatives. I point out in all seriousness the evil effects of coteries in politics, and of the putting up of candidates upon—to borrow an expressive American phrase—"a single ticket" as one of the worst features of our age; and I contend that a shorter duration of parliaments would greatly extend the power of this evil, by renewing the chances of coteries to get in their man and gain their special point; by increasing the number of candidates for admission to the House, and by lowering the aims of legislators from that of passing the laws most advantageous to the commonwealth to that of managing to pass the "ticket" for which they were sent up. Worse evil could scarcely befall a nation than its getting into the hands of political nostrum-mongers.

Again, I think the bearing of this question on the kind of men likely to aspire to the honour of representing constituencies ought to be taken into account. Most obviously representatives may be regarded as of five sorts:—1. Aspirants for political power and place. 2. Men who desire position, influence, and usefulness. 3. Those who have interests at stake, or connections to support. 4. Those whose ancestral and traditionary tendencies are to assume the important places in public life. And 5. Those who have keen convictions on special points, are widely known as holding them, and are enthusiastic in their desire to see these incorporated in the Statute Book of the Realm. If parliaments were shortened the attainment of political power would be increased in difficulty; the position of an M.P. would be lessened in dignity; the House would be in part vulgarized, and hence the importance of the office would

be deteriorated, and the less men would find opposition withdrawn, and admission would be easier, in consequence of which it would be oftener tried. In this case the country could not but suffer severely; for it is indispensable for the safety and stability of a country that its best minds and men of greatest influence should be encouraged to aspire to endeavour to acquire the position of legislators.

A still greater difficulty suggests itself to me in considering this question farther. What influence would the shortening of parliaments have in the creation of a Bureaucracy in Britain? The control of departments lies in Parliament, but would not a frequent change of masters also create an uncertainty in the character of the supervision exercised over the executive, and lead to the too ready acceptance of the proposals and plans of the chiefs of departments, especially as Parliament could scarcely exist long enough to see its orders duly implemented, or its recommendations fully tried? This, too, seems to me, from the light I look at it in, a question which requires to be honestly looked in the face by us before we give in our adhesion to what seems to be merely a theoretical one, but which in reality implies a great deal of practically momentous thought. I would call upon the readers of the *British Controversialist* to exercise their intelligence upon this debate and to try out the question in all these directions before they decide in favour of change. I think there are strong grounds for affirming that parliaments ought to be septennial.

EU. N. LISLE, M.A.

#### NEGATIVE REPLY.

"THE great Chartist leader," as Feargus O'Connor used to be styled, who was made up pretty much of the braggart, the coward, the demagogue, and the democrat, went to the opposite extreme of this question in "The People's Charter," which, amongst its other demands, claimed "annual parliaments." The "charter" was advocated by wiser and clearer headed men than the hot-headed Irishman, otherwise it would never have attained the importance which it occupied at one time in the eye of the nation. Something could be advanced in favour of this "point" of the charter, or it would not have had the advocacy of such men as Lovett, Collins, Henry Vincent, Bronterre O'Brien, and Thomas Cooper, men who were so earnest in their zeal that they earned by the strength of their words the "legal right" to spend years in the gaols of Stafford, Warwick, Lancaster, and Monmouth, and who, when released from their incarceration, were still minded to bate no jot of heart or hope in their determination to advocate and enforce the adoption of "the charter." Although, therefore, we cannot endorse the annual parliaments' clause of "the charter," we entertain the utmost sympathy and respect for many of the men who taught and believed in such a change in the duration of the nation's assembly. Such of these men as now survive, although they have

not seen the realization of their too sanguine anticipations, have excellent reason to rejoice in the progress of "the charter,"—or, which is better, *the principles* of "the charter." No doubt, for the time being, those principles were retarded by the mouthing of Feargus O'Connor and men of his class and stamp. Men of ease and position did not care to be dragooned into the adoption of any "point" advocated with such an utter want of sense and decency. The madman—for he was, or at least ultimately became, mad—retarded the spread and adoption of political progress for years; when he was removed by the cold hand of death.

Samuel Bamford, in his "Life of a Radical," relates many instances of meanness in the career of Henry Hunt, so famous as the "Hero of Peterloo," who had an inordinate appetite for applause, and who, to attain his loved public plaudits, would do things and utter words deserving of the utmost contempt. Poor human nature! Well might the Rev. Mathew Henry say, "The best of men are only men at the best."

Our chief objection to annual parliaments is, that they would keep the whole nation continually in a broil. We have just got through the exercises of a general election: we know by experience the annoyance, the loss in trade, which takes place through the absorbing interest which such an election necessitates, and we say advisedly that it were well if this sort of thing did not occur too often. While men are men, and not angels, they will be influenced and affected by the feeling of party; they will not only condemn the principles of those in political opposition, but they will move heaven and earth to attain their own party purpose, and to frustrate the aims and ends of "the other candidate." It is amazing how much animosity can be imported into the discussion and carrying on of an election contest; trade interests are of no moment in comparison. Religion—or rather what has been called religion—has furnished matter for persecution and social disturbance; but now, owing to a more sober spirit possessing men, the fact that one man goes to church and another to chapel or meeting-house, causes no annoyance, and is no recognized ground for ill-will or bad feeling. In these matters common sense has been permitted to gain the ascendancy. But not so in politics. A Radical laughs at a Tory; and the Tory hates the Radical: worse than this, the enmity is carried into business; the Liberal in politics refuses to exercise liberality, while the Conservative does not store or conserve his ill-will and enmity. Both may be excellent tradesmen, exemplary as fathers, devoted loving husbands, but as politicians they exhibit the evil which, if theologians are correct, they inherited from Adam. How, then, can we do other than pray, as we do—or at least ought to pray—to be delivered from evil, that these times of seething party feeling—general elections—may not come too often. Annual parliaments indeed! why six months would not be sufficient to bury the enmity and animosity generated by the contest; and then for the other six months preparations for the coming contest would

absorb what little of calmness and coolness might be left. No, annual parliaments would be annual evils.

But while we condemn this, the shortest proposed duration of parliaments, our objections to their continuance for the longer term of seven years is not less earnest and determined. The evil of an annual repetition of a general election is certain; the evil is not less, but greater, when the occasion for the exercise of the elective franchise is deferred for seven years. Taking the average, how many times in the ordinary length of an ordinary life would the right of voting, supposing each parliament to extend to seven years, be exercised? We may be mistaken, but we anticipate the reply of the actuary to be *four times*. That is, that the greatest privilege which a private citizen and subject of the realm can exercise—the selection of a representative to sit in the Commons' House of Parliament, to amend and make laws for the governance of England, which, by their influence, may and will affect every land upon which the sun shines—can only be exercised during an ordinary life four times. The result is, that the privilege is not by its rarity all the more valued, but by its rarity it is not appreciated, and, as a consequence, loses its influence as an educational agent; for it is clear that that which is needed to be exercised so seldom, and the exercise of which is not compulsory, can but slightly influence the voter in the attainment of political knowledge, in order to the right and faithful discharge of his elective duty. In this respect, other things being equal, it were better that the voter should be called upon once every year to elect a parliamentary representative, than that the franchise should only be exercised once in seven years. When parliaments were shorter the political interest was more lively and more intelligent. Just as a man in trade studies the trade reports, the prices of the markets, making himself acquainted with every minutiae of his business, and the various influences which affect it, so would the voter, frequently called to exercise his vote, make himself acquainted with the composition of parties, the object of parties, and the useful or vexatious measures which they fostered and made law; the man, on the other hand, who is out of business, or called upon to exercise his business once only in seven years, and then only for a brief hour, might deem the constant preparation for such business a needless task; that any information at the time could be obtained from those whose business it was to keep themselves abreast of the needful facts. One of the Athenian laws made it a penal crime not to manifest concern in matters of public interest; not to be a citizen exercising as much interest in the affairs of the state as in private affairs. A man would now be justly punished if he neglected his family; the strong arm of the law would punish him if he so neglected them as to make them chargeable to the parish. The Athenian law held that every man was a member of the public family, and that he was bound to furnish his *quota* of interest, concernment, and care in providing for the common weal of the commonwealth; and, without attaching any corporal punishment to the

non-fulfilment of the duty, we hold that the due discharge of public duty is as incumbent, is as binding a duty as the care of children or the providing of necessities for home use. The neglect of this duty, the source of so much complaint on the part of earnest progressive reformers, mainly arises from the absence of interest in political life—one of the results of seven years' parliaments. A man during that long period, not being called upon to exercise his vote, might well be excused for considering that the political business was done for him—that, like the man Lord Jeffrey saw in church, who was unaffected by the moving appeal of the minister, because, as he said, "he did not belong to that parish."

But if septennial parliaments have such an evil influence upon the voter, they have not less, if not greater, influence for evil upon the member of Parliament. A man may go to Parliament with purposes and intentions the most single and honest; he may determine to do his duty to his constituents and his country. But the atmosphere of the House of Commons, the blandishments and temptations offered him by party—the party that swears by a creed, and not by the deeds and demands of country—cause him to forego his intentions, to vote many times when he ought not to vote, to refrain from voting when principles demanded that he should have voted. He satisfies himself with the thought that the session, which will extend for seven years, will afford him ample opportunity to make amends for his tergiversation; and at least during that time his constituents will have forgotten, if they have not forgiven, his broken pledges and forgotten promises. It is noticeable, as the session of the House of Commons nears its close, how earnest the members become—no trimming or pairing then. The overtures of the Prime Minister—nay, the kindest inquiries, and solicitations, and invitations of the Prime Minister's wife, whose drawing-room has effected more conquests over members disposed to kick over the traces, than any serious solicitations of the minister himself—now affects the "John Hampden," "as the idle wind which he regards not." Is he not in possession of a trust?—the delegate of his constituents, who send him to represent principles; and shall he not, if needs be, like another Andrew Marvell, refuse any bribe, or appearance of a bribe, come it whence it may? Poor man! he does not like to whisper to himself how much his early anticipated appearance before his constituents has to do with his patriotic resolves. But he is only a man, and we may as well repeat, "the best of men are only men at the best." Well, then, if this is so—and everybody knows it is so—then the more frequently the elected is brought before the electors for re-election the better—the better for him, the better for them,—with the exception already noted.

And the Prime Minister is also materially influenced by the extended duration of parliaments. He is specially chary in introducing any unpopular measure on the eve of a general election—any measure which seems like or is a job—in money or patronage. Give him

seven years to work his will, supported by an impressible majority, and he *will* work his will, he will spend needlessly millions of the people's money, he will, if his whim tends that way, let the nation drift into war; conserve every institution which has no duty but plenty of pay, as nests for the younger sons of the aristocracy; continue abuses, and create abuses, which, if there ever is such an institution as a Reformed House of Commons, will be swept away in the first sessions. It is well that that man—be he who he may, great and wily, gracious and popular, as the late Lord Palmerston, or a better man, who will one day, though now another occupies the seat, be Prime Minister—William Ewart Gladstone,—should present his books to be audited by the nation *once every three years*; to have his public acts approved or condemned,—approved, by having his supporters sent back to him; condemned, by finding, on the re-assembling of a new Parliament, a majority in opposition who will speedily cause him to be dismissed from office. A minister and a Parliament subjected to examination, like a clerk whose books were about to be looked into, would, as Carlyle says, “be dreadfully in earnest.” So long as the evil day is far away—so far away, indeed, as not to be perceived—it is of no account, and is not taken into consideration; but let it approach, let a dissolution be threatened, and heaven and earth is compassed to ward off the danger. If, then, the near approach of the evil day brings so much careful discharge of duty, it is evident that its more frequent and certain recurrence must be for the advantage of the nation.

The minor advantages of three years' parliaments would be the almost entire absence of bribery. It would not be worth while to run the risk of a parliamentary petition and committee for a seat which only lasts for three years, and possibly for less. In the past, would-be M.P.s have spent £40,000, £50,000, and £60,000 for a seat in the house; they would scarcely do that if they were certain, under any circumstances, only to occupy the position of “honourable member” for three years. And then—but it is degrading to have to refer to such a matter—M.P.s would find it needful to discharge their lawfully contracted debts—immunity from arrest would only extend to three years, not to seven, which would enable the fraudulent debtor to plead the statute of limitations—thus escaping payment and punishment. A greater good would be, that constituencies would be enabled to send to the right-about any incapable who, by chance or misrepresentation, had obtained a seat, without being compelled for seven years to put up with his incapacity. And, further, the electors generally having decided upon the attainment of some important measure—a Reform Bill, for instance—and the members, unmindful of promises and pledges, returning to their constituents for re-election would very properly be relieved of their duties, and handed back to that oblivion which is the congenial atmosphere of do-nothings.

We have purposely avoided noticing the history of parliaments as affecting the question of their duration; we hold that any ex-

perience of the past cannot, in this respect, affect the present—the present being exceptional in the matter of the education of the people—so important an element in the consideration of all political questions. Those, however, who are anxious to know something of the past in the matter under consideration, are referred to Carlyle's "Letters and Speeches of Cromwell," to Cassell's "Illustrated History of England," to Hayden's "Dictionary of Dates;" and those who wish to read upon the subject should consult Col. Thompson's Collected Letters, Stanton's "Reform and Reformers," and the "History of the Half Century." J. I.

## History.

### IS A SCIENCE OF HISTORY POSSIBLE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

"History cannot be separated from facts, and depends entirely on reality; and thus the philosophy of history, as it is the spirit or idea of history, must be deduced from historical events, for the faithful record and lively narration of facts—it must be the pure emanation of the great whole—the one connected whole of history, and for the right understanding of this connection a clear arrangement is an essential condition and an important aid. For although this great edifice of universal history, where the conclusion at least is still wanting, is in this respect incomplete, and appears but a mighty fragment of which even particular parts are less known to us than others; *yet is this edifice advanced sufficiently and many of its great wings and members unfolded sufficiently to our view to enable us by a lucid arrangement of the different periods of history to gain a clear insight into the general plan of the whole.*"—*Fred. Von Schlegel.*

How shall we discriminate the possible from the impossible? Who can affirm what may not be? Who, in other words, can accomplish the task of proving a negative? "Is a Science of History possible?—that is the question which has been propounded, and which ought not to have been lost sight of, as it seems to have been by the negationists. Many things would at one time have been pronounced to be impossible which are known now to be quite possible; for example, who on looking first at "the starred azure" could believe that men could

"Unwind the eternal dances of the sky?"

Who could fancy that the whole splendid gush and swell of music, the very slightest changes in

"The mazy running soul of melody"

could be noted, registered, written down, and reproduced? These we should be inclined to regard at first sight as impossibilities, but



we know they are not. In fact, in the hardness of success, men have grown sanguine of learning even the secrets of the formation of the various chemical elements, and expect to learn the laws of their transformations, activities and relations. Why then should it be deemed a thing impossible to frame a science of the doings of

"Men, my brothers, men the workers, ever reaping something new  
That which they have done but earnest of the things that they shall do?"

It is true that difficulties surround the attempt, and it is also quite certain that

"Science moves but slowly, slowly creeping on from point to point,

Yet I doubt not through the ages one increasing purpose runs,  
And the thoughts of men are widened with the process of the suns;"

and it is because the idea of the poet is a good, wholesome and probable one that we believe a science of history to be possible.

Our own opinions do not quite coincide in details with the ideas of "that series" of writers and thinkers, from Herder to Michelet, by whom history, which was till then "a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing," has been made a science of causes and effects; who, "by making the facts and events of the past have a meaning and intelligible place in the gradual evolution of humanity, have at once given history, even to the imagination, an interest like romance, and afforded the only means of predicting and guiding the future by unfolding the agencies which have produced and still maintain the future;" but we cordially agree with them in their aim and effort to make the idea of causation a permanent one in history. A knowledge of causes, and the laws according to which they act is science. Human life is the subject of history. To know how causes operate in human life to bring about events would be to possess a science of history, and such a knowledge we believe to be possible.

The general principles on which we maintained this possibility were laid down in the opening articles (pp. 102-105), and we need not restate them. We were glad to notice that the estimate of history formed by "Philalethes" so nearly accorded with our own, and that he so eloquently expressed his opinions as to make his article one of mark in the magazine; but the able and pointed article of H. K. has so clearly demonstrated the untenability of his argument, drawn from the authority of the great thinker of our times, Thomas Carlyle, and the most *brusque* and sanguine of our modern clerics, Charles Kingsley, that we need pursue the task of refutation no farther on that point. The authorities he invokes *tell* against him, his own witnesses condemn his negations. Not the less, however, are we grateful to him for bringing forward the two splendid passages which he chose. His taste is much more apparent in their selection than his judgment. Indeed we feel inclined to say, that the whole series of his papers seem to be underlaid with a deposit of prejudice

drawn from some theological source—some idea that the providence of God and the prudence of man were incompatible with each other—some subsumption, as the logicians call it, of a fear of heresy more than of a love of truth. And yet we must confess that there is a fine spirit of power in his thinking which appears to us to afford hope that he is not altogether involved in theological toils; and we hope that the argument of H. K. has shown him that it is not at all necessary to disbelieve in Divine Providence because one believes in the possibility of a science of history. Because we have a science of the stars, we do not the less admit that

“An undevout astronomer is mad.”

We have a science of health—“a science of uncertainties,” as “Philaethes” will himself admit—but it is not founded on a denial of God’s foreseeing care; it is expressly built on the acknowledgment that all things follow the Divine law of their being, that their being as He desires them to be is true well-being. Other sciences there are whose basis is laid in law—chemistry, electricity, optics, &c.,—yet all repose upon the fact of a perception of unity of law amid diversities of appearances. If these analogies are correctly stated it must follow that the science of history does not involve the scepticism as to Scripture which “Philaethes” (p. 185) implies it must. For a reply to that passage we are indebted to a contributor, “Samuel,” which by his consent has been put into our hands by the kindness of the editor.

“We believe as firmly as “Philaethes” does, that “The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing is of the Lord.” He who thus disposeth all things is, however, a God of order, and He has decreed that causes which, under certain circumstances, have at one time produced certain effects, shall lead to the same results at all other times when attended with the same circumstances. The Author of nature governs in accordance with the laws of nature. He could suspend the usual course of nature if He pleased, but it is not His will to do so, only in such exceptional cases as those which rise to the miraculous displays of His omnipotence in olden times. The science of history is not “the impugner of human responsibility.” This science shows that the effects produced by certain actions in the past will correspond with the results of those actions in the future, unless some modifying cause should prevent, and thus it increases the weight of man’s responsibility. But if a science of history is not possible, we cannot be sure that actions which in days gone by have led to disastrous results will have the same effect under the same circumstances at the present time. How, then, can we be responsible for the *consequences* of our actions, when we have no means of judging what the effect of those actions will be? Therefore the man who impugns human responsibility is not he that believes a science of history to be possible, but he who asserts that it is not possible, though even the latter cannot alter man’s responsibility where that responsibility is attached to the *nature* of the actions.”

We may call attention to one fact which deserves notice on two grounds. In the course of this debate “Philaethes” has found one coadjutor, A. C. W., whose chief merit seems that he has read that gentleman’s article and refurbished his ideas without *quite* preserving

the gentlemanly spirit in which they were originally expressed. Does A. C. W. call his remarks on history and biography (p. 347) arguing against or railing at R. S., whose thoughtful paper he impugns? Or is that reasoning which he employs (in p. 348) about the Premiership of the Holy Land, and about Armageddon? The mysteries of religion ought not to be thus flippantly dealt with, and we commend A. W. C. to take a little more of the spirit of "the first true gentleman," of whom he speaks (p. 349) into himself.

The inference we draw from the fact that one advocate held the field in the negative for three successive months before help of any sort reached him, while on the other side four advocates appeared, is, that the affirmatives were held to have the best of the argument. Let us, however, say, as is due, that the pluck he shows in returning again and again to the contest is worthy of admiration, while the reading, illustration, and general good taste of his papers make him an antagonist with whom it is pleasant (and we will add profitable) to have to deal.

We feel sure "Philaethes" does not endorse the sophistical passage in A. C. W.'s paper (p. 348) on "Man is the same in all ages," which the context plainly showed R. S. meant to use as equivalent to—the essential nature of man is the same in all ages, although the accidental circumstances of his life may change. This his opponent unfairly contorts into an equivalent for, Man has been stationary in all ages—an excessively unfair translation.

We quote from our coadjutor, "Samuel," this specific refutation of A. C. W.'s initial argument—borrowed, however, from "Philaethes"—about the impossibility of "a fixed and knowable order of nature" in history.

"We believe 'Chepenom' is strictly correct in saying that 'causative antecedence and consequence is science. Whenever we perceive that one effect involves another, we have attained to a certain amount of scientific information.' If these assertions are true, it necessarily follows that a science of history is not only possible but also that it has an actual existence. This argument may be put in a syllogistic form, thus:—

If we can perceive the causes and effects of the phenomena of any branch of study, there is necessarily a science of that subject.

We are able to discover the causes and effects of many historical phenomena. *Ergo*, there is a science of history.

"If we can conclusively establish the truth of our propositions, the accuracy of the conclusion will be indisputable. This, therefore, we will now endeavour to do.

"Science does not require that we should be able to discover the cause which produces, and the effects which result from, every individual member of the distinct class of phenomena connected with any one particular subject; neither is it necessary that we should be able to find out all the causes which unite to produce, and all the effects which result from, each of these phenomena. This has been clearly proved by R. S. in the second and third paragraphs of his excellent article."

In closing this debate we may remark that in our opinion it has been one of the most interesting we have had for some time. It has

called out the fine spirit of our opponent "Philalethes" to gratify, though not to satisfy. It has given us one of the best papers from R. S.'s pen; it has restored (P) H. K. to the magazine with greater intellectual impressiveness than ever; it has brought before us the clear and valuable contribution of C. B., a contribution of which while specially noticing the worth, I relish none the less that it gives the present writer a rebuke in passing. In self-justification I may be allowed to say, that no "blowing hot and cold" was in my mind. I affirmed that the metaphysical question is "a whirlpool of thought," into the discussion of which if we got we were sure to leave the main question, involving the possibility of a science of history, far away behind us. How nearly on the verge of this going off the line we were, each reader of the discussion in its course has seen. On the question of free will, and necessity—when it arises in the form of a proposed discussion "is man a free agent?"—we may have something to say. But we contend that we were justified in endeavouring to keep free from the entanglement of the present question with any other, however closely allied in some of its relations. I am none the less gratified at the article of C. B., though he has stricken his own side, because it cannot but aid by its judicious clearness to help the reader and thinker to come to a decision of this interesting question, which has, in the great universities of Oxford and Cambridge, opposing advocates. May we not congratulate ourselves on having had an opportunity of thoroughly ventilating the subject whatever be the decision we arrive at?

CHEPENOM.

#### NEGATIVE REPLY.

HISTORY is the record of human achievement. It is a detail of man's doings in "the infinite complex of things." If all causation is invariably pre-ordained, history is a misnomer. It is no longer a narrative of individual activity and effort, but of mankind's passive working out of a series of necessitated acts: and man is not a living reality, but a strange monstrosity; he has no self-produced energy, but is a mere inert material in the hands of circumstance. If this is history, spirit and life and freedom are fictions, and man is not what he *seems*. Aims, principles, efforts, are mere figments, and the despotism of destiny overrules all. Character, will, intelligence, passion, what are they but ghosts and shams and *simulacra*, out of which all energy has gone—indeed, in which no energy, but the most supposititious, has ever existed? Greatness, glory, nobility, heroism,—what of all these can there be in man, if every fibre of volition is moved *for* and not *by* him? Honour, fame, renown, reverence,—who can be worthy of these, if a scientific predetermination of human acts and passions is possible? If man is only one small item in the immense machinery of despotic causation and irresistible necessitarianism, who can justly call him to account for his ways, thoughts, doings, or desires?

It is useless to repeat these plain truisms; for we fear we have

already said more than enough upon this topic. They seem to me to be very needful matters to insist upon, when we find writers so capable as C. B. teaching the doctrine of necessity in its most perverse form, and doubting (p. 343) even the *prescience* of *Omniscience*! at the same time that he charges Deity (p. 344) with giving man only an "imaginary freedom," while He has burdened him with a real responsibility.

It would have been well if C. B. had more clearly explained Buckle's distinction, adopted by him, between "causes" and "occasions" (p. 344). Such ambiguous phrases destroy debates, so far as usefulness is concerned. A cause may be an occasion, and yet no cause can act without an occasion. Does occasion mean anything else than the condition of effectiveness permitted to a cause? Upon this question of causation the whole possibility of a science of history turns, and we have not got from any writer on the affirmative an adequate definition of a true cause.

On another point it would have been well if C. B. had been more explicit. He says, "History or philosophy, teaching by experience, proves that the best kind of government is that which tends to develop all man's powers, and which leaves him the fullest *freedom* of action. Self-government is the best" (p. 345). "Philaethes" cannot comprehend how "*Self-government*" can exist in a world where all man's actions are determined by an "undeviating regularity," called Necessity; and how "freedom of action" is possible where every change occurring in man "is always in a certain invariable order," any more easily than he can comprehend how "Omniscience can foresee that which, if free, may not take place" (p. 343). But he has human reason asserting the former couples and denying the latter, while he has Scripture affirming the latter and denying the former. He can conceive human reason able to err, he cannot conceive God to deceive with an "imaginary freedom," under the form of an invincible necessity.

That certain probabilities are attainable as deductions from history, "Philaethes" has never doubted; but science does not, as he conceives it, consist of probabilities, but of certainties. So that the statistical argument has no force on his mind in settling the dispute.

I turn now, however, to my other antagonists, and deny the calculability of the results of motives in the human mind, even in average cases. In his able and excellent poem, entitled "An Address to the Rigidly Righteous," the Ayrshire poet, Burns, has written in words of great wisdom as well as of the most benign charity the following lines, which suggest an unanswerable argument against the possibility of a science of history on this very ground:—

"One point must still be greatly dark,  
The moving why they do it,  
And still as lamely can ye mark,  
How far perhaps they rue it.

Who made the heart, 'tis He alone  
 Decidedly can try us :  
 He knows each chord—its various tone,—  
 Each spring—its various bias ;  
 Then at the balance let's be mute,  
 We never can adjust it ;  
*What's done we partly may compute,  
 We know not what's resisted."*

Here the matter is sent, like an arrow, to its mark ; and hits in the very centre. Actions we can estimate, motives we can only guess at, resistances we cannot calculate, weigh, or measure. This is one-half of every act, which we cannot reach to a knowledge of ; and such a knowledge is indispensable to an accurate acquaintance with the power of causes on the human will. Here the moral philosophy of peasant experience has given expression to a truth of serious import, and one bearing with great force against the idea of the science of history being possible.

H. K. accuses "Philalethes" of misrepresenting or misunderstanding Professor Kingsley. Of the latter I am unconscious, of the former I hope I cannot have been guilty. If "Philalethes" does not judge inaccurately, the passage he quotes is exactly that which most forcibly proves his opinion. It is a passage in which Professor Kingsley admits certain facts, on which a philosophy of history must be based, to be defective in history. The reader will observe that "ought to," "is conceivable," and such like phrases, are by no means transmutable into "is possible." I assert as freely as Professor Kingsley, or H. K., that there *may be* "fixed and unerring laws of life" which, if knowable, would make a science of history possible ; but, as Professor Kingsley says, and H. K. endorses, "these laws assert themselves and are to be discovered, not in things, but in persons ; in the actions of human beings." I deduce from that fact, that because "the actions of human beings" are governed by springs placed within each, touched by motives peculiar to each, the results are incalculable ; that is, are irreducible to science. This, as I understand it, is proving that a science of history is impossible.

H. K. equally freely censures "Philalethes," for committing an error in quoting Thomas Carlyle. I again admit the possibility of my having done so, but I deduce from the passages quoted by H. K. arguments to support the negative. "History, as it lies at the root of all science" (p. 274), cannot be itself either all science or any science, any more than the earth which "lies at the root of" an oak is itself an oak. It may furnish the nutriment of the oak, as history furnishes the materials of science, but it is *not* an oak, neither is history a science.

The quotation which H. K. makes, without, in this instance, quoting his authority, from "Essays and Review," is not favourable to his purpose. The anthropomorphic man, into which he would transmute the human race, is a mere figure of rhetoric, and is worse

than a man of straw—it is a fiction of fancy. Men never do believe themselves to be but corpuscles in the frame of some huge age-enduring monster, which serve his purpose for a brief space and are then excreted from his system—into the dismal grave. “It would be well for” H. K. also “to reconsider his opinion; or, if not, to reflect on his authorities.” May he not be reminded of the proverb, “Physician, heal thyself.”

The arguments of R. S. have already been replied to by “Philaethes” and by A. C. W.—the concluding part of whose paper presents three tests for a touchstone in this discussion. Can our readers satisfy themselves that any science of history will be attained to by man which will stand the tests there stated. We think not. If man is not stirred by mere mechanic force, but is lead to adopt his course of life and action by the decisions of his reason, conscience, and will, there can be no science of history; for man’s will is inscrutable by man; the resistive power of conscience cannot be estimated, and the varieties of human thought show that, though there may be laws of thinking, men are not bound by them, and often do not obey them.

Life is a discipline. There can be no discipline where all is fixed; the energy of the will is vain, the power of conscience futile, and the light of reason dim and fluctuating, where all acts co-ordinate themselves independently of man, and are preordained as to their manner rather than their results, into “fixed fate.” But the Mighty Former can know the results and foresee them, without enforcing either act or mode. He fixes the end, foresees the method, and yet permits the will to work on the pivot of motive according to its own laws.

In some of the debates in this serial, as elsewhere, there occur unfairness, exaggeration, and acrimony; but we feel pleasure in testifying to the general candour and moderation of the contestators in this debate. We have had perhaps an unequal share of the brunt of warfare to bear. We have not, however, any quarrel as to the weapons used. Sarcasm has been sparingly employed, sneers and jibes have been pretty well kept out of the discussion. I may be permitted to say, that such a style of arguing greatly enhances the pleasure of being a contributor to our own magazine. We recognize with pleasure the ability displayed by our opponents, though we fain hope that our remarks may have had the effect of showing that the possibility of a science lies, at least, far below the horizon of our present time. Meanwhile we coincide in our opinions with Cowper, who says:—

“Happy the man who sees a God employed  
In all the good and ill that chequer life!  
Resolving all events, with their effects  
And manifold results, into the will  
And arbitration wise of the Supreme.”

PHILAEETHES.

## Social Economy.

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### OUGHT CORPORAL PUNISHMENT TO BE EMPLOYED IN EDUCATION?

#### AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

THE general principles of the advocacy of corporal punishment were modestly, though we hope adequately, laid down in the opening paper of this debate. It was there maintained that this is a world where endurance is required, that pain is an efficient educator, and that punishment is essential as a check upon the schoolboy. But it was never asserted that the rod was a persuader—as “Hopstock” charges the advocates of the affirmative with holding,—that, indeed, was expressly denied. One would think, from “Hopstock’s” tirade (p. 112), that indiscriminate, all-day-long flogging had been practised or praised. “Hopstock” is smart, but he does not reason. We guess he has endured the infliction he speaks of more than once “for reputed” (if not real) “duncery,” and is endeavouring to expend his hoarded vengeance upon one of a maligned class—“the old croakers whom” (as he fancies) “Scholasticos represents.” Of argument we can see no vestige, though some clever epigrammatic touches occur in his paper. The paper by J. M. S. is evidently the production of a sincere, thoughtful, and earnest mind, but it is not, we should think, the result of the experience of one engaged in “the tear and wear” of education. He knows enough of it apparently to form a right opinion of its end, but not enough to prove the means he has employed to be effective.

Boys seen in school day by day; boys known for their habits, and by their every-day life; boys whose tastes and tendencies are ever before a master’s eyes, are quite different from boys seen on Sundays for an hour, imperfectly known themselves, and imperfectly knowing their teachers; with little, if anything, expected of them. In them attendance is voluntary; from them little perceptible advancement is anticipated; from them the pupils may be expelled; and in them the pupils are so short a time at once, that the spirit of mischief has little time to work. In them, besides, their fellow-pupils are almost strangers; in them the shadow at least of a sabbath feeling lingers,—if it be only in the shape of those little hypocrisies which simulate goodness; and the atmosphere is laden with a sort of “religiose” superstition. These differences make Sunday school teaching not at all analogous to week-day teaching.

Arnold’s experience at Rugby is quite unavailing. He did punish “in extreme cases” corporally, but he reserved to himself the double-distilled punishment of expulsion; one which, by its



disgracefulness in the rank of his scholars, often affected the entire after life of an expelled Rugby boy. In common schools no such power is reservable, nor is it in the lower classes of schools effective; besides, the extreme cases must be educated somehow and somewhere.

The ragged schools confer other benefits—estimable by the stomach—upon their frequenters, and a stopped ration is quite as severe (if not more so) a punishment as an application of the rod. Each of the examples chosen by J. M. S. is thus shown to be unapt.

"Scholasticos" would not "flog the infants." He would lay down the law simply and kindly; he would bear, warn, and expostulate until the sense of duty had been impressed on the child, after which, if faults were persisted in, he would punish as discretion commended, and corporally if necessary.

Of "Hopley's" case we do not really know the whole facts. Has it ever been shown that "Hopley" knew the state of the boy's brain? Has it ever been denied that the parent in placing him under "Hopley's" care did not stipulate for cramming sufficient to pass a certain examination within a definite time, and give Hopley the character of his son as a capable enough but stubborn boy? How far "Hopley" was misled by these means has not been put fairly before the public, and we contend that the falsehoods, conscious or unconscious, told by parents to teachers often mislead the master and ruin the boy. I have no desire to act as the apologist of "Hopley," but I do not think his case a sufficient one to be quoted to prove the error of moderate and discreet corporal punishment.

B. C. N. has produced an essay on "The fourfold state" of those who are corporally punished. He asserts that "flogging depraves the moral character;" my opinion is that depravity pre-dates flogging, and brings it about; that were there no depravity there would be no occasion for punishment. Again, "corporal punishment is humiliating." That may be safely granted. The power of feeling shame could never be brought into action if punishment did not humiliate. Are we then never to humiliate? If so, how is life to be carried on? Bankrupts, thieves, liars, impostors must not be humiliated, therefore they must neither be exposed nor punished. But does being made the subject of a gallery lesson, of imprisonment, of sour looks and refusal to be shaken by the hand, not humiliate? If it do not, what is its use? if it do, where is B. C. N.'s argument? "Corporal punishment is cruel." It is only so when excessive or unjust. Else disease and ruined fortunes which we see following by the divine decree upon conduct resembling that of the prodigal son in scripture, who "wasted his substance with riotous living" must be cruel. Is all pain cruelty? then what is the general name of all the diseases to which the attention of physicians is given, and of which they seek to discover the cure? "Corporal punishment is absurd" because it is self-defeating. So is example, for it defeats itself; so is religion, for it defeats itself; so is every-

thing, except God's providence, which never defeats itself. But God's providence in this world makes use of corporal punishment to effect its purposes, and must be held to succeed.

S. J. R. E. gives as an argument that punishment is degrading to criminals. It is so, for they knowingly offended, and feel the shame of the infliction putting them on the level with children. But the substitute is "a longer term of imprisonment." This is not possible in common education. By a misprint some of the arguments used by S. J. R. E. are made to appear as if adduced in opposition to J. M. S., while they are evidently intended for J. M. G. This is unfortunate, for J. M. S. is temperate and moderate, when compared with S. J. R. E., who seems to think that sneers are syllogisms. In this opinion we do not coincide. We could easily turn into ridicule strong expressions of his, but we feel that personalities have little or nothing to do with the question before us, of which we had advocated, without asperity we hope, the affirmative, that corporal punishment ought to be employed in education.

SCHOLASTICOS.

#### NEGATIVE REPLY.

"Such ways of education as are prudently fitted to the particular disposition of children, are like wind and tide together; which will make the work go on amain; but those ways which are applied cross to nature are like wind against tide, which will make a stir and conflict, but a very slow progress. . . . Great severities do often work an effect quite contrary to that which was intended; and many times those who were bred up in a very severe school hate learning ever after, for the sake of the cruelty that was used to force it upon them."—*Archbishop Tillotson*.

I AM sorry that "Elpisticos" has not provided the reply to issue which is the privilege of the opener of a debate; as his second in the argumentative warfare I willingly rejoin.

Very little has been advanced in affirmation of "the glorious liberty" of scholastic tyrants to inflict corporal punishment upon the tender cuticle of boyhood, and to macerate the flesh of little school lads. "The rod is a check," (p. 23) is the main argument. But if "it is not the work of the rod to persuade," how can it be so? I have seen, I may admit I have felt, some of the chequer-work of the rod, and do not think it fine. It is coarse work at the best, and little calculated to increase morality, though well-fitted to induce moroseness. If anger is not to mete out punishment (p. 23) who will use the rod? Not the loving, intelligent teacher; who sees his pupils' faults, but does not twig them; for he knows that fruits of bitterness are not the best inducements to the pursuit of the fruits of knowledge. Stricken palms are not likely to increase one's love for the palm of intellectual victory, they are more likely to encourage one to palm off ignorance as knowledge. Love, we contend, is the best teacher, not cruelty; and we maintain that the worst imposition is the imposition of the birchen tree's boughs. I fear your stern, conscientious, cool inflictors

of corporal punishments. They are seldom of nervous temperament themselves, and do not know much about how to temper the usage they give to the nerves of others. Temper in them only makes them sharper, not, as in true steel, more flexible. Under the quiet impulse of their rage they little heed the pulses of their victims. I am not sure that there is any need for debating with "Scholasticos," for his paper is unphilosophical and contradictory; and "Elpisticos" has, on p. 27, finely shown the fallacy of his views of punishment. There is great force in his comment,—corporal punishment "soon loses its power." If "Scholasticos" will lay that one fact to heart he will see the fallacy of the entire fabric of his theory that pain is a necessary agent in promoting school training.

"Malvern," who occupies the post of immediate *vis-a-vis* to me in the debate, affirms that "punishment is a necessary part of human life," (p. 111) a statement which may be quite correct, but does not prove that corporal punishment is so. Schools exist for *training*, and training is effective only when it is managed in a way to draw out the faculties of the mind. If he adduces Burns and Goldsmith as examples of the training obtainable by the use of corporal punishment, we wonder what he bases his argument upon. Were not these men—genuine as were their powers of mind—the least trained of mortal men; and in all but their genius the very opposite of that they ought to have been?

"R. S." writes forcibly upon *cram*; but to write against that does not prove that corporal punishment *is* education. "Obedience must be enforced" (p. 190), but must the force employed be that of the rod and the master's arm?

"J. M. S." has the right secret of successful teaching. "There is a golden chord of sympathy;" touch that with kindness and the music of joyful obedience will be given forth spontaneously. This is not what "R. S." calls "bribery" (p. 191), it is only the duty of the experienced to the inexperienced, who know how prevalent woe is in the world, and seek to make it less abundant. "R. S." mistakes a figure of speech for a fact when he argues that because "Education lops off and prunes" (p. 191), corporal punishment is justifiable. Lopping and pruning are metaphorical terms, and do not at all imply the rightness, still less the righteousness of corporal punishment. I do not think punishment should be sought for which shall be deterrent; if we are to have any, let us find one which is deterrent; let us rather purify than terrify,—win from sin than drive from it,—which, alas, too frequently makes those so acted on to run to it. Might not encouragement do more good than punishment?

J. M. G. has a very low opinion of humanity—is it from self-reflection that he gets it? The common way of flogging has been found efficacious, he avers, therefore let it be upheld and maintained. Oh these good old ways, how very good they must be! Imagination cannot conceive improvement in them. Let the force

of the mill-stream, or the irregular and fitful gusts of the wind be used as a motive-force; why adopt steam? Let the educative birch flourish in everlasting greenness. It was used by Cain to educate his brother, and as it is very effective in quickening the steps of asses, it cannot fail to be productive of an acceleration of wits to overjaded children, who are unreasoning creatures, as "Scholasticos" affirms; or as J. M. G. sagaciously remarks, "cannot comprehend ultimate reasons." If they cannot comprehend ultimate reasons, they can understand extreme ones; for if you apply the extreme parts of a birch twig to the extremities of the child, you will give him a reason, level to his understanding—and that of its giver, may we not also ejaculate?

Nothing has surprised us more in this debate than the scandalous misuse of Scripture in it. "Scholasticos" begins, and every affirmer of the beneficiality of corporal punishment seems to have thought that men would admit at once any thesis supported by biblical quotations drawn out in fine array, as

"Confirmations strong as proofs from Holy Writ."

We think we do the Gospel of Divine Love grievous wrong in making it a party to such a contest. How much evil has been wrought by this perverse employment of so-called scriptural argument. It has been used to advocate persecution, the institution of the inquisition, the lighting up of martyr-fires, the staying of the march of science, the continuance of capital punishment, the upholding of slavery, and the schoolmaster's right to flog so much of creation as comes within his rod's touch. When will religious hypocrisy flee from the earth, and hide its sophistical head in some cave or den whence it shall never reappear?

The regular incorporation of the rod as a part and parcel of education is, we think, wrong. If it is ever allowable it ought only to be as a *dernier ressort*. I am not able to bring my mind to believe that whipping can ever be effective as a controlling agent so long as it is indiscriminately used for all and sundry school offences. I am prepared to admit that on some occasions its administration may be necessary and salutary, but I am inclined to say that then it will be used "far more in sorrow than in anger. Its general use cannot be other than mere tyranny, however right the hand may be that yields it. Let us find out, if possible, a true theory of punishment, and become wiser by the errors of ages past.

"O let us keep the soul unstained and pure,"

as far as possible; and so render the need of or the temptation to corporal punishment a minimum quality in this universe of God's where we dwell, and sin and sorrow and suffer, yet have hope!

HOPESTOCK.

## Eloquence of the Month.

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W. E. GLADSTONE, ESQ., M.P., CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER,  
ON MYTHOLOGY AND THEOLOGY.

[W. E. Gladstone, fourth son of Sir John Gladstone, Bart., was born in Liverpool, 29th of December, 1809. He was educated at Eton, whence he went to Christ Church College, Oxford. In 1831, he graduated a double-first. He was in 1832 returned to the reformed House of Commons as member for Newark, under the auspices of the Duke of Newcastle. In 1834 Sir R. Peel appointed him one of the Lords of the Treasury, but he accepted thereafter, a sub-secretaryship for the colonies. He married, in 1839, Catherine, eldest daughter of Sir S. R. Glynne. In 1840 he issued his "State in its Relation to the Church," reviewed by Macaulay in one of his famous "Essays." "Church Principles Traced to their Results," followed in 1841, in which year he was appointed Vice-president of the Board of Trade, and Master of the Mint. He advocated Peel's tariff in 1842. In 1843 he became President of the Board of Trade. Two years later he published his "Remarks on Recent Commercial Legislation." Resigned office a few months afterwards rather than advise on the extension of the Maynooth Grant. He became Secretary of State for the Colonies, in December, adopted the Corn Law Repeal doctrines, and lost his seat in consequence. In 1845 he issued "Selections from the Liturgy for Family Use." The University of Oxford chose him one of their Burgesses in 1847. He wrote "Remarks on the Royal Supremacy in Reference to the Gorham Case," and after the death of Sir R. Peel, he travelled in Italy, where he found occasion to write "Two Letters to the Earl of Aberdeen on the State Prosecutions of the Neapolitan Government." He also translated, in part, Farini's famous book the "History of the Roman States" from the Italian. His speech against Disraeli's budget, November, 1852, contributed greatly to the overthrow of Lord Derby's administration. Under Lord Aberdeen, he became Chancellor of the Exchequer, which he retained also under Lord Palmerston for only a few weeks. In 1856, "Papers on Homer" from his pen appeared in *Oxford Essays* and *The Quarterly*. In 1858 his "Homer and the Homeric Age" appeared. He was Commissioner Extraordinary to the Ionian Islands in 1859. He became Chancellor of the Exchequer under Lord Palmerston again, and accepted the French commercial treaty 1860, arranged by Richard Cobden. In 1861, he incorporated the repeal of the duty on paper in his financial scheme, and blotted out the last of the taxes on knowledge. At the late election he was ousted from Oxford and chosen for Liverpool. In 1859 he was chosen Lord Rector of the University of Edinburgh, by the suffrages of the students, an office to which he was re-elected in 1862. It was on demitting this office that he delivered the address on "The Place of Greece in the Providential Order of the World," of which the gist and the most eloquent passages will be found below. Mr. Gladstone is unrivalled as an expositor and has few equals as a debater. In copiousness, and purity of diction he excels most orators. His voice is flexible, and well-intoned. He speaks from a full mind, and one whose rare culture is displayed in acute distinctions, and closely knit logic, combined with the fluency and sonorousness of an accomplished rhetorician.]

Mr. Gladstone announced his subject as one which might "seem to partake of

paradox ;" and in a few remarks cleared away some misapprehensions about that scheme of culture which has awarded to Greece "the place of honour in the career of general education ;" and which indisposed men "to regard ancient Greece as having had a distinct, assignable, and most important place in the providential government of the world." Then proceeding on the assumption "that all philosophy claiming to be Christian, regards the history of our race—from its earliest records down to the incarnation and advent of our Lord—as a preparation for that transcendent event on which were to be hung thereafter the destinies of our race," he criticised the opinion entertained by Milton, Bochart, Huet, Vossius, Gale, &c., that the records of Providence were to be found "Nowhere except in the pages of the Old Testament and in the 'History and Traditions of the Patriarchs and the Jews.'" This he thinks is incorrect. He thinks Eusebius, as a controversialist, errs when "He treats the religions of the world as having been purely and wholly, even in their first beginnings, errors and inventions of the human mind, without any trace or manner of relationship to that divine truth, which, as he truly tells us, had been imparted to the Hebrews long before the days of Moses and the composition of the Pentateuch." Mr. Gladstone then proceeded to say,—

"The early Christian writers—not the narrow-minded men that many take them for—did not deny or disparage the intellectual prodigies of the great heathen races, of those marvellous philosophers (as Eusebius often calls them), that Plato so eminently commended by his intellectual debtor, the great Saint Augustine ; nor did they make light of the voice of nature in the soul of man, nor of the divine government over the whole world at every period of its existence, nor of the truths to be found in ancient writers. But the defiled and putrescent system of religion which they found confronting them—formidable as it was from antiquity, wide extension, general consent, from the strength of habit, and from the tenacious grasp of powerful interests upon temporal possessions and advantages—this evil system they hunted down in argument without mercy, and did not admit to be a historical and traditional derivation from a primeval truth, which the original ancestry of the Semitic and the European races had once in common enjoyed. The Christian writers took the lives, deeds, and genealogies of the heathen deities, just as they found them in the popular creed, for the starting-points of their argument. Their immediate business was to confute a false religion, and to sweep from the world a crying and incurable moral evil : not to construct a universal philosophy of the religious history of man ; for which the time had not yet then, and perhaps has not yet, arrived. But we have new sources of knowledge, new means of detecting error and guiding inquiry, new points of view open to us ; and the more freely and faithfully we use these the more we shall find cause to own, with reverence and thankfulness, the depth, and height, and breadth of the wisdom and goodness of God. Meantime, it is easy to perceive the polemical advantage which was obtained by this unsparing manner of attack. It brought the case straight to an issue,—not between differently shaded images of a Deity confessed to be the same, with their respective champions ready to uphold their several claims amidst the din of contending preferences and interminable dispute ; but, taking his stand on the very threshold of the argument, and like a soldier in fight disencumbered himself of all needless detail—between the God of the Hebrews on the one side, worshipped from the beginning of mankind, and pretended gods on the other, which could render no distinct account of their origin, and were in truth no gods at all. And, to estimate the greatness of this advantage, we must take into view the nature of the adverse arguments. The Pagan champions did not too much embarrass themselves by defending the

popular forms and fables of the old religion. Perhaps, to the credulous villager, the religion of Porphyry might have been as unintelligible or as odious as that of St. Paul. All these encumbrances were at once disposed of by treating them on the Pagan side as allegorical, figurative, secondary manifestations of the true Deity, or even as having been in many cases due to the intrusive and mischievous activity of the spirits of evil. The Pagan champion, then, was himself contending, not for the forms, but for the one great unseen Deity, which, when driven to his shifts, he affirmed to lie hid within the forms. To admit, under circumstances like these, that any principle of inward life, under whatever incrustations, was latent in the mythology as it lay before their eyes, would have been to betray the truth. And any seeming approach to that admission, any confession that that foul and loathsome corpse had once been alive in youthful health and beauty, might have sorely hindered and perplexed the Christian argument on its way to the general mind. As respects the religious ideas of the Greeks, properly so called, and their philosophical tenets, the scholars of the seventeenth century seem to have occupied much the same ground with Eusebius and the early Christian writers. But as respected their mythological personages, not having the Pagans to argue with, they had no prejudices against finding for them a lineage in Scripture. We are not called upon to believe, with some of these scholars, that Neptune was Japhet, or that Iphigenia was Jephthah's daughter; or that Deucalion was Noah, or that Bellerophon was really Joseph in the house of Potiphar, notwithstanding certain resemblances of circumstances by which these and some other such cases are marked. But if we believe in the substantial soundness of the text of Scripture and in the substantial truth of its history, we must also believe that the Hamitic and Japhetic races, as they in their successive groups set out upon their long migrations, brought with them, from the early home which they had shared with the sons of Shem, the common religious traditions. They could not but go as Æneas is fabled to have gone from Troy—

“Cum patribus populoque, Penatibus, ac magnis Dīs.”

But if there be those who strangely forbid us to appeal to what may be called by the most modest of its august titles the oldest and most venerable document of human history, the argument would still remain much the same. Ethnological and philological research supplies us with accumulating evidence of the chain of migrations, north and westwards, of the Turanian, and especially of the Aryan races, from points—necessarily undefined—but in close proximity with the seats of the patriarchal nomads; and has not supplied us with any evidence, or with any presumption whatever, that the traditions we know them to have cherished sprang from any fountain head other than that which is described in the Book of Genesis as the three-branching family of Noah. If, then, upon this ground, there is, to say the least, nothing to exclude or to disparage, but so much to support, the doctrines of the original intercommunion of these races of the Semitic tribes, which could not but include community of religion, the question recurs in all its force, how was it even possible that they could leave behind them their religious traditions upon the occasion of their first local separation from their parent stock? They did not surely, like the souls in transmigration, drink of the river of forgetfulness, and raze out from the tablets of the brain, as a preparation for their journey, all they had ever known, or heard, or felt. The obscuration and degeneracy of religious systems is commonly indeed a rapid, but is necessarily a gradual process. *Nemo repente fuit turpissimus*; and no tribe or nation passes either from light to darkness, or from the possession

of a religious belief to the loss of it, at a moment's notice. It was therefore antecedently probable that, in examining the actual religious systems of later times, and of countries at a distance from the earliest known seats of mankind, but connected with it by the great current of human migration, we should find remaining tokens of affinity to any religious system, which upon competent evidence we might believe to have prevailed among the races most distinctly and directly connected with that seat. And this antecedent probability is sustained by a mass of evidence running through the whole web of the Hellenic mythology, obscure indeed in its latest and most darkened ages, but continually growing in force and clearness as we ascend the stream of time, and so strong in itself as to be, I am firmly persuaded, incapable of argumentative confutation. I submit then to you, that the true *Preparatio Evangelica*, or the rearing and training of mankind for the gospel, was not confined to that eminent and conspicuous part of it, which is represented by the dispensations given to the Patriarchs and the Jews, but extends likewise to other fields of human history and experience; among which, in modes, and in degrees, varyingly perceptible to us, the Almighty distributed the operations preliminary and introductory to *His one great, surpassing, and central design for the recovery and happiness of mankind*. So that, in their several spheres, some positive, some negative, some spiritual, some secular, with a partial consciousness, or with an absolute unconsciousness, all were co-operators in working out His will; under a guidance strong, and subtle, and the more sublime, perhaps, in proportion as it was the less sensible. In the body of those traditions of primitive religion which are handed down to us in the Book of Genesis, and which I shall make no apology for treating as records of great historic weight, there was manifestly included what I may term a humanistic element. It was embodied in the few but pregnant words which declared that the seed of the woman would bruise the serpent's head. The principle of evil was to receive a deadly shock in its vital part, and this at the hand of One who should be born into the very race that He would come to deliver. There was no provision made, so far as we are aware, at any rate in the Mosaic system, for keeping alive this particular element of the original traditions, otherwise than as an anticipation reaching into the far distant future. On the contrary, every precaution was taken to prevent any human being, or any human form, from becoming the object of religious reverence. To this aim the abstraction of the body of Moses from the view of the people seems to be most naturally referred; and the stringent prohibitions of the Second Commandment of the Decalogue appear to have been especially pointed against the execution by human hands of the figure of a man. For we hear in Holy Writ of the serpent made by Moses and exhibited to the nation—and the brazen sea of the Temple rested upon twelve brazen oxen. There were cherubim in the ark framed by Moses; and "cherubim of image-work" were made by Solomon for the Temple—but they were not, it is commonly believed, in human figure—and the four living creatures of the vision of Ezekiel had each the mixed character of man, lion, ox, and eagle. And it would appear that these measures were effectual. Ready as were the Jews to worship the serpent or the golden calf, their idolatry never was anthropomorphic. The majesty of the Deity was thus kept, in the belief of the Hebrew race, effectually apart from that one form of lowering association, which, as we see from the experience of Paganism, was by far the subtlest, the most attractive, and the most enchainingly. A pure Theistic system was maintained: a redemption to come was embraced in faith; and in a religion laden with ritual, and charged with symbol, no rite, no symbol, was permitted to exhibit to the senses, and through the senses to the



mind, of the people, the form of Him who was to be the worker of the great deliverance. Thus was kept vacant until the appointed time, in the general belief as well as in the scheme or theory of religion, the sublime and solitary place which the Redeemer of the world was to fill. Counterfeits there were, but they had not that dangerous resemblance to the truth, which would enable them to make head against the Messiah when He should arrive. And so, after He had come, His only rivals and competitors in Judæa were conceptions, distorted in the abstract, of the nature of His character and office; far different from those solid formations of an embodied and organized religion, whose dangerous contact the gospel had not to encounter, until the life and work of its author, and the foundations of Christian society with all its essential powers, were complete. Let us now turn to the religion of the Hellenic world; and we shall find that, as matter of fact, it appropriated to itself, and was intensely permeated by, that very anthropomorphic element which the Mosaic system was so especially framed to exclude, and to which the other religions of antiquity gave, in comparison, but a doubtful and secondary place. If I am asked to point out a link which especially associates the early Greek mythology with the humanistic element of primitive tradition, I venture to name the character of Apollo as pre-eminently supplying such a link. He is born of Zeus, but he is not born of Herè. Through him the divine counsels are revealed to the world as the God of prophecy and of oracle. This lamp of knowledge, burning in him, establishes an affinity between him and the sun; but the anthropomorphic energy of the religion was jealous of the absorption of Deity into mere nature-power. At what epoch the identification of Apollo with the sun took place in the Hellenic system, we cannot positively say; but this we know, that it had not taken place in the time of Homer, with whom Apollo and the Sun are perfectly distinct individuals. To him is assigned the healing art, and the general office of deliverance. To him again, who remains to the last the perfect model of masculine beauty in the human form, is assigned by tradition the conquest alike over death and over the might of rebellious spirits. In his hands we find functions of such rank and such range, that we cannot understand how they could pass to him from Zeus as the supreme deity, until we remember that they are the very functions assigned by a more real and higher system to the Son of God; the true Instructor, Healer, Deliverer, Judge, and Conqueror of Death, in whom the power and majesty of the Godhead were set forth to the world. The character of this deity, whom Eusebius calls "the most venerable and the wisest" of the whole Olympian order, affords, in my opinion, the most complete and varied proof of the traditional relationship to which I now refer. But I do not refer to this weighty subject at present with a view of leading you to affirm the existence of such a relationship; I now advert to the question only as casting light upon matter which will follow. What I take, however, to be indisputable, apart from all theorizing, is this fact—that the Hellenic mythology is charged throughout with the humanistic element, in a manner clearly and broadly separating it from the other religions of the ancient world. It has anthropomorphism for the soul and centre of all that is distinctive in it; and that peculiar quality seems to enter more or less, into the religion of other tribes nearly in proportion as they were more or less nearly related to the Hellenic race. Let us now shortly contemplate that mythology, such as it appears in the works of Homer, its prime and most conspicuous author, and himself the true representative of the purely Hellenic spirit in its largest and most authentic form. The theology of Homer is variously composed. He seems to have lived at the critical moment in the history of the Hellenic, or, as they were then

called, Achaian families or tribes, when the different ethnical elements or factors with which they were to assimilate—Pelasgic, Ionian, Egyptian, Phœnician and the like—settled down and compounded themselves into the firmly-knit and sharply-defined character of a people, and they were no longer a chaotic assemblage of unassorted, perhaps even conflicting units, but as a people were born into that world on whose fortune they were to exercise an influence almost immeasurable. The theology of Homer is the Olympian system; and that system exhibits a kind of royal or palace life of man, but on the one hand more splendid and powerful, on the other more intense and free. It is a wonderful and a gorgeous creation. It is eminently in accordance with the signification of that English epithet—rather a favourite apparently with our old writers—the epithet *jovial*, which is derived from the Latin name of its head. It is a life of all the pleasures of mind and body, of banquet and of revel, of music and of song; a life in which solemn grandeur alternates with jest and gibe; a life of childish wilfulness and fretfulness, combined with serious, manly, and imperial cares. Its inhabitants busily deliberate on the government of man, and in their debates the cause of justice wins. I do not now, however, discuss the moral titles of the Olympian system; what I dwell upon is its intense humanity, alike in its greatness and its littleness, in its glory and in its shame. As the cares and joys of human life, so the structure of society below is reflected, by the wayward wit of man, on heaven above. Though the names and fundamental traditions of the several deities were wholly or in great part imported from different quarters abroad, their characters, relations and attributes passed under an Hellenising process, which gradually marked off for them special provinces and functions, according to laws that would appear to have been mainly original and indigenous, and to have been taken by analogy from the division of labour in political society. As early as in Homer, while the prerogatives of Apollo and Athênè are almost universal, yet the Olympian society has its complement of officers and servants with their proper functions. Hephaistos moulds the twenty golden thrones which move automatically to form the circle of the council of the gods; and builds for each of his brother deities their separate palaces in the deep-folded recesses of the mountain. Music and song are supplied by Apollo and the Muses; Gany-mede and Hebe are the cup-bearers; Hermes and Iris are the messengers; Themis, in whom is impersonated the idea of deliberation and of relative rights, summons the Great Assembly of the Twentieth Iliad, when the great issue of the war is to be determined.”

Having made this statement, he proceeds to contrast the Hellenic with Barbaric worships. The former venerating animals while the latter symbolized “the annexation of manhood to deity and the reciprocal incorporation of deity into manhood; which made the human form the link between the visible and the invisible worlds, the meeting point of earth and heaven.” He next points out the Greek repugnance to human sacrifice; their high admiration of manly beauty, and the elevated ideas they held of womanly purity, and proceeds:—

“The materials for the old religions, outside of Greece and the Greek races, were in a great part afforded first by the worship of nature, and secondly by the worship of animals.

“But the emancipation and due ascendancy of woman are not a mere fact; they are the emphatic assertion of a principle; and that principle is the dethronement of the law of force, and the enthronement of other and higher laws in its place, and in its despite. Outside the pale of Christianity, it would be difficult to find a parallel, in point of elevation, to the Greek woman of the heroic age. Among the Jews polygamy was permitted; to

the Greeks it was unknown. Tales like that of Amnon and Tamar, or like that of the Levite and his concubine, are not found even among the deeds of the dissolute suitors of the *Odyssey*. Among the Jews the testimony of our Lord is that because of the hardness of their hearts Moses suffered them to put away their wives; but that "from the beginning it was not so." The picture of Penelope waiting for her husband through the creeping course of twenty years, and of Odysseus yearning in like manner for his wife, is one of the most remarkable in the whole history of human manners; and it would lose little, if anything, of its deeper significance and force, even if we believed that the persons, whom the poet names Odysseus and Penelope, had never lived. It must be observed, too, what, in the mind of Homer, constitutes the extraordinary virtue of the royal matron. It is not the refusal to marry another while her husband is alive, but her stubborn determination not to accept the apparently certain conclusion that he must have ceased to live. Not even the suitors suggest that, if he be indeed alive, any power can set her free. Scarcely less noteworthy, for the purpose of the present argument, are the immunities which she enjoys even in her painful position. She is importuned, but she is not insulted. She feels horror and aversion, but she has no cause for fear. Such, in the morning of Greek life, was the reverence that hedged a woman as she sat alone and undefended in the midst of a body of powerful and abandoned men. Again, the famous scene of Hector and Andromache is not more touching by its immeasurable tenderness than it is important for the proof which it affords of what may be called the moral equality of man and wife. And the general effect of the poems is, to give an idea of a social parity, and of a share borne by women in the practical and responsible duties of life, such as we seek in vain, notwithstanding some charming specimens of character, among the Jews. Still less can it be found among the Greeks of the more polished ages. In their annals we scarce ever hear of a wife or mother, though the names of mistresses and courtesans are entered on the roll of fame; and Phryne dedicated in a Phocian temple a gilded statue of herself, which was wrought by the hand of Praxiteles. Indeed, not to speak of the poetry of Euripides, even the most solid and impartial judgments, such as those of Thucydides and Aristotle, were unfavourably warped in their estimate of women."

After illustrating "the high value set by the Greeks upon man, in his mind, life, and person," he says:—

"I pass, however, to a subject of larger scope; and venture to suggest that the anthropomorphic spirit of the Greek religion was the source of that excellence in art which has become to after ages a model for imitation, and a tribunal without appeal. All are aware that the Greek religion was eminently poetical; for it fulfilled in the most striking manner that condition which poetry above all requires—harmony in the relation between the worlds of soul and sense. Every river, fountain, grove, and hill was associated with the heart and imagination of the Greek; subject, however, always to the condition that they should appear as ruled by a presiding spirit, and that that spirit should be impersonated in the human shape. A poetical religion must, it seems, be favourable to art. The beauty of form which so much abounded in the country was also favourable to art. The Athenians, however, are stated not to have been beautiful: and at Sparta, where art was neglected, beauty was immensely prized. And, indeed, the personal beauty of a race is by no means usually found sufficient to produce the development of the fine arts; and as to the poetry of religion, and its bearing upon art, while a general connection may be admitted, it is very difficult to define the manner and degree. Of the finest remaining works of Greek

art, not very many bear the mark of having been intended for worship. The great size required for statues like the *Athenè* of the Parthenon and the *Zeus* of Olympia, seems unfavourable to the exhibition of fine art in the highest sense. Although the highest artists were employed, it does not appear probable that they derived any part of their higher inspiration from the fervour or the multitude of the worshippers in the temples. That many accessories contributed to the wonderful result I do not doubt. But mainly and essentially, every art and method, every device and habit, in the language of Aristotle, has an end; and is modelled upon the end at which it aims; and by that end its greatness or its littleness is measured. Now the climax of all art, it seems to be agreed, is the rendering of the human form. What, then, could be so calculated to raise this representation to the acmé of its excellence, as the belief that the human form was not only the tabernacle, but the original and proper shape, the inseparable attribute, of Deity itself? As Tennyson has sung:—

‘It was my duty to have loved the highest—  
We must needs love the highest when we see it.’

It was this perpetual presentation of the highest to the mind of the Greek artist, that cheered him and rewarded him; and yet, while it cheered him and rewarded him, still ever spurred him on in his pursuit. Whatever he had done, more remained to do:—

‘*Nil actum reputans dum quid superesset agendum.*’

The desire of ambition was unfulfilled: he had always more worlds to conquer. The divine was made familiar to him by correspondence of shape; but, on the other hand, its elements, which it was his business to draw forth and indicate to men, reached far away into the infinite. And I know not what true definition there is for any age or people of the highest excellence in any kind, unless it be perpetual effort upwards in pursuit of an object higher than ourselves, higher than our works, higher even than our hopes, yet beckoning us on from hour to hour, and always permitting us to apprehend in part. I venture then to suggest that the fundamental cause of the transcendent excellence of the Greek artist lay in his being, by his birth and the tradition of his people, as well as with every favouring accessory, both in idea and in form, and in such a sense as no other artist was, a worker upon deity, conceived as residing in the human shape. Unconsciously then to himself, and in a sphere of almost parochial narrowness, the Greek not only earned himself an immortal fame, but was equipping from age to age a great school of art, to furnish principles and models made ready to the hand of that purer and higher civilization which was to be; and over the preparation of which, all the while, Divine Providence was brooding, like the spirit on the face of the waters, till the fulness of time should come.

“I must also shortly touch upon their philosophy. The first philosophers of the Greek race were not, for the most part, natives and inhabitants of Greece, nor subject exclusively to Greek influences. Their speculations turned mainly on the nature of the first principle, and partook of an Eastern spirit. But when Philosophy took up her abode in the country where Hellenism was supreme and without a rival, then that human element, which lay so profoundly embedded in the whole constitution of the Hellenic mind, unfolded itself also in the region of speculative thought; and the true meaning of the famous saying, that Socrates called down philosophy from heaven, would seem to be, that he gave expression to the genius of his country by propounding, as the prime subject for the study of man, the nature, constitution,

and destiny of man himself. And the illustrious series of disciples, some of them probably greater than their master, who followed his example, were not therein apeing or adopting the mere peculiarity of an individual, but obeying a congenial impulse that sprang from the depths of their being; and their power and fame, as analysts of our unfathomable constitution, are fresh and unabated at the present hour. Never, probably, has there appeared upon the stage of the world so remarkable a union, as in the Greeks, of corporal with mental excellence. From the beginning of the race, Homer shared his most gorgeous epithets between battle and debate. The Odes of Pindar commemorate, so to speak, the marriage of athletic exercises with the gift of song. We do not trace among the Greeks that contrast, which is found so rude and sharp elsewhere, between energy in the body and energy in the brain. The Greek was in this respect like Adam, in the noble verse of Milton:—

‘For contemplation and for valour born.’

And the Greek philosophy was for nothing more remarkable than for the manner in which it not only asserted but felt, as an elementary law, the place of the body in human education. This was with no exclusive or peculiar view to what we should call utilitarian purposes, such as those of defence, or industry, or even art. It seems to have been rather an ample recognition of the right of the body to be cared for, and to be reared in its various organs up to the highest excellence it is capable of attaining, as being, what indeed it is, not a mere vesture, or tool, or appendage of the soul, but, like the soul, an integral part of man himself. In general, the philosophies of the world, outside of Christianity, have shown a tendency to fluctuate between sensuality on the one hand, and on the other a contempt and hatred of matter, and a disposition to identify it with the principle of evil. The philosophy of Socrates, of Plato, and of Aristotle, seems to have steered clear and safe between this Scylla and this Charybdis. But again, the Greek saw, as all men see, the body parted from the soul at death, and hastening rapidly, as by the law of its nature, to corruption. To none could this severance, and its mournful and painful incidents, be more repulsive than to him, with his delicate perceptions and his lively emotions. Of a future existence in any shape he usually knew, or even surmised, little; of the revival of the body, or of the reunion hereafter of the two great factors of the human being, he had yet less conception. We may say, then, that he lay under every temptation to a disparaging view of the body and of its office; yet, in spite of his immense disadvantage, it fell to him to find a place for the body in the philosophy of human nature, and to incorporate the principle thus conceived in laws, usages, and institutions, with a clearness and general justness of view, by which Christian learning has done, and will yet do well to profit. What, with us, is somewhat dubious and fluctuating, both in theory and in practice, with him was familiar and elementary in both; and the teachers of mental accomplishment taught in Greece also the science, if not the art, of bodily excellence. Thus, for example, Plato, in his Treatise on the State, has to consider what men are fit to be chosen for rulers. They should if possible, he says, have the advantage of personal beauty. They must be energetic; and he therefore proceeds to treat of the character of the *φλόπωνος*, or diligent man. He must be ready and keen in study; for human souls are much more cowardly in strong studies than in exercises of corporal strength; as in the former they bear all the burden, while in the latter they share it with the body. But philosophy itself, he admits, has

fallen into some dishonour, from a tendency to partiality in handling this question. The truly diligent man, then, must not be halt, or one-sided in his diligence. If he be fond of athletic exercise and of sports, but not apt for learning and inquiry, then he is but half-diligent. And no less 'lame' will he be, says the philosopher, if, addicted to mental pursuits, he neglects the training of the body, and of the organs with which it is endowed. They may serve for a sample, but it is a sample only, of the large and complete grasp of the Greek philosophy upon the nature of man; and I connect this largeness and completeness with the fact that the Greek, from the nature of his religion, cherished in a special degree the idea of the near association of human existence, both in soul and body, with that existence which we necessarily regard as the largest and most complete—namely, with the Divine.

"It may indeed be said that the Greek lowered and contaminated the divine idea by weak and by vile elements carried into it from the human. Yes; this and much more may be said, and said with truth. Nothing can be more humbling or more instructive than the total failure of the Greek mind, with all its powers, either to attain or even to make progress towards attaining the greater ends of creation, by making men either good or happy. This is the negative but most important purpose which the Greek of old may have been destined to fulfil; the purpose of casting down the strongholds of our pride, by first showing us how great he is, and then leaving us to see how little, when standing alone, is all his greatness, if it be measured with reference to its results in accomplishing those ends of life without which every other end is vain. But I am not now endeavouring to ascertain how Greek life was the secular counterpart of the gospel; and how it became the great intellectual factor of Christian civilization.

"If we survey with care and candour the present intellectual, moral, and spiritual wealth of the world, we find that Christianity has not only contributed to the patrimony of man its brightest and most precious jewels, but has likewise been what our Saviour pronounced it, the salt or preserving principle of all the residue, and has maintained its health, so far as it has been maintained at all, against corrupting agencies. But the salt is one thing, the thing salted is another; and as in the world of nature, so in the world of mind and of human action, there is much that is outside of Christianity that harmonizes with it, but that did not and could not grow out of it. It seems to have been for the filling up of this outline, for the occupation of this broad sphere of exertion and enjoyment, that the Greeks were, in the councils of Providence, ordained to labour; that so the gospel, produced in the fulness of time, might have its accomplished work in rearing mankind up to his perfection; first in the spiritual life, but also, and through that spiritual life, in every form of excellence for which the varied powers and capacities of man have been created. If this be so, it is quite plain that the Greeks have their place in the providential order, aye, and in the evangelical preparation, as truly and really as the children of Abraham themselves.

"But there is no need, in a due appreciation of our debt to the ancient Greeks, to forget or disparage the function assigned by the Almighty Father to His most favoured people. Much profit, says St. Paul, had the Jew in every way. He had the oracles of God; he had the custody of the promises; he was the steward of the great and fundamental conception of the unity of God, the sole and absolute condition under which the Divine idea could be upheld among men at its just elevation. No poetry, no philosophy, no art of Greece ever embraced, in its most soaring and widest conceptions, that

simple law of love towards God and our neighbour, on which 'two commandments hang all the law and the prophets,' which supplied the moral basis of the new dispensation. There is one history, and that the most touching and most profound of all, for which we should search in vain through all the pages of the classics—I mean the history of the human soul in its relation with its Maker; the history of its sin, and grief, and death, and of the way of its recovery to hope, life, and enduring joy. For the exercises of strength and skill, the achievements and enchantments of wit, eloquence, art, genius, for the imperial games of politics and war, we may seek them on the shores of Greece. But if the first among the problems of life be how to establish the peace and restore the balance of our inward being; if the highest of all conditions in the existence of the creature be his aspect towards the God to whom he owes that existence, and in whose great hand he stands, then let us make our search elsewhere. All the wonders of the Greek civilization heaped together are less wonderful than is the single Book of Psalms. Palestine was weak and despised, always obscure, oftentimes and long trodden beneath the feet of imperious masters. Greece for a thousand years,—

‘Confident from foreign purposes.’

repelled every invader from her shores, and, fostering her strength in the keen air of freedom, she defied, and at length overthrew, the mightiest of empires; and when finally she felt the resistless grasp of the masters of all the world, them too, at the very moment of her subjugation, she herself subdued to her literature, language, arts, and manners. Palestine, in a word, had no share at all in the glories of our race; they blaze on every page of the history of Greece with an overpowering splendour. Greece had valour, policy, renown, genius, wisdom, wit—she had all, in a word, that this world could give her; but the flowers of paradise, which blossom at the best but thinly, blossomed in Palestine alone. And yet, as the lower parts of our bodily organization are not less material than the higher to the safety and well-being of the whole, so Christianity itself was not ordained to a solitary existence in man, but to find helps meet for it in the legitimate use of every faculty. Besides the loftiest part of the work of Providence, entrusted to the Hebrew race, there was other work to do, and it was done elsewhere. It was requisite to make ready the materials, not only of a divine renewal and of a moral harmony for the world, but also for a thorough and searching culture of every power and gift of man, in all his relations to the world and to his kind, so as to lift up his universal nature to the level upon which his relation as a creature to his Creator and as a child to his father was about to be established. And the question arises whether, among the auxiliaries required to complete the training process for our race, there were not to be found some which were of a quality, I will not say to act as a corrective to Christianity, but to act as a corrective to the narrow views and the excesses which might follow upon certain modes of conceiving and applying it. The just idea of their general purpose is that they were a collection of implements and materials to assist in the cultivation of the entire nature of man, and to consecrate all his being to the glory and the designs of our Maker. Yet in part they might have a purpose more special still—the purpose of assigning due bounds to the action of impulses springing out of Christianity itself.

“A system of religion, however absolutely perfect for its purpose, however divine in its conception and expression, yet of necessity becomes human too, from the first moment of its contact with humanity; from the very time,

that is to say, when it begins to do its proper work, by laying hold upon the hearts and minds of men, mingling with all that they contain, and unfolding and applying itself in the life and conduct of the individual, and in the laws, institutions, and usages of society. In the building up of the human temple the several portions of the work, while sustaining and strengthening each other, confine each other also, like the stones of a wall, to their proper place and office in the fabric. It is manifest, indeed, that there was in Christianity that which man might easily and innocently carry into such an excess as, though it would have ceased to be Christian, would not have ceased to seem so, and would, under a sacred title, have tended to impair the complete development of his being. Rousseau objects to the Christian system that it is opposed to social good order and prosperity, because it teaches a man to regard himself as a citizen of another world, and thus diverts him from the performance of his duties as a member of civil society. 'Far from attaching the hearts of the citizens to the State, it detaches them from it, as from all other earthly things. I know nothing more opposed to the social spirit. . . . A society of true Christians would no longer be a society of men. . . . What matters it to be free or slave in this vale of misery? The one thing needful is to go to paradise, and submission to calamity is an additional means of getting there.' In an age and in a country such as this it is not required, it is scarcely allowable, to seem to depreciate those various forms of self-restraint and self-conquest which the spirit of man, vexed in its sore conflict with the flesh and with the world, has in other times employed to establish the supremacy of the soul, by trampling upon sense and appetite and all corporal existence. Even in the time of the apostles it seems to have been manifest that a tendency to excess in this direction had begun to operate in the Christian church. As time passed on, and as the spirit of the unrenewed world became more rampant within the sacred precinct, the reaction against it likewise became more vehement and eager. The deserts of Egypt were peopled with thousands upon thousands of anchorites, who forswore every human relation, extinguished every appetite, and absorbed every motive, every idea, every movement of our complex nature in the great but single function of the relation to the unseen world. True and earnest in their Christian warfare, they notwithstanding represent a spirit of exaggeration, which it was requisite to check, uprooting what they ought rather to have pruned, and destroying what they ought to have chastised and mastered and turned to purposes of good. That internecine war with sin, which is of the very essence of Christianity, seems to have been understood by them as a war against the whole visible and sensible world, against the intellectual life, against a great portion of their own normal nature; and though, as regarded themselves, even this exaggeration was pardonable, and in many respects a noble error, yet its unrestricted sway and extension would have left man a maimed, a stunted, a distorted creature. And it would have done more than this. By severing the gospel from all else that is beautiful and glorious in creation it would have exposed the spiritual teacher to a resistance not only vehement but just, and would have placed the kingdom of grace in permanent and hopeless discord with the kingdoms of nature, reason, truth, and beauty,—kingdoms established by the very same Almighty hand. Those principles of repression, which were indispensable as the medicine of man, were unfit for his food. What was requisite, however, was not to expel them, and thereby to revert to the mental riot and the moral uncleanness of heathenism, but to check their usurpations and to keep them within their bounds; and this was to be effected, not by prohibition or disparagement, but by vindicating for every



part and power and work of human nature, and every office of life, its proper place in the divine order and constitution of the world. The seed of this comprehensive philosophy was supplied by the words of the apostle: 'Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report: if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things.' And so the solid and fruitful materials of the Greek civilization came in aid, by a wise Providence, of the humanizing principles and precepts of the gospel, to assist in securing a well-balanced development of the powers of the Christian system, and to prevent the instruments designed for eradicating the seeds of disease from subverting the yet higher agencies appointed for the fostering and development of life in every region of our being and our activity.

.. "Volumes might be written on the application of the principles touched upon in this address to the whole history of the church and of the Christian civilization. I glance at some of its results. First, it places on high and safe grounds that genial primacy of the Greeks in letters and in human culture, to the acknowledgment of which Christian Europe has been guided, not so much by a logical process or a definite forethought as by a sure instinct, with the after confirmation of a long experience. Nor can this primacy be justly disturbed by the multiplication and the energetic and growing pursuit of those branches of knowledge, for which this age has been so remarkable. For Aristotle it was excusable to regard the heavenly bodies as objects nobler than man. But Christianity has sealed and stamped the title of our race as the crown and flower of the visible creation; and with this irreversible sentence in their favour the studies, well called studies of humanity, should not resent nor fear but should favour and encourage all other noble research having for its object the globe on which we live, the tribes with which it is peopled in land, air, and sea, the powers drawn forth from nature or yet latent in her unexplored recesses, or the spaces of that vast system—

"Ultra flammantia mœnia mundi,"

to which our earth belongs. But more than this—we live in times when the whole nature of our relation to the unseen world is widely, eagerly, and assiduously questioned. Sometimes we are told of general laws, so conceived as to be practically independent either of a lawgiver or a judge. Sometimes of a necessity working all things to uniform results, but seeming to crush and to bury under them the ruins of our will, our freedom, our personal responsibility. Sometimes of a private judgment, which we are to hold upon the hard condition of taking nothing upon trust, of passing by, at the outset of our mental life, the whole preceding education of the world, of owning no debt to those who have gone before without a regular process of proof—in a word, of beginning anew each man for himself; a privilege which I had thought was restricted to the lower orders of creation, where the parent infuses no prejudices into its litter or its fry. Such are the fancies which go abroad. Such are the clouds which career in heaven, and pass between us and the sun, and make men idly think that what they see not is not, and blot the prospects of what is in so many and such true respects a happy and a hopeful age. It is, I think, an observation of Saint Augustine, that those periods are critical and formidable, when the power of putting questions runs greatly in advance of the pains to answer them. Such appears to be the period in which we live. And all among us, who are called in any manner to move in the world of thought, may well ask who is sufficient for

these things? Who can with just and firm hand sever the transitory from the durable, and the accidental from the essential, in old opinions? Who can combine, in the measures which reason would prescribe, reverence and gratitude to the past with a sense of the new claims, new means, new duties of the present? Who can be stout and earnest to do battle for the truth, and yet hold sacred as he ought the freedom of inquiry, and cherish as he ought, a chivalry of controversy like the ancient chivalry of arms? One persuasion at least let us embrace; one error let us avoid. Let us be persuaded that Christianity will by her inherent resources find for herself a philosophy equal to all the shifting and all the growing wants of the time. Let us avoid the error of seeking to cherish a Christianity of isolation. The Christianity which is now and hereafter to flourish, and, through its power, in the inner circles of human thought, to influence ultimately, in some manner more adequate than now, the masses of mankind, must be such as of old the Wisdom of God was described:—‘For in her is an understanding spirit, holy, one only, manifold, subtle, lively, clear, undefiled, plain, not subject to hurt, loving the thing that is good, quick, which cannot be letted, ready to do good, kind to man, steadfast, sure, free from care, having all power, over-seeing all things. . . . For she is the brightness of everlasting light, the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of His goodness.’ It must be filled full with human and genial warmth, in close sympathy with every true instinct and need of man, regardful of the just titles of every faculty of his nature, apt to associate with and make its own all, under whatever name, which goes to enrich and enlage the patrimony of the race. And therefore it is well that we should look out over the field of history, and see if haply its records, the more they are unfolded, do or do not yield us new materials for the support of faith. Some at least among us experience has convinced that, just as fresh wonder and confirmed conviction flow from examining the structure of the universe and its countless inhabitants, and their respective adaptations to the purposes of their being and to the use of man, the very same results will flow in yet larger measure from tracing the footmarks of the Most High in the seemingly bewildered paths of human history. Everywhere, before us, behind us, and around us, and above us, and beneath, we shall find the Power which—

‘Lives through all life, extends through all extent,  
Spreads undivided, operates unspent.’

And together with the power, we shall find the goodness and the wisdom, of which that sublime power is but a minister. Nor can that wisdom and that goodness anywhere shine forth with purer splendour, than when the Divine forethought; working from afar, in many places, and through many generations, so adjusts beforehand the acts and the affairs of men, as to let them all converge upon a single point, upon that redemption of the world, by God made man, in which all the rays of His glory are concentrated, and from which they pour forth a flood of healing light even over the darkest and saddest places of creation.”

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## The Essayist.

SIR JOHN SINCLAIR.

THE public and private conduct of a man is the only source from which we are able to determine whether he deserves approbation or not. If he has, according to the talents with which Providence has endowed him, rendered good to his fellows, by leading a virtuous and active life, and in increasing the prosperity of society, we judge him favourably. An individual may be gifted with great powers of body and of mind, and may employ them to no useful purpose whatever; while another, possessed of these only in a limited degree, may, by his own perseverance and determination, reach a far greater height of perfection and extent of usefulness than the other. The person to be admired is he who, by his own application and assiduity, attains greatness. It is not, however, our policy to look down on any one who may be termed a genius; but this we truly say, that the ordinary man, acquiring fame by the continuous but gradual development of his mental powers, deserves a greater degree of esteem and respect. If the process be slow, the ultimate end is certain. Patience, honesty, and activity in the course of a virtuous life, are the principal elements of success, and can procure renown for any one in any sphere of life. Foster said that "genius" was lighting one's own fire; and Buffon, that it was "patience." If, therefore, these definitions constitute a man of genius, the subject of this essay may have a claim to be admitted into this privileged order. But whether this be the case or not, it is true that he attained to fame and greatness by the most indefatigable industry. He received the grateful thanks of the public when living, and now, when dead, his name will, as a great benefactor of his country, descend in its social annals on the stream of time to succeeding generations.

Mr. Sinclair was born on the 10th day of May, 1754, in Thurso East Castle, Caithness. He was the son of George Sinclair, of Ulbster, and Lady Janet Sutherland, a daughter of William, Lord Strathnaver. His father died while the son was scarcely sixteen years of age, and his mother discharged her own duties, as well as those which devolved upon her in consequence of her husband's death, with the greatest tenderness, sagacity, and prudence.

Mr. Sinclair, after having studied at a private seminary, and at the High School of Edinburgh, returned to his native county, with the celebrated John Logan (1748—1788), the gifted divine and poet, author of "Runnymede," "Lectures on History," "Sermons," &c.

as his tutor, on the recommendation of the learned Dr. Hugh Blair (1718—1800), Prof. of Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. But Logan's uncouthness disgusted Lady Janet. She was afraid that the obnoxious traits of the tutor should be fully developed in the pupil. She wrote to Dr. Blair, stating the cause of her uneasiness, and his reply was characteristic:—"Your ladyship, in selecting a tutor for your son, should prefer a scholar to a dancing master."

John Sinclair entered the University of Edinburgh at the early age of thirteen, while it was at the zenith of its fame, and remained there four years. He afterwards proceeded to Glasgow to study civil law under Prof. John Millar (1735—1801), and subsequently entered Trinity College, Oxford; but his stay there was brief. In 1772 he became a member of the Speculative Society, Edinburgh, to acquire fluency in "the art of speaking." He pursued his studies with great perseverance. He divided the day thus:—Seven hours for sleep; half an hour for dressing; two hours and a half for meals and relaxation; two hours for exercise; and twelve hours for study. The lawyer's gown was then the only passport to eminence, and on his admission as a member of the Faculty of Advocates, the examiners were astonished at the readiness of his answers and the extent of his knowledge, which led one of them to say, "I believe you know more of the subject than any one of us." He was subsequently, in 1782, called to the English bar. Although he studied the law, he never intended to practise. Having terminated his academical career, he extended his knowledge by a continental tour, and married a Miss Sarah Maitland, of Stoke Newington, near London, on the 20th of March, 1776.

His zeal in anything that would benefit his country was great. With an eye always on the alert, and a heart and hand ready to execute, he turned all his observations to good account. He knew no life but one of activity; and his native county required such a man at the time. The far-famed house of John O'Groat was heard of in southern homes; but the hills, bogs, and mosses of Caithness presented no agreeable access thereto. Macadamized roads were unknown. The hill, Ben Chielt, was an impassable barrier. He taxed his brains to remedy this state of matters and to level this hill. He examined the hill, marked out a line of road, and collected 1,200 of his tenants to work at day-break; he superintended, and they worked in earnest. Ere night the sun cast its lingering rays on a road six miles and a half in length over hill, in a place which had been regarded ere the dawn of that morning with the greatest anxiety by those who required to pass its dangerous and rocky surface, this road reformer was eighteen; and the inhabitants inferred from this omen that he would grow into a man of note. In this they were not disappointed. This is merely a specimen of the improvements he made in his native county; but he did not confine himself to agriculture and general improvements—he was a literary man. In 1782 he published "Observations on the Scottish Dialect," and in 1783 an "Historical Essay on Addison."

In 1780, and in the twenty-sixth year of his age, he was elected to represent Caithness in Parliament, and delivered his first speech in the House of Commons in 1781 against the Dutch, who had entered into an alliance with France. His career in the House of Commons was one of ceaseless activity in the service of his country. His chief success lay in the principle that he viewed every question on the common-sense side, and arrived at his judgment after a careful investigation of the evidence advanced. In 1782 the naval affairs of the kingdom had been, in the words of Fox, "grossly mis-managed," and Mulgrave, an Admiralty lord, delivered a speech, which stirred Mr. Sinclair to reply in a pamphlet, styled, "Thoughts on the Naval Strength of the British Empire." This pamphlet was lucid, practical, and important, and added greatly to his popularity. He also published a number of other pamphlets on the naval state of the kingdom, copies of which he some time afterwards sent to Lord Nelson, who replied, "That no man in the country was so able to place this important matter before the public as he (Mr. Sinclair) was."

In 1782 the crops in the northern counties of Scotland became a complete failure, and the consequence was that abject poverty and destitution reigned. Mr. Sinclair implored aid from Government on account of the distress that prevailed, and, after some opposition, procured a grant of about £15,000, which sufficed for temporary relief to about 17,520 people. On the dissolution of Parliament on the 24th of March, 1784, he lost his seat for Caithness, as that county had only at that time alternate representation with Rothesay. He resolved to canvas for the Northern Burghs; but he was opposed by a still greater candidate in the person of Mr. Fox, who was successful. He was, however, returned for the burgh of Lothwithiel, in Cornwall.

He devoted himself diligently to the study of the financial position of Great Britain, which, owing to the intricacy of the subject, was one attended with great labour. But labour, however difficult, was never with him a preventive of, but rather a stimulus to, exertion. He determined to publish a work on public revenue. His authorities in this work number no less than 713; and one cannot conceive the labour which such a publication entailed. This work was the most complete and comprehensive treatise published before that on the subject, and was recommended by some of the most celebrated men of the day as a standard work of reference. In 1786 George III. created him a baronet of the United Kingdom.

At this period he made another Continental tour to extend his knowledge of the habits, commerce, and agriculture of foreign nations. During this tour he met with some of the most distinguished foreigners of the day; among others, Gustavus of Sweden, Princess Daschkow, the Empress Catherine, and the Grand Duke (afterwards Paul I.) of Russia, King Stanislaus of Poland, Joseph of Austria, Frederick William II. of Prussia, the Prince and Prin-

cess of Orange, besides a great number of military leaders, ambassadors, literary and scientific men. Sir John's tour was usefully spent in gleaning all kinds of valuable information for the advancement of his native country; and on his return the King requested him to publish pamphlets on "The State of Denmark, Sweden and Russia." This Sir John did with the usual punctuality which distinguished his whole career.

A short time after his return from the Continent he married the second time (his first wife having died some time previously), the Honourable Diana, only daughter of Lord Macdonald; and the marriage ceremony was performed by the famous apologist for the Bible, Richard Watson (1737—1816), Bishop of Llandaff.

One of the most important services which he rendered to the public was the institution of the Wool Society. Such an institution was highly necessary. The habits of the sheep, and the climate best suited for its constitution, were not ascertained, and the quality of Scotch wool had become very defective. A crowded meeting was held at Edinburgh, on 31st Jan., 1791, when the society was instituted, and Sir John was elected chairman. The society procured specimens from all quarters, and the gentry and farmers did all in their power to encourage it. Most beneficial, indeed, were the results of its institution; not only was the breed of sheep improved, but rocky and sterile tracts of hill-ground became sources of profit to the owners and to the holders. An impetus of prosperity was given to social development. Estates that were comparatively worthless increased in value ten, twenty, and fifty-fold. One estate which had only been yielding a rental of £300, sold for £50,000. Reay, about £1,400 annually, for £300,000.

Disastrous consequences resulted from the Continental wars; and in 1793 the number of bankruptcies became very alarming, especially in the principal commercial establishments of Manchester and Glasgow, as the general places of credit were temporarily suspended. The doom that awaited the operatives was apparent, but what could be done to evade the danger? Distress seemed ready to besiege their doors. Sir John wished Parliament to grant a loan of Exchequer notes to the extent of £5,000,000 to merchants, provided they would grant security. Parliament adopted this wise policy, and the "vote passed late at night." But Sir John knew well that the officials would not be over active, and that a short time would elapse ere all would be in readiness. He therefore borrowed, the same evening, £70,000 on personal security, from London bankers, and sent it to those parties whose pressing demands required the most immediate aid. Pitt meeting Sir John next day, regretted that relief could not be sent to Manchester for some time, and that the money could not be raised for a few days. "It is already gone! it left London by to-night's mail," was Sir John's reply. He afterwards amusingly related that "Pitt was as much startled as if I had stabbed him."

In 1794 France exerted herself greatly in developing her naval

and military resources. This created apprehension in the minds of our countrymen. Our leaders therefore energetically engaged in increasing our powers in order that they might cope with the hostile foe. Mr. Pitt remarked to Sir John Sinclair, that every effort would require to be strained to add to the strength of the kingdom, and that his assistance would be expected; that he was informed his (Sir John's) estates in the North were inhabited by a warlike people, and that a fencible regiment could be very easily raised from them for the service of the country. Sir John replied that he would "not hesitate to comply with his request." The regiment was organized, and seven months thereafter passed as effective by Sir Hector Munro. This regiment was a model of order, and on being disbanded not one was on the sick list. He carried his principles of practical experience into his military discipline, and his men loved him greatly. For the most meritorious he procured promotion, and some of them afterwards acquired wealth, which they left to their worthy benefactor. The regiment was stationed for sometime at Berwick, and the inhabitants were so well pleased with their deportment that they conferred the freedom of the burgh on their colonel, Sir John Sinclair.

But the greatest work undertaken by Sir John was the publication of the statistical account of Scotland; he introduced the word from the German "statistik." He commenced its publication in 1790, and published it in twenty-one volumes in January, 1798, thus taking seven years for its completion. He had many obstacles to retard his progress in its prosecution, all of which were, however, not without difficulty surmounted. Answers were required from about 1,000 ministers to 160 queries, and some were not inclined to acquiesce. Not a few rigid Presbyterians then thought that gleaned information about temporal matters did not lie within their province. Besides, a number of the clergy were unaccustomed to consider such subjects as those to which Sir John expected replies; and farmers were timid to give the value of the productions of their farms lest their rents should be increased. However, Sir John was not to be daunted. To those parishes which sent no answers, he sent persons whom he called Statistical Commissioners to collect information. Friends augured that the work would be a failure, but their auguries were unfounded. It was completed and given to the public, who hailed it with unbounded satisfaction. It became a repertory of information regarding every parish in, and added largely to the agricultural knowledge of, Scotland. The stipends of the clergy were increased to £150, and the profits accruing from the publication were generously handed over to the Society for the Sons of the Clergy. When we consider the work effected, the time spent in connection with paltry refusals, and the number of letters written, in the publication of this work, we must concur with the Abbé Gregoire, when he said that Sir John Sinclair was the most indefatigable man in Europe. From 1790-94 he represented Caithness in Parliament, and was thereafter returned

for Petersfield, in Hampshire, through the influence of the Prince of Wales.

When his Statistical Account of Scotland proved so successful, and had been so well received by the public, he resolved to begin one on England, which would entail still greater labour. But Sir John was doomed to disappointment in this matter. The Archbishop of Canterbury refused his sanction, as the work would interfere with tithes. This is to be regretted, as the work, if finished, would greatly illustrate the condition of England and its people.

Sir John's estates lay in the most northerly county of Scotland, and extended to about 60,000 acres. The rental was only about £2,300, burdened with a debt of £18,000, and an annuity of £500. But he always found ways and means to encourage any laudable object which might require his support. His debts were increased to a large extent in the course of his political life. Many of these he contracted for the service of his country, which never yielded him any pecuniary return. His benevolence overcame all personal considerations, and his charity was often distributed without prudence; but this was not due to negligence, on the contrary, it was owing to the dissimulation of those who craved his aid.

Again, one cannot fail to admire the noble spirit with which he treated those who were rising by industry and ingenuity. Continually on the alert doing good, he always traced and encouraged them to persevere in their efforts. Mr. Loudon Macadam, the road improver, was proud to acknowledge his obligations to Sir John. "It is owing to you, Sir John, that these improvements were ever made." On hearing that Andrew Meikle, the "thrashing machine" inventor laboured under pecuniary difficulties, he wrote to the Earl of Haddington, and the result was that on a meeting being called £1,500 was collected, which saved the family from impending poverty. In the same manner James Small, the improver of the plough, had been rescued from distress. These are only a few instances out of many which occurred during his long life.

Caithness was, at the end of the last, and beginning of the present century, one of the least improved and most uncultivated counties of Scotland. It remained nearly in the rude condition, as regards agriculture, that it was in 200 years before. Certain relics of feudalism still existed, and Sir John's energetic spirit determined to advance the interest of his own beloved county in every possible way consistent with prudence. Roads were made; farms squared, ditched, and drained. Improved implements of agriculture were introduced to facilitate a better system of husbandry; new breeds of animals were brought in to advance or supplement the old; and a spirit of enthusiasm stirred up the lethargical farmers of the time to renewed exertion in the cultivation of the soil. This spirit of enthusiasm was not limited to the northern county alone, but its beneficial influence was felt over the length and breadth of the kingdom. The statistical account of Scotland became a standard authority. His works and pamphlets on agriculture became, on



account of their practical nature and the common-sense principle on which they were written, widely known from the eastern to the western hemisphere; from George Washington, of American celebrity, to the Emperor Paul of Russia; from the highest personage in Britain to the jovial farmer of the Lothians;—that a man whose fame had always preceded his name should be known and generally admired was not to be wondered at.

Britain's prosperity had been increasing at a rapid rate, her commerce extending to nearly every quarter of the globe, and the sun never set upon her dominions; that she would, therefore, have boards for the administration of her affairs, did not seem very strange; but as no society can claim perfection in all her institutions, Sir John Sinclair thought the want of an Agricultural Board a defect in her social position, and, therefore, suggested the propriety of instituting one to Mr. Pitt. The expense, however, alarmed the Minister, as a Board of Trade had for a long time existed. Sir John made his motion in the form of an address to the Crown, recommending the organization of the Board, in the House of Commons the 15th May, 1793, and determined, if possible to carry his point. Great opposition was given by the Ministers of the Crown, with the exception of Mr. Pitt and Dundas. It was contended that the expenses would be exorbitant, and that the local agricultural institutions existing were quite sufficient to meet the exigencies and improvements of agriculture. Sheridan concurred in the formation of the Board if no expense would be attached to the country; and the great Fox denounced it as a mere job fitted only to become a machine for ministerial patronage. Notwithstanding the determined resistance shown by some of the most able men in the House, it was carried by a majority of 75, being 101 ayes to 26 noes. Sir John reduced his first estimate of its expense from £10,500 annually to £5,500, and afterwards to £2,500; but £3,000 was the sum agreed to by the Minister. When Sir John began to think of the Board, Arthur Young (1741—1820) of agricultural celebrity, had not the faintest hope of its success; and he stated to Sir John that "Your Board of Agriculture will be in the moon! If on earth, remember I am to be Secretary." After the Board had been in working order for some time, the most distinguished men in the minority confessed its utility, and expressed their regret for the part they had taken in opposing it.

A wide field of labour lay before the Board, yet that field, however extensive, was not beyond their grasp. Difficulties hemmed them enough to protract their success, but the merits of the smallest thing worthy of consideration was never overlooked: the members of the Board knew well that objects, however insignificant in themselves, ought never to be trifled with, as diminutive ones were nothing but the elements of the great; hence the attainment of their success—affording patronage and countenance to all agricultural operations in general, and at the same time stimulating the farmer individually to be enterprising in cultivating his farm. A

reciprocal correspondence sprang up between the Board and the most celebrated societies and farmers on the Continent. Good-will shown for each other's prosperity, and the experience of the one conveyed with the view of increasing the usefulness of the other. The Board became a repertory of agricultural information, and the most ignorant were allowed to draw from its fountain through the instrumentality of its first president, Sir John Sinclair, who published about this time his "Agricultural Report of Scotland," in five volumes. He presided over the Board of Agriculture for thirteen years. At the end of the first five he was replaced by Mr. Pitt's candidate, Lord Somerville, by a majority of one; and after an interval of eight years Sir John was again re-elected. Bishop Watson was displeased that he accepted the office, "from which," the bishop said, "he had been so ruthlessly dismissed." He was compelled to resign in 1813 on account of the embarrassed state of his estates. After the resignation of Sir John, and the demise of Arthur Young, the Board gradually languished until it became entirely extinct.

It cannot be doubted but the Board of Agriculture did much good in its day, and tended greatly to develop and improve the agriculture of the kingdom. It would be absurd, however, to confine its beneficial influence to the period in which it had its existence, as it is manifest to every one acquainted in the least degree with the social history of the century, that its effects are now as clearly felt as then, and will continue to be so for many generations.

Melville, chief of the Admiralty, was impeached, along with his subordinates, in April, 1805, for malversation in pecuniary matters. Mr. Whitbread introduced the charges. A report was given in by the commission, appointed by the Addington administration, condemnatory of the integrity of Melville. The opposition ran to the extreme, and moved unlimited and disgraceful resolutions. Mr. Pitt wished the report to be considered by a select committee. This contemptible and hasty line of action shown to Melville annoyed Sir John Sinclair greatly. He was quite convinced of Melville's sincerity and honesty, and argued that he would come out unscathed from the charges brought against him. The votes were equal, and Mr. Whitbread's motion was only carried by the vote of the speaker.

No greater tribute can be paid to the memory of Sir John than that he never deserted a political friend or foe in the hour of trial—the greater the distress the more keenly were his sympathies enlisted in the cause—the heavier the danger the more were his good offices persevered in, until what he desired was procured—that justice would be brought to every man's door.

Notwithstanding Sir John's ceaseless activity in the arena of public life, he never remained inert during his spare hours, but made it a principle to do good, till it became a habit; and not only did the idea of making men's lives happy cause him many a weary thought, but he resolved to give to the public his opinions on its

prolongation. In 1802 he published an essay on health and longevity, and he now resolved to publish a work entitled "A Code of Health." For that purpose he carried on a correspondence with eminent medical authorities in every quarter of the civilized globe, who sent him information with the utmost promptitude. It appeared in four volumes. The public received it with interest. Critics were not slack in dissecting its merits, not knowing that they were testing their ingenuity upon the ideas and suggestions of the most eminent physicians of the day. Some maintained that it was an unsatisfactory chaos of facts, huddled together without any regard to perspicuity or elegance. Others, that it was so important and instructive that they resolved to read it every year. Literary and medical journals were, as in all cases, *pro* and *con*. But Sir John had the gratification of learning that he had the undoubted testimony of those who were competent judges in his favour. Sir Humphrey Davy said, "I have just been perusing your 'Code of Health,' from which I have received much pleasure and information. The work cannot fail to be a public benefit, for no species of composition is more impressive than that in which maxims are illustrated by facts." He was sworn in a member of His Majesty's Privy Council during Perceval's administration.

His last speech in Parliament was on the bullion question, and in consequence of the debts accumulated during his parliamentary career, he was compelled, in July, 1811, to accept the cashiership of excise in Scotland, with a salary of £2,000. Thus terminated his course in the senate; but his retirement did not prevent him from taking as great an interest as ever in the affairs of the nation. No member of the house could be more active than he was. About 1806 he was member of eleven committees of the House of Commons, and acquitted himself with honour in all. No one could be more diligent as a servant of the nation. His great wish was to encourage peace and comfort—to spread the advantages of civilization from Cornwall to the Shetland islands, to increase commerce by integrity and honesty, and to disseminate those principles of common sense to all classes, which alone can conduce to a nation's welfare. His foreign policy was to maintain the independence of the nation, to secure it against foreign aggression, and to cherish a regard for the prosperity of other states. To this aim he bent his noble mind.

He took great interest in Catholic emancipation, and recommended a conciliatory policy. He wished political liberty to be granted for a year, and if the Roman Catholics behaved consistently with the principles of the constitution, to grant the liberty annually. This plan was simple, but never acted upon. He paid great attention to Reform, and published his views of how it should be conducted—he preferred practice to theory in improvements—to purify the old rather than form a new constitution, and maintained that the system applicable to one country, might be wholly unsuitable to the other; *e. g.*, the United States in relation

to Great Britain. These were a few of the notions on Reform, entertained by our patriot in the 77th year of his age.

In 1831, he published his correspondence, with reminiscences of the most eminent men of the day, in two volumes. No correspondence could be more diversified in its character, as he had accumulated thousands of letters during his long career of activity and usefulness.

He died on the 21st day of December, 1835, after a few days prostration. He lived a Christian life, and died a Christian death—he scorned ostentatious display; he passed his latter days with the utmost resignation and calmness, and ended them with the felicity which only a true believer can experience in passing the “ivory portals.”

He had the thanks of twenty two counties awarded him for his meritorious services. He was a member of a great number of scientific and literary institutions at home, and held twenty-five diplomas from various associations on the continent. He was both a Scottish advocate and an English barrister; and, in allusion to the number of his titles, his friend George Dempster added T. U. V. W. X. Y. Z.

I have thus attempted to portray in brief, the principal incidents in the life of this great philanthropist. Its brevity must account for many imperfections. I have traced the mere outlines of his biography with impartiality, and the utmost deference to the subject under consideration. His life no doubt has conveyed a moral which no one will easily forget, and by his labours his name in Scotland has become nearly a “household word.” By his efforts the state of the kingdom has been considerably improved; by his intelligence the people of the North were enlightened; and by his activity he saved many a man from eminent perils, such as continually surround humanity in the intricacies of life. He brought joy to many a poor man’s heart, and bloom to many a widow’s cheek. He introduced the comforts and blessings of civilization when he had the power. He aided many a noble mind labouring under difficulties; and with a willing heart and helping hand charity flowed from his coffers. No sooner did he hear of the sorrow of the gifted suffering in obscurity, than he was ready to encourage and soothe them with his matured counsel. No sooner did he hear the wail of distress, than he was ready to respond to the suppliant’s petition. No sooner did the meshes of adversity coil their tangled folds round a victim than he appeared to administer his help and counsel, and nobly did he accomplish it; in time of trial his was a noble mission.

No higher motives could move the sympathies and judgment of any one than his—the desire that his fellow men might elevate themselves physically and morally; that all people might unite together for their own prosperity, and that universal peace and contentment and piety, should flourish within the circle of the globe.

*Wick, July 25th, 1865.*

GEORGE MILLER SUTHERLAND.

## The Reviewer.

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*Exercises on Etymology.* By WILLIAM GRAHAM, LL.D. London and Edinburgh: W. and R. Chambers.

THOUGHTS are the wealth of wise men, and words are their counters. The currency of the wise therefore is always genuine. Spurious coinage and false exchanges alike displease them. To know the exact value of words is a solemn duty to every one—above all, to the self-educator. This book will aid greatly in the acquisition of such an acquaintance with the vital element in words, as will enable a writer or speaker to marshal them rightly to effect his purpose. No better book within the same compass, so far as we know, exists. It contains the materials of learning, interest, and amusement; but, above all, it will give help in the honest employment of expressive speech, and induce many thoughts regarding words and their meanings. To tell what is in an educational work is most frequently the best way of indicating its character. Students and teachers can then know whether it will suit their purpose and be informing to them. In this book, Anglo-Saxon and Latin affixes and prefixes are explained; a general vocabulary of common words having notable derivations is given; examples of words originating in Latin and Greek follow, with exercises upon them; collections of Latin, French, and Italian phrases succeed; several miscellaneous derivations are noticed; the affinities of language are pointed out; a number of names of places and persons are noted, with the words to which they owe their significance, and a few other matters relating to etymology follow in an appendix. The exercises are well chosen and complete. Even to the mere reader the production affords not a few interesting particulars about language, which can scarcely fail to add delight to his perusal of passages in which such words occur as have their parentage and descent noted here. We cannot do other than recommend young composers to try to compass a practical acquaintance with the contents of this book.

*The Higher Ministry of Nature.* By G. S. INGRAM.  
London: Elliot Stock.

THE prolific idea contained in Butler's "Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature," receives in this work another expansion, and a fresh, vigorous offshoot it forms. Its purpose is to trace the associations between the

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chief elements of nature and religion. It is an endeavour to make nature suggestive of holy thought; to catch and link together in the mind the suggestions that are contained in Scripture regarding the true uses of nature; and the suggestions which analogy perceives between nature and the teachings of Scripture. Thus the entire universe is shown to be symbolical of heavenly thought, and the influences of nature are brought to be "stimulative of spiritual thought and conducive to devotional feeling," and are thereby adapted to aid the action of Christian truth, or in other words, to promote its mission in the world.

In a fine, thoughtful, and poetic strain, Mr. Ingram pursues the thought, that the Creator of the universe is also the Author of the Bible, through seven chapters; describing in the first his idea of the Author and object of creation, and tracing in the subsequent ones the ministry of fruits and flowers, of trees and grass, of mountains and rocks, of rivers and seas, of sun and clouds, of moon and stars. It is, in fact, an attempt to prove that the universe is a divine epic written to the senses of man, and full of splendid spiritual teaching. It is a well accomplished and able book.

*Stories for Sunday School Scholars.* London: Elliot Stock.

SINCE our first notice of these monthly serial stories we have seen the entire round of a year's issues. They will make up a fine "Sunday Scholar's Album." Of "Milly's New Year" 19,000 have been sold. "The Chamois" was well told, as are, on the whole, the others of the series, viz., "The First False Step;" "Philip Reeve;" "Little Jem;" "Nellie Herbert;" "The First Sunday School;" "Idle Dick's Fall;" "The Best Sunday Scholar;" "Richard Shaw;" "Henry's Dream." But nothing better in sacred ballads has been issued, so far as we know, since the days of Hannah More and Jane Taylor, than the closing tract, "Works of Love." Sunday school teachers who have not seen these penny stories should send at once for samples, and they will find they have got something school children will value and read with pleasure and profit.

*Epoch Men, and the Results of their Lives.* By SAMUEL NEIL.  
Edinburgh: Wm. P. Nimmo.

WE really take blame to ourselves for not much earlier noticing the issue of this book. It consists of eight biographies, reprinted from the pages of this *serial*, and hence we are precluded from expressing our opinion of the matter it contains as we would otherwise do. Our readers require from us no appraisal of the author's merits. We may, however, note that the lives included in this volume are those of Charlemagne, Gregory VII., Roger Bacon, Dante, Chaucer, Copernicus, Clive, and Watt. In the interleaves there are mottoes and sonnets, several of them original. The volume is a handsome square octavo, on tinted paper, with orna-

mental head-pieces and a portrait of Charlemagne, and contains 320 pages for 3s. 6d. At this gift-giving season we would commend the book to readers as well adapted for that purpose, for school prizes, and for institute libraries. In the panorama of biography it presents there will be found both interest and instruction, as all will at once know who read the author's name on the title-page. The possession of the work will be considered indispensable by many.

*Outlines of Modern Geography.* By Rev. ALEXANDER MACKAY.  
Edinburgh and London: Blackwood and Son.

THOSE who wish a concise, compact, readily consultable, and easily mastered handbook of geography will find in these 112 pages the most admirably arranged shilling's worth of matter they could desire. The type is clear, the arrangement excellent, and the economy of expression could scarcely be carried farther, while retaining the perfect intelligibility of this treatise. Teachers and self-educators should see that this book gets fair usage, for it will repay the labour spent on it. Six pages of index would make it a handy gazetteer.

*The Logic of Life and Death; or, Words with an Unbeliever.* By  
B. H. COWPER. London: E. Stock.

WE have never read G. J. Holyoake's "Logic of Death," though we have frequently heard him speak on secular topics. Hence we are unable—even were this the right place—to give an opinion of the comparative merits of this book and that to which it professes to be an answer. We need not hesitate, however, to say that this work does contain some well-put arguments and several ingenious replies. The style is terse, telling, and vigorous. Those who read it diligently will find the sense good, the logic plain, the spirit of the book pleasing, and they may be led to better views both of life and death than seem to be common at present in society, Christian or secular.

*Meditations; a Few Selected Papers.* By W. ORMOND. Bristol:  
J. B. Taylor and Son.

OUR genial Bristolian friend, W. Ormond, brings together here a few of his best prose pieces, for the former editions have passed away. We are happy to notice that he keeps up his old *esprit*, and gladdens himself with a hearty love for old dame Nature—your true poet's only true love. Who can read his "Postman" without finding himself the author's friend? Who can peruse his notice of Edward Capern without feeling that Ormond is a fellow-spirit, whose jubilant mind might easily ring out splendidly music as distinct and melodious as "sweet Bells." Those of our readers who can get a copy will find in it not a few capital things.

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## The Societies' Section.

### REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

#### *Philosophical Institution, Edinburgh.*

—We have been furnished with a "Syllabus of the Lectures to be delivered during the Winter Session" in the above institution. We subjoin the list, with annotations:—

"Inaugural Address, on the Influence of the Reformation on Scottish Character," 3rd Nov. By J. A. Froude, M.A. [Author of the "History of England." He was born 1818. Is youngest son of the Archdeacon of Totness, Devonshire. He graduated at Oriel College, Oxford, 1840; was Chancellor's prizeman for English essay on "The Influence of Political Economy on the Moral and Social Welfare of a Nation," 1842, in which year he was chosen Fellow of Exeter College; and in 1845 he was ordained priest,—which, however, he resigned two years afterwards, and has not since held any office in the church. In 1849 he resigned his fellowship. He is author of "The Nemesis of Faith," "History of England," and editor of *Fraser's Magazine*. He is a gentleman of fine mind and rare persistency.]

"Scotland in the Eighteenth Century." By the Rev. W. C. Smith, M.A., Glasgow. [A Free Church clergyman of genius, piety, and liberality.]

"The Ocean: its Physical Characteristics and Functions." By David Page, F.R.S.E., F.G.S.

"The Era of Louis the Fourteenth." By J. H. Brydges, late fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. [Expositor of Comte, a man of singular lucidity of thought and expression, whose "General View of Positivism" has received considerable praise.]

"The Moral and Intellectual Influence of Woman on Society:—Charlotte Bronte." By Mrs. Clara Lucas Bal-

four, London. [Temperance advocate and religious writer; authoress of "Troubled Waters," "Retribution," "Well Married," "The Kaleidoscope of Home," &c. Her fresh, buoyant, and fertile mind has given for a quarter of a century the instructive enlivenment of fiction to popular philanthropic literature.]

"The Art Satirists of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries:—William Hogarth and John Leech." By the Rev. Adam L. Simpson, F.S.A., Scot. [A dissenting clergyman whom Derby has wisely taken from Edinburgh.]

"The Geology of the North of Scotland." By James Nicol, Prof. of Natural History, Aberdeen. [Author of several able educational books on science.]

"The Papacy in its Relations to the Temporal Power." By James Bryce, B.C.L., Oriel College, Oxford. [Son of Dr. James Bryce, of the Glasgow High School, author of "The Holy Roman Empire," Arnold Prize Essay, 1862—a young man who has taken rank among historians at one step.]

"Concert of Vocal and Instrumental Music." Under the direction of John Hullah, Professor of Vocal Music, King's College, London. [This popularizer of music was born at Worcester, 1812; was a pupil of Mr. Horsley and Cruvelli. He wrote the music for Charles Dickens's comic opera, "Village Coquettes," and several other works of mark. He has since 1840 devoted himself to the diffusion of a knowledge of music amongst all classes, and his system has been found highly successful. He is Professor of Vocal Music at King's College, London, Organist of Charterhouse, and author of "Lectures on the History of Music."]

"Reading: the School for Scandal." By Miss Murray.



"A Sketch of Greek Travel." By George O. Trevelyan, Esq., M.P. for Tynemouth. [Nephew of Lord Macaulay, author of "The Competition Wallah," "Cawnpore," &c.]

"The History of English Literature. Third Course:—From the Elizabethan Age to the Commonwealth." By John Nichol, B.A., Oxon., Prof. of the English Language and Literature, Glasgow.

"Preachers and Preaching." By the Very Rev. Dean E. B. Ramsay, LL.D.

[Born 1793; fourth son of Sir Alex. Ramsay, of Balmain; graduated at St. John's, Cambridge; became incumbent of St. John's, Edinburgh, 1830; was chosen Dean of that diocese, 1838; had the title of LL.D. conferred on him by the university. He is author of "Reminiscences of Scottish Life and Character," "Diversities in Christian Character," "Diversities of Faults in Christian Believers," &c. &c. He is highly beloved in the religious and literary circles of Edinburgh.]

"The Food of Man." By Lyon Playfair, C.B., Professor of Chemistry in the University of Edinburgh. [He is the nephew of the Provost of St. Andrew's, Fifeshire. He was born in Bengal, 1819; he studied at St. Andrew's and Glasgow. After going out to India he went to Giessen, where he studied chemistry under Liebig, and gained his Ph.D. He was chosen Prof. of Chemistry in the Royal Institution, Manchester, 1844. He has been Inspector of Scientific Museums, Sanitary Commissioner, Commissioner at the Exhibition, 1851, Joint Secretary to the Department of Science and Art, &c. He was elected Professor of Chemistry in Edinburgh (worth £2,000 per annum), after Faraday refused it, in 1858. He has written some tracts, &c., on chemical and other topics.]

"Socrates." By the Rev. Benjamin Jowett, M.A., Regius Prof. of Greek, Oxford. [He was distinguished as a student at Baliol, where he was Hertford Latin Scholar, 1837; graduated first class, 1839; gained Latin Essay prize, 1841, "On the Culture, Laws, and

Customs of the Etruscans, and the Traces of them found among the Romans." In 1849 he was chosen Examiner, in which year also he was select preacher; and he held the offices of junior bursar, tutor, and logical lecturer in his college. On the demise of Professor T. Gaisford, he was appointed Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford. He contributed "The Interpretation of Scripture" to the "Essays and Reviews," 1860; and it is understood that he is the most learned Platonist in Britain. Even after Grote, Goulbourn, Wiggers, Butler, Burton, Hampden, &c., he will doubtlessly find something fresh to say on "Socrates."]

"Archbishop Laud:—Richard Baxter." By George Dawson, M.A., Birmingham.

The "Course" provided is varied, interesting, and instructive; the selection of lecturers is judicious and exciting, and is certain to ensure success.

*Birmingham Young Men's Society, Steelhouse Lane.*—The first lecture in connection with the above society was delivered on Tuesday evening, October 3rd, 1865, in the upper school room of Ebenezer Chapel, by J. A. Cooper, Esq., F.R.L.S. Subject,—*"The Pilgrim Fathers."* The subject was treated graphically. The tone and teaching of the lecturer were excellent. The research involved in the bringing together of the matter was a fine example of thoroughness, and the delivery was attractive. This society, established for mutual improvement, meets every Tuesday evening, at eight o'clock, in the reading-room. The course includes debates, history, readings, and lectures; and the terms of membership, with use of reading-room and library, are sixpence per quarter. The secretary, at the rooms, any Tuesday evening, will be glad to give further information to young men in Birmingham; especially to strangers desiring to form intellectual and religious friendships.

*Newcastle-upon-Tyne Literary and Philosophical Society.*—The course of lectures for the session 1865—66 is ex-

tensive and good. We quote the list, adding—where we can—notes of the lecturers, in the hope of giving greater interest to the programme. "The Physical Accompaniments of Mind:" 1. the feelings and the will; 2. the intellect; 3. historical view of the theories of mind. By Alexander Bain, M.A. [(b. 1818) Professor of Logic in the University of Aberdeen, a distinguished writer on philosophical subjects, and one of the ablest disciples of J. S. Mill (see *British Controversialist*, July 1862, p. 49)]. Three "Readings," by Rev. J. M. Bellew [author of "Shakespeare's House," &c. He was assistant to the incumbent of St. Matthew's, Spring Gardens, London; received the chaplaincy of St. John's, Calcutta, whence he returned ten years ago to become preacher at St. Phillip's, Waterloo Place, London. He has written a novel, and is noted as a reader, lecturer, and preacher]. "Painting and Painters," by Henry Ottley, Secretary to the Fine Arts Society, London. "The Runic Inscriptions of Great Britain;" their relation to History, Poetry, and Romance, by Edw. Charlton, M.D. "The Relations of Great Men to Women." Thackeray's "Vanity Fair," by G. Dawson, Esq. "The Mechanical Properties of Air," by Professor J. H. Pepper [the well-known popularizer of science as amusement] of the Polytechnic Institution. "The Evidences of Geological Time," by Professor A. C. Rumsay. "Mozart," with Illustrations, by William Rea, Esq. "Age of Ice in Scotland, and Characteristics of Scottish Scenery," by Rev. H. W. Crosskey, an able Unitarian clergyman of Glasgow. "Personal Travels in Greece," by G. O. Trevelyn, Esq., M.P. "The Ocean," by D. Page, Esq. "Electrical Torpedoes," by N. J. Holmes, Esq., London. "Natural History," by Rev. T. Hincks, Leeds. This extensive course of twenty-nine lectures, and a conversation, are open to members at half a guinea.

**SUBJECTS SUITABLE FOR DEBATE.**  
 Is the Parochial System of the Church a Failure?  
 Is Monasticism necessary for England's Welfare?  
 Have the Masses of the People been improved by the Introduction of Christianity?  
 Was Edward Irving rightly or wrongly used?  
 Are Courts of International Arbitration practicable?  
 Ought the Unpaid to be replaced by a Paid Magistracy?  
 Is a Limited Monarchy the only durable Form of Government?  
 Is Commercial Morality what it should be?  
 Ought Sabbath Observance to be enforced by Law?  
 Should the Franchise depend on Property or Intelligence?  
 Ought the Employment of Females to be encouraged?  
 Are there any limits to the dominion of Revelation over Reason?  
 Which has most Weight in Parliament—Common Sense or Oratory?  
 Can Christians consistently join in the Three Choirs' Festival?  
 Does Man possess Innate Ideas?  
 Is Scepticism a natural Consequence of a Belief in Ideas?  
 Are there any necessary Human Beliefs?  
 Do all Beliefs take their Origin from Experience?  
 Is Mind Active or Passive in Sensation?  
 Is the Practice of Arguing in opposition to our own Opinions in Debate Justifiable?  
 Which is the most beneficial in training the Mind—Logic, Mathematics, Metaphysics, or Classics?  
 Have Dissenters Moral Right to agitate the severance of Church and State?  
 Should the Irish Church be disestablished?  
 Ought the Roman Catholics to have a University for themselves?  
 Is Free Trade in Banking advisable?

## Our Collegiate Course; OR, AIDS TO SELF-CULTURE.

### STUDIES IN ENGLISH LITERATURE.

#### POPE'S "ESSAY ON CRITICISM."—PART II.

[Proper objects of critical reproof are abundant enough.]

But if in *noble* minds some *dregs* remain  
Not yet purged off, of spleen and sour disdain;  
*Discharge* that *rage* on more *provoking* crimes.  
Nor fear a dearth in these flagitious times.  
No *pardon vile obscenity* should find 330  
Though wit and art conspire to move your mind;  
But dulness with obscenity must prove  
As shameful sure as impotence in love.  
In the *fat* age of *pleasure*, wealth, and ease,  
Sprung the rank weed, and thrived with large increase; 335  
When love was all an easy monarch's care;  
Seldom at council, never in a war; (60)  
Jilts (61) ruled the State, and statesmen farces writ:

#### MEANINGS OF WORDS IN ITALICS, AS SUGGESTIONS FOR PARAPHRASING.

326. Superior; less; linger.

328. Expend; wrath; mischievous.

330. Forgiveness; repulsive vice.

334. Self-indulgent; luxury.

(60) "Charles [II.] came forth from that school [of misfortune] with social habits, with polite and engaging manners, and with some talent for lively conversation, addicted beyond measure to sensual indulgence, fond of sauntering and of frivolous amusements, incapable of self-denial and of exertion, without faith in human virtue or in human attachment, without desire of renown, and without sensibility to reproach. According to him, every person was to be bought; but some people haggled more about their price than others; and when this haggling was very obstinate and very skilful, it was called by some fine name. The chief trick by which clever men kept up the price of their abilities was called—integrity. The chief trick by which handsome women kept up the price of their beauty was called—modesty. The love of God, the love of country, the love of family, the love of friends, were phrases of the same sort, delicate and convenient synonyms for the love of self. Thinking thus of mankind, Charles naturally cared very little what they thought of him. Honour and shame were scarcely more to him than light and darkness to the blind. His contempt of flattery has been highly commended, but seems, when viewed in connection with the rest of his character, to deserve no commendation. It is possible to be below flattery as well as above it. One who trusts nobody will not trust sycophants. One who does not value real glory will not value its counterfeit. . . . He detested business, and would sooner have abdicated the Crown than have undergone the trouble of really directing the administration."—*Macaulay's History of England*, chap. ii. (People's edition) vol. i., p. 81.

(61) Nell Gwynne; Barbara Palmer, Duchess of Cleveland; the Duchess of

Nay, wits had pensions, and young lords had wit ;	
The fair sat panting at a courtier's play, (62)	340
And not a mask went unimproved away ;	
The modest fan was lifted up no mere,	
And <i>virgins smiled</i> at what they <i>blushed</i> before.	
The following license of a foreign reign (63)	
Did all the dregs of bold Socinus drain ; (64)	345

343. Maidens bore complacently ; felt shame on account of.

Portsmouth ; Hortensia Mancini, Duchess of Mazarin, &c.,—"Women whose charms," as Macaulay says, "were the boast, and whose vices were the disgrace, of three nations."

(62) "Upon Charles Stuart the lesson of adversity was wasted. The bloody fate of his father might well have thrown a solemn memory of the past over all his after life. When the Restoration brought him once more to the royal home of his childhood, he seems to have mounted the throne with a determination to make up the arrears of interrupted pleasure by a career of unrestrained debauchery, the like of which had not been seen in England before. The ancient palace was reeking with the filthy atmosphere of the tavern, or viler haunts of iniquity. Moral opinion was scoffed at, and national honour betrayed. . . . Vice was in riotous possession of the high places of the land, and the throne was the seat of the scoffer. Looking from the throne thus occupied, and begirt with profligates and wits,—Shaftesbury, and Buckingham, and Rochester [Sedley, Davenant, and Etheredge], the old age of Milton is seen with heightened sublimity."—*Henry Reid's "English Literature,"* Lect. vii., p. 124.

(63) "William [III.] had been carefully instructed from a child in the theological system to which his family was attached [Calvinism]; and he regarded that system with even more than the partiality which men generally feel for a hereditary faith. He had ruminated on the great enigmas which had been discussed in the Synod of Dort, and had found in the austere and inflexible logic of the Geneva school something which suited his intellect and temper. That example of intolerance, indeed, which some of his predecessors had set, he never imitated. For all persecution he felt a fixed aversion, which he avowed, not only where the avowal was obviously politic, but on occasions where it seemed that his interest would have been promoted by dissimulation, or by silence. His theological opinions, however, were even more decided than those of his ancestors. The tenet of predestination was the keystone of his religion."—*Macaulay's "History of England,"* chap. vii. (People's edition), vol. ii., p. 2.

(64) Lælius Socinus (1525—1562) was born in Sienna, in Italy. His ancestors were famous as legists, but he forsook the study of law for research in the Scriptures. His brief life was a restless one; he was doubtful on several doctrinal points then commonly believed, but as the doctrine of toleration was in his age unknown, he concealed his real convictions, unless where their promulgation threatened little injury to himself. His tenets took deepest root in Poland. He died in Zurich. Faustus Socinus, his nephew, was also born at Sienna, in 1539. His parents died early, and his education was neglected. He entered the service of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and from his uncle's papers learned that the religious opinions he had formed for himself by studying the Scriptures agreed in the main with those contained in the papers. He became a suspected heretic, and escaped from the dangers of the Inquisition in Italy by going to Basle to study theology. He was the first to reduce Anti-Trinitarianism to a system. He organized many small congregations in Poland. He attended the

Then unbelieving priests reformed the nation,  
 And taught more pleasant methods of salvation,  
 Where Heaven's free subjects might their rights dispute,  
 Lest God himself should seem too absolute;  
 Pulpits their sacred satire learned to spare, 350  
 And *vice admired* to find a *flatterer* there!  
 Encouraged thus, wit's Titans braved the skies,  
 And the press groaned with licensed blasphemies.  
 These monsters, critics, with your darts engage,  
 Here *point* your thunder and *exhaust* your rage; 355  
 Yet *shun* their *fault*, who *scandalously nice*,  
 Will needs mistake an author into vice;  
 All seems infected that the infected spy,—  
 As *all seems* yellow to the jaundiced eye.

351. Sin-wounded; panderer.

355. Aim; satiate; anger.

356. Avoid; error; disgracefully precise.

359. Everything appears.

(End of Part Second.)

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Synod of Brest, 1588, and took a leading part in the discussions carried on there. He did not conceal his opinions, but expounded them with eloquence, moderation, and ability. He wrote in a good Latin style. His works have been published in two volumes folio. He was at one time dragged from his sick chamber and hauled half-naked through the streets by the rabble, on account of his opinions. His house was plundered and his writings destroyed. He died in 1604. Unitarian has a general Socinian, a specific meaning: every Socinian is a Unitarian, but every Unitarian is not a Socinian; a Unitarian is a believer in the personal unity of God; a Socinian is also a believer in the personal unity of God, but he also holds that Jesus Christ, though a man, is a right object of religious worship. In many cases in the 17th century, it was true, as D'Alembert afterwards remarked that "the theologians of Geneva had unconsciously become Socinians." The latter is the "bold Socinus" of the text.

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## Literary Notes.

It is said that J. S. Mill, M.P., will edit the posthumous works of the late H. T. Buckle.

Francis Barham, founder of *Alism*, author of "Life of Christ," "Life and Times of Reuchlin," "Socrates," a Drama, &c., has executed a new version of Job. He regards him as Jobab, the son of Joktan (Gen. x. 29), and considers Elihu the author of the book.

P. J. B. Buchez (b. 1796), advocate

of St. Simonism, author of "Introduction to the Science of History" (1833), "Parliamentary History of the French Revolution," &c., died suddenly at Rhodes.

Saadi's "Rose-Garden" is to be issued (translated) with an Introduction by Emerson, who is engaged on "Essays" for the *Atlantic Monthly*.

The works of the late Earl of Carlisle are to be issued as a *souvenir* of his viceroyalty.

James Lowe, formerly editor of the *Critic*, latterly of *The Field*, *The Queen*, &c., an honest, painstaking, and able man, died 1st November.

A new "Encyclopædia" is to be issued in Paris, under the auspices of M. Pereire, the banker, and political economy will form a chief feature in the work; a topic hitherto little attended to in French Conversations-Lexicons.

Nicholas Boquillon (b. 1795), translator, author of "Dictionary of Inventions," &c., has gone to Florence, to re-study "The Works of Galileo."

Z. le G. Hegnet (b. 1810), author of "Madame de Maintenon," &c., litterateur, novelist, and dramatist, is dead.

"King John," translated into Bohemian by F. Doucha, has been published at Prague.

Rev. W. H. Drummond, D.D., translator of "Lucretius," scholar, poet, and divine, died at Dublin 16th Oct.

Jos. E. Worcester, LL.D., American lexicographer, died 27th Oct., aged 81.

Tennyson is said to be translating Homer's "Iliad."

Mrs. E. C. Gaskell (born 1812), authoress of "Mary Barton," "Ruth," "Wives and Daughters of England," biographer of "Charlotte Brontë," died 12th Nov.

J. L. Klein's "History of the Drama," vol. ii., will treat of Greek comedy and Roman plays.

A Breton drama of the Middle Ages, entitled "The Great Mystery of Jesus," has been published in a French translation by M. de la Villemarqué.

Apollonius of Tyana, as the rival and contemporary of Christ, is to find a biographer in Albert Réville, D.D., Rotterdam.

It is intended to publish a selection from the works of John Wickliffe, the early Reformer, at Oxford.

Sir William Rowan Hamilton, the late Dublin professor of Astronomy, had a new work on his great discovery, "Quaternions," in the press at his death. This is nearly ready.

Rénan's "Apostles" is in the press.

Guizot's "Memoirs" are to be completed, as far as he intends to carry them, by the close of the year.

"A History of Art," by M. Thiers, is about to appear.

Prudhon's "Theory of Property," a new work left finished at his death, has just been put to press.

In the library of Count de Nostitz a MS., by Copernicus, "On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Bodies," has been discovered.

A *People's Edition* of "The Serious and comic verse of Thomas Hood" (1798-1845) has been placed under the editorial care of Mr. S. Lucas, of the *Times*, *Shilling Magazine*, &c.

J. V. Leclerc (born Dec. 2, 1787), author of "Eloge on Montaigne," "History of Platonism," editor of "Cicero," and one of the conductors of the *Journal des Débats*, died 12th Nov.

The originals of the "Paston Letters," vol. v., have been found, it is said, by Mr. Philip Frere, amongst Sir John Fenn's papers. Their authenticity had been doubted.

Peter Parley's "Annual for 1866" is the work of William Martin.

Rev. R. W. Dale, of Birmingham, is about to issue "Sermons on Special Occasions."

"The Working Man and the Franchise," by Rev. F. D. Maurice, consists of Lectures delivered at the Working Men's College, London.

The Rev. Thomas Pattison, a licentiate of the Church of Scotland, who died in October, was widely known as a *litterateur*. We understand that a collection of his "Translations from the Gaelic" are to be published.

Lady Theresa, widow of Sir G. C. Lewis, authoress of several novels, of "The Friends and Contemporaries of Clarendon," and editress of "The Correspondence of Miss Berry," died 11th Nov.

Mr. Gladstone's "Rectorial Address" has been separately published.

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